implied bias doctrine in Texas

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir.1997). .

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656 , 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir. 1997). [13] See Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir.2008) ("in extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.2009) ("The concept of im

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir.1997). .

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656 , 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir. 1997). [13] See Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir.2008) ("in extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.2009) ("The concept of im

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir.1997). .

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656 , 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir. 1997). [13] See Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir.2008) ("in extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.2009) ("The concept of im

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir.1997). .

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656 , 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir. 1997). [13] See Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir.2008) ("in extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.2009) ("The concept of im

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir.1997). .

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656 , 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir. 1997). [13] See Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir.2008) ("in extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.2009) ("The concept of im

2010Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 791-93 (8th Cir. 2008). [14] See Brooks v. Dretke, supra, at 329 ("We maintain that the doctrine of implied bias is `clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court'" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), which requires federal habeas judges to defer to the judgments of state courts unless a particular state court judgment is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"). [15] Majority opinion, at 306 (holding that Smith v. Phillips stand

2010Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 791-93 (8th Cir. 2008). [14] See Brooks v. Dretke, supra, at 329 ("We maintain that the doctrine of implied bias is `clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court'" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), which requires federal habeas judges to defer to the judgments of state courts unless a particular state court judgment is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"). [15] Majority opinion, at 306 (holding that Smith v. Phillips stand

2010United States v. Polichemi, supra, at 705 . 11 Ruckman v. State, 109 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. ref’d); Harvey v. State, 123 S.W.3d 623, 631 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d). 12 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have tentatively suggested that the implied bias doctrine might have been abrogated, but they have avoided resolving the issue by holding that it would not apply in any event to the facts presented in any of the cases before them.

2010United States v. Polichemi, supra, at 705. [11] Ruckman v. State, 109 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. ref'd); Harvey v. State, 123 S.W.3d 623, 631 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd). [12] The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have tentatively suggested that the implied bias doctrine might have been abrogated, but they have avoided resolving the issue by holding that it would not apply in any event to the facts presented in any of the cases before them.

2010United States v. Polichemi, supra, at 705 . 11 Ruckman v. State, 109 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. ref’d); Harvey v. State, 123 S.W.3d 623, 631 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d). 12 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have tentatively suggested that the implied bias doctrine might have been abrogated, but they have avoided resolving the issue by holding that it would not apply in any event to the facts presented in any of the cases before them.

2010United States v. Polichemi, supra, at 705. [11] Ruckman v. State, 109 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. ref'd); Harvey v. State, 123 S.W.3d 623, 631 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd). [12] The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have tentatively suggested that the implied bias doctrine might have been abrogated, but they have avoided resolving the issue by holding that it would not apply in any event to the facts presented in any of the cases before them.

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U

2010United States v. Polichemi, supra, at 705. [11] Ruckman v. State, 109 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. ref'd); Harvey v. State, 123 S.W.3d 623, 631 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd). [12] The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have tentatively suggested that the implied bias doctrine might have been abrogated, but they have avoided resolving the issue by holding that it would not apply in any event to the facts presented in any of the cases before them.

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U

2010See Smith , 455 U.S. at 222-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (listing situations in which implied bias might be present, including "a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction"); Solis v. Cockrell , 342 F.3d 392, 395-98 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing cases that have discussed doctrine of "implied" or "presumed" juror bias when juror fails to disclose material information); see also Andr

2010See Brooks v. Dretke, supra, at 329 ("We maintain that the doctrine of implied bias is ‘clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court’ ” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), which requires federal habeas judges to defer to the judgments of state courts unless a particular state court judgment is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”). .

2010Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 791-93 (8th Cir. 2008). [14] See Brooks v. Dretke, supra, at 329 ("We maintain that the doctrine of implied bias is `clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court'" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), which requires federal habeas judges to defer to the judgments of state courts unless a particular state court judgment is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"). [15] Majority opinion, at 306 (holding that Smith v. Phillips stand

2018Uranga, 330 S.W.3d at 306–07 (reasoning that Texas does not recognize the implied bias doctrine because “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias”).

2012Cf. Uranga, 330 S.W.3d at 308-10 (Price, J., dissenting) (stating that the implied bias doctrine should be applied in this case and citing.

2010See Smith , 455 U.S. at 222-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (listing situations in which implied bias might be present, including "a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction"); Solis v. Cockrell , 342 F.3d 392, 395-98 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing cases that have discussed doctrine of "implied" or "presumed" juror bias when juror fails to disclose material information); see also Andr

2010See Smith, 455 U.S. at 222-23 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (listing situations in which implied bias might be present, including “a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction”); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395-98 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing cases that have discussed doctrine of “implied” or “presumed” juror bias when juror fails to disclose material information); see also Andrew

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U

2001Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir.1990).

2010E.g., Connor v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n.4 (4 th Cir. 2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4 th Cir. 2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4 th Cir. 1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4 th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6 th Cir. 2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6 th Cir. 1997). 13 See Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9 th Cir. 2008) (“in extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Uranga — 5 doctrine as so entrenched that it has seen

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656 , 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir. 1997). [13] See Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir.2008) ("in extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.2009) ("The concept of im

2010Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 791-93 (8 th Cir. 2008). 14 See Brooks v. Dretke, supra, at 329 (“We maintain that the doctrine of implied bias is ‘clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court’” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), which requires federal habeas judges to defer to the judgments of state courts unless a particular state court judgment is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”). 15 Majority opinion, at 10-11 (holding that Smith v. Phillips stands

2010Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 791-93 (8th Cir. 2008). [14] See Brooks v. Dretke, supra, at 329 ("We maintain that the doctrine of implied bias is `clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court'" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), which requires federal habeas judges to defer to the judgments of state courts unless a particular state court judgment is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"). [15] Majority opinion, at 306 (holding that Smith v. Phillips stand

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656 , 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir. 1997). [13] See Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir.2008) ("in extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.2009) ("The concept of im

2010E.g., Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 198 , 206 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005); Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312-13 (4th Cir.2002); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1998); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656 , 664 (4th Cir.1988); Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 380 (6th Cir. 1997). [13] See Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir.2008) ("in extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.2009) ("The concept of im

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U

2010Those courts have nevertheless assumed (without deciding) that the doctrine remains viable, but have held that it did not apply to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the particular facts presented.12 Since the time we issued our opinion in Morales, the federal courts of appeals have continued to recognize and apply the implied bias doctrine.13 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit regards the 45-6 (2 nd Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328 (5 th Cir. 2006) (Opinion on rehearing); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5 th Cir. 1988); U