United States v. Valerian Trifa, 662 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1981). · Go Syfert
United States v. Valerian Trifa, 662 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
2 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Mandycz (mied, 2002-05-01)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mandycz
E.D. Mich. · 2002 · confidence medium
See Costello, 365 U.S. at 281 , 81 S.Ct. 534 (observing that lower courts consistently have recognized “that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government”); United States v. Trifa, 662 F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir.1981) (noting the district court’s holding that laches defense is not available in a denaturalization suit); United States v. Schmidt, No. 88-9475, 1990 WL 6667 , at *10 (N.D.Ill.
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Liudas Kairys, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee
7th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Trifa, 662 F.2d 447 (6th Cir.1981), certiorari denied, 456 U.S. 975 , 102 S.Ct. 2239 , 72 L.Ed.2d 849 (1982).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Valerian TRIFA, Defendant-Appellant
80-1762.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Nov 3, 1981.
662 F.2d 447
1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 16371
William W. Swor, Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellant., Richard A. Rossman, U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., Kathleen N. Coleman, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Crim. Div., Washington, D. C., for the U. S.
Weick, Jones, Phillips.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Defendant-Appellant Trifa has appealed to this court from a judgment of the district court in an action by the government seeking denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) which expressly recites that it was entered into by consent, and was signed by Trifa, his attorneys, and the attorney representing the government, which judgment revoked Trifa’s citizenship on the ground that he had procured his citizenship illegally and through misrepresentation of material facts. He had previously on August 25, 1980, surrendered his citizenship.

In his appeal which recites it is from the judgment entered by consent, Trifa does not contend that the judgment was entered without his consent or that he and his attorneys did not know what they were doing. He seeks to rely on previous proceedings in the same case before District Judge Kennedy in which he moved for summary judgment on the ground that 8 U.S.C. § 1451 is unconstitutionally vague and infringes on First Amendment freedoms; that the government’s delay of 25 years since his entry into this country and 18 years since his naturalization before bringing the present action was a denial of due process.

• District Judge Kennedy denied Trifa’s motion for summary judgment holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate the First Amendment; that there is no laches defense to a denaturalization suit; that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to pre-in-dictment or pre-accusation delay; that there were genuine issues of fact which could only be determined at a trial. Judge Kennedy further denied Trifa’s request to certify the order denying his motion for summary judgment to this court for an interlocutory appeal.

The case was then transferred to District Judge Gilmore upon Judge Kennedy’s elevation to this court. In proceedings before Judge Gilmore, the consent decree was submitted to him for approval and he signed it and entered judgment the same day in favor of the United States revoking Trifa’s naturalization.

In this appeal, Trifa seeks to raise the same issues previously presented to Judge Kennedy, but they are no longer appealable because Trifa has surrendered his citizenship pursuant to a valid decree to the entry of which he consented. He does not claim that either he or his attorneys were under any disability when they signed the decree.

Reliance on Raceway Properties, Inc. v. Emprise Corp., 613 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1980), and similar cases not involving consent decrees is inappropriate.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.