green
Positive treatment
Issue: general saving clauseTX ↗
Issue: express preemption clauseTX ↗
Issue: adequacy warningAZ ↗
Issue: state law claimNE ↗
Quoted verbatim 2×
7.7 score
“papas ii”
Treatment trajectory · 1926 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1926
1976
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "see"
Parker v. Shecut
See Du Pre v. Tilghman Lumber Co., 114 S.C. 269, 272 , 103 S.E. 526, 527 (1920) (holding trespass not sufficient to sustain an action for forcible entry and detainer).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Findett Corporation
See United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir.1992) (“Only response actions— i.e., removal or remedial actions — can be inconsistent with the NCP, which can be demonstrated by a showing that the government’s choice of response action was arbitrary and capricious.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 , 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Alliedsignal, Inc.
See United States v. Hardage, 750 F.Supp. 1460, 1519 (W.D.Okla.1990) (“[S]ite maintenance [is a] ‘necessary eost[] of response ... consistent with the national contingency plan.’ ”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(b)), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 , 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); see also Freeport-McMoran Resource Partners Ltd.
discussed
Cited "see"
Environmental Protection Agency Ex Rel. United States v. TMG Enterprises, Inc.
CERCLA makes responsible parties liable for “all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States ... not inconsistent with the national contingency plan [NCP].” 16 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(A); see United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir.1992) (“if the government’s response actions are in harmony with the NCP, the costs incurred by those actions are recoverable from responsible parties”), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 913 , 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Edüd 248 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Lashawn Y. McDonald
See United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 , 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); United States v. Vasquez, 909 F.2d 235, 238 (7th Cir.1990), ce rt. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 , 111 S.Ct. 2826 , 115 L.Ed.2d 996 (1991); cf. Bond v. United States, 77 F.3d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir.) (citing Rem for that proposition), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 270 , 136 L.Ed.2d 194 (1996). .See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 516-17 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also United States v. Ruth, 65 F.3d 599, 604 (7th Cir.1995), cer…
discussed
Cited "see"
Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kansas, Inc.
See United States v. Hardage, 750 F.Supp. 1460, 1495-96 (W.D.Okla.1990), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 , 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F.Supp. 1410, 1421 (W.D.Mich.1988), aff'd, 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied,. 494 U.S. 1057 , 110 S.Ct. 1527 , 108 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
Stanberry v. State
See United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806, 812 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993) (privacy interest of those utilizing public thoroughfares who place luggage on publicly available rack is substantially diminished).
discussed
Cited "see"
Gina Lowe v. Sporicidin International
See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir.) (Papas II) (stating, “FIFRA leaves states with no authority to police manufacturers’ compliance with the federal procedures”), cer t. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir.) {Arkansas-Platte II) (“136v(b) ... simply deprives the state of power to adopt any regulation”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 60 , 126 L.Ed.2d 30 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
State Ex Rel. Howes v. WR Peele, Sr. Trust
See *741 United States v. Hardage, 733 F.Supp. 1424, 1439 (W.D.Okla.1989), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); United States v. Northeastern Pharmacetitical and Chem.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. SCA Services of Indiana, Inc.
See United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1448 (10th Cir.1992) (costs borne by private party in investigating and developing remedial alternatives for purposes of defending against government’s suit are not necessary to containment of polluted site and thus are not “necessary” response costs recoverable under section 107(a)(4)(B)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); see also Key Tronic v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 1968 , 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. SCA Services of Indiana, Inc.
See United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1448 (10th Cir.1992) (costs borne by private party in investigating and developing remedial alternatives for purposes of defending against government's suit are not necessary to containment of polluted site and thus are not "necessary" response costs recoverable under section 107(a)(4)(B)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); see also Key Tronic v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 1968 , 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994).
discussed
Cited "see"
Akzo Coatings, Incorporated, and the O'Brien Corporation v. Aigner Corp.
(2×)
See United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1448 (10th Cir.1992) (costs borne by private party in investigating and developing remedial alternatives for purposes of defending against government's suit are not necessary to containment and cleanup of polluted site and thus are not "necessary" response costs recoverable under section 107(a)(4)(B)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); see also Key Tronic v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 1968 , 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Bonnie Kaye Little
(2×)
See United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806 , 812 & n. 3 (7th Cir.) (observing that privacy interest of travelers on public thoroughfares is "substantially less" than privacy interest in fixed dwellings), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 475-76 (D.C.Cir.1989) (rejecting defendant's argument that an Amtrak roomette is like a hotel room or apartment, finding that "[w]hile an Amtrak sleeper car may in some ways resemble a residence, it enjoys no such status in the law"); United States v. Tartaglia, 864 F.2d 837, 841 (D.C.Cir.19…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Nathan Kimmel, Inc. Nathan Kimmel, LLC Knf Corp., Formerly Known as Kennedy Nylon Film Corp. v. Dowelanco
See also Taylor AG Industries v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir.1995) (“ ‘[I]t is for the EPA Administrator, not a jury, to determine whether labeling and packaging information is incomplete or inaccurate, and if so, what label changes, if any, should be made- We think FI-FRA leaves states with no authority to police manufacturers’ compliance with the federal procedures.’”) (quoting Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 , 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Findett Corp.
Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1117-18 (D.Minn.1982) (citing § 9607(a)'s "notwithstanding" language in rejecting defendant's contention that the existence of a cooperative agreement between the state and federal government which § 9604(c)(3) requires before the President can take any remedial actions is a prerequisite to liability under § 9607); see also United States v. Hardage, 733 F.Supp. 1424, 1435 (W.D.Okla. 1989) (finding that defendant provided no authority for its contention "that a fact dispute exists as to whether certain costs were incurred in compliance with federal procurement …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Broderick Investment Co.
(2×)
See also United States v. Hardage, 733 F.Supp. 1424, 1434 (W.D.Okla.1989), rev’d other grounds, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 , 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993) (permitting United States to recover response costs incurred prior to notification of PRPs).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Dean Jenkins
See, e.g., United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806, 812 (7th Cir.) (“[T]he privacy interests of people who are in transit on ‘public thoroughfares are substantially less than those that attach to fixed dwellings.’”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 , 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc.
See also United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1441 (10th Cir.1992) (CERC-LA § 107 mandates that EPA recover “all costs of removal or remedial response ae- *327 tions, incurred not inconsistent with the NCP.”) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 300 (1993).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Shaw
v.
Shaw.
v.
Shaw.
10440.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jun 28, 1920.
Messrs. Cole. L. Blease, W.N. Graydon and H.S. Blackwell , for appellant, of whom Mr. Graydon cites: Ordinarily a father is entitled to custody of minor children: 73 S.C. 296 ; 75 S.C. 220 ; 54 S.C. 392 ; 19 S.C. (Reed). Court here has jurisdiction although infants themselves out of the State: 5 Crouch 622; 15 Mich. 417 ; Fry Spec. Performance, secs. 102, 103; 25 Barb. 532; 3 Kern. (N.Y.) 587; 16 Peters 25; 110 S.C. 491 ; 33 Ga. 195 . Domicile of child is domicile of the father: 14 Cyc. 843. Under habeas corpus body of person sought to be procured must actually be brought before the Court, or showing of impossibility made:
Church Habeas Corpus 107-8; Hurd on Habeas Corpus , p. 241; 10 Johns 328; 2 How. 65.
Messrs. Simpson, Cooper Babb and Richey Richey , for respondent, cite: Process of State Court does not extend beyond its borders and jurisdiction fixed by place of detention:
21 Cyc. 310; 9 Enc. Pl. Pr. 1025; 61 L.R.A. 744; 21 How. 506. Court powerless to enforce orders beyond border of State: Story Conflict of Laws, sec. 539; 18 Wall. 350. And judgment a nullity unless Court could reach children: 39 S.C. 484 ; 95 U.S. 714 . Writ properly dismissed:
9 Enc. Pl. Pr. 1021. Courts in State where children reside proper Courts to which to apply for relief: 76 N.J. Eq. 313 ; 72 S.C. 16 .
Watts.
Cited by 4 opinions | Published
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Watts.[*302] This is an appeal from an order of Judge Gary made in a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by the petitioner-appellant, Thomas M. Shaw, to recover possession of his two children, John D. M. Shaw, about ten years old, and Franklin M. Shaw, about eight years old. The respondent, Bessie D. Shaw, is the wife of Thomas M. Shaw. The petitioner alleges that he is a citizen of Laurens county, married to the respondent, and alleges that “about two years ago that Bessie D. Shaw left your petitioner against his will, and against the will of your’petitioner took said boys with her and carried them to the State of Missouri“that your petitioner has 'begged her and demanded of her that she return said boys to your petitioner, but this she has failed and refused to do.”
Mrs. Shaw was in Laurens county, but left the children, and was served with process in this case. Mrs. Shaw appeared on the day appointed for a hearing, did not answer, did not traverse the petition, but made a motion to quash the writ, on the sole ground that, as the petition showed on its face that the children ordered to be produced were outside of the State, to wit, in the State of Missouri, the Court was without jurisdiction to pass any order in the proceedings.
This objection was sustained by Judge Gary and proceedings dismissed, he holding that the Court was powerless and without jurisdiction. From this- order appellant appealed.
The order appealed from must be reversed. The Court acquired jurisdiction when the respondent was personally served. The children were the subject matter of the dispute. The question to be determined is whether father or mother should be awarded control. The Court clearly acquired jurisdiction when respondent was served. The order appealed from is reversed, and case remanded to Circuit Court for Laurens county for further proceedings.
Reversed.