Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2005). · Go Syfert
Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2021–2024 · 2 courts · …no reasonable person could not be affected in his actions as a juror. at p. 331 ⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2021–2024 · 2 courts · …the constitution refuses to accept any assurances to the contrary. ⚠ not in text
73 citation events (73 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 2007 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2007 2016 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 25 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perez v. Director, TDCJ-CID
N.D. Tex. · 2024 · confidence medium
The Fifth Circuit, which adopted a rule regarding implicit bias in Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2006), has explained its doctrine of implied bias as follows: Implied bias . . . exists when “no reasonable person could not be affected in his actions as a juror.” Brooks, 444 F.3d at 331 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kines v. Lumpkin
W.D. Tex. · 2024 · confidence medium
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2006).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Escobedo v. Director, TDCJ-CID
W.D. Tex. · 2023 · confidence medium
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gemar
5th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
VI, XIV; and then citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). 2 Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392 , 400 & n.44 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 , 973 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1998)). 3 Hatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 600 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2006)). 4 See United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146, 161 (5th Cir. 2010). 5 See United States v. Mahmood, 820 F.3d 177, 190 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The law of this circuit is well established that a motion for new trial may ordinarily be decided upon affidavits without an evidentiary hea…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Craaybeek v. Lumpkin
5th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
“A claim of alleged bias is ordinarily addressed in a hearing where the judge examines the juror and obtains assurances of the juror’s impartiality.” Id. (citing Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2006)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Wayne Allen v. Betty Mitchell
6th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787 , 791–92 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting conflicting circuit case law); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 329 (5th Cir. 2006); Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567, 587 (4th Cir. 2006). 8 The majority relies on White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517 (6th Cir 2005), to distinguish Allen’s case, Majority Op. at 8–9, but White is of little assistance.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Suniga, Brian
Tex. Crim. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
The Fifth Circuit held that the prosecutor’s power over the juror created an “intolerable risk.” 444 F.3d at 332.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Morrison (3×)
E.D.N.Y · 2013 · confidence medium
“In short, Remmer II is an application of the implied bias doctrine.” Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 331-32 (5th Cir.2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ingram v. Goodwin (2×)
W.D. La. · 2013 · confidence medium
In Smith , “the Court ... held that in most cases the remedy for claims of juror bias is a post-event hearing, in which the trial judge can examine the juror and obtain assurances that, despite the event leading to the claim of bias, the person is able to continue serving as an impartial juror.” Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 217-18 , 102 S.Ct. 940 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Morales v. Rick Thaler, Director
5th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
This court has held, however, “that the doctrine of implied bias is clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.” Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 329 (5th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 We need not decide whether the state’s contentions are correct; the TCCA held that Roberts and Lugo did not render IAC even assuming that “the Sixth Amendment embraces the doctrine of implied bias ... [and that] the implied bias doctrine would require the exclusion from jury service of a prospective juror who is an employee of the prosecuting agency, as Wyatt was.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Terry Freeman v. Rick Thaler, Director (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 329-30 (5th Cir.2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ricardo Mitchell (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 437 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 2009); Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567 , 586-87 & nn. 21, 22 (4th Cir. 2006); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2006); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Torres, 128 F.3d at 45-46 ; Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404, 1406 (1st Cir. 1992); Burton, 948 F.2d at 1158-59 ; Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir. 1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jessie Wiley v. Harvey Grimmer
5th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Scott, 854 F.2d at 699-700 ; United States v. Buckhalter, 986 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir.1993); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 332 (5th Cir.2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sedillo v. Hatch
10th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Although House casts doubt on the matter, see id. at 1016 , we are content to assume without deciding that an implied-bias theory does fall within the ambit of clearly established federal law in this case, 4 see Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 329 (5th Cir.2006) (“We maintain that the doctrine of implied bias is ‘clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.’ ” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1))), because that assumption has no impact on the outcome.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dowdye v. People
virginislands · 2011 · confidence medium
While the testimony of jurors is not “inherently suspect” Corrado, 304 F.3d 593, 603 (citing United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 533 (6th Cir. 1984)) there is “[n]othing in Remmer I [that] rejects the notion that sometimes courts must refuse to accept a juror’s assurances of impartiality[.]” Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Uranga v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. Crim. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 791-93 (8th Cir. 2008). [14] See Brooks v. Dretke, supra, at 329 ("We maintain that the doctrine of implied bias is `clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court'" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), which requires federal habeas judges to defer to the judgments of state courts unless a particular state court judgment is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"). [15] Majority opinion, at 306 (holding that Smith v. Phillips stan…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Uranga, John Iii
Tex. Crim. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 791-93 (8 th Cir. 2008). 14 See Brooks v. Dretke, supra, at 329 (“We maintain that the doctrine of implied bias is ‘clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court’” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), which requires federal habeas judges to defer to the judgments of state courts unless a particular state court judgment is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”). 15 Majority opinion, at 10-11 (holding that Smith v. Ph…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hatten v. Quarterman (2×)
5th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217-18 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 946 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Andre Williamson
4th Cir. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
cited Cited "see" Carney v. Director, TDCJ-CID
N.D. Tex. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 , 329–30 (5th Cir. 2006).
discussed Cited "see" Uranga v. Davis
5th Cir. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson v. Sellers , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1188 , 1194, 200 L.Ed.2d 530 (2018) (holding "that federal habeas law employs a 'look through' presumption" in determining "the reasons for the [state] higher court's decision" denying habeas relief). 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). 444 F.3d 328 , 329-33 (5th Cir. 2006) (on denial of petition for rehearing en banc). 21 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1994). 455 U.S. 209 , 222, 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" Uranga, John Iii
Tex. Crim. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. Dretke , supra , at 329 ("We maintain that the doctrine of implied bias is 'clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court'" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), which requires federal habeas judges to defer to the judgments of state courts unless a particular state court judgment is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"). 15.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Lecco
S.D.W. Va · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 332 (5th Cir.2006) (opinion denying rehearing by panel and en banc, observing “The state court concluded that the events surrounding the arrest of juror Garcia, during Brooks’s capital-murder trial, were not sufficient to imply bias.
cited Cited "see" Green v. Quarterman
5th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 329-30 (5th Cir.2006).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Johnson v. Atencio
D. Idaho · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 329 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding the implied bias rule clearly established, observing that the “pedigree of the implied bias doctrine has … old[] origins”) (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (D.Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J., riding circuit) (stating that even with individuals under the influence of personal prejudices who state an ability to serve as fair and impartial jurors, there are circumstances in which “the law will not trust him”)).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Brooks
v.
Dretke
04-70023.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Mar 29, 2005.
444 F.3d 328
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

404 F.3d 924

Carl L. BROOKS, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Doug DRETKE, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 04-70023.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 25, 2005.

Jani J. Maselli, Houston, TX, Michael W. McCrum, San Antonio, TX, for Brooks.

Thomas M. Jones, Austin, TX, for Dretke.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

[*~328]1

* Carl L. Brooks was convicted by a Texas jury of the capital murder of Frank Johnson in the course of a robbery and sentenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed[1] and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.[2] The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the state trial court and denied Brooks's state application for a writ of habeas corpus.[3] Brooks then filed his application for a federal writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 4, 2003. The federal district court judge denied all relief on June 2, 2004[4] and denied a certificate of appealability two weeks later. Brooks now petitions this court for a certificate of appealability, a prerequisite to an appeal of the denial of relief by the district court.[5]

Brooks asks that we certify six issues:

2

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's challenges for cause against Jurors Jeffrey Chandler and Marina Campos;

3

2. Whether Brooks was denied an impartial jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because the trial court permitted a juror subject to disqualification to sit on the jury and determine his death sentence;

4

3. Whether Brooks was denied an impartial jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because the trial court failed to grant a mistrial although Juror Garcia was subject to disqualification under Articles 35.16(3), 35.19, and 44.6 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Texas Government Code § 62.102(8);

[*~329]5

4. Whether Brooks was denied an impartial jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because Juror Garcia was permitted to sit on the jury and determine his death sentence even though Juror Garcia engaged in misconduct and demonstrated a bias and prejudice against Brooks;

6

5. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of John Kipling at the punishment phase of trial; and

7

6. Whether the death penalty was inflicted in violation of the Federal Constitution when Brooks was denied his right to due process and a fair and impartial trial by jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when the State's witness John Kipling presented testimony at the punishment phase that provided a false impression because Kipling's testimony was racially motivated by the fact that Brooks, a Black, had an intimate relationship with his daughter Stephanie Kipling, a White.

II

[*~330]8

We can grant a certificate only if Brooks makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."[6] This in turn requires Brooks to show that "reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."[7] Finally, in deciding whether Brooks has cleared these hurdles we are to resolve doubts in his favor and be mindful that Brooks seeks review of his death sentence.

III

9

For essentially the reasons stated by the federal trial court we refuse a certificate upon issue number one, sustaining the State's challenges for cause of Jurors Jeffrey Chandler and Marina Campos, and issues five and six challenging the admissibility of the testimony of John Kipling during the sentencing phase of the trial. We are not persuaded that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of these issues or could conclude that they are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.

[*~331]10

Issues two, three and four are directed at Juror Santiago Alexander Garcia. On the first day of the sentencing phase, Garcia was arrested as he passed through courthouse security with a pistol in his briefcase. He was arrested for a misdemeanor offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon. Released on his personal recognizance he completed his service on the jury. As recounted by the federal district court, the state habeas judge, in findings adopted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, concluded inter alia that

11

[1] Garcia did not at the punishment phase of [Brooks's] trial in a manner designed to ingratiate himself with prosecutors but, rather, based his vote solely on the evidence, [2] [Brooks] had failed to show bias or impartiality on the part of Garcia, [3] [Brooks] had failed to show Garcia was treated any differently than other persons arrested under similar circumstances, [and] [4] no juror misconduct had occurred ....[8]

12

We are persuaded that these are issues deserving encouragement to proceed further.

[*~332]13

The clerk will calendar this case for oral argument with a schedule for any additional briefs on the merits that Brooks or the State may wish to file.

Notes:

1

Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

2

Brooks v. Texas, 528 U.S. 956, 120 S.Ct. 384, 145 L.Ed.2d 300 (1999).

3

Ex Parte Brooks, No. 45,631-01 (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 13, 2000) (unpublished).

4

Brooks v. Dretke, No. SA-00-CA-1050-FB (W.D.Tex. Jun. 2, 2004) (unpublished).

5

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003).

6

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)

7

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

8

Brooks v. Dretke, No. SA-00-CA-1050-FB, at *76.