¹ The trial court erred in denying [appellant’s] Motion for Grand Jury Information for the Preceding Five Years.

² The trial court erred in denying [appellant’s] motions for change of venue.

³ The trial court erred in limiting questioning and denying [appellant’s] motion to strike prospective jurors Delores Palmer and Aaron Whitworth for cause.

⁴ The trial court erred in denying [appellant’s] motion to strike the capital murder charge.

⁵ The trial court erred in denying a second-degree murder instruction.

⁶ The trial court erred in admitting testimony about an alleged statement made by [appellant] during his arraignment.

⁷ The trial court erred in denying [appellant’s] Motion to Set Aside the Verdict. For the following reasons, this Court affirms appellant’s convictions. I. BACKGROUND On appeal, “we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 439, 442, 642 S.E.2d 295, 296 (2007) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004)). So viewed, the evidence is as follows. The Shooting On March 7, 2013, appellant shot and killed Virginia State Trooper Junius Alvin Walker on the shoulder of Interstate 85 in Dinwiddie County. Appellant had pulled his car onto the shoulder because it “had been running hot.” Walker activated his police cruiser’s blue lights and pulled over beside appellant’s car, at which point appellant—without provocation—fired numerous shots into the cruiser at Walker, killing him. As Walker’s cruiser rolled toward the woods beside the interstate, appellant followed and continued firing his rifle into it. Thomas Hales, a delivery truck driver, was heading south on Interstate 85 at the time of the shooting. Noticing the state police cruiser resting at the edge of the woods and finding it - 15 - proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986))). But Virginia’s grand jury procedures, like those of all states, remain subject to certain constitutional minimums. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 563 (1979) (“Federal habeas review is necessary to ensure that constitutional defects in the state judiciary’s grand jury selection procedure are not overlooked by the very state judges who operate that system.”). Although most errors, including constitutional errors, are subject to harmless error review, structural constitutional errors require automatic reversal because they “deprive defendants of ‘basic protections’ without which ‘a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence . . . and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.’” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)). The United States Supreme Court has held that intentional racial discrimination in grand jury selection in violation of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause is such a structural error. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986) (“[D]iscrimination in the grand jury undermines the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself, and is not amenable to harmless-error review. . . . Once having found discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, we simply cannot know that the need to indict would have been assessed in the same way by a grand jury properly constituted. The overriding imperative to eliminate this systemic flaw in the charging process, as well as the difficulty of assessing its effect on any given defendant, requires our continued adherence to a rule of mandatory reversal.”). The Sixth Amendment provides a separate basis for challenging jury selection and composition. From that Amendment’s guarantee of trial “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” the Supreme Court has derived a - 16 - requirement that trial juries represent a fair cross-section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). This requirement, however, may not apply to state grand juries. See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 403 (1998) (declining to rule on whether state grand jury selection procedures are subject to Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenges). To establish a prima facie fair-cross-section violation, a defendant must show: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Crucially absent from this test is any showing of intent to discriminate. Indeed, the Duren majority intended a fair-cross-section challenge to lie regardless of proof of intent. See id. at 368 n.26 (noting that discriminatory purpose constituted an “essential element” of equal protection challenges, whereas “in Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section cases, systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant’s interest in a jury chosen from a fair community cross section” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that the difference between equal protection and fair-cross-section challenges “apparently lies in the fact, among others, that under equal protection analysis prima facie challenges are rebuttable by proof of absence of intent to discriminate, while under Sixth Amendment analysis intent is irrelevant, but the State may show ‘adequate justification’ for the disproportionate representation of the classes being compared”). 3. Appellant’s Request for Grand Jury Information Under what circumstances a criminal defendant is entitled to the information used to select grand jurors in order to prepare a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenge is a question of first impression in Virginia. Appellant urges this Court to adopt the procedure - 17 - identified by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Prieto v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149, 721 S.E.2d 484 (2012), for obtaining information used to select petit jurors. In that case, the Court held that good cause exists to provide a defendant with the petit jury list from which his venire would be selected in order to investigate potential constitutional challenges. Id. at 185, 721 S.E.2d at 505. The Court recognized that lists for additional years may be useful for establishing a constitutional challenge, but that a defendant would be entitled to them only after establishing a “constitutionally significant underrepresentation of a distinctive group in the venire from which his jury would be selected” using the initial list. Id. at 185, 721 S.E.2d at 506. The Preito Court’s reasoning is distinguishable in the grand jury context. As an initial matter, no authoritative tribunal has yet held that a defendant may make a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenge against a state’s grand jury procedures. See Campbell, 523 U.S. at 403. Additionally, the Prieto Court itself was presented with a request for grand jury information, but held that the request was procedurally defaulted because it was made after the defendant entered a plea. The Court ruled without opining, even in dicta, whether the same petit jury procedures would apply in the grand jury context. Prieto, 283 Va. at 181-84, 721 S.E.2d at 503-05. Moreover, appellant’s motion in the instant case sought disclosure of five years of grand jury information, not merely the year in which he was indicted. He made no effort to narrow this request either at trial or in his assignment of error on appeal. Virginia decisions, Prieto among them, have consistently emphasized that jury lists are sensitive documents and their disclosure raises serious concerns about citizen privacy. Archer, 213 Va. at 641, 194 S.E.2d at 712 (noting that even after a showing of good cause, inspection of jury lists should occur “only under the ‘watchful eye of the court’”); see also Prieto, 283 Va. at 185, 721 S.E.2d at 505 (“The disclosure of an expired jury list does not raise the same tampering or harassment concerns that the - 18 - disclosure of a current jury list does, but it still raises privacy concerns. A jury list contains sensitive information that should be protected. We thus believe that a good-cause standard is appropriate for the release of both a current and expired jury list.”). Because “[e]xposure of the list to the public could lead to tampering with and harassment of potential jurors and seriously affect their impartiality and the proper administration of justice,” courts must exercise caution in permitting their disclosure. Archer, 213 Va. at 641, 194 S.E.2d at 712. Lacking any binding authority requiring it to disclose the requested information to appellant, the trial court assessed appellant’s motion in light of these known principles: appellant had no constitutional or statutory entitlement to the information and his broad request implicated recognized citizen privacy considerations. Given these considerations, this Court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for five years of grand jury information. Even assuming that the trial court did err in denying appellant’s motion, such error was harmless. Because Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenges, unlike Equal Protection Clause challenges, do not require or even contemplate intentional discrimination, see Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26, they are not among the “very limited class of cases” in which error is structural. Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)). As such, the failure to provide a defendant with information used to select grand juries—even if it were error—would be subject to harmless error review like any other nonstructural error, even those of a constitutional dimension. Id. Accordingly, because the petit jury ultimately convicted appellant of all charges, the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion was inescapably harmless. The trial jury’s guilty verdict not only means that probable cause existed to believe appellant was guilty as charged, but that he was in fact guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. See Diehl, 9 Va. App. at 196, 385 S.E.2d at 231. - 19 - B. Motion to Change Venue In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his repeated motions to change venue. Appellant specifically cites the intensive media coverage of the crime, the close-knit Dinwiddie community’s collective mourning of Walker, and the difficulty of seating a jury to support his argument that he could not receive a fair trial in Dinwiddie County. Because appellant failed to overcome the presumption that he would receive a fair trial in the jurisdiction in which the crime occurred, this Court holds that the trial court did not err in denying his motions. 1. Standard of Review “Change of venue is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and refusal to grant it will not constitute reversible error unless the record affirmatively shows an abuse of discretion.” Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 137, 314 S.E.2d 371, 379 (1984). In reviewing motions to change venue, appellate courts begin with the presumption that the defendant can receive a fair trial from the citizens of the jurisdiction where the offense occurred. Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 477, 643 S.E.2d 708, 720 (2007); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 216, 230, 559 S.E.2d 652, 659-60 (2002). The defendant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption by “clearly showing ‘that there is such a widespread feeling of prejudice on the part of the citizenry as will be reasonably certain to prevent a fair and impartial trial.’” Stockton, 227 Va. at 137, 314 S.E.2d at 280 (quoting Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 248, 257 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1979)). 2. Merits In determining whether community prejudice against the defendant is sufficiently pervasive to preclude a fair trial and justify a change in venue, the primary inquiry is the ease with which an impartial jury can be selected. Thomas, 263 Va. at 231, 559 S.E.2d at 660. “This - 20 - is so because the relative ease of seating an impartial jury negates the existence of the ‘widespread prejudice’ which a criminal defendant must show to justify a change in venue.” Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 407, 384 S.E.2d 757, 767 (1989) (quoting Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 120, 360 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1987)). Moreover, “[j]urors are not required to be totally ignorant of the facts and issues in a case. Consequently, the mere showing of extensive publicity or general knowledge of a crime or of the accused, including his criminal record, is not enough to justify a change of venue.” Id. at 406-07, 384 S.E.2d at 767 (citations omitted). In fact, many of the most qualified jurors will know enough about the case to have formed some preliminary opinions: In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961). Nevertheless, the volume and timing of publicity, as well as whether that publicity is factually accurate, temperate, and noninflammatory remain pertinent concerns in assessing whether a change in venue was appropriately denied. Buchanan, 238 Va. at 407, 384 S.E.2d at 767; Thomas, 263 Va. at 230-31, 559 S.E.2d at 660. Where media coverage, though voluminous, is largely factual and unprovocative, it will not justify a venue change. See Stockton, 227 Va. at 137, 314 S.E.2d at 380 (observing that despite the volume of press coverage, “the articles, in the main, were factual in nature” in upholding denial of venue change); Buchanan, 238 Va. at 407, 384 S.E.2d at 767 (affirming denial of venue change in part because - 21 - “the publicity was accurate and noninflammatory”); LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 578, 304 S.E.2d 644, 651 (1983) (holding lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying venue change despite extensive publicity because “[t]he news articles tendered to the court simply reported the facts, which are shocking in themselves” and “were not inflammatory”). a. Nature of Coverage There is no dispute that this case received substantial media attention. Of course, “sheer volume of publicity is not alone sufficient to justify a change of venue.” LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 578, 304 S.E.2d at 651. On brief, appellant alleges only two inaccuracies out of the hundreds of pages of media coverage included in the record, neither of which are actually inaccurate. The first related to statements appellant made during his initial court appearance that suggested he was aware of his guilt and accepted that he might receive the death penalty. As discussed further infra, testimony that appellant in fact stated “I’m guilty. Go ahead and stick the needle in my arm,” in open court was admitted into evidence at appellant’s trial, thereby supporting the accuracy of the news accounts. The second alleged inaccuracy was a television report offering a speculative account of Walker’s death in which the newscaster suggested that Walker pulled over and asked appellant, “Can I help you, brother?” Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Williams, 49 Va. App. at 442, 642 S.E.2d at 296, the only logical inference from the fact Walker stopped his police cruiser near appellant’s stationary vehicle on the interstate shoulder is that Walker planned to assist appellant. Moreover, appellant’s own opening statement acknowledged this obvious inference, including the observation, “Trooper Walker pulls up next to [appellant], most likely to see if he was okay,” in a narrative of the events leading up to the shooting. Accordingly, the newscaster’s implication was accurate regardless of the precise words used in the broadcast. - 22 - Appellant further contends that the media coverage was inflammatory, emphasizing the extensive coverage of “Walker’s extraordinary local standing and memorialization” as well as appellant’s criminal history and legal team. Appellant, however, cites no binding precedent holding that factual reporting of a victim’s life and community standing is inflammatory for purposes of a change-of-venue inquiry, nor is this Court aware of such precedent. Further, media reports covering a criminal defendant’s past conduct is not per se inflammatory. See Thomas, 263 Va. at 231, 559 S.E.2d at 660 (“[P]ublication of matters concerning the crime, the accused’s prior criminal record, and even a confession of the accused, if factually accurate and non-inflammatory, is not improper and will not alone support a change of venue.”). The threshold for establishing that a factual report of a defendant’s history is inflammatory is a high one. For instance, the Supreme Court has upheld denial of a venue change even where media reports labeled the defendant “Surry’s Public Enemy No. 1,” discussed his “life of crime” and described his involvement in a variety of serious offenses, and even compared him to Charles Manson. Stockton, 227 Va. at 135-36, 314 S.E.2d at 379. Appellant cites no coverage sufficiently sensational to be deemed inflammatory; instead, the media reports, “in the main, were factual in nature.” Id. at 137, 314 S.E.2d at 380. Finally, appellant contends that certain reports regarding statements by the trial court and prosecution concerning defense counsel were inflammatory; a review of the record indicates that the reports accurately set forth those statements. The timing of the publicity in this case further supports the trial court’s denial of a venue change. “On a change of venue motion, the court must look to the conditions at the time of the trial, not to the conditions at the time of the crime.” Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 717, 204 S.E.2d 414, 420 (1974). Appellant contends that the media continued its extensive coverage of the case through trial. Appellant, however, cites few reports between the initial - 23 - frenzy of coverage in March 2013, when the crime occurred, and July 2016, when the trial began. In fact, the lull in coverage was a common topic during jury selection. When asked what he had heard about the case, one potential juror replied: “It’s been kind of so long, I don’t remember, really, a whole lot about it. It was a shooting. . . . It’s probably been at least a few years ago.” Another similarly stated that he could put aside his opinions based on the prior media reports because they “first came out a while back” and he now had “very little recollection” of them. In Greenfield, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s denial of a change in venue in part because of the “substantial time difference between the date of the crime, November of 1972 (when most of the press accounts appeared), and the date of the trial, June 13, 1973”—a difference of eight months. 214 Va. at 717, 204 S.E.2d at 420. Because over three years elapsed between the crime and trial in this case, the lull in coverage further supports the trial court’s decision to deny appellant’s motion. b. Ease of Jury Selection Turning to the “critical element” in determining a community’s degree of prejudice, Thomas, 263 Va. at 231, 559 S.E.2d at 660, appellant contends that “[s]eating a fair jury in Dinwiddie was an impossible task.” Measuring the ease of impaneling a jury is an important tool in considering a request for change of venue. It allows the trial court to take into account a cross section of the community so as to understand the pervasiveness of prejudice. It also allows the trial court to keep in mind that justice must not only be fair, it must also be above suspicion, because the more difficult it is to seat a jury, the more likely it is that the public will believe the judicial process to be tainted by prejudice. Id. at 233, 559 S.E.2d at 661. Appellant emphasizes the number of jurors questioned and the amount of time it took to qualify the twenty-eight prospective jurors necessary to proceed. He then compares those numbers to figures in Thomas, relying on that case for the proposition that because the selection - 24 - process here was more difficult than there, this Court must find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to change venue. Appellant’s reliance on Thomas is misplaced. At the outset, we note that whether to grant a motion to change venue is not a mathematic calculation based on the number of prospective jurors considered and days of voir dire. Instead, as appellant acknowledges on brief, courts considering motions to change venue should look to the “totality of the surrounding facts.” Irvin, 366 U.S. at 721. Additionally, Thomas is distinguishable from this case. Contrary to appellant’s characterization, the Supreme Court in Thomas did not reverse the lower court because it abused its discretion in denying a motion to change venue. In fact, the Thomas Court did not even reach the abuse-of-discretion question. Instead, it held that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by failing to apply the proper test and failing to consider the necessary factors when making its decision to deny Thomas’ motion to change venue. Consequently, because the trial court used an improper legal standard in exercising its discretionary function, we are unable to apply the appellate review standard of abuse of discretion. In light of this holding, the judgment of conviction must be vacated. 263 Va. at 233, 559 S.E.2d at 661. The lower court in Thomas looked exclusively to whether “it had ultimately seated an impartial jury” in denying the motion to change venue; it did not consider the ease of seating a jury. Id. at 232, 559 S.E.2d at 661. This, the Supreme Court held, was an improper test. Id. A simple statistical comparison between this case and Thomas is therefore unpersuasive in assessing the ease of jury selection here. This Court instead looks to the actual selection process in the trial court to determine whether it abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion. The trial court maintained an awareness of the Thomas decision throughout voir dire, alluding to it multiple times in its ruling. It recognized that the selection process took six days and that it considered six panels of twenty jurors before arriving at the final pool of twenty-eight jurors. Recognizing that, “on their face, - 25 - the percentages look bad,” the trial court noted: “I don’t think I can approach this mechanically and say if the level of people who know is X percent, then I will automatically grant the motion.” Instead, it considered why the selection process took six days and why it was necessary to consider so many jurors. The trial court indicated that it deliberately took a slower, cautious approach to jury selection, including individual questioning of most prospective jurors, because the “multiple considerations” in this case required a “thorough and careful approach.” The trial court recognized that it was not “publicity alone” that necessitated a slower voir dire, but instead “all the other considerations . . . such as the insanity defense, the fact it is a capital murder case, the questions regarding burden of proof, psychologists, law enforcement, and so forth.” The core issue in the trial below was appellant’s insanity defense. Both parties agreed that appellant killed Walker; the controversy was whether appellant was criminally liable for doing so in light of his mental condition. As such, prospective jurors’ opinions regarding the insanity defense and comprehension of the burden of proof for that defense were essential considerations during voir dire. Similarly, because appellant was charged with capital murder, the trial court had to ensure that the jury was death qualified. These complex concerns bear greater responsibility for the length of jury selection than issues related to the potential partiality of the jury pool. In fact, more prospective jurors were stricken for their views on the death penalty, difficulty understanding the burdens of proof, and other reasons unrelated to prejudice against appellant than those stricken for a fixed opinion of appellant’s guilt or familiarity with Walker or his family. The trial court conducted a deliberate and thoughtful voir dire in order to seat an appropriate jury. In each day of selection and with each panel considered, it made appreciable progress toward seating a jury—at no point did the process stall. Most excused prospective jurors were stricken for reasons unrelated to prejudice against appellant or knowledge of the - 26 - case. The trial court appropriately considered the impact of media coverage and applied the correct legal standards to its analysis of appellant’s motions. For those reasons, this Court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant failed to overcome the presumption that he would receive a fair trial in Dinwiddie County and accordingly denying his motions to change venue. C. Motions to Strike Specific Jurors In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by limiting questioning during voir dire and in denying his motions to strike prospective jurors Delores Palmer and Aaron Whitworth for cause. Because appellant fails to provide any argument or authority for the proposition that the trial court improperly denied him the opportunity to ask questions during voir dire, this Court finds that contention procedurally defaulted under Rule 5A:20(e). See Rambo v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 418, 426-27, 658 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2008). Further, because both challenged jurors indicated their impartiality after thorough examination, this Court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to strike them. 1. Standard of Review “Given that the trial court is ‘able to see and hear each member of the venire respond to questions posed’ during voir dire, it ‘is in a superior position to determine whether a prospective juror’s responses during voir dire indicate that the juror would be prevented from or impaired in performing the duties of a juror as required by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.’” Lovos-Rivas v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 55, 61, 707 S.E.2d 27, 30 (2011) (quoting Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329, 619 S.E.2d 71, 73 (2005)). “Juror impartiality is a question of fact, and a trial court’s decision to seat a juror is entitled to great deference on appeal.” Id. “Accordingly, the decision to retain or exclude a prospective juror ‘will not be - 27 - disturbed on appeal unless there has been manifest error amounting to an abuse of discretion.’” Id. at 62, 707 S.E.2d at 30 (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 823, 826, 553 S.E.2d 731, 732 (2001)). In assessing juror impartiality, this Court considers the voir dire in its entirety, not merely a challenged juror’s isolated statements. See Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 212, 576 S.E.2d 471, 482 (2003). 2. Merits Code § 8.01-385 permits both the court and counsel for either party to examine prospective jurors in order to ascertain, among other things, whether they have formed an opinion or have any bias or prejudice regarding the case. If the court finds that a “juror does not stand indifferent in the cause,” then it strikes that juror. Code § 8.01-385. As this Court has repeatedly recognized, It is not uncommon to discover during voir dire that prospective jurors have preconceived notions, opinions, or misconceptions about the criminal justice system, criminal trials and procedure, or about the particular case. Even though a prospective juror may hold preconceived views, opinions, or misconceptions, the test of impartiality is whether the venireperson can lay aside the preconceived views and render a verdict based solely on the law and evidence presented at trial. Cressell v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 744, 761, 531 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2000) (quoting Griffin v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 619, 621, 454 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1995)). Under this rule, a prospective juror is disqualified if he or she holds “an opinion of that fixed character which repels the presumption of innocence in a criminal case, and in whose mind the accused stands condemned already.” Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 976, 266 S.E.2d 87, 91 (1980) (quoting Slade v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 1106, 156 S.E. 388, 391 (1931)). With these principles in mind, we consider the jurors that appellant challenges. Early in her examination, Palmer stated that she had formed an opinion that “he did it.” Immediately thereafter, she clarified that she would “still have to draw [her] own answer” and, - 28 - for the remainder of voir dire questioning by both parties, steadfastly maintained that she would decide the case based on the evidence presented at trial. The trial court, which was in a superior position to assess Palmer’s responses, characterized her as someone who had developed an initial opinion based on prior news reports, but needed to hear the evidence at trial before deciding the case. Whitworth similarly developed an initial opinion about the case based on media reports— he said “[i]t would be hard not to form an opinion” after hearing about the case—but maintained that he would not let the information he had learned affect his judgment. He “realize[d] that media coverage . . . is entertainment” and acknowledged that he did not “know enough about what happened to be able to base a judgment on that.” Like Palmer, he recognized that he could not remove what he had learned, but insisted he would decide the case “based solely on evidence presented in the courtroom.” And although Whitworth had prior personal experience with mental illness in his family and became emotional while discussing it, he likewise maintained that his personal experiences would not inhibit his ability to consider appellant’s case. On the specific facts of this case, however, this Court need not reach the question whether the prospective jurors’ responses evinced such a state of mind as to disqualify them. See Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 760, 771 n.11, 274 S.E.2d 305, 312 n.11 (1981) (“Whether a juror is impartial and stands indifferent to the cause is to be determined in light of the controverted issues.”). Any tentative opinions formed by the challenged jurors were that appellant had shot Walker. Crucially, this fact was not in controversy. As appellant concedes, the essential issue in this case was whether appellant was legally insane when he shot Walker. Accordingly, “any previously held opinion that [appellant] fired the gun was irrelevant to a determination of his criminal responsibility for his acts” and “[n]one of the . . . prospective jurors had formed any opinion as to [appellant’s] sanity.” Id. at 771, 274 S.E.2d at 312. With respect to Whitworth’s prior personal experiences with mental health issues in his family, the trial court - 29 - carefully assessed Whitworth’s answers and properly concluded that “he was sufficiently rehabilitated” to remain in the jury pool. Therefore, because the prospective juror’s responses indicated that they had not formed “fixed and decided opinion[s]” about appellant’s sanity, the issue upon which his guilt or innocence turned, id., and because they were not otherwise disqualified, this Court holds that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motions to strike Palmer and Whitworth. D. Intent to Interfere with Walker’s Official Duties In his fourth assignment of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of capital murder. Specifically, appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he acted with the intent to interfere with Walker’s official duties as a Virginia State Police officer. Because the evidence supports the inference that appellant acted with the requisite intent, this Court holds that the trial court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to strike the capital murder charge. 1. Standard of Review “When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court ‘must affirm the conviction unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Gerald v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 167, 172, 805 S.E.2d 407, 410 (2017) (quoting Spencer v. City of Norfolk, 271 Va. 460, 463, 628 S.E.2d 356, 358 (2006)). Under this familiar standard of review, “[a]n appellate court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193, 677 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. “Additionally, upon appellate review, the evidence and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be examined in the light - 30 - most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court. Any evidence properly admitted at trial is subject to this review.” Commonwealth v. Presley, 256 Va. 465, 467, 507 S.E.2d 72, 72 (1998). 2. Merits Code § 18.2-31(6) provides, in part, that the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a law-enforcement officer as defined in § 9.1-101 . . . when such killing is for the purpose of interfering with the performance of his official duties” constitutes capital murder. The Supreme Court has held that the crucial inquiry contemplated by the statute is not whether the officer was in fact engaged at the time he was killed in performing a law enforcement duty but, rather, whether the killer acted with the purpose of interfering with what he perceived to be an officer’s performance of a law enforcement duty. Delong v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 357, 369, 362 S.E.2d 669, 676 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 440, 271 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1980)). “[W]hether the required intent exists is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact.” Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 548, 551, 238 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1977). “Intent in fact is the purpose formed in a person’s mind and may be, and frequently is, shown by circumstances.” Becker v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 481, 491, 769 S.E.2d 683, 688 (2015) (quoting Abdo v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 468, 475, 769 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2015)). “Circumstantial evidence is as acceptable to prove guilt as direct evidence, and in some cases, such as proof of intent or knowledge, it is practically the only method of proof.” Abdo, 64 Va. App. at 476, 769 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980)). Importantly, the “reasonable inferences to be drawn from proven facts are within the province of the trier of fact.” Robertson v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 814, 820, 525 S.E.2d 640, 643 (2000) (quoting Fleming v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 349, 353, 412 S.E.2d 180, 183 (1991)). - 31 - As such, the “fact finder may infer that a person intends the immediate, direct, and necessary consequences of his voluntary acts.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 530, 533, 399 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1991)). The record reveals ample evidence from which the jury may have inferred that appellant acted with the intent to interfere with Walker’s performance of his official duties. Walker was in uniform when he pulled over his marked police cruiser with lights activated. All parties acknowledge that the only reasonable explanation for Walker pulling over was to assist appellant on the roadside, an act within a state trooper’s official duties. Further, appellant’s own words indicate that he knew he attacked and killed a law enforcement officer acting in his official capacity: he recognized that “a police car pulled up beside him on the shoulder” and stated that he “knows [police] procedure” because “police are supposed to pull behind you with lights on and call for backup.” His extended gunfight with Moss, who was uniformed and arrived in a marked state police cruiser, provided further evidence from which the jury could infer appellant’s intent to interfere. Appellant concedes that he knew what he was doing; his insanity defense relied solely on the claim that he did not understand the wrongfulness of his actions. Both clinical psychologists who examined appellant agreed that appellant was fully aware he had killed an officer in the line of duty. Nelson testified that appellant “repeatedly said” that he knew he was shooting a gun and knew that he “killed a police officer.” Nelson additionally acknowledged that appellant had “multiple rational motives for shooting a police officer that day.” Boyd agreed that appellant was aware of the nature of his actions and that they constituted a capital offense. The jury thus had before it evidence that Walker was acting in his official capacity, that appellant knew he was killing a police officer in the line of duty, that he understood killing Walker would necessarily prevent Walker from carrying out his official duties, and that he - 32 - undertook that action voluntarily. Because the jury is entitled to draw inferences from the evidence presented, and it further “may infer that a person intends the immediate, direct, and necessary consequences of his voluntary acts,” Robertson, 31 Va. App. at 820, 525 S.E.2d at 643, it appropriately found that appellant killed Walker with the intent to interfere with the performance of his official duties. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that sufficient evidence had been presented to submit the issue to the jury and therefore did not err in denying appellant’s motion to strike the capital murder charge. E. Second-Degree Murder Instruction In his fifth assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his proffered instruction on second-degree murder because more than a scintilla of evidence supported a finding that the shooting was not willful, deliberate, or premeditated. Because the evidence presented at trial did not support a second-degree murder instruction, this Court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying it. 1. Standard of Review “When reviewing a trial court’s refusal to give a proffered jury instruction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.” King v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 580, 583, 770 S.E.2d 214, 216 (2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 263 Va. 31, 33, 557 S.E.2d 220, 221 (2002)). Jury instructions “are proper only if supported by the evidence,” Commonwealth v. Donkor, 256 Va. 443, 445, 507 S.E.2d 75, 76 (1998), and “more than a mere scintilla of evidence” is required, Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 130, 132, 415 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1992). “If any credible evidence in the record supports a proffered instruction . . . failure to give the instruction is reversible error.” Id. at 132, 415 S.E.2d at 251; see also Foster v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 380, 383, 412 S.E.2d 198, 200 - 33 - (1991) (“[A] trial judge may not refuse to grant a proper, proffered instruction if evidence in the record supports the defendant’s theory of defense.”). 2. Merits Familiar principles govern appellate review of a trial court’s refusal of a lesser-included offense instruction in murder cases: “We have long recognized that evidence showing a murder ‘to have been deliberate, premeditated and willful could be so clear and uncontroverted that a trial court could properly refuse to instruct on the lesser included offenses.’ It follows, therefore, that a criminal defendant ‘is not entitled to a lesser degree instruction solely because the case is one of murder.’ A second[-]degree murder instruction is only appropriate where it is supported by evidence. Moreover, the evidence asserted in support of such an instruction ‘must amount to more than a scintilla.’” Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 241, 661 S.E.2d 415, 434 (2008) (quoting Buchanan, 238 Va. at 409, 384 S.E.2d at 769). In Virginia, there is a presumption that all homicides are second-degree murders. LeVasseur, 255 Va. at 590, 304 S.E.2d at 658. “The presumption of second-degree murder,” however, must “yield[] to facts.” Id. (quoting Plymale v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 582, 602, 79 S.E.2d 610, 620 (1954) (Buchanan, J., dissenting)). In this case, no evidence presented supports a finding that appellant acted without willfulness, deliberation, or premeditation. The evidence instead paints a picture of a prepared actor carrying out a planned attack. Appellant was camouflaged, armed with a powerful hunting rifle, and had with him enough ammunition to kill Walker, shoot at Hales, and still carry on an extended gunfight with Moss. Appellant acted carefully during the gunfight, employing tactics consistent with Virginia State Police training procedures while engaging Moss. He continued to act strategically on retreat by abandoning his firearm and clothing, thus inhibiting the ability of police dogs to track him and similarly reducing the likelihood that another police officer would shoot him. Moreover, appellant ambushed Walker without provocation. Walker never had the - 34 - chance to put his cruiser in park, much less exit and draw his service sidearm. Appellant then followed Walker’s cruiser as it rolled into the woods where he was still firing at Walker’s body. Appellant’s own evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to him, established that he acted with premeditation. The essence of the psychiatric testimony he offered only challenged his ability to distinguish right from wrong. Accordingly, because there was not more than a scintilla of evidence to justify an instruction on second-degree murder, this Court holds that the trial court did not err in refusing appellant’s proffered instruction for that reason. F. Statement at Appellant’s Arraignment In appellant’s sixth assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting his statement, “I’m guilty. Go ahead and stick a needle in my arm,” made during his arraignment because the Commonwealth failed to disclose it during discovery and it constituted improper rebuttal evidence. Because the statement was not subject to discovery disclosure and was relevant to contradict appellant’s argument that he did not know his actions were wrong, this Court affirms the trial court’s ruling. 1. Standard of Review “Appellate courts review evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard.” Boone v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 383, 388, 758 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2014). To the extent this inquiry requires interpretation of statutes or rules of court, this Court reviews such questions of law de novo. Woodard v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 276, 280, 754 S.E.2d 309, 311 (2014). 2. Merits Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth was required to provide notice of the statement during discovery pursuant to Rule 3A:11 and the discovery order. Both the rule and order required the Commonwealth to disclose to defense counsel all “written or recorded statements made by the accused, or copies thereof, or the substance of any oral statements or - 35 - confessions made by the accused to any law enforcement officer.” Rule 3A:11(b)(1). If a statute or rule is unambiguous, this Court will “apply the plain meaning of the language appearing” therein. Harvey v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 280, 285, 777 S.E.2d 231, 234 (2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Amos, 287 Va. 301, 305-06, 754 S.E.2d 304, 306-07 (2014)). “The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction.” Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 519, 522-23, 465 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1996) (quoting Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992)). In this case, both Rule 3A:11(b)(1) and the order required prior disclosure of “any oral statements” made “to” a law enforcement officer. Although the order contains only the phrase “oral statements,” Rule 3A:11(b)(1) includes beside it the phrase “or confessions.” This Court has consistently recognized and applied the canon of statutory construction known as “noscitur a sociis.” “Noscitur a sociis is the principle that ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’ It ‘provides that the meaning of a word takes color and expression from the purport of the entire phrase of which it is a part, and it must be read in harmony with its context.’” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 402, 411, 672 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2009) (en banc) (first quoting S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006), then quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 460, 309 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1983)). As such, the fact that Rule 3A:11(b)(1) provides for disclosure of a defendant’s “oral statements or confessions” he or she makes “to a law enforcement officer” indicates that the rule contemplates disclosure only of those statements made either in response to police questions or at least volunteered to an officer, but not those an officer merely happens to hear. In this case, Mann testified that he heard appellant make the statement during an arraignment in open court. Appellant did not make the statement in response to a question from Mann; he was not even speaking to Mann when he made it. Mann was simply present in the - 36 - public courtroom and heard what appellant said. To accept appellant’s reading of the rule would require this Court to mandate disclosure of any oral statements made within hearing of a law enforcement officer, drastically expanding the Commonwealth’s disclosure duties beyond the rule’s plain meaning. This Court declines to do so. The Commonwealth was not required, during discovery, to provide notice of appellant’s statement, and the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant’s argument to that effect. Appellant alternatively contends that the statement was improperly admitted during the Commonwealth’s rebuttal case because it was consistent with the defense evidence and therefore irrelevant. The crux of the defense case was to establish that although appellant knew what he was doing, he did not appreciate that his actions were wrong and was therefore insane. The Commonwealth introduced the statement in order to rebut that argument. All relevant evidence is generally admissible, Va. R. Evid. 2:402, and “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact in issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence” is relevant, Va. R. Evid. 2:401 (emphasis added). Appellant’s statement at arraignment permitted the inference that, because he was conscious of guilt and accepted the possibility of punishment for what he had done, he knew his actions were wrong. Because the statement thus had at least some tendency to prove that appellant realized his actions were wrong, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement. 3. Harmless Error Even if the trial court erred in admitting the statement, that error was harmless. “No trial is perfect, and error will at times creep in.” Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1009, 407 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1991) (en banc) (quoting Parsons v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 832, 852, 152 S.E. 547, 554 (1930)). “In Virginia, non-constitutional error is harmless ‘when it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a fair - 37 - trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached.’” Id. at 1005-06, 407 S.E.2d at 911 (quoting Code § 8.01-678). “In a criminal case, it is implicit that, in order to determine whether there has been ‘a fair trial on the merits’ and whether ‘substantial justice has been reached,’ a reviewing court must decide whether the alleged error substantially influenced the jury.” Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 259, 546 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2001) (quoting Code § 8.01-678). “An error does not affect a verdict if a reviewing court can conclude, without usurping the jury’s fact finding function, that, had the error not occurred, the verdict would have been the same.” Lavinder, 12 Va. App. at 1006, 407 S.E.2d at 911. Appellant acknowledged that, if admitted, the statement “would be cumulative rather than rebutting anything.” In fact, appellant offered at trial several of his other statements demonstrating his awareness that execution was a potential punishment for his action. Because admission of the statement was, by appellant’s own admission, merely “cumulative,” any error in admitting it was harmless. G. Motion to Set Aside the Verdict In his final assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the verdict because no evidence contradicted the defense expert testimony that appellant was legally insane at the time of the offense. Because the jury was free to reject appellant’s evidence and find that he failed to prove his insanity defense, this Court holds that the trial court did not err in denying the motion. 1. Standard of Review This Court “will reverse a trial court’s refusal to set aside a jury verdict only if that verdict was ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 288, 795 S.E.2d 908, 915 (2017) (quoting Code § 8.01-680). “If there is evidence to support the conviction[], the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.” - 38 - Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 641, 691 S.E.2d 786, 788 (2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998)). On review of a sufficiency challenge based on a motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, the key issue is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442, 657 S.E.2d 499, 502 (2008) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 2. Merits “In Virginia, unlike many jurisdictions, insanity is an affirmative defense that the defendant must establish to the satisfaction of the fact finder.” Shifflett, 221 Va. at 769, 274 S.E.2d at 310. The defendant bears the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. White v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 123, 129, 616 S.E.2d 49, 52 (2005) (en banc); see also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 316, 322, 157 S.E.2d 185, 189-90 (1967) (“In Virginia, every man is presumed to be sane until the contrary is made to appear and when insanity is relied upon as a defense in a criminal prosecution, it must be proved by the defendant to the satisfaction of the jury. This does not shift the ultimate burden of proof which rests upon the Commonwealth to prove the commission of the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”). The test for insanity in Virginia is the M’Naghten test stated in the disjunctive: “[I]t must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” Price v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 452, 457, 323 S.E.2d 106, 109 (1984) (quoting M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722-23 (1843)). Appellant contends that he proved - 39 - his insanity under this test as a matter of law because there were “no factual disputes about the defendant’s sanity.” This argument mischaracterizes the evidence. Although the Commonwealth did not present expert testimony about appellant’s mental health, it provided evidence that appellant was both aware of his actions in killing Walker and knew that what he did was wrong. The Commonwealth also thoroughly cross-examined both defense experts, highlighting weaknesses in their evaluation methodologies. In doing so, the experts conceded that appellant had “multiple rational motives for shooting a police officer” and that “several of [his] actions pointed away from insanity . . . and towards an awareness that his actions were legally wrong.” Once the Commonwealth has adduced proof that “the accused committed the act, it is not sufficient for the accused to raise a reasonable doubt as to his sanity; he must go one step further and prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act.” Wessells v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 664, 673, 180 S.E. 419, 422 (1935). The jury was free to reject appellant’s evidence and find that he failed to prove his insanity defense. Because its fact finding was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it, the trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the jury’s verdict. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms appellant’s convictions. Affirmed. - 40 -