State v. Williams, 516 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). · Go Syfert
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State v. Williams, 516 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, last quoted 2005 · …generally, the right to order restitution is limited to the actual damage or loss caused by the offense of which the defendant is convicted. ✓
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2010–2019 · …due process ascertainment that the amount of restitution bears a reasonable relationship to the loss suffered. ✓
238 citation events (180 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: State v. Owens (ohioctapp, 2024-09-03)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Owens
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Implicit in this principle is that the amount claimed must be established to a reasonable degree of certainty before restitution can be ordered.” State v. Williams, 34 Ohio App.3d 33, 34 (2nd Dist. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jones
Ohio Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
This court noted that "[t]he trial court may consider a PSI when ordering restitution." Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Brumback, 109 Ohio App.3d 65, 83 (9th Dist.1996); State v. Williams, 34 Ohio App.3d 33, 34 (2d Dist.1986). {¶ 28} This court further noted, however, that both appellant and his attorney had objected to the amount of restitution ordered.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Albaugh
Ohio Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
State v. Bowman, 181 Ohio App.3d 407 , 2009-Ohio-1281, ¶10 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 34 Ohio App.3d 33, 34 (8th Dist.1986).
cited Cited "see" State v. Russell, 08 Ca 82 (5-13-2009)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Bowman , Miami App. No. 06-CA-41, 2007-Ohio-6673 , ¶ 7 , citing State v. Williams (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 33 .
cited Cited "see" State v. Labghaly, Unpublished Decision (1-11-2007)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Williams (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 33 ; Hooks , supra, at 748 . {¶ 15} The record in the case at bar fails to provide enough evidence to support the $13,655 restitution order.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Borders, Unpublished Decision (8-22-2005)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Williams (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 33 ; and State v. Hansen (Mar. 22, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 56778 (where evidence of actual losses is not presented by the victim and the court does not hold a hearing to determine with reasonable certainty the amount of actual loss, the court abuses its discretion in ordering restitution).
cited Cited "see" State v. Littlefield, Unpublished Decision (2-6-2003)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Williams (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 33 at 34 cited in Hafer .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Hafer (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Williams (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 33, 34 , 516 N.E.2d 1270, 1271-1272 ; Hooks at 748 , 735 N.E.2d at 524 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Carosella, Unpublished Decision (6-25-1999)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Friend (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 241 , 242-43 . "[T]he right to restitution is limited to the actual damage or loss caused by the offense of which the defendant is convicted." State v. Williams (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 33 , 34 (interpreting the felony restitution statute which had language identical to the misdemeanor restitution statute) The Twelfth Appellate District decided a case which provides additional guidance.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Miller (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, State v. Williams (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 33 , 516 N.E.2d 1270 and State v. Williams, 3d Dist.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Radway, 06ap-1003 (8-21-2007) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence low
Restitution "can be ordered only for those acts that constitute the crime for which the defendant was convicted and sentenced." State v. Hafer (2001), 144 Ohio App.3d 345 , 348 , 760 N.E.2d 56 ; see, also, State v. Williams (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 33 , 516 N.E.2d 1270 . {¶ 11} With these authorities guiding our review, we now examine the record to determine whether the trial court's restitution order is limited to the actual loss caused by the conduct for which appellant was convicted, and is based upon credible evidence in the record from which the amount of restitution may be ascertained to …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Sommer (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
State v. Brumback (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 65, 83 , 671 N.E.2d 1064 ; see, also, State v. Williams (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 33, 34 , 516 N.E.2d 1270 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Miller v. Miller (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Williams (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 33 , 516 N.E.2d 1270 , which involves an R.C. 2929.11(E) restitution order.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The State of Ohio, Appellee,
v.
Williams, Appellant
2200.
Ohio Court of Appeals.
Sep 24, 1986.
516 N.E.2d 1270
1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 10323
Stephen A. Schumaker, prosecuting attorney, and David E. Smith, for appellee. Martin, Grady, Monnin Wilson and Thomas J. Grady, for appellant.
Brogan, Wilson, Wolff.
Cited by 119 opinions  |  Published
Brogan, P.J.

On January 21, 1986, defendant-appellant, Ty A. Williams, entered a negotiated plea of guilty to a charge of aggravated vehicular homicide, R.C. 2903.06, a fourth degree felony.

The trial court requested a pre-sentence investigation by its probation department. A report was submitted to the court at the time of sentencing on January 31, 1986.

Appellant was sentenced to a term of incarceration of eighteen months and was fined $2,500. He was also ordered to make restitution in the amount of $10,000.

The order of restitution forms the basis of the present appeal. Appellant contends the trial court erred in imposing a requirement of restitution without basing the ordered amount upon competent, relevant and probative evidence. Appellant argues the only evidence in the record supporting the imposition of a $10,000 restitution amount was a statement made in the pre-sentence investigation report. The victim’s father related to a probation officer that the estimated total costs in medical and funeral expenses for his son was between $9,000 and $10,000.

R.C. 2929.11(E) provides that the court “may require a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony to make restitution for all or part of the property damage that is caused by his offense * *

Generally, the right ’ to order restitution is limited to the actual damage or loss caused by the offense of which the defendant is convicted. Implicit in this principle is that the amount claimed must be established to a reasonable degree of certainty before restitution can be ordered.

In the present action, the court below relied on figures presented in a victim impact statement prepared by the Clark County probation department to arrive at the restitution amount. R.C. 2947.051 mandates the preparation of such statements where the offender pleads guilty to a felony. Subsection (B) of R.C. 2947.051 provides:

“Each victim impact statement shall identify the victim of the offense, itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense, identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense and the seriousness and permanence of the injury, identify any change in the victim’s personal welfare or familial relationships as a result of the offense and any psychological impact experienced by the victim or the victim’s family as a result of the offense, and contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim that the court requires.”

The victim impact statement involved in the present action failed to itemize the economic loss suffered as a result of the offense. The only evidence of loss was a statement by the victim’s father to the probation officer that hospital, medical and funeral expenses totalled between $9,000 and $10,000.

We find the restitution order sub judice cannot stand because there must be a due process ascertainment that the amount of restitution bears a reasonable relationship to the loss suffered. See State v. Trivedi (1982), 8 Ohio App. 3d 412, 416, 8 OBR 534, 539, 457 N.E. 2d 868, 873.

The sums claimed were never identified with certainty prior to the order of restitution. The figures presented to the court were simply estimated. This fact is evidenced by the $1,000 range in the sum representing the actual losses.

This court is not disputing that substantial economic loss was suffered[*35] by the victim’s family as a result of the tragic incident. However, the types of losses claimed could readily have been substantiated by submission of bills or statements showing that the expenses were incurred. In many instances, the bills or statements could be attached to the victim impact statement, where one is prepared. See State v. D ’Andrea (Dec. 8, 1982), Hamilton App. No. C-820036, unreported.

Similarly, as in the case of demonstrating medical and funeral expenses incurred in personal injury or wrongful death actions, the bills or statements themselves would be prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the expenses incurred. See R.C. 2317.421.

Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion in ordering restitution in an amount which had not been determined to bear a reasonable relationship to the actual losses suffered. The order of restitution is set aside and we remand the cause for resentencing according to law and consistent with this decision.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Wilson and Wolff, JJ., concur.