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24 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1994–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwoodred2 sentences2023In particular, implied obstacle preemption invites judges to imagine what the unexpressed “purposes and objectives” of Congress might have been and speculate about whether there is tension between those purposes and state law that rises to the level of an “obstacle.” Such creativity seems especially misplaced when (as here) the statute includes an express preemption clause, which “necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993). 1994See Cipollone, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2618 ("When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a `reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,' ... `there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions' of the legislation."); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1737 , 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) ("If the statute contains an express preemption clause | 5 | 6 |
Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvaradogreen2 sentences1999See id. at 10 (stating with respect to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 that "[b]y limiting the Act's express preemption clause to instances in which the Secretary has adopted a safety standard, Congress implicitly left the states free to enforce their own standards in the interstices."). 1999The court concluded that “in light of the language of the Safety Act’s express preemption clause, the savings clause, and the statute’s legislative history, we do not perceive a ‘clear and manifest’ intent on Congress’s part to preempt the Alvarados’ claims.” Id. | 4 | 5 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.green2 sentences1994When determining whether such an express preemption clause indeed preempts state law, we "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Cipollone , ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2617 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 , 67 S.Ct. at 1152 ). 1994When determining whether such an express preemption clause indeed preempts state law, we “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Cipollone , — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2617 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 , 67 S.Ct. at 1162 ). | 3 | 3 |
Altria Group, Inc. v. Goodgreen2 sentences2021Even when Congress includes an express preemption clause, as it did in the ICCTA, “the question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state law still remains.” Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). 2021Plaintiffs, on the other hand, rely on other cases explaining that the presumption applies even to statutes with an express preemption clause if “the text of the pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading,” at least “when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States.” Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008). | 2 | 2 |
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.green2 sentences2010See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. at 867-68 , 120 S.Ct. 1913 (concluding that the Safety Act’s express preemption clause preempts nonidentical standards contained in state legislation and regulations). 2010See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. at 867-68 , 120 S.Ct. 1913 (concluding that the Safety Act’s express preemption clause preempts nonidentical standards contained in state legislation and regulations). | 2 | 2 |
Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp.green2 sentences1998See, e.g., Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir.1994), aff'd sub nom. 1998See, e.g., Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir.1994), aff'd sub nom. | 2 | 2 |
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Blackgreen2 sentences2014Federal preemption of state law is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that ―the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 5 notwithstanding.‖ Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1181 (2004) (quoting U.S. Const., art. 2011Id. at 749 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (a)(6), (a)(12)(A)). | 1 | 2 |
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.green2 sentences1994When determining whether such an express preemption clause indeed preempts state law, we "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Cipollone , ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2617 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 , 67 S.Ct. at 1152 ). 1994When determining whether such an express preemption clause indeed preempts state law, we "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Cipollone , ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2617 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 , 67 S.Ct. at 1152 ). | 1 | 2 |
C.Y. Wholesale, Inc. v. Eric Holcombgreen1 sentence2025Wholesale, 965 F.3d at 547 (court concluded that it was “unconvinced that the express preemption clause, standing alone, precludes a state from prohibiting the possession and sale of industrial hemp within the state”). | 1 | 1 |
in Re Facebook, Inc. and Facebook, Inc. D/B/A Instagramgreen1 sentence2023See In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80 , 88 n.5 (Tex. 2021) (collecting cases). | 1 | 1 |
Elam v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co.green1 sentence2021Regardless, there is no preemption here for the other reasons in this opinion. –3– The express preemption analysis examines whether the claims “fall squarely” under section 10501(b), meaning the state law—here, Texas negligence law— “directly attempts” to regulate rail transportation in the “economic realm.” Elam, 635 F.3d at 806-08. | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardogreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Hernandez-Gomez, 917 P.2d at 243 (noting that it is possible the Act's savings clause categorically precludes preemption, but proceeding with implied preemption analysis because the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327, 336 (Ind.1996) (holding that Act's savings clause "entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption," but proceeding with implied preemption analysis as the safer course). 1998See, e.g., Hernandez-Gomez, 917 P.2d at 243 (noting that it is possible the Act’s savings clause categorically precludes preemption, but proceeding with implied preemption analysis because the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327, 336 (Ind.1996) (holding that Act’s savings clause “entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption,” but proceeding with implied preemption analysis as the safer course). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Pleasantgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Hernandez-Gomez, 917 P.2d at 243 (noting that it is possible the Act's savings clause categorically precludes preemption, but proceeding with implied preemption analysis because the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327, 336 (Ind.1996) (holding that Act's savings clause "entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption," but proceeding with implied preemption analysis as the safer course). 1998See, e.g., Hernandez-Gomez, 917 P.2d at 243 (noting that it is possible the Act’s savings clause categorically precludes preemption, but proceeding with implied preemption analysis because the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327, 336 (Ind.1996) (holding that Act’s savings clause “entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption,” but proceeding with implied preemption analysis as the safer course). | 1 | 1 |
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrickgreen2 sentences1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . 1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Farner v. Brunswick Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. Blumenthalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chester O. Draper, Personal Representative of the Estate of Ilene Draper, Deceased v. Robert Chiapuzio, M.D., and Harney County, Oregon, a Public Bodygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gills v. Ford Motor Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Worm v. American Cyanamid Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mowery v. Mercury Marine, Division of Brunswick Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| American Agriculture Movement, Inc. v. Board of Tradered | 1 | 1 |
| Burke v. Dow Chemical Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Papas v. Upjohn Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Marrs v. Ford Motor Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Boyle v. Chrysler Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Covey v. Surgidev Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Jennifer Stamps v. Collagen Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Morales, 504 U.S. at 388 . 2020Morales, 504 U.S. at 378 . | 3 | 2003–2020 |
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
green
2 sentences2010Like the Safety Act, the Boating Act contains both an express preemption clause and a saving clause, which the Court interpreted the same way — the preemption clause only affected state legislation and regulations, and the saving clause preserved common-law tort actions. 537 U.S. at 63 , 123 S.Ct. 518 . 2010Like the Safety Act, the Boating Act contains both an express preemption clause and a saving clause, which the Court interpreted the same way — the preemption clause only affected state legislation and regulations, and the saving clause preserved common-law tort actions. 537 U.S. at 63 , 123 S.Ct. 518 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Black v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Federal preemption of state law is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that “the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d 746, 748 (Tex.2003), cert. denied, 640 U.S. 1181 , 124 S.Ct. 1418 , 158 L.Ed.2d 84 (2004) (quoting U.S. Const., art. 2014Federal preemption of state law is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that ―the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 5 notwithstanding.‖ Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1181 (2004) (quoting U.S. Const., art. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Worthy v. Collagen Corp. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Patricia M. Wood v. General Motors Corporation
green
1 sentence1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Cooper v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Anne Duffy Pokorny, Administratrix of the Estate of John Duffy, Deceased v. Ford Motor Company
green
1 sentence1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Menasche
green
2 sentences1998Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 , 101 S.Ct. 2478 , 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 , 75 S.Ct. 513 , 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955). 10 The Act’s legislative history strongly supports the conclusion that the express preemption clause does not extinguish the Al-varados’ claims. 1998Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 , 101 S.Ct. 2478 , 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 , 75 S.Ct. 513 , 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955). 10 The Act’s legislative history strongly supports the conclusion that the express preemption clause does not extinguish the Al-varados’ claims. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Estate of Montag ex rel. Montag v. Honda Motor Co.
green
1 sentence1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Kitts v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Cellucci v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C 1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Jennifer R. Harris, by and Through Her Guardian Ad Litem, Lucian J. Harris, III v. Ford Motor Company green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan
green
2 sentences1998Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 , 101 S.Ct. 2478 , 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 , 75 S.Ct. 513 , 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955). 10 The Act’s legislative history strongly supports the conclusion that the express preemption clause does not extinguish the Al-varados’ claims. 1998Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 , 101 S.Ct. 2478 , 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 , 75 S.Ct. 513 , 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955). 10 The Act’s legislative history strongly supports the conclusion that the express preemption clause does not extinguish the Al-varados’ claims. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Kitts v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C 1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Stangler v. Darling
green
1 sentence1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C 1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Montag v. American Honda Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C 1998See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 286 , 115 S.Ct. 1483 . [1] 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.1998). [2] See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 61 , 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 , 111 S.Ct. 147 , 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (airbag), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Vivian Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. Moore ex rel. Moore green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Stamps v. Collagen Corp green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Papas v. Zoecon Corp green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Jones v. Rath Packing Co. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Malone v. White Motor Corp. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.