adequacy warning in Arizona

2024See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 434 (App. 1978) (affirming preclusion of expert testimony on the adequacy of warning labels on drums of industrial solvent and reasoning that such testimony would not “aid the trier of fact” because “[t]he jury was as competent as any expert to determine whether the ‘FLAMMABLE LIQUID’ label was adequate to convey the hazard”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., 245 Ariz. 501 (2018); see also Berg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 983 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160 (D.S.D. 2013) (holding, in a “negligent failure to w

2024App. Div. 1986) (reversing summary judgment in favor of hammer manufacturer and holding that expert testimony was not required to establish inadequacy of safety warnings because “[a] hammer is a commonly used consumer product” and so “it was within the competence of a jury, unaided by expert testimony, to determine . . . the adequacy of the warnings”); see also Berg, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 1160 (“Who better to determine whether a warning should be provided than the people to whom the warning would be addressed?”).

2024See Marci v. Ames McDonough Co., 512 A.2d 548, 552-53 (N.J.

2024See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 434 (App. 1978) (affirming preclusion of expert testimony on the adequacy of warning labels on drums of industrial solvent and reasoning that such testimony would not “aid the trier of fact” because “[t]he jury was as competent as any expert to determine whether the ‘FLAMMABLE LIQUID’ label was adequate to convey the hazard”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., 245 Ariz. 501 (2018); see also Berg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 983 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160 (D.S.D. 2013) (holding, in a “negligent failure to w

2024See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 434 (App. 1978) (affirming preclusion of expert testimony on the adequacy of warning labels on drums of industrial solvent and reasoning that such testimony would not “aid the trier of fact” because “[t]he jury was as competent as any expert to determine whether the ‘FLAMMABLE LIQUID’ label was adequate to convey the hazard”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., 245 Ariz. 501 (2018); see also Berg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 983 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160 (D.S.D. 2013) (holding, in a “negligent failure to w

2024See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 434 (App. 1978) (affirming preclusion of expert testimony on the adequacy of warning labels on drums of industrial solvent and reasoning that such testimony would not “aid the trier of fact” because “[t]he jury was as competent as any expert to determine whether the ‘FLAMMABLE LIQUID’ label was adequate to convey the hazard”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., 245 Ariz. 501 (2018); see also Berg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 983 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160 (D.S.D. 2013) (holding, in a “negligent failure to w

2024See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 434 (App. 1978) (affirming preclusion of expert testimony on the adequacy of warning labels on drums of industrial solvent and reasoning that such testimony would not “aid the trier of fact” because “[t]he jury was as competent as any expert to determine whether the ‘FLAMMABLE LIQUID’ label was adequate to convey the hazard”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., 245 Ariz. 501 (2018); see also Berg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 983 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160 (D.S.D. 2013) (holding, in a “negligent failure to w

2021Id. ¶7 The adequacy of a warning may be a question for a jury if, for example, the landowner had “reason to expect that the invitee’s attention [would be] distracted.” Silvas v. Speros Const. Co., 122 Ariz. 333, 335 (App. 1979) (citation omitted).

2008A manufacturer cannot warn of dangers that were not known to it or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing scientific and technical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution.”); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill.2d 26 , 37 Ill.Dec. 304 , 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (1980) (“requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger that caused the injury, and that the defendant manufacturer failed to warn plaintiff of that danger, is a reasonable requirement, and one which focuses on the nature of the p

2008A manufacturer cannot warn of dangers that were not known to it or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing scientific and technical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution.”); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill.2d 26 , 37 Ill.Dec. 304 , 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (1980) (“requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger that caused the injury, and that the defendant manufacturer failed to warn plaintiff of that danger, is a reasonable requirement, and one which focuses on the nature of the p

1999See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir.1961); Elia, 194 Ariz. 74 ¶¶ 32-34 , 977 P.2d 796 ¶¶ 32-34 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. a, and holding that a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel need not necessarily be an appealable judgment as long as it is reviewable by an appellate tribunal at that stage). ¶ 12 Although the choice-of-law ruling here was in limine, it nonetheless was not tentative in the context of the litigation.

1999See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir.1961); Elia, 194 Ariz. 74 ¶¶ 32-34 , 977 P.2d 796 ¶¶ 32-34 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. a, and holding that a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel need not necessarily be an appealable judgment as long as it is reviewable by an appellate tribunal at that stage). ¶ 12 Although the choice-of-law ruling here was in limine, it nonetheless was not tentative in the context of the litigation.

1999See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir.1961); Elia, 194 Ariz. 74 ¶¶ 32-34 , 977 P.2d 796 ¶¶ 32-34 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. a, and holding that a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel need not necessarily be an appealable judgment as long as it is reviewable by an appellate tribunal at that stage). ¶ 12 Although the choice-of-law ruling here was in limine, it nonetheless was not tentative in the context of the litigation.

1997Taylor AG Industries v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555 (9th Cir.), quoting Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir.) (“Papas II”), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 913 , 114 S.Ct. 300 , 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993).

1988Ortho relies on Elledge v. Brand, 102 Ariz. 338, 339 , 429 P.2d 450, 451 (1967), to argue that the trial judge’s instructions could not adequately cure the prejudice and that a new trial is required.

1988Ortho relies on Elledge v. Brand, 102 Ariz. 338, 339 , 429 P.2d 450, 451 (1967), to argue that the trial judge’s instructions could not adequately cure the prejudice and that a new trial is required.

1988See Godwin, 129 Ariz. at 421-22 , 631 P.2d at 576-77 .

1988See Godwin, 129 Ariz. at 421-22 , 631 P.2d at 576-77 .

1980In Dunnaway v. Duquesne Light Co., 423 F.2d 66, 69 (3rd Cir. 1970), the court stated: The adequacy of a warning in relieving an electric company from liability must depend on both the expected efficacy of the warning and the availability of more effective alternate precautions.

1974Where the question of a defendant’s lack of mental capacity lurks in the background, however, the same inquiry, while still necessary, fails to completely resolve the question of whether the defendant can properly be said to have had a ‘rational, as' well as a factual, understanding’ * * *_ “We think Westbrook makes it plain that, where a defendant’s competency has been put in issue, the trial court must look further than to the usual ‘objective’ criteria in determining the adequacy of a constitutional waiver. * * * ” Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir: 1973).