Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1981). · Go Syfert
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Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 1995–2025 · 2 courts · …if the interpretation is unreasonable from the beginning, such an interpretation may still be arbitrary and capricious. ✓
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 1985 · 2 courts · …where the trustees impose a standard not required by the pension plan itself, this court has stated that such action 'would result in an unwarranted and arbitrary construction of the plan. at p. 1321 ✓
72 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 29 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: James Brown v. Southern California Ibew-Neca (ca9, 2009-12-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 40 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Brown v. Southern California Ibew-Neca
9th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 93 F.3d 600, 608 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating it is an abuse of discretion for plan trustees to “ ‘impose a standard [of eligibility for pension plan benefits] not required by the pension plan itself’ ”) (quot- ing Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981)) 15974 BROWN v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA (alteration in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Southern California IBEW-NECA Trust Funds
9th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 93 F.3d 600, 608 (9th Cir.1996) (stating it is an abuse of discretion for plan trustees to “ ‘impose a standard [of eligibility for pension plan benefits] not required by the pension plan itself ”) (quoting Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981)) (alteration in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 20 Employee Benefits Cas. 2543, Pens. Plan Guide P 23930x Gail Swaback, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of David Swaback, Deceased v. American Information Technologies Corporation, Illinois Bell Company, Ameritech Employees Benefit Committee
7th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
We do not conclude that the words in this parenthetical expression can carry the weight Ameritech asks them to carry 14 See Filipowicz, 56 F.3d 807 ; Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981) ("Where the Trustees impose a standard not required by the pension plan itself, ... such action would result in an unwarranted and arbitrary construction of the plan."); see also Cousin v. New Orleans S.S.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 20 Employee Benefits Cas. 1710, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6181, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,112, Pens. Plan Guide P 23924x Mario Canseco James Daniels Manuel Delgado Jessie Riley Corse Whitehurst, Jr., Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California Board of Trustees of the Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, Individually and in Their Official Capacities
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Lower federal courts have held that where plan trustees "impose a standard [of eligibility for pension plan benefits] not required by the pension plan itself," that action " 'result[s] in an unwarranted and arbitrary construction of the [p]lan.' " Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981) (quoting Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir.1975)). 47 We have applied this principle in the context of severance benefits and disability benefits.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Canseco v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Lower federal courts have held that where plan trustees “impose a standard [of eligibility for pension plan benefits] not required by the pension plan itself,” that action “‘result[s] in an unwarranted and arbitrary construction of the [p]lan.’ ” Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981) (quoting Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir.1975)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Epright v. Environmental Resources Management, Inc.
3rd Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) 19 Employee Benefits Cas. 2936, Pens. Plan Guide P 23919d Charles John Epright v. Environmental Resources Management, Inc. Health and Welfare Plan Erm Enviroclean Noble Lowndes/johnson, Administrator John Doe Trustees, 1 Through 10 in Their Capacity as Trustees of the Environmental Management, Inc. Health and Welfare Plan Chief Financial Officer, Environmental Resources Management, Inc
3rd Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Haberern v. KAUPP VASCULAR SURGEONS BEN. PLAN
E.D. Pa. · 1993 · confidence medium
Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 , 106 S.Ct. 183 , 88 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985); accord Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 318 (5th Cir.1982); Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kay v. Thrift and Profit Sharing Plan
E.D. Pa. · 1991 · confidence medium
See also Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir.1982) (“factors to be considered in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard” include analysis of “reasonableness” of interpretation offered by plan administrators); Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1323 (8th Cir.1981) (application of arbitrary and capricious standard requires examination of the reasonableness of the Trustee’s interpretation of disputed language).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) De Nobel v. Vitro Corp.
4th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314 (“factors to be considered in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard” include analysis of “reasonableness” of interpretation offered by plan administrators) (citing Bayles v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir.1979)); Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1323 (8th Cir.1981) (application of arbitrary and capricious standard requires “examination of] the reasonableness of the Trustees’ interpretation” of disputed language); Lowenstern v. International Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Work…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HECI Exploration Co., Employees' Profit Sharing Plan v. Holloway
5th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
While the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is extremely deferential, we have held that “[a] rational and reasonable interpretation of a plan may still be arbitrary and capricious if contrary to the plain meaning of the plan. ‘Where the trustees impose a standard not required by the ... plan itself, this court has stated that such action “would result in an unwarranted and arbitrary construction of the Plan.” ’ ” Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314 (quoting Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981)); Gan ze, 741 F.2d at 793 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heci Exploration Co., Inc. v. Holloway
5th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
However, even if the argument was properly framed in terms of the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Plan would not prevail. 37 While the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is extremely deferential, we have held that "[a] rational and reasonable interpretation of a plan may still be arbitrary and capricious if contrary to the plain meaning of the plan. 'Where the trustees impose a standard not required by the ... plan itself, this court has stated that such action "would result in an unwarranted and arbitrary construction of the Plan." ' " Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314 (quoting Morgan …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Voliva v. Seafarers International Union of North America
E.D. Va. · 1988 · confidence medium
See e.g., Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir.1984); Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harlan v. Sohio Petroleum Co.
N.D. Cal. · 1988 · confidence medium
Blau, 748 F.2d at 1356 ; accord Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 318 (5th Cir.1982); Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Central Tool Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists National Pension Fund, Benefit Plan A
D.C. Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Bd., 623 F.2d 196 , 203 & n. 15 (2d Cir.1980); Johnson v. Botica, supra note 37 , 537 F.2d at 933-934 ; Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981); Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir.1972); Collins v. UMWA Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 298 F.Supp. 964, 968 (D.D.C.1969), aff’d, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 387 , 439 F.2d 494 (1970). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Central Tool Company v. International Association of MacHinists National Pension Fund, Benefit Plan A, Central Tool Company v. International Association of MacHinists National Pension Fund, Benefit Plan A
D.C. Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Bd., 623 F.2d 196 , 203 & n. 15 (2d Cir.1980); Johnson v. Botica, supra note 37 , 537 F.2d at 933-934 ; Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981); Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir.1972); Collins v. UMWA Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 298 F.Supp. 964, 968 (D.D.C.1969), aff'd, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 387 , 439 F.2d 494 (1970) 48 E.g., Burroughs v. Board of Trustees of Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs, supra note 36, 542 F.2d at 1130.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Agee v. Armour Foods Co.
W.D. Mo. · 1986 · confidence medium
Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir.1975); Wilken v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 632 F.Supp. 772, 774 (E.D.Mo.1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Devine v. Xerox Corp.
D. Del. · 1986 · confidence medium
See Blau v. Del Monte Corp., supra, 748 F.2d at 1354 ; Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilken v. AT & T TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
E.D. Mo. · 1985 · confidence medium
However, this Court must make a limited inquiry into the propriety of the committee's interpretive resolution, since "[a] reviewing court will intervene in the administration of a pension plan ... where the trustees' action is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Lucian G. Vorpahl, H.T. Bartelme, John R. Pelinka, Charles P. McClure Delores Johnson, Everett A. Olsen, Wells L. Wescott, Roy E. McGee Joseph B. Raba, Russell E. Ritzler, Robert Packowski, Cadwalder I. Larson, Simon S. Siefert, Carol B. Christ, William H. Graham, Leonard A. Rabe, Irving W. Twito, J.E. Culpepper, Robert H. May, Lawrence E. Wallace, Glenn E. Hubbard, Donald G. King, James C. Peterson, Therese K. Schaefer, Ladonna J. Slowik, Gerald M. Soller, Robert H. Huber and Eugene M. Austin, on Their Own Behalf and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated
8th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Quinn v. Burlington Northern Inc. Pension Plan, supra, 664 F.2d at 678 ; Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981); Bueneman v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, supra, 572 F.2d at 1209 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Vorpahl
8th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Quinn v. Burlington Northern Inc. Pension Plan, supra, 664 F.2d at 678 ; Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981); Bueneman v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Are ah Pension Fund, supra, 572 F.2d at 1209 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) LeFebre v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
D. Maryland · 1982 · confidence medium
Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dennard v. Richards Group
5th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Should an Employee fail to return to Service within the time specified for such leave of absence, or after such temporary absence or authorized vacation, or after the period specified in (d) or (e), as appropriate, the Service of such Employee will be deemed terminated as of the end of such permitted period of absence. 10 2.23 "One Year Break in Service" shall mean any consecutive twelve month period commencing at the beginning of a Plan Year during which an Employee has not completed more than 500 Hours of Service. 11 See, e.g., Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir. 1977); W…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc.
5th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir. 1977); Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 823-24 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 , 101 S.Ct. 922 , 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1978); Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981); Bueneman v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1975) (case based on Labor-Management Relations Act); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Quinn v. Burlington Northern Inc. Pension Plan (2×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981); Bueneman v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978); Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1976); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William J. Quinn v. Burlington Northern Inc. Pension Plan, Burlington Northern Inc. Pension Trust and the First Trust Company of Saint Paul, a Minnesota Banking Corporation, as Trustee, William J. Quinn v. Burlington Northern Inc. Pension Plan, Burlington Northern Inc. Pension Trust and the First Trust Company of Saint Paul, a Minnesota Banking Corporation, as Trustee (2×) also: Cited "see"
1st Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981); Bueneman v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978); Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1976); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roy C. Richardson v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, Roy C. Richardson v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
8th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
The court ruled, in substance, that the decision was not supported by any evidence and constituted an erroneous application of the applicable law under the general common law test incorporated into the Pension Plan through Article I § 7(d). 2 See Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320 at 1321 (8th Cir. 1981); Bueneman v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978); Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1976). 5 Between the relevant dates Richardson performed truck driving services for King Van Lines.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Richardson v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund (2×)
8th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
The court ruled, in substance, that the decision was not supported by any evidence and constituted an erroneous application of the applicable law under the general common law test incorporated into the Pension Plan through Article I § 7(d). 2 See Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981); Bueneman v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978); Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1976).
discussed Cited "see" Norris v. Ford Motor Co.
E.D. Mich. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981)(holding that a plan administrator acted arbitrarily by imposing a standard of benefit eligibility not contained in the plan); Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 , 106 S.Ct. 183 , 88 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985)(finding plan administrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously by attempting to impose additional conditions of eligibility above and beyond those required by the terms of the plan).
cited Cited "see" Kroschinsky v. Trustees of Steamship Trade Ass'n/International Longshoremen's Ass'n Pension Trust Fund-Benefits Trust Fund
D. Maryland · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See de Nobel, 885 F.2d at 1188 (inconsistent application of plan provisions may constitute abuse of discretion) (citing Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320 , 1324 n. 4 (8th Cir.1981)).
discussed Cited "see" Clarke v. Bank of New York
S.D.N.Y. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
However, “[w]here the trustees of a plan impose a standard not required by the plan’s provision, or interpret the plan in a manner inconsistent with its plain words, or by their interpretation render some provisions of the plan superfluous, their actions may well be found to be arbitrary and capricious.” Miles, 698 F.2d at 599; see Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir.1975); Poggi, 624 F.Supp. at 983 .
discussed Cited "see" Skelton v. Lowen
E.D. Va. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981); Rueda v. Seafarers International Union of North America, 576 F.2d 939, 943 (1st Cir.1978); Snyder v. Titus, 513 F.Supp. 926, 932 (E.D.Va.1981).
cited Cited "see" Kochendorfer v. Rockdale Sash & Trim Co., Inc.
N.D. Ill. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited "see" Blau v. Del Monte Corporation (2×)
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981) ("Where the Trustees impose a standard not required by the pension plan itself, this court has stated that such action 'would result in an unwarranted and arbitrary construction of the Plan.' ") (quoting Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir.1975)). 45 Del Monte imposed several standards not required by the severance policy.
discussed Cited "see" Blau v. Del Monte Corp. (2×)
9th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320 , 1321 (8th Cir.1981) (“Where the Trustees impose a standard not required by the pension plan itself, this court has stated that such action ‘would result in an unwarranted and arbitrary construction of the Plan.’ ”) (quoting Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir. 1975)).
discussed Cited "see" Carr v. Trustees of the Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Pension Fund
E.D. Pa. · 1984 · signal: accord · confidence high
“When the trustee’s interpretation of a plan is in direct conflict with express language in a plan, this action is a very strong indication of arbitrary and capricious behavior.” Dennard, supra; accord, Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference, Etc., 698 F.2d 593 , 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. *953 105, 78 L.Ed.2d 108 (1983) (“Where the trustees of a plan ... interpret the plan in a manner inconsistent with its plain words ... their actions may well be found to be arbitrary and capricious.”) Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir.1981) (“[T]he Tru…
discussed Cited "see" Baker v. Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 9 Pension Trust Fund
Colo. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.1981); Church v. Huge, 500 F.Supp. 133 (W.D.Va.1980); Winston v. Trustees of Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Welfare Fund, 110 Ill.App.3d 163 , 65 Ill.Dec. 703 , 441 N.E.2d 1217 (1982).
cited Cited "see" Harold Miles v. The New York State Teamsters Conference Pension And Retirement Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan
2d Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321, 1324 (8th Cir.1981); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir.1975).
cited Cited "see" Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan
2d Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321, 1324 (8th Cir. 1981); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir.1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc.
N.D.N.Y. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See, e.g., Clarke v. Bank of New York, 687 F.Supp. 863, 867 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (citing, e.g., Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conf., 698 F.2d 593 , 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 , 104 S.Ct. 105 , 78 L.Ed.2d 108 (1983)); see also Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir.1981).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Beavlee Morgan
v.
Julius Mullins, Trustee Paul R. Dean, Trustee Kenneth Houck, Trustee and the United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds
80-1310.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Mar 11, 1981.
643 F.2d 1320
1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19391
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

643 F.2d 1320

90 Lab.Cas. P 12,638, 2 Employee Benefits Ca 1040

Beavlee MORGAN, Appellee,
v.
Julius MULLINS, Trustee; Paul R. Dean, Trustee; Kenneth
Houck, Trustee; and The United Mine Workers of
America Health and Retirement Funds, Appellants.

No. 80-1310.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 9, 1980.
Decided March 11, 1981.

J. Michael Cogbill, Shaw & Ledbetter, Fort Smith, Ark., E. Calvin Golumbic, Gen. Counsel (argued), William F. Hanrahan, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Jeanne K. Beck, Associate Counsel, U.M.W.A. Health & Retirement Funds, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Gregory G. Smith, Pryor, Robinson, Taylor & Barry, Fort Smith, Ark., for appellee.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, and BRIGHT and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.

[*~1320]1

The Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds (Trustees) appeal from the summary judgment entered by the district court[1] in favor of appellee Beavlee Morgan. The Trustees denied Morgan credit for the time he received Black Lung benefits on the grounds that Morgan's only employment after April 1, 1971, had not been for a signatory employer. The district court held the Trustees acted arbitrarily and capriciously in interpreting the pension plan to deny Morgan pension benefits. We affirm.

2

On October 29, 1973, Morgan filed an application for benefits from the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund. The pension eligibility requirements applicable to Morgan are set forth in Resolution 90, which was drawn and adopted by the Trustees in 1972, pursuant to their authority under the 1950 Wage Agreement. Morgan's application was eventually denied for failure to meet certain requirements of Resolution 90.

3

Morgan filed a complaint in the Arkansas courts, alleging the Trustees had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying him pension benefits. The suit was removed to federal court and an answer filed by the Trustees on May 24, 1978.

4

An additional hearing was set before the Trustees on July 11, 1978. The Trustees finally determined, and it is not contested, that Morgan had worked a total of 163/4 credit years in the coal industry when he ceased work in October 1973. 121/2 years credit had been for employment with an employer who had signed the applicable National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. Morgan argued that his receipt of Black Lung benefits from 1973 to 1977 should apply as "years of service" as defined in Resolution 90, but the Trustees refused to credit the Black Lung years because his employment in the mines subsequent to April 1, 1971, was with a nonsignatory employer. The case, before the district court on cross-motions for summary judgment, was referred to a magistrate. The magistrate, and subsequently the district court, agreed with Morgan and determined that the Trustees had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in their determination. This appeal followed.

5

Review by the courts of the Trustees' decision is limited. A reviewing court will intervene in the administration of a pension plan only where the trustees' action is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Bueneman v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978); Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1976); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1975). Where the Trustees impose a standard not required by the pension plan itself, this court has stated that such action "would result in an unwarranted and arbitrary construction of the Plan." Maness v. Williams, supra, 513 F.2d at 1267.

6

Thus our inquiry is to determine whether the Trustees' interpretation of Resolution 90 violates the above standards. Resolution 90 provides in relevant part:

I. ELIGIBILITY

7

A. An applicant who ceased work in the bituminous coal industry shall be eligible for a pension if he has:

[*~1321]8

1. Attained the age of fifty-five (55) years or over at the date of his application for pension.2. Completed twenty (20) years' service in the coal industry in the United States, a "year of service" being as defined in paragraph II A hereof, provided, however, that as a part of such twenty (20) years' service, the applicant must have worked, after May 28, 1946, the following minimum years of signatory service, a "year of signatory service" being as defined in paragraph II B hereof:

9

Employment in the coal industry after April 1, 1971, will be credited as service required for pension eligibility as provided in paragraphs I A 2 and I A 3 hereof only if it is performed for an employer signatory to the bituminous coal wage agreement then in effect.

II. DEFINITIONS

10

A. A year of service.

11

1. A year of service, as required in paragraphs I A 2 and I A 3, is a calendar year during which an applicant:

12

(a)(1) Worked, subsequent to January 1, 1937, as an employee in a job classified in the then existing bituminous coal wage agreement for an employer in the coal industry * * *.

13

(b) Received state workmen's compensation payments pursuant to an award as a result of an occupational disease or injury sustained in the mine while regularly employed in a classified job under the bituminous coal wage agreement then in effect, provided, in the case of occupational disease, applicant had been so employed by an employer signatory to the bituminous coal wage agreement then in effect for at least ten (10) years after May 28, 1946. Credit may be given up to a maximum of four (4) years' service credit from date of injury, or from the date of last employment in case of occupational disease, provided applicant did not work regularly in jobs outside the coal industry during the compensable period. Benefits awarded pursuant to the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 shall be deemed "workmen's compensation payments" within the meaning of this section, only if the miner was last regularly employed in the coal industry after the enactment date of the Act, December 30, 1969, in a classified job under the bituminous coal wage agreement then in effect, and had been so employed by an operator signatory to the agreement for at least ten (10) years after May 28, 1946.

14

(c) Rendered service as an employee of the United Mine Workers of America * * *.

15

(d) Served in the military service of the United States in any war, * * *.

16

B. A year of signatory service.

17

1. A year of signatory service referred to in paragraphs I A 2 and I A 3 is:

18

(a) a year of service as defined in paragraph II A 1(a)(1) hereof during which an applicant worked, after May 28, 1946, as an employee in a classified job for an employer signatory to the bituminous coal wage agreement then in effect, or

[*~1322]19

(b) a year of service as defined in paragraph II A 1(b) hereof, during which an applicant received state workmen's compensation payments pursuant to an award as a result of an occupational disease or injury awarded after May 28, 1946, immediately following employment as an employee in a classified job for an employer signatory to the bituminous coal wage agreement then in effect * * *.

20

(emphasis added).

21

It is not disputed that Morgan has attained the age of fifty-five and has sufficient signatory service as is required by section I.A.2 of the plan. (I.A.2). The contested point is whether he has twenty "years of service" as required by I.A.2. I.A.2 expressly refers the reader to the definition of "year of service" contained in II.A.1(a)-(d). Morgan is no longer contesting the Trustees' decision that he has worked 163/4 years in a classified job under II.A.1(a). He is therefore 31/4 years short of the requisite twenty years of service and seeks to have 31/4 years credited for his receipt of Black Lung benefits beginning in the fall of 1973. Morgan claims that he has satisfied the requirements of II.A.1(b) because he has received Black Lung benefits for the requisite period and "was last regularly employed in the coal industry after * * * December 30, 1969, in a classified job under the bituminous coal wage agreement then in effect, and had been so employed by an operator signatory to the agreement for at least ten (10) years after May 28, 1946." We agree with Morgan and the district court that the plain meaning of the words in Resolution 90 indicate that Morgan qualified for pension benefits 31/4 years after he began to receive Black Lung benefits.

22

Our inquiry does not end there, however. The Trustees argue that even if Morgan's interpretation is reasonable, the Trustees' decision must be upheld if it too is reasonable. Lowenstern v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 479 F.2d 1211, 1213 (D.C.Cir.1973). We therefore examine the reasonableness of the Trustees' interpretation.

23

The last paragraph of I.A.2 states that employment in the coal industry after April 1, 1971, must be for a signatory employer for the miner to receive service credit. The Trustees interpret "employment in the coal industry" to mean employment as defined in II.A.1(a),[2] and also the "employment equivalents" defined in II.A.1(b)-(d) receipt of Black Lung benefits, receipt of Workmen's Compensation, employment in the United Mine Workers of America, and military service. Morgan argues that such an interpretation places additional requirements on the receipt of the pension benefits which the plain words of Resolution 90 do not require. He notes that if this interpretation was intended, I.A.2 could have easily been written to so indicate.[3]

[*~1323]24

The Trustees contend their interpretation is reasonable because it has a proper and reasonable purpose to treat nonworking miners the same as working miners. Morgan's employment in 1972 and 1973 had been for a nonsignatory employer and clearly was not and could not be counted towards the twenty years of service. Morgan is not contesting this. Therefore if he had continued to work for this nonsignatory employer, he would have earned no more credit than the 163/4 years he already possessed. The Trustees argue that to award him credit for Black Lung benefit years would be to treat nonworking miners more favorably than working miners. Thus the Trustees contend that a reasonable interpretation is to treat working and nonworking miners in an equal manner. This argument, however, assumes that but for Morgan's disabling disease he would have remained working for a nonsignatory employer. However, Morgan had worked most of his coal industry years, including 1967-1971, for signatory employers. Knowing he needed a few more years of service to receive the pension benefits, it is reasonable to assume he would have sought signatory employment at the first opportunity. However, because of his disease, he was unable to work for a signatory employer.

25

The provision in II.A.1(b) for credit for Black Lung benefit years is intended to reward miners who have substantial signatory employment but were prevented from further employment because of the occupational disease. This is made clear by the II.A.1(b) requirement that the miner have ten years of signatory employment in order to count Black Lung benefit years, whereas Morgan otherwise needed only five years of signatory employment. Thus the Trustees' interpretation frustrates the purpose of the plan to make fair provision for miners who have become incapacitated, but have significant signatory employment.

26

There is a further indication that the Trustees' interpretation is unreasonable and unwarranted. II.A.1(b) also requires that in order for Morgan to obtain credit for the time he received Black Lung benefits, he must have been employed after December 30, 1969, in a classified job under the bituminous coal wage agreement. However, if we accept the Trustees' interpretation and apply the last paragraph I.A.2 to credit for Black Lung benefits time, then Morgan is required to have been employed after April 1, 1971, in a classified job with an employer signatory to the wage agreement. Thus the "last employment" clause of II.A.1(b) (the Black Lung benefits section) would be rendered superfluous. In Maness v. Williams, supra, this court found that the trustees' construction of a pension plan was arbitrary and capricious because the interpretation made certain requirements in the plan superfluous. See also Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1272-73 (7th Cir. 1978).

27

We conclude the Trustees acted arbitrarily and capriciously in interpreting Resolution 90 in a way which is inconsistent with the plain words of the document and which renders some requirements superfluous.[4]

[*~1324]28

Because the record does not indicate exactly when Morgan began to receive Black Lung benefits, we agree with the district court that the case must be remanded to the Trustees for this determination and the consequent award of pension benefits.

Affirmed.[5]

1

The Honorable Paul X Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas

2

Part II.A.1(a) provides, in relevant part:

A. A year of service.

1

A year of service, as required in paragraphs I A 2 and I A 3, is a calendar year during which an applicant:

(a)(1) Worked, subsequent to January 1, 1937, as an employee in a job classified in the then existing bituminous coal wage agreement for an employer in the coal industry * * *.

3

The provision (I.A.2) could have easily been written to state that no credit (as opposed to only employment credit) could be obtained after April 1, 1971, unless it was signatory credit (as opposed to employment for a signatory employer)

4

The Trustees argue that they have consistently interpreted Resolution 90 to preclude the award of non-signatory pension credit based on Black Lung benefits received after April 1, 1971. They state a reasonable interpretation consistently applied is to be accorded substantial if not controlling weight in interpreting the purpose and meaning of the trust document. See Miracle v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund, 373 F.Supp. 603, 604 (D.D.C.1974). However, if the interpretation is unreasonable from the beginning, such an interpretation may still be arbitrary and capricious. Further, the only record evidence of this consistently applied interpretation is an affidavit by Robert T. Boylan, Director of the Funds, stating this conclusion. None of the documents in evidence explaining pension requirements to the miners, however, discuss this precise point. Nor does the Trustees' construction of Resolution 90 concerning Black Lung benefit years expressly appear in any of their interpretive documents

5

Morgan argued that if the Trustees' interpretation was held to be reasonable, then it should be struck down as violative of section 302(c)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186, as an unreasonable last signatory employment requirement. See Roark v. Boyle, 439 F.2d 497 (D.C.Cir.1970), and its progeny, e. g., Pete v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund, 517 F.2d 1275 (D.C.Cir.1975) (en banc). The Trustees' interpretation in the instant case would not result in a last signatory employment contract but its effect is similar. Our holding that the Trustees' interpretation is an unreasonable reading of the contract obviates reaching the merits of Morgan's alternative argument. We note, however, that our holding is supported by Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82, 89 (3d Cir. 1978), which held that, if a "provision deprives an otherwise eligible employee of all benefits derived from substantial contributions made in his behalf, § 302(c)(5) requires that the defenders of such provision come forward with substantial justification * * * in terms of the Fund's legitimate goals."