record shows error in Texas

2019Here, because Hamilton did not object to the charge, we will not reverse unless the record shows the error resulted in 1 See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim.

2014Here, because Thomas did not object to the charge, we will not reverse unless the record shows the error resulted in egregious harm, Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743-44 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g), such that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial.

2026The defendant’s rights go to those who serve, not to those who are excused.” Id. at 298-99 (quoting Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 393 ); see also Tasby, 111 S.W.3d at 182 (“There is no right to have a particular person on the jury.”). “[I]n a non-constitutional error analysis, a venireperson’s improper excusal requires reversal ‘only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury.’” Gray, 233 S.W.3d at 299 (quoting Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 394 ).

2026The defendant’s rights go to those who serve, not to those who are excused.” Id. at 298-99 (quoting Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 393 ); see also Tasby, 111 S.W.3d at 182 (“There is no right to have a particular person on the jury.”). “[I]n a non-constitutional error analysis, a venireperson’s improper excusal requires reversal ‘only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury.’” Gray, 233 S.W.3d at 299 (quoting Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 394 ).

2015But the Supreme Court has explained that the broad language in Gray was too sweeping to be applied literally and should not be extended beyond the context of the “‘erroneous Witherspoon exclusion’ of a qualified juror in a capital case.” This Court has also held that, when Witherspoon error is not at issue, the erroneous excusal of a veniremember will call for reversal “only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury.” Under Jones, the question is whether or not the jurors who actually sat were impartial.” Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 590 (Tex.

2015But the Supreme Court has explained that the broad language in Gray was too sweeping to be applied literally and should not be extended beyond the context of the “‘erroneous Witherspoon exclusion’ of a qualified juror in a capital case.” This Court has also held that, when Witherspoon error is not at issue, the erroneous excusal of a veniremember will call for reversal “only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury.” Under Jones, the question is whether or not the jurors who actually sat were impartial.” Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 590 (Tex.

2026Here, because [Simon] did not object to the charge, we will not reverse [the judgment] unless the record shows the error resulted in egregious harm, Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738 , 743–44 (Tex. Crim.

2026When, as here, the defendant “did not object to the charge, we will not reverse [the judgment] unless the record shows the error resulted in egregious harm.” Murrieta v. State, 578 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (citing Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743–44).

2026Jackson v. State, No. 05-15-00414-CR, 2016 WL 4010067 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim.

2026Jackson v. State, No. 05-15-00414-CR, 2016 WL 4010067 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim.

2025When Detective Duke asked if Tran understood his rights, Tran affirmatively indicated he understood and whispered, “Yeah.” After confirming that he did not feel ill, Tran initiated the interrogation by asking Detective Duke to proceed with the interview: “You may continue.” See Umana v. State, 447 S.W.3d 346, 356 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (“The recording of the oral statement shows Varela read appellant his rights and asked, ‘Do you understand all your rights?’ Appellant nodded his head up and down and stated, ‘Uh-huh.’ Thus[,] the record shows the warnings were given a

2015Umana v. State, 447 S.W.3d 346 , ––––, 2014 WL 4199116, at *7 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26, Discussion 2014, pet. filed).

2004See Ovalle, 13 S.W.3d at 786 ; Escobar, 28 S.W.3d at 777 .

2004See Ovalle , 13 S.W.3d at 786 ; Almanza , 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; Escobar , 28 S.W.3d at 777 .

2026The defendant’s rights go to those who serve, not to those who are excused.” Id. at 298-99 (quoting Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 393 ); see also Tasby, 111 S.W.3d at 182 (“There is no right to have a particular person on the jury.”). “[I]n a non-constitutional error analysis, a venireperson’s improper excusal requires reversal ‘only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury.’” Gray, 233 S.W.3d at 299 (quoting Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 394 ).

2026The defendant’s rights go to those who serve, not to those who are excused.” Id. at 298-99 (quoting Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 393 ); see also Tasby, 111 S.W.3d at 182 (“There is no right to have a particular person on the jury.”). “[I]n a non-constitutional error analysis, a venireperson’s improper excusal requires reversal ‘only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury.’” Gray, 233 S.W.3d at 299 (quoting Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 394 ).

2021Rodriguez v. State, 425 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, 8 no pet.); see also Bearnth v. State, 361 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“We cannot conclude that the presentment requirement was satisfied where the record shows only defense counsel’s statement that the motion had been presented, but does not indicate that counsel in fact communicated the request for a hearing in a timely manner to a person capable of acting on it.”).

2021Rodriguez v. State, 425 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Bearnth v. State, 361 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“We cannot conclude that the presentment requirement was satisfied where the record shows only defense counsel’s statement that the motion had been presented, but does not indicate that counsel in fact communicated the request for a hearing in a timely manner to a person capable of acting on it.”).

2026“And in the absence of such a showing, 47 ‘we presume that jurors are qualified[.]’” Id. at 301 (quoting Ford v. State, 73 S.W.3d 923, 925 (Tex. Crim.

2005Additionally, even if the trial court had erred in striking Veniremember Two for cause,“the erroneous excusing of a veniremember will call for reversal only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury.” Ford v. State , 73 S.W.3d 923, 925 (Tex. Crim.

2025Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016).

2025Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016).

2025See Routier, 112 S.W.3d at 571-72 .

2021See Routier, 112 S.W.3d at 576, 577 .

2024See Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 741 (Tex. Crim.

2022See Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 741 (Tex. Crim.

2021Rodriguez v. State, 425 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, 8 no pet.); see also Bearnth v. State, 361 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“We cannot conclude that the presentment requirement was satisfied where the record shows only defense counsel’s statement that the motion had been presented, but does not indicate that counsel in fact communicated the request for a hearing in a timely manner to a person capable of acting on it.”).

2021Rodriguez v. State, 425 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Bearnth v. State, 361 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“We cannot conclude that the presentment requirement was satisfied where the record shows only defense counsel’s statement that the motion had been presented, but does not indicate that counsel in fact communicated the request for a hearing in a timely manner to a person capable of acting on it.”).

2020Bearnth v. State, 361 16 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“We cannot conclude that the presentment requirement was satisfied where the record shows only defense counsel’s statement that the motion had been presented, but does not indicate that counsel in fact communicated the request for a hearing in a timely manner to a person capable of acting on it.”); Burrus v. State, 266 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (finding a certificate of presentment and docket entry noting the filing of the motion were insufficient evidence of presentment).

2011See id. (defense counsel’s “certificate of presentment” that the motion “would be hand-delivered to the trial court” held insufficient to demonstrate timely presentment where the record did not show it was “hand-delivered to the trial judge” or that “the trial judge ever saw the motion”); Burrus v. State , 266 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (defense counsel’s certificate of presentment and notation on docket sheet that counsel filed a motion for new trial held insufficient to demonstrate timely presentment); Longoria v. State , 154 S.W.3d 747 , 762–63 (Tex. App.—Houston [

2011See Rezac, 782 S.W.2d at 870 ; Denison, 651 S.W.2d at 760 ; Shaw, 329 S.W.3d at 654 ; Valdez, 826 S.W.2d at 782 .

2011See Rezac , 782 S.W.2d at 870 ; Denison , 651 S.W.2d at 760 ; Shaw , 329 S.W.3d at 654 ; Valdez , 826 S.W.2d at 782 .

2011See id .; Ngo , 175 S.W.3d at 750 n.48; Almanza v. State , 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); De Los Santos , 219 S.W.3d at 74, 78-79 .

2011See id.; Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 750 n.48; Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); De Los Santos, 219 S.W.3d at 74, 78-79 .

2007Jiminez v. State , 32 S.W.3d 233, 237-38 (Tex. Crim.

2007Jiminez v. State, 32 S.W.3d 233, 237-38 (Tex. Crim.

2005App. 1998); see also Collum v. State , 96 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, no pet.).

2005App. 1998); see 9 also Collum v. State, 96 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

2002King v. State , 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim.

2000King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)(citing Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 776 , 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)).

2026The record shows no violation of Article 39.14(h) or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 11.

2026There is nothing in 3 Intertwined in his argument for his first issue, Appellant contends that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose the video of Veniremember No. 39, which necessitates “a de novo constitutional inquiry into whether the nondisclosure compromised fairness.” See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”); Pena v. S

2014App. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 985 (1999).

2001Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 562 ; see also Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 394 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 985 , 120 S.Ct. 444 , 145 L.Ed.2d 362 (1999) (“the erroneous excusing of a veniremember will call for reversal only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury”).

2014See, e.g., Stokes, 277 S.W.3d at 21 ; Bearnth v. State, 361 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd) (“We cannot conclude that the presentment requirement was satisfied where the record shows only defense counsel’s statement that the motion had been presented, but does not indicate that counsel in fact communicated the request for a hearing in a timely manner to a person capable of acting on it.”); Longoria v. State, 154 S.W.3d 747, 762 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operati

2011See id. (defense counsel’s “certificate of presentment” that the motion “would be hand-delivered to the trial court” held insufficient to demonstrate timely presentment where the record did not show it was “hand-delivered to the trial judge” or that “the trial judge ever saw the motion”); Burrus v. State , 266 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (defense counsel’s certificate of presentment and notation on docket sheet that counsel filed a motion for new trial held insufficient to demonstrate timely presentment); Longoria v. State , 154 S.W.3d 747 , 762–63 (Tex. App.—Houston [