In Re Application of Braden, 148 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). · Go Syfert
In Re Application of Braden, 148 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Senk (ohioctapp, 2024-12-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1960 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1960 1993 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Senk
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
R.C. 3734.99(A) and (F) set forth the penalties for these violations and provide that the offender: shall be fined at least ten thousand dollars, but not more than twenty-five thousand dollars, or imprisoned for at least two years, but not more than four years, or both. {¶15} “‘Shall’ means must.” Wilson v. Lawrence, 2017-Ohio-1410, ¶ 12 , quoting Application of Braden, 105 Ohio App. 285, 286 (1st Dist. 1957).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lind Media Co. v. Marion Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals
Ohio Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Importantly, the language of the Resolution unambiguously conveys that the zoning inspector shall act within 10 days of receiving an application, “‘and no apparent purpose could be served by attempting to torture it into something else.’” Wilson at ¶ 12 , quoiting Beach v. Mizner, 131 Ohio St. 481, 485 (1936). {¶34} Unequivocally, “‘“[s]hall” means must.’” Id. at ¶ 13, quoting Application of Braden, 105 Ohio App. 285, 286 (1st Dist.1957), and citing Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 107 (1971) (“The word ‘shall’ is usually interpreted to make …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. C.L.
Ohio Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
It creates an obligation.’” Wilson v. Lawrence, 150 Ohio St.3d 368 , 2017-Ohio-1410 , ¶ 13, quoting Application of Braden, 105 Ohio App. 285, 286 (1st Dist.1957) and Willis v. Seeley, 68 N.E.2d 484 , 485 (C.P.1946).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re K.D.
Ohio Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
As noted by the Ohio Supreme Court, the word "shall" means "must." Wilson v. Lawrence, 150 Ohio St.3d 368 , 2017-Ohio- -2- Clermont CA2020-11-063 1410, ¶ 13, citing Application of Braden, 105 Ohio App. 285, 286 (1st Dist.1957); and Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 107 (1971), citing Cleveland Ry.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re Application of Braden, Registrar. [Fn]
8376.
Ohio Court of Appeals.
Dec 23, 1957.
148 N.E.2d 83
1957 Ohio App. LEXIS 791
Mr. William Saxbe, attorney general, Mr. Hugh A. Sherer and Mr. C. Richard Marsh, for appellant George C. Braden, Registrar. Mr. Irwin I. Aronoff, for appellee Fred Youngblood.
Long, Híxidebrant, Matthews.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
Long, J.

In the Court of Common Pleas, George C. Braden, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, sought the suspension of the license of Fred Youngblood to operate his automobile for a period of one year, pursuant to Section 4507.40 of the Revised Code. Youngblood, appellee herein, moved to quash and dismiss the proceedings and, upon oral argument, the court below sustained said motion. It is from this ruling that the registrar appeals. The contention of Youngblood is that said Section 4507.40, Revised Code, was passed as an emergency measure and that it was not passed in conformity with the Constitution of Ohio, Section lei of Article II, and that, therefore, the Act is inapplicable to him inasmuch as the offenses charged against him occurred prior to the effective date of the statute.

Section Id of Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides as follows:

[*286] “* * Such emergency laws upon a yea and nay vote must receive the vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly, and the reasons for such necessity shall be set forth in one section of the law, which section shall be passed only upon a yea and nay vote, upon a separate roll call thereon.” (Emphasis added.)

It is admitted by the Attorney General that the Senate voted only once on its committee report, and that, although the report received the necessary two-thirds vote, the Senate failed subsequently in any section of the bill, by two-thirds vote, to set forth the “reasons for such necessity” for the passage of the law as required by the Constitution. The Attorney General contends that it is not necessary for the Senate to pass specifically upon the “reasons for such necessity”; that the passage of a bill of necessity on the first reading implies a finding by the Senate of good “reasons for such necessity”; and that the language of the Constitution, requiring the setting forth of the “reasons for such necessity in one section of the law” is directory and not mandatory. With this reasoning, we can not agree.

The very purpose of this section of the Constitution is to protect the people in the exercise of the right of referendum. The language of the Constitution is clear on the point. It says: “The reasons for such necessity shall be set forth.” (Emphasis added.) The word, “shall,” does not suggest that the Senate may disregard the plain intendment of the Constitution. “Shall” means must.

We have read the decisions of Ohio on this subject and feel that the law is well settled in this field.

The Senate having failed in this clear demand of the Constitution, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

HíxiDEbrant, P. J., and Matthews, J., concur.