Am. Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. James Corcoran, as Superintendent of Ins. of the State of New York, 715 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
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Am. Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. James Corcoran, as Superintendent of Ins. of the State of New York, 715 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1991 · …sweeping preemptive effect in the employee benefit plan field, at p. 786 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1996 · 2 courts · …sweeping preemptive effect in the employee benefit plan field. at p. 786 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1990 · …the express pre-emption provisions of erisa are deliberately expansive, and designed to 'establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern. at p. 786 ⚠ not in text
35 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 18 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Roberts v. Life Insurance Company of North America (kyed, 2023-12-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 30 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Roberts v. Life Insurance Company of North America
E.D. Ky. · 2023 · confidence medium
Co. of N.Y. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 2983) (noting that the various exceptions to preemption are “meant to be ‘narrow’”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miara v. First Allmerica Financial Life Insurance
D. Mass. · 2005 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.1983) (explaining that “the State’s purported regulatory actions are not directed at any particular plans or at employee benefit plans in general ... [but] at the business conduct of a company that happens to sell insurance policies to ERISA plans .... [WJhatever slight effect the Regulation may have on benefits is extrinsic to the aim of the Regulation and so peripheral to ERISA plans that it cannot justifiably be characterized as an attempt to govern such plans under the guise of state insurance regulation.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Haag v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance
D. Minnesota · 2002 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983) (state regulation setting maximum commission that life insurance salesmen may earn saved from preemption).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. New York State Department of Labor
W.D.N.Y. · 1996 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Franklin H. Williams Insurance Trust v. The Travelers Insurance Company
2d Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983) (state regulation setting maximum commission that life insurance salesmen may earn saved from preemption). 37 We conclude that Sec. 3214(c) is saved from preemption under ERISA.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Franklin H. Williams Insurance Trust ex rel. Williams v. Travelers Insurance
2d Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983) (state regulation setting maximum commission that life insurance salesmen may earn saved from preemption).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Riley on Behalf of Swanson v. Herbes
Minn. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Co. of New York v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2nd Cir.1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Devine v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.
D. Conn. · 1991 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jaskilka v. Carpenter Technology Corp.
D. Conn. · 1991 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983), it was not intended to reach state laws that may only indirectly affect the benefit plans.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Prevost
2d Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983); see Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 , 102 S.Ct. 512 , 70 L.Ed.2d 384 (1981). “[T]he express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive, and designed to ‘establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.’ ” Pilot Life Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Judy Prevost Gerald Kolinsky, Compensation Commissioner, Eighth District, State of Connecticut John A. Arcudi, Chairman, Board of Compensation Commissioners, State of Connecticut Clarine Nardi Riddle, Attorney General, State of Connecticut, United Automobile, Agricultural Implement and Aerospace Workers, Afl-Cio and District 91, International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers, Afl-Cio, Amici Curiae. O & G Industries, Inc. v. John Arcudi, Edward F. Bradley, Gerald Kolinsky, Gregory Gorman and Sharon Ferrillo Petrushonis
2d Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983); see Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 , 102 S.Ct. 512 , 70 L.Ed.2d 384 (1981). "[T]he express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive, and designed to 'establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.' " Pilot Life Ins.
cited Cited as authority (rule) General Electric Co. v. New York State Department of Labor
2d Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) General Electric Company v. New York State Department Of Labor
2d Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Northern Group Services, Inc. v. Auto Owners Insurance
6th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Certain aspects of the legislative history imply that a main concern of Congress in adopting the final broad version of section 514 that emerged from the conference committee was to avoid intentional — and perhaps pretextual — attempts by states to restrict the discretion of ERISA plans to engage in practices that otherwise would be permitted by federal law. 3 See American Progressive Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company Virgil E. Arrington v. James A. Neusser
6th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Accord Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises, 793 F.2d 1456, 1465-70 (5th Cir. 1986) (state law fiduciary duty claim affecting relationship between director and shareholder not preempted by ERISA); American Progressive Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.1983) (state regulation of insurance commission affects ERISA plans in too tenuous or remote a manner to warrant preemption); American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.1979) (state law permitting garnishment of pension benefits to enforce alimony and…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fixx v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA DIST. 17
S.D.W. Va · 1986 · confidence medium
American Progressive Life and Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.1983); Cuttle, 623 F.Supp. at 1156 ; *355 Employers Association of New Jersey v. New Jersey, 601 F.Supp. 232, 240 (D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Giles v. TI Employees Pension Plan
Tex. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
American Progressive Life and Health Insurance Co. of New York v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2nd Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey
3rd Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 , 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2899-2900 , 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983); American Progressive Life and Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983); Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238, 1250 (3d Cir.1980), aff’d Alessi v. Raybes-tos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522-25 , 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1905-07 , 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981); California Chamber of Commerce v. Simpson, 601 F.Supp. 104, 107-09 (C.D.Cal.1985). . 34.-5A-1 Title 34:5A-2 Legislative findings and declarations 34:5A-3 Definitions 34:5A — 4(c) Spanish translation 34:5A-4(d) Deadlin…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
3rd Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
For purposes of this opinion, "manufacturing sector" shall be considered synonymous with SIC Codes 20-39 3 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 , 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2899-2900 , 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983); American Progressive Life and Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983); Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238, 1250 (3d Cir.1980), aff'd Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522-25 , 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1905-07 , 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981); California Chamber of Commerce v. Simpson, 601 F.Supp. 104, 107-09 (C.D.Cal.1985) 4 34:5A-1 Title 34:5A-2 Legislati…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts
SCOTUS · 1985 · confidence medium
Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F. 2d 784, 787 (CA2 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Authier v. Ginsberg
6th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Co. of New York v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983) (sweeping preemptive effect); Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Inti Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815 , 830 (3rd Cir.1983) (preemption as broad as “relate to” language), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3179 , 82 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984); Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323 , 329 (2d Cir.1982) (Section 1144(a) clearly eliminates the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state laws), aff’d, — U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 3564 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1983); Kapuscinski v. Plan Adm’r (The Pension Plan…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Authier v. Ginsberg
6th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Co. of New York v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983) (sweeping preemptive effect); Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815 , 830 (3rd Cir.1983) (preemption as broad as "relate to" language), vacated on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3179 , 82 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984); Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323 , 329 (2d Cir.1982) (Section 1144(a) clearly eliminates the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state laws), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 3564 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1983); Kapuscinski v. Plan Adm'r (The Pension Plan-G…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rebaldo v. Cuomo
2d Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
So too, for example, do State laws and municipal ordinances regulating zoning, health, and safety increase the operational costs of ERISA trusts, but no one could seriously argue that they are preempted. 26 See also American Progressive Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.1983). 27 The purchase of hospital service is like the purchase of public utility service, or of any other service or commodity whose price is controlled by the State.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
D.N.J. · 1984 · confidence medium
See, e.g., People of the State of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 413-14 (7th Cir. 1984) (narrowly construing savings clause in Federal Water Pollution Control Act); American Progressive Life and Health Insurance Co. of New York v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786-87 (2d Cir.1983) (narrowly construing savings clause regarding insurance in ERISA); Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir.1979) (narrowly construing savings clause in Mineral Lands Leasing Act); Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 , 1274-81 (5th Cir.1978) (narrowly construing jurisdic…
discussed Cited "see" Northern Group Services, Inc. v. Auto Owners Insurance Company
6th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102 , 117-18 & n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 2051 , 2060-61 & n. 13, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). 61 Certain aspects of the legislative history imply that a main concern of Congress in adopting the final broad version of section 514 that emerged from the conference committee was to avoid intentional--and perhaps pretextual--attempts by states to restrict the discretion of ERISA plans to engage in practices that otherwise would be permitted by federal law. 3 See American Progressive Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.…
cited Cited "see" McColley v. Rosenberg (In Re Candor Diamond Corp.)
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally American Progressive Life and Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.1983).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Trogner v. New York Life Insurance
D. Maryland · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also American Progressive Life and Health Insurance Company of New York v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence medium
We explained that when “a State statute of general application does not affect the structure, the administration, or the type of benefits provided by an ERISA plan, the mere fact that the statute has some economic impact on the plan does not require that the statute be invalidated.” Id. at 139 , 103 S.Ct. at 2905 (footnote omitted); see also American Progressive Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.1983) (commission scales adopted by state regulation might indirectly affect levels of benefits provided by insurer, but such was so peripheral to ERISA as not to b…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence medium
We explained that when "a State statute of general application does not affect the structure, the administration, or the type of benefits provided by an ERISA plan, the mere fact that the statute has some economic impact on the plan does not require that the statute be invalidated." Id. at 139 , 103 S.Ct. at 2905 (footnote omitted); see also American Progressive Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.1983) (commission scales adopted by state regulation might indirectly affect levels of benefits provided by insurer, but such was so peripheral to ERISA as not to be pr…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Rebaldo v. Cuomo
2d Cir. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also American Progressive Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.1983).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
AMERICAN PROGRESSIVE LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
James CORCORAN, as Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York, Defendant-Appellee
1349, Docket 83-7252.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Aug 22, 1983.
715 F.2d 784
1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 24623
Vincent R. Fitzpatrick, Jr., New York City (Dwight A. Healy, Alice K. Jump, White & Case, New York City, of counsel) for plaintiff-appellant., Richard G. Liskov, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City (Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of N.Y., Melvyn R. Leventhal, Deputy First Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Farrar, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel) for defendant-appellee.
Oakes, Cardamone, Pierce.
Cited by 34 opinions  |  Published
CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:

The case before us presents the sole issue of whether a particular New York State insurance regulation and a report concerning appellant prepared by the State of New York’s Insurance Department (Department) constitute state regulation of an employee benefit plan preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. We conclude that neither the report nor the regulation are preempted by ERISA.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are not in dispute. American Progressive Life and Health Insurance Company of New York (Company) is licensed by New York to sell accident, health, and life insurance policies. During a three-year period ending on December 31, 1979 the Insurance Department conducted an extensive examination of the Company’s organization, operations, and finances. It prepared a report dated March 10, 1981 (Report) detailing the results of its examination. Section 9 of the Report discusses the Company’s sales of individual life insurance policies to union-management welfare and pension funds (ERISA plans). The Report criticized the Company’s sales of such policies for several reasons. Included among the problems cited was the fact that while the Company had previously assured the Department that it would market the policies only on an individual sales basis, the Company actually mass merchandised the policies. The Report found, moreover, that the compensation paid to the Company’s agents in connection with the sale of the policies was excessive and in violation of New York Insurance Regulation 65,11 N.Y. C.R.R. § 202, which establishes a maximum commission for life insurance salesmen selling on a mass merchandising basis to union-management pension funds. The Report further criticized the Company because the[*786] policies issued had a low cash surrender value in their early years due to excessive selling expenses. Finally, the Report concluded that replacement policies issued to laid-off workers upon their return to work were sold at unreasonably high prices.

In response to this unfavorable report, the Company filed the instant action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against James Corcoran, as Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York (Superintendent). The Company sought a declaration that the Report and Regulation 65 amount to state regulation of ERISA plans and are, therefore, preempted by ERISA. The Company also sought to enjoin the Superintendent from filing the Report for public inspection, taking any action against the Company based on the Report, and enforcing Regulation 65 against the Company. Following the submission of cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court (Gagliardi, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of the Superintendent and dismissed the Company’s complaint. In so holding, the district court correctly reasoned that the Report and Regulation 65 are within the insurance exception to ERISA preemption.

DISCUSSION

On appeal the Company renews its contention that section 9 of the Report and Regulation 65 are not within purview of the insurance exception to ERISA preemption. It argues that while the Report and Regulation 65 ostensibly purport to relate to insurance, they effectively and exclusively regulate employee benefit plans. We disagree with this contention and believe that the Report and Regulation 65 fall squarely within the insurance exception.

We turn to the applicable provisions of ERISA. Section 514(a) states that the relevant provisions of the Act “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... ” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976). This broad preemption provision is qualified by a savings clause that provides, in pertinent part, that “nothing in this sub-chapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance .... ” Id. at § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1976). To prevent evasion by state law of the broad preemption imposed by federal law, section 514(b)(2)(B) states that no employee benefit plan “shall be deemed to be an insurance company ... for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies ....” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976).

Admittedly, as appellant argues, the ERI-SA preemption provision was designed to have a sweeping preemptive effect in the employee benefit plan field, and the various exceptions to preemption are meant to be “narrow.” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287, 1304 (2d Cir.), vacated in part on other grounds, 666 F.2d 21 (2d Cir.1981), prob. juris, noted, 456 U.S. 924, 102 S.Ct. 1968, 72 L.Ed.2d 439 (1982). Thus this Court, for example, has previously struck down, as preempted by ERISA, a state law that required employers to continue making contributions to a fund on behalf of employees receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 329-30 (2d Cir.1982); see also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981) (ERISA preempts state law prohibiting benefit plans from offsetting workers’ compensation award against pension benefits); Kramarsky, 666 F.2d at 26 (ERISA preempts New York’s Human Rights Law to extent that state statute required plans to provide benefits for disability due to pregnancy). None of these cases, upon which appellant relies, deals with the savings clause applicable to insurance that is currently before us.

More relevant are the decisions in Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.1977); and Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir.1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 980, 98 S.Ct. 1630, 56 L.Ed.2d 72 (1978). In Wayne Chemical, the Seventh Circuit held that ER-ISA did not preempt an Indiana insurance law forbidding the sale of unauthorized[*787] group insurance policies even though, as here, the policies were sold to employee benefit plans. See 567 F.2d at 700. ERISA’s exemption of pension plans from state regulation did not extend, the court continued, to either insurers who sell to plans or. insurance policies purchased by plans. Id. Again, in Wadsworth, the First Circuit upheld a New Hampshire insurance law which mandated that certain benefits be granted in group insurance policies marketed to employee benefit plans. 562 F.2d at 78. The appellants in Wadsworth had challenged the state regulation on grounds similar to those advanced here, i.e., that the regulation of group insurance sold to plans affected the plans that purchased such insurance and it, therefore, fell within ERISA’s preemptive ambit. In Wadsworth the court rejected this argument, reasoning that it would render the insurance savings proviso of ERISA mere surplusage. Id.; see also Eversole v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 500 F.Supp. 1162, 1169-70 (C.D.Cal. 1980); Cate v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 434 F.Supp. 1187, 1190 (E.D. Tenn.1977).

Here, as in Wadsworth and Wayne Chemical, the State’s purported regulatory actions are not directed at any particular plans or at employee benefit plans in general. Instead, the State of New York is focusing its regulatory power at the business conduct of a company that happens to sell insurance policies to ERISA plans. We recognize that the commission scale established by Regulation 65 may affect indirectly the level of benefits an insurer will provide to beneficiaries of policies governed by that Regulation. Nevertheless, whatever slight effect the Regulation may have on benefits is extrinsic to the aim of the Regulation and so peripheral to ERISA plans that it cannot justifiably be characterized as an attempt to govern such plans under the guise of state insurance regulation. Similarly, even if the Report could be considered state regulation for purposes of preemption analysis, it too is plainly concerned primarily with the internal business practices of the Company. [1] Thus, we conclude that since Regulation 65 and the Report deal exclusively with insurance, they are within the ERISA insurance savings clause. See generally Manno, ERISA Preemption and Congressional Action, 52 Temp.L.Q. 51, 57-58 (1979) (state regulation of internal policies of insurance companies that sell to ERISA plans and marketing of policies to such plans clearly not preempted).

Had it so desired, Congress could also have excluded from the insurance savings clause those state laws, such as the Regulation here at issue, which regulate the sale of insurance to plans, insurers who sell to such plans, and/or the terms of policies sold to such plans. Congress did not do so expressly, and nothing in ERISA’s legislative history leads us to find such an exemption by implication. We decline the invitation to create an additional exception to the general rule that state insurance laws are excluded from the broad reach of ERISA’s preemption. Cf. Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 1910-11, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1

. Appellant’s argument on appeal is focused on Section 9 of the Report which is simply a review by the Department of Company practices in the issuance of the relevant policies and an evaluation of their value. Thus, even were Regulation 65 preempted by ERISA, release of the Report would not constitute prohibited state regulation, particularly in view of the fact that the Company has an opportunity to contest the Department’s findings at a hearing that has been deferred by stipulation pending this appeal.