05/18/2018 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON February 6, 2018 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CURTIS MORRIS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 13-00001 Chris Craft, Judge ___________________________________

No. W2017-00393-CCA-R3-CD ___________________________________

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Curtis Morris, of first-degree murder, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and felony murder of his seventeen-month-old son. On appeal the defendant argues: the trial court erred when excluding a daycare record; the trial court erred when permitting the jury to view autopsy photos of the victim; the trial court erred when allowing certain expert testimony; the State failed to properly elect offenses; the trial court erred when failing to define “knowing” in its aggravated child abuse instructions; the State presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; and the cumulative effect of these errors resulted in the denial of a fair trial. Based on our thorough review of the record, pertinent authorities, and arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

William D. Massey, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Curtis Morris.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Zachary T. Hinkle, Assistant Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Carrie Shelton, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

On January 8, 2013, a Shelby County grand jury returned indictment No. 13- 00001, charging the defendant with first-degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, first-degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated child

neglect, aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, and aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less. The victim in the present case was the biological son of the defendant and seventeen months old at the time of his death on November 14, 2009. The jury heard proof from the State indicating the defendant knowingly inflicted severe injuries on the victim, resulting in substantial internal bleeding and, consequentially, death. The defendant argues he accidently landed on the victim when jumping over a baby gate and did not knowingly cause the victim’s injuries.

A. State’s Evidence

The State initially called Glenda Eddins, the owner of the Creative Christian Learning Center (“the day care”). The victim and his sister were enrolled at the day care at the time of the victim’s death and had been for approximately four months. The day care enrollment form listed the defendant as the victim’s father. Ms. Eddins testified that the victim had thrown tantrums and injured himself or other children during these incidents. Ms. Eddins noted there were no reported injuries to the victim on November 13, 2009, his last day at the day care prior to his death.

During cross-examination, the defendant attempted to enter three accident reports from the day care detailing the victim’s tantrums. The trial court permitted two of the records, finding it clear the persons who completed the forms saw the tantrums and contemporaneously reported them. The trial court, however, did not allow the third record. This record indicated that August 27, 2009, an employee of the day care, Samantha Yates, witnessed the victim throw a tantrum and hit his head on the concrete. During a jury-out hearing, the trial court determined after questioning Ms. Eddins that another employee, Adrian Fleming, actually witnessed the event. As Ms. Yates, not Ms. Fleming, prepared the report, the trial court found the record inadmissible.

The jury then heard from Shirley Boyland, a 9-1-1 dispatcher with the Germantown Police Department. Ms. Boyland testified she handled the 9-1-1 call made by the defendant when he discovered the victim was not breathing. She dispatched paramedics to the residence. She confirmed the transcript of the 9-1-1 call was accurate and that another dispatcher, Chuck Douglas, instructed the defendant on the performance of CPR on the victim.

The State’s next witness, Chief William Beaman, with the Germantown Fire Department, entered the defendant’s apartment first. After entering the apartment, Chief Beaman announced “fire department” twice, and the defendant called him upstairs. Once upstairs, Chief Beaman saw the defendant giving the victim CPR. The victim was not breathing and did not have a pulse. The victim’s extremities were dark and cool to the touch indicating he had not been breathing for forty-five minutes to an hour. Chief Beaman expected to find the victim’s airway blocked and was surprised to find the airway clear.

The defendant told Chief Beaman the victim had been “fine about an hour ago.” Chief Beaman began CPR on the victim as the remaining emergency crew came upstairs to assist. The defendant came into the room “a couple of times” and appeared concerned. The emergency personnel then transported the victim to the emergency room, and Lieutenant Mark Carter, another first responder, accompanied the defendant to the hospital.

Then Lieutenant, now Captain, Mark Carter, an EMS coordinator with the Germantown Fire Department, arrived at the scene and went upstairs to join the other paramedics. He found the defendant in the room “standing over” everyone. Captain Carter took the defendant downstairs and interviewed him. The defendant told Captain Carter the victim did not have a medical history and did not take any medication except Tylenol, but had not taken any that evening

Captain Carter asked the defendant to recount the day’s events. The defendant told Captain Carter the victim played normally during the day but fell off a bike several times. Captain Carter saw the bike and opined it was large enough for a ten or twelve year-old. The defendant told Captain Carter that, after riding the bike, the victim ate a snack, watched a movie, and went to bed. Later, the defendant could not wake the victim.

Captain Carter then gave the defendant a ride to the hospital. On the way, Captain Carter asked the defendant to go over the day’s events again. This time, the defendant told Captain Carter the victim and his sister got off the bus, had a snack, and took a nap. After Captain Carter heard the defendant recount two different versions of the day’s events, he informed a police officer at the hospital that detectives should interview the defendant.

Prior to the State’s next witness, the trial court conducted a jury-out hearing to determine the admissibility of photos taken during the victim’s autopsy. The trial court redacted several photos by trimming those depicting the victim with his eyes open and by covering the victim’s genitalia with exhibit stickers. The trial court additionally required the State to convert a photo of a subdural hemorrhage to black and white. Finally, the trial court excluded all photos in which the victim’s internal injuries were visible, finding the medical examiner could instead rely on anatomical diagrams when explaining the victim’s injuries to the jury.

The State next called an expert witness, Dr. Karen Chancellor, Chief Medical Examiner for Shelby County. Dr. Chancellor performed the autopsy on the victim on November 15, 2009. Dr. Chancellor noted the victim had numerous injuries on his face, scalp, chest, and abdomen. The victim also had either one large bruise or a confluence of bruises on his abdomen. One of the injuries to the victim’s head caused a hemorrhage in the deep scalp tissue, which could only occur through the application of severe force. The victim also had numerous abrasions on his body.

Upon conducting the autopsy, Dr. Chancellor discovered the victim had about 150 to 200 cubic centimeters of blood inside his abdomen, which comprised about thirty to forty percent of the victim’s total blood volume. Dr. Chancellor stated that level of blood loss would have sent the victim into shock, with death following shortly thereafter. She found fatty tissue from the mesentery floating in the blood removed from the victim’s abdominal cavity. Dr. Chancellor noted this was very unusual. The mesentery, the membrane that keeps the bowels in place, was completely torn, resulting in severe internal bleeding. Dr. Chancellor noted the mesentery was a “very tough substance” and would require a severe injury to tear.

In addition to the torn mesentery, Dr. Chancellor found bruised lung tissue; blood outside the esophagus; and hemorrhages on the large and small intestine, transverse colon, and subcutaneous and skeletal muscle tissue in the victim’s abdomen. Of note, she also found the psoas muscle, a muscle running from the lower spine to the top of the leg, had been completely torn away from the spine. The psoas muscle was completely “pulpified” and the victim’s spine was exposed internally. Dr. Chancellor noted she had never before seen such a severe injury to the psoas muscle. She further stated all the injuries occurred “close in time” to one another.

Dr. Chancellor testified the cause of death was the injury to the abdomen which led to fatal internal bleeding. She did note, had the victim received immediate medical attention, there would have been a possibility of survival. When asked if the injuries could have come from falling off a bicycle, Dr. Chancellor opined such a fall could cause one, but not all, of the injuries. Over the defendant’s objection, Dr. Chancellor further opined a seventeen-month-old child could not possess the developmental coordination to ride a bike. The trial court allowed this testimony after the State laid a foundation for Dr. Chancellor’s expertise, which included medical training on child development. Dr. Chancellor concluded by stating the victim could not have received these injuries on his own, and the manner of death was homicide.

The State concluded its case-in-chief with testimony from Detective Anthony Kemp, an investigator with the Germantown Police Department. Detective Kemp interviewed the defendant at the hospital shortly after the victim had been pronounced dead. Detective Kemp noted the defendant “rambled” a bit during the interview. During this interview, the defendant stated the victim fell while playing in leaves. It was not until two days later that the defendant admitted he stepped on the victim. Detective Kemp then went to the defendant’s apartment where the defendant performed a reenactment of his version of events. Detective Kemp witnessed the defendant place a stuffed animal on the other side of a baby gate and jump over the gate, landing on the stuffed animal’s stomach. The State played a video of this reenactment for the jury. Detective Kemp stated the defendant did not accept responsibility for the victim’s death.

B. Defendant’s Evidence

The defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that the day the victim died, the victim and his sister were playing outside. He testified the victim fell off a bike and fell again while playing in a pile of leaves. After this, the defendant placed the victim in a room secured with a baby gate because he was worried the victim might fall down the stairs. According to the defendant, the victim often threw tantrums and hit his head. He testified that he heard a “thud” and thought the victim had climbed over the gate and fallen down the stairs. In his rush to determine what happened, the defendant jumped over the gate and landed on the victim, who was lying on the ground behind the gate. The defendant’s leg buckled and his hand struck the victim’s head. When the defendant landed, he heard the victim make a noise “like he had never heard before.”

The victim “looked stunned” but was breathing. The defendant tried to feed the victim who barely ate and then vomited. The defendant thought if the victim relaxed, he would be fine. He put the victim in his playpen and then went downstairs to watch a movie. When the defendant returned an hour later, he found the victim unresponsive. The defendant called the victim’s grandmother, who told him to call 9-1-1. He called 9- 1-1 and began performing CPR until the paramedics arrived.

The defendant remembered being interviewed at the hospital but “everything was a blur at that point.” After approximately two days of interviews, the defendant told investigators he stepped on the victim and explained he did not include this information in his initial accounts of the incident because he was ashamed. The defendant then performed the afore mentioned reenactment for police investigators. The defendant admitted he lied to law enforcement due to his embarrassment and maintained the entire incident was an accident.

C. State’s Rebuttal Evidence

In rebuttal, the State first called Detective Ryan Carter of the Germantown Police Department. Detective Carter questioned the defendant at the hospital with Detective Kemp and then interviewed the defendant over the subsequent two days. After two days of questioning, the defendant admitted to stepping on the victim. Detectives Carter and Kemp then witnessed the defendant’s reenactment of the jump. The defendant told Detective Carter that after stepping on the victim, he tried to get the victim to play outside and attempted to feed him. Noticing the victim was in distress, the defendant placed the victim in his playpen. When the defendant checked on the victim thirty minutes later, he found the victim unresponsive. According to Detective Carter, the defendant’s story remained consistent after he offered this final version of events. The defendant was cooperative throughout the investigation.

Finally the State called Dr. Karen Lakin, Assistant Professor of Pediatrics at the University of Tennessee, medical director for the Le Bonheur Cares program, and a pediatrician with University Le Bonheur Pediatric Specialists. Dr. Lakin testified that the Pediatric Specialists program focused on traumatic injuries to children and worked with law enforcement and Child Protective Services when there were concerns of child abuse. Prior to Dr. Lakin’s testimony, the defense objected because Dr. Lakin reviewed photographs of prior injuries the victim received before November 14 that were excluded before trial. The trial court overruled the objection and instructed Dr. Lakin to base her expert opinions on the evidence presented at trial.

Dr. Lakin testified she was trained in differentiating a diffuse, accidental injury from a specific, direct-force injury. She opined the defendant’s “accidental-stepping” account was inconsistent with the injuries listed in the autopsy report. When an “accidental-stepping” injury occurs, the child typically suffers rib fractures, radius fractures, or occasionally femur fractures. She concluded the lack of bone fractures suggested the victim’s injuries were not caused by an “accidental stepping.”

Additionally, Dr. Lakin had never seen injuries to the intestines or pancreas in similar “accidental-stepping” cases. Severe and traumatic organ ruptures usually result from direct force to a specific area of contact, rather than dissipated force over a wide area. The complete rupture of the psoas muscle, the tearing of the mesentery, and the hemorrhages in multiple parts of the body were not typical “accidental-stepping” injuries. Dr. Lakin noted a rupture of the psoas muscle was highly unusual and the type of injury more often caused by a car accident.

On cross-examination, Dr. Lakin stated a direct blow would likely cause more damage than a 250-pound man falling on an infant. However, Dr. Lakin conceded she did not have the biomechanical training necessary to determine the exact pounds of force required to cause the victim’s injuries. According to Dr. Lakin, if the defendant did step on the victim, only an “extremely violent and severe” impact could have caused the injuries.

D. Jury Instructions

The trial court charged the jury with the four count indictment and instructed the jury on the necessary law. The trial court also instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses for each count, which on at least three occasions included the definition of “knowing.” However, the trial court did not provide a definition for “knowing” under count three, aggravated child abuse.

The jury found the defendant guilty as charged on all four counts and sentenced him to life imprisonment under count one. The trial court merged count two with count one and count four with count three and sentenced the defendant to twenty-two years at one-hundred percent. The defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial, the trial court overruled both. This timely appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant challenges his conviction on seven grounds. First, the trial court committed reversible error when excluding a day care accident report indicating the victim injured himself two months prior to his death. Second, the trial court erred when allowing the jury to view post-mortem photographs detailing the victim’s injuries. Third, the trial court erred when allowing the medical examiner to testify regarding the victim’s developmental capacity, and a pediatrician specializing in the treatment of child abuse injuries to testify regarding the biomechanics of the victim’s injuries. Fourth, the State failed to properly elect the “substantial bodily injuries” inflicted to satisfy the elements of aggravated child abuse. Fifth, there was insufficient evidence the defendant knowingly inflicted all of the victim’s injuries to support the jury’s verdict. Sixth, the trial court erred when failing to define the mens rea required to prove aggravated child abuse. Finally, the cumulative effect of these errors denied the defendant a fair trial. We disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A. Day Care Accident Report

We first consider whether the trial court erred when excluding a day care accident report because the teacher who prepared the report was not the same teacher that witnessed the reported tantrum. The Tennessee Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). “Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as provided by [the Tennessee Rules of Evidence] or otherwise by law.” Tenn. R. Evid. 802. The day care’s accident report constituted hearsay evidence that was not admissible unless it satisfied an exception provided in the Rules of Evidence or some other law. Arias v. Duro Standard Prod. Co., 303 S.W.3d 256, 262 (Tenn. 2010).

Our Supreme Court recently announced the following standard of review with regard to hearsay:

The standard of review for rulings on hearsay evidence has multiple layers. Initially, the trial court must determine whether the statement is hearsay. If the statement is hearsay, the trial court must then determine whether the hearsay statement fits within one of the exceptions. To answer these questions, the trial court may need to receive evidence and hear testimony. When the trial court makes factual findings and credibility determinations in the course of ruling on an evidentiary motion, these factual and credibility findings are binding on a reviewing court unless the evidence in the record preponderates against them. Once the trial court has made its factual findings, the next questions - whether the facts prove that the statement (1) was hearsay and (2) fits under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule - are questions of law subject to de novo review.

Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 479 (Tenn. 2015) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 335 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2015).

Records of regularly conducted business activities are not excluded by the hearsay rule. See Tenn. R. Evid. 803(6). Often known as the business records exception, a party seeking to admit a document under this exception must make five showings:

1. The document must be made at or near the time of the event recorded;

2. The person providing the information in the document must have first- hand knowledge of the recorded events or facts;

3. The person providing the information in the document must be under a business duty to record or transmit the information;

4. The business involved must have a regular practice of making such documents; and 5. The manner in which the information was provided or the document was prepared must not indicate that the document lacks trustworthiness.

Arias, 303 S.W.3d at 263 (quoting Alexander v. Inman, 903 S.W.2d 686, 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)).

The defendant argues the accident report met all five prongs of the business records exception. The form was a record of an act, the victim’s tantrum and injury, and was recorded the same day as it occurred. The witness to the event, Ms. Fleming, reported the acts to Ms. Yates. Ms. Yates then prepared the document and provided it to Ms. Eddins, the custodian of records. The defendant argues Ms. Yates had “knowledge of the recorded events or facts” because Ms. Fleming gave Ms. Yates an account of the occurrence. The State argues Ms. Yates did not observe the event first-hand, so the report lacked trustworthiness and did not meet all the requirements of the business record exception. Based on our review of the record, we agree with the State.

Ms. Yates did not have first-hand knowledge of the victim’s tantrum and injury. When reviewing the document, it is unclear who observed the injury. Ms. Eddins testified at trial, however, that Ms. Fleming, not Ms. Yates, observed this tantrum. Accordingly, the document does not satisfy the second prong of the business records exception. At best, the accident report contained hearsay within hearsay and the defendant has not provided an exception that would allow admission of Ms. Fleming’s hearsay. State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 278 (Tenn. 2016); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 805 (“Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules or otherwise by law.”). Therefore, the observation report was not admissible.

Even if the trial court erred when excluding the document, the error was harmless. The exclusion of this evidence did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, so the defendant bore the burden of proving the report’s exclusion “more probably than not” prejudiced the defendant. State v. Bell, 512 S.W.3d 167, 190-91 (Tenn. 2015); State v. Herron, 461 S.W.3d 890, 909 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 372 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b)). Ostensibly, the defendant wished to introduce this report to show the victim had a history of violent tantrums. However, the defendant was able to introduce two other accident reports from the day care indicating the victim had a history of tantrums and had received injuries during these incidents. Moreover, the excluded report documented a tantrum thrown two months prior to the victim’s death. Based on the expert evidence presented at trial, any injuries self-inflicted at that time had no relevance to the injuries that caused the victim’s death. The defendant is not entitled to relief.

B. Photographs of the Victim’s Injuries

The defendant next challenges the trial court’s admission of post-mortem photographs of the victim. The State introduced sixteen photographs that detailed the victim’s injuries. A few of the photographs provided a closer view of specific scratches and bruises on the victim’s body. Four of the photographs included a view of the victim’s face with his eyes closed. The State introduced all of the photographs to aid Dr. Chancellor in her testimony regarding the victim’s cause of death and to refute the defendant’s contention the victim’s death was an accident. The trial court excluded the autopsy photographs showing details of the victim’s internal injuries. Instead, the trial court required the State to use anatomical diagrams to aid Dr. Chancellor’s explanations. Additionally, the trial court redacted photographs where the victim’s eyes were open or that displayed the victim’s genitalia.

Tennessee courts traditionally acknowledge “a policy of liberality in the admission of evidence in both civil and criminal cases.” State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978); see also State v. Robinson, 930 S.W.2d 78, 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). To be admissible, evidence must satisfy the threshold determination of relevancy mandated by Rule 401 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949. Rule 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. However, relevant “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . the danger of unfair prejudice.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403; see also Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951.

Graphic, gruesome, or even horrifying photographs of crime victims may be admitted into evidence if they are relevant to some issue at trial and their probative value is not outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949-51. On the other hand, “if they are not relevant to prove some part of the prosecution’s case, they may not be admitted solely to inflame the jury and prejudice them against the defendant.” Id. at 951 (citing Milam v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1955)). The decision as to whether such photographs should be admitted is entrusted to the trial court, and that decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Id. at 949; State v. Dickerson, 885 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

The defendant argues the State presented sixteen autopsy photographs and did not need the photographs of the victim’s injuries that also portrayed the victim’s face because closer images were available and the State had ample photographic evidence to aid Dr. Chancellor in her testimony. Accordingly, the photographs depicting the victim’s face were cumulative, prejudicial, and lacked probative value. According to the defendant, - 10 -

the age of the victim was not in dispute, so the trial court erred when finding the photographs of the victim’s face were probative because they “showed the age of the victim.”

The State asserts the photographs were necessary because, while the cause of the victim’s death was not in dispute, the extent of the injuries was probative to establish that the injuries were not accidental. The State points out Dr. Chancellor utilized every photograph during her testimony to illuminate to the jury that the victim’s injuries were contemporaneously inflicted and that the nature of the injuries indicated homicide, not an accident. Based on our review of the record, we agree with the State.

We note a discrepancy as to which photographs are being challenged. The defendant’s brief challenges Exhibits 13, 15, and 16. The State, however, references Exhibits 9, 12, 14, and 15. In the interest of thoroughness, we have reviewed all of the listed photographs.

Exhibits 9 and 12 both show close up photographs of a small cut and a bruise. These photographs do not depict the victim’s face, genitalia, or any blood. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when admitting these photographs. See State v. Derek Williamson, No. M2010-01067-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3557827, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2011) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2011) (citing Collins v. State, 506 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973) (holding photographs are not necessarily rendered inadmissible because they are cumulative of other evidence or because descriptive words could be used)). Dr. Chancellor utilized these photographs during her testimony helping the jury understand the extent and nature of the victim’s injuries. Id.

Exhibits 13 through 16 show various injuries to the victim’s arms and face. The victim’s face is visible in these photographs, but his eyes are closed. There is no blood or exposed tissue visible in these photographs. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when admitting them. Each photograph provides a different view of the victim’s various injuries and each was used by Dr. Chancellor in her testimony at trial. Id. They were relevant to show that all of the victim’s injuries were inflicted within the same time period during the course of one continuing episode and to show that the injuries were not inflicted accidentally. See State v. Paul Jerome Johnson, Jr., No. E2013-02437-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 1579873, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2015) (concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when admitting autopsy photographs that were probative of the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries and relevant to show the injuries were inflicted during the course of one continuous episode).

- 11 - The defendant relies on the case State v. Collins when arguing the admission of photographs of a dead infant was inherently prejudicial. 986 S.W.2d 13, 21 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). However, Collins is not applicable to the present case. In Collins, the State presented the jury with graphic color photographs of a deceased infant. Id. Many of the photographs depicted the victim still covered in blood and showed exposed bone or the victim’s genitalia. Id. In the present case, no blood was visible in any of the challenged photographs. Additionally, the trial court took deliberate steps to redact photographs showing the victim’s genitalia or open eyes and ordered the State to convert a photograph of a subdural hemorrhage to black and white so as to minimize its prejudicial nature. The trial court excluded internal autopsy photographs and instead had Dr. Chancellor rely on anatomical diagrams when explaining the extent of the victim’s internal injuries. The trial court carefully evaluated each photograph individually before ruling on its admissibility. The trial court weighed the probative value of the photographs against any prejudice to the defendant when concluding they were admissible or too inflammatory. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. State v. Hughes, No. M2016-01222-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3724457, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2017) (holding the trial court’s steps in redacting and altering photographs indicated proper discretion in admitting post-mortem photos). Thus, the defendant is not entitled to relief. C. Expert Witness Testimony The defendant next challenges the expert testimony of both Dr. Chancellor and Dr. Lakin. The defendant argues that both witnesses lacked the qualifications to answer specific questions regarding the victim and his injuries. Additionally, the defendant argues that Dr. Lakin was an improper rebuttal witness and relied on inadmissible evidence in forming her opinion. ^[1]. Dr. Karen Chancellor The defendant does not challenge Dr. Chancellor’s testimony in its entirety. The defendant only challenges Dr. Chancellor’s testimony regarding the developmental ability of the victim to ride a bike at the age of seventeen months. It is well-established that questions regarding the admissibility, relevancy, and competency of expert testimony are left to the broad discretion of the trial court. See Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tenn. 2005); State v. McLeod, 937 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tenn. 1996). “We may not overturn the trial court’s ruling admitting or excluding expert testimony unless the trial court abused its discretion.” Brown, 181 S.W.3d at 273; see also McLeod, 937 S.W.2d at 871. A trial court abuses its discretion “when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous - 12 - assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Scott, 275 S.W.3d 395, 404-405 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008)). The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Tennessee Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 301 (Tenn. 2007); Brown, 181 S.W.3d at 273. Rule 702 states, “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Tenn. R. Evid. 702. Rule 703 provides: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. The court shall disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or inference if the underlying facts or data indicate lack of trustworthiness. Tenn. R. Evid. 703. When determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the trial court must first determine whether the witness is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to give an opinion within the limits of the witness’s expertise. Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 402; State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 834 (Tenn. 2002). “The determinative factor is whether the witness’s qualifications authorize him or her to give an informed opinion on the subject at issue.” Stevens, 78 S.W.3d at 834. A trial court “may make a finding of reliability if the expert’s conclusions are sufficiently straightforward and supported by a rational explanation which reasonable [persons] could accept as more correct than not correct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant argues Dr. Chancellor is not qualified to testify to the victim’s developmental ability to ride a bike. The State asked Dr. Chancellor if the victim would plausibly have been able to ride a bike. The trial court required the State to lay the foundation for Dr. Chancellor’s expertise in child development. Dr. Chancellor then stated that medical school provided her with the knowledge to speak to the developmental ability of a seventeen-month-old child. The trial court certified Dr. Chancellor as an expert qualified to offer the opinion sought, and Dr. Chancellor opined a seventeen-month-old child would not have been developmentally able to ride a bike as - 13 - the defendant claimed. The defendant maintains that, as a forensic pathologist, Dr. Chancellor was only qualified to speak to the cause of the victim’s death, and whether the victim had the ability to ride a bike fell beyond the scope of her expertise. The State contends Dr. Chancellor’s education and training and her continued medical education required to maintain an active license provide a sufficient basis of knowledge to opine on the subject. We agree with the State. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when permitting Dr. Chancellor to testify to the victim’s developmental ability to ride a bike. The trial court required the State to lay a foundation for Dr. Chancellor’s expertise. Brown, 181 S.W.3d at 273. It is logical that developmental capacity would have been part of Dr. Chancellor’s training and within the purview of her expertise; therefore, the trial court did not err in accepting her qualifications. Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 404-05. Moreover, any error was harmless. The defendant did not claim the fatal injuries occurred due to the victim’s fall from a bike. Rather, the defendant conceded he stepped on the victim. Accordingly, Dr. Chancellor’s testimony regarding the victim’s ability to ride a bike had little effect at trial. Herron, 461 S.W.3d at 909. The defendant maintains he did not present a “bicycle theory” at trial, so Dr. Chancellor’s testimony was wholly irrelevant and prejudicial. However, the defendant, in statements to police and first responders, claimed the victim had fallen while riding a bike a few hours prior to his death. These statements make questions regarding whether the victim could ride the bike relevant for a jury to consider for purposes of credibility alone. Tenn. R. Evid. 401; see also Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949. The defendant is not entitled to relief. ^[2]. Dr. Karen Lakin The defendant next challenges Dr. Lakin’s rebuttal testimony. The State offered Dr. Lakin as an expert in general pediatrics and child abuse pediatrics to refute the defendant’s argument that the victim’s injuries were the result of an “accidental stepping.” The trial court certified Dr. Lakin as an expert in general pediatrics and child abuse pediatrics but instructed the jury that it must decide whether to rely on Dr. Lakin’s opinion in light of her training and experience. Dr. Lakin testified the injuries she observed from the evidence presented to the jury could not have resulted from an “accidental stepping,” as the defendant maintains. The defendant challenges Dr. Lakin’s testimony on four different grounds. First, Dr. Lakin was not an expert in biomechanics or forensic pathology, so she could not testify to the plausibility of the defendant’s version of events. Second, Dr. Lakin testified to the ultimate issue of whether the victim died as a result of a deliberate act and therefore her testimony was improper. Third, Dr. Lakin reviewed inadmissible photos of - 14 - the victim’s previous injuries prior to her testimony, which tainted her opinion.^[1] Finally, allowing a child abuse expert to testify was inherently prejudicial as it gave the jury the impression the victim must have been abused. The State maintains the trial court acted within its discretion when allowing Dr. Lakin to testify as an expert in general pediatrics and child abuse pediatrics. The State further responds that Dr. Lakin’s testimony was pertinent to rebutting the plausibility of the defendant’s version of events and did not speak to the ultimate issue. Again, we agree with the State. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when allowing Dr. Lakin to testify as to the mechanics of the victim’s injuries. Dr. Lakin conceded she had no specialized training in biomechanics; however, Dr. Lakin’s practice involved diagnosing the mechanics of injuries potentially caused by child abuse. Dr. Lakin’s training allowed her to determine the difference between injuries caused by accidental or dissipated forces versus those caused by specific or direct forces. Dr. Lakin provided the following example to illustrate her role as a child abuse pediatrician: If you have a baseball bat that falls on top of someone they may get a bruise. But if you have a baseball bat that’s swung at someone and impacts someone, you can kill them. You can have a very severe injury. So it’s still the same baseball bat but it’s a matter of how it makes contact with the person. Dr. Lakin may not have been able to testify to the forces involved when a 250-pound man lands on a small child; however, her testimony was relevant in illuminating whether the injuries she observed were consistent with an accidental or a specific force. In light of the defendant’s theory, her rebuttal testimony was extremely relevant. Tenn. R. Evid. 401; see also Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949. Additionally, the trial court issued an instruction cautioning the jury to only consider Dr. Lakin’s testimony in light of her qualifications, and the defendant challenged the relevancy of her qualifications during his closing statements. Furthermore, Dr. Lakin’s opinion was not directed to the ultimate issue of whether the victim died as a result of knowing abuse. The Tennessee Rules of Evidence provide that “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Tenn. R. Evid. 704. However, opinion testimony is not admissible on an ultimate issue if the jury could readily draw its own conclusions on the matter without the aid of the witness’ opinion. See State v. Turner, 30 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000);