Webb, Jeffrey v. Scanlon, M.d., Facp, Thomas S., 133 A.D.3d 1385 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). · Go Syfert
Webb, Jeffrey v. Scanlon, M.d., Facp, Thomas S., 133 A.D.3d 1385 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
46 citation events (46 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Rashada v. Ahmed (nyappdiv, 2026-06-26)
Treatment trajectory · 2016 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2016 2021 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rashada v. Ahmed (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2026 · confidence medium
With regard to the cross-appeals, defendants were required to meet their initial burden by "present[ing] factual proof, generally consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony and medical records, to rebut the claim of malpractice by establishing that [they] complied with the accepted standard of care or did not cause any injury to the patient" ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Isensee v Upstate Orthopedics , LLP , 174 AD3d 1520 , 1521 [4th Dept 2019]; Occhino v Fan , 151 AD3d 1870, 1871 [4th Dept 2017]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heather J. v. Rochester Regional Health
N.Y. App. Div. · 2026 · confidence medium
Haskin met her initial burden of establishing her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on deviation from the accepted standard of care through the submission of an expert affidavit that was "detailed, specific and factual in nature[,] . . . addressed each negligence claim raised in [plaintiffs' amended] bill of particulars" relating to her ( Kristie M. v Mercy Hosp. of Buffalo , 240 AD3d 1228 , 1229 [4th Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and opined that Haskin did not deviate from good and accepted medical practice ( see Nesterenko v Hall , 239 AD3d 1314 , 1315 [4th Dept 20…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nesterenko v. Hall (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
Defendant met his initial burden of establishing his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on both deviation and causation by submitting his own expert affidavit, which was detailed, specific and factual in nature, opining that he did not deviate from good and accepted medical practice and that his care and treatment of plaintiff did not proximately cause any injury ( see Wicks v Virk , 198 AD3d 1315, 1315 [4th Dept 2021]; Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]; see also Toomey v Adirondack Surgical Assoc. , 280 AD2d 754, 755 [3d Dept 2001]).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Zappia v. Cai (4×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
In order to meet their initial burden on a summary judgment motion in a medical malpractice action, a defendant is required to "present factual proof, generally consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony and medical records, to rebut the claim of malpractice by establishing that [they] complied with the accepted standard of care or did not cause any injury to the patient" ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grammatico v. Lamar
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · confidence medium
The burden then shifted to plaintiffs to raise a triable issue of fact by submitting " 'evidentiary facts or materials to rebut the prima facie showing by the defendant[s]' beyond mere '[g]eneral allegations of medical malpractice' " ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386-1387 [4th Dept 2015], quoting Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320, 324-325 [1986]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Amber R. v. Pediatric & Adolescent Urgent Care of W. N.Y., PLLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2023 · confidence medium
Defendants submitted deposition testimony, medical records and expert affidavits that were "detailed, specific and factual in nature" and addressed "each of the specific factual claims of negligence raised in . . . plaintiff's bill of particulars" ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Nevarez v University of Rochester , 173 AD3d 1640 , 1641 [4th Dept 2019]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen v. Grimm (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2022 · confidence medium
We agree with defendants that they satisfied their initial burden on the motion insofar as it sought summary judgment dismissing the claims against them regarding post-operative care by establishing that [*2]there was no departure from good and accepted medical practice ( see generally Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Humbolt v. Parmeter
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
The expert's affidavit was "detailed, specific and factual in nature" ( Toomey v Adirondack Surgical Assoc. , 280 AD2d 754, 755 [3d Dept 2001]), and " 'address[ed] each of the specific factual claims of negligence raised in . . . plaintiff's bill of particulars' " ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]; see Dziwulski , 181 AD3d at 1166 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Campbell v. Bell-Thomson
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
A defendant physician may submit his or her own affidavit to meet that burden provided that the affidavit is "detailed, specific and factual in nature" and addresses plaintiff's specific factual claim of negligence ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dziwulski v. Tollini-Reichert
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
The medical expert's affidavit submitted by defendant in support of her motion was "detailed, specific and factual in nature" (Toomey v Adirondack Surgical Assoc., 280 AD2d 754, 755 [3d Dept 2001]) and " address[ed] each of the specific factual claims of negligence raised in [the] plaintiff's bill of particulars' " ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]; see Bubar , 177 AD3d at 1360-1361).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stradtman v. Cavaretta
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
We conclude that the affidavit of defendant Joseph A. Caruana was sufficient to meet that burden inasmuch as it was "detailed, specific, and factual in nature," and it "address[ed] each of the specific factual claims of negligence raised in . . . plaintiff's bill of particulars" ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Shattuck v Anain , 174 AD3d 1339 , 1339 [4th Dept 2019]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Isensee v. Upstate Orthopedics, LLP (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
We affirm. "[T]o meet [their] initial burden on [their] summary judgment motion in this medical malpractice action, defendant[s] [were] required to present factual proof, generally consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony and medical records, to rebut the claim of malpractice by establishing that [they] complied with the accepted standard of care or did not cause any injury to the patient' " ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]; see Cole v Champlain Val.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shattuck v. Anain
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, defendant met her initial burden on the motion by " present[ing] factual proof, generally consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony and medical records, to rebut the claim of malpractice by establishing that [she] complied with the accepted standard of care' " ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]; see Macaluso v Pilcher , 145 AD3d 1559, 1560 [4th Dept 2016]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nevarez v. University of Rochester (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
"A defendant physician may submit his or her own affidavit to meet that burden, but that affidavit must be detailed, specific and factual in nature' . . . , and must address each of the specific factual claims of negligence raised in [the] plaintiff's bill of particulars' " ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hope A.L. v. Unity Hosp. of Rochester
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Ctr ., 116 AD3d 1283 , 1285 [3d Dept 2014] [emphasis added]; see Aliosha v Ostad , 153 AD3d 591, 592 [2d Dept 2017]; Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dickinson v. Bassett Healthcare
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
A defendant in a medical malpractice action meets its initial burden on summary judgment by presenting " factual proof, generally consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony and medical records, to rebut the claim of malpractice by establishing that [he or she] complied with the accepted standard of care or did not cause any injury to the patient' " ( Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]; see Cole v Champlain Val.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moyer v. Roy
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Furthermore, inasmuch as the affidavit of plaintiffs expert was as “ ‘detailed, specific and factual in nature’ ” as defendant’s own affidavit with respect to the additional theory that defendant was negligent in the performance of the EUS procedure (Webb v Scanlon, 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [2015]), and plaintiff “was not required to prove the precise nature of defendant’s negligence” (Coluzzi v Korn, 209 AD2d 951, 951 [1994], lv denied 85 NY2d 801 [1995]), we conclude that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact on that theory as well (see generally Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 324-325 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) CZERESZKO, FRANK v. PROCOPIO, JR., D.D.S., STEVE A.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Defendants did so by submitting plaintiff’s medical records and defendant’s own affidavit, which was “ ‘detailed, specific and factual in nature’ ” (Webb v Scanlon, 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [2015]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MACALUSO, LAURA v. PILCHER, M.D., PH.D., WEBSTER H.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
In order to meet their initial burden on their motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice action, defendants were “required to ‘present factual proof, generally consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony and medical records, to rebut the claim of malpractice by establishing that [they] complied with the accepted standard of care or did not cause any injury to the patient’ ” (Webb v Scanlon, 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [2015]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Koster v. Davenport
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
The plaintiff did not submit an expert affidavit in opposition and, therefore, failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Webb v Scanlon, 133 AD3d 1385, 1387 [2015]; Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26, 48 [2012]; D’Elia v Menorah Home & Hosp. for the Aged & Infirm, 51 AD3d at 851 ).
discussed Cited "see" Wicks v. Virk
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
Defendant Amarjit Singh Virk, M.D. satisfied his initial burden on his motion with respect to both deviation and causation by submitting his own expert affidavit opining, with detailed reasoning, that he "did not deviate from good and accepted medical practice . . . and that [his] care and treatment of [the decedent] did not proximately cause [him] any injury" ( Thompson v Hall , 191 AD3d 1265, 1267 [4th Dept 2021]; see Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]; see also Page v Niagara Falls Mem.
discussed Cited "see" Bristol v. Bunn
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
The defendant must address "each of the specific factual claims of negligence raised in [the] . . . bill of particulars" ( Groff v Kaleida Health , 161 AD3d 1518 , 1520 [4th Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]).
discussed Cited "see" Pasek v. Catholic Health Sys., Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
A medical malpractice defendant meets his or her initial burden on a motion for summary judgment by presenting "factual proof, generally consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony and medical records, to rebut the claim of malpractice by establishing that [he or she] complied with the accepted standard of care or did not cause any injury to the patient" ( Hope A.L. v Unity Hosp. of Rochester , 173 AD3d 1713 , 1714 [4th Dept 2019]; see Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]).
discussed Cited "see" Bubar v. Brodman (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
Urschel met her initial burden on the motion by presenting factual evidence that she complied with the applicable standard of care for a registered nurse practitioner, including deposition testimony and her own detailed affidavit that "address[ed] each of the specific factual claims of negligence in . . . plaintiff's bill of particulars" ( Wulbrecht v Jehle , 89 AD3d 1470, 1471 [4th Dept 2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]).
cited Cited "see" Boland v. Imboden
N.Y. App. Div. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
Ctr. , 116 AD3d 1283 , 1285 [3d Dept 2014]; see Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Washer v. Memorial Hosp. of William F. & Gertrude F. Jones, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2026 · signal: see also · confidence medium
By not submitting the requisite expert medical response in opposition to defendants' showing, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to that claim ( see id. ; see also Webb v Scanlon , 133 AD3d 1385, 1387 [4th Dept 2015]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jeffrey Webb, Appellant,
v.
Thomas S. Scanlon, M.D., FACP, Respondent
CA 14-02242.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Nov 20, 2015.
133 A.D.3d 1385
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John M. Curran, J.), entered September 29, 2014. The order granted the motion of defendant for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this medical malpractice action alleging that defendant, his primary care physician, was negligent in prescribing him various pain medications to treat pain that plaintiff reported experiencing in his arm and shoulder. Although plaintiff admits that he falsified symptoms so that he could obtain the pain medication prescriptions from[*1386] defendant, the complaint, as amplified by the bill of particulars, alleges, inter alia, that defendant should have performed diagnostic testing to determine whether plaintiff actually needed the medications. We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In order to meet his initial burden on his summary judgment motion in this medical malpractice action, defendant was required to “present factual proof, generally consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony and medical records, to rebut the claim of malpractice by establishing that [he] complied with the accepted standard of care or did not cause any injury to the patient” (Cole v Champlain Val. Physicians’ Hosp. Med. Ctr., 116 AD3d 1283, 1285 [2014]; see Lake v Kaleida Health, 59 AD3d 966, 966 [2009]). A defendant physician may submit his or her own affidavit to meet that burden, but that affidavit must be “detailed, specific and factual in nature” (Toomey v Adirondack Surgical Assoc., 280 AD2d 754, 755 [2001]; see Cole, 116 AD3d at 1285), and must “address each of the specific factual claims of negligence raised in [the] plaintiff’s bill of particulars” (Wulbrecht v Jehle, 89 AD3d 1470, 1471 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, in support of his motion, defendant submitted plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which plaintiff admitted that he lied to defendant about his subjective complaints of pain in order to “manipulate [defendant] into prescribing drugs” for him. Defendant also submitted his own affidavit, with accompanying medical records, wherein he described his physical examinations of plaintiff and plaintiff’s complaints of pain and reduced range of motion. Defendant opined that his treatment of plaintiff complied with the accepted standard of medical care because he performed physical examinations when they were called for, plaintiff was instructed on the medication’s proper use when prescribed, and the medications were properly prescribed based upon plaintiff’s history, his complaints, and the physical examinations performed by defendant and other physicians. Defendant’s affidavit was sufficiently detailed and specific, and defendant thus established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Suib v Keller, 6 AD3d 805, 806 [2004]; Toomey, 280 AD2d at 755). In order to raise an issue of fact to defeat defendant’s motion, plaintiff was required to submit “evidentiary facts or materials to rebut the prima facie showing by the defendant physician” beyond mere “[g]eneral allegations of medical malpractice” (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324-325 [1986]). It is well settled[*1387] that “[e]xpert opinion evidence from a party defendant in a medical malpractice action which is otherwise sufficient to show entitlement to summary judgment ‘requires some expert response from plaintiff on the question of alleged deviation from proper and approved medical practice’ ” (Maust v Arseneau, 116 AD2d 1012, 1012 [1986]; see Bills v Africano, 132 AD2d 935, 935 [1987]). Here, plaintiff failed to submit the requisite expert medical response in opposition to the motion (see Maust, 116 AD2d at 1012; see also Brown v Soldiers & Sailors Mem. Hosp., 193 AD2d 1077, 1078 [1993]), and “[t]he affidavit of plaintiff’s attorney was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact” (Bills, 132 AD2d at 935). Present — Scudder, P.J., Centra, Peradotto, Lindley and Valentino, JJ.