Michael C. Weigand & Lois M. Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
Michael C. Weigand & Lois M. Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
34 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991 2008 2026
Cited for
At page 1074 Determining statute of limitations for estimated tax refunds13 citing casesunpublished1 citing court put it this way
  • Winford v. United States, 889 F. Supp. 2d 863 (W.D. La. 2012).published
    Id. (citing Dantzler v. United States, 183 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir.1999); Ertman v. United States, 165 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir.1999); Ott v. United States, 141 F.3d 1306, 1308-09 (9th Cir.1998); Gabelman v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d 609, 611-12 (6th…
  • Boensel v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 607 (Fed. Cl. 2011).published
    While the Federal Circuit declined to adopt a per se rule that all remittances accompanying such requests for extensions are “payments” as have five other circuits cited in that opinion, see id. (citing Dantzler v. United States, 183 F.3d…
  • Nicholas Acoustics & Specialty Co., Inc. v. United States, 644 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2011).published
    Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 27-28 (1st Cir.1993) (per curiam); Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir. 1985); Ehle v. United States, 720 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam). 5 .
  • Deaton v. Comm'r, 440 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2006).published
    See Dantzler v. United States, 183 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir.1999); Ertman v. United States, 165 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir.1999); Ott v. United States, 141 F.3d 1306, 1308-09 (9th Cir.1998); Gabelman v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d 609, 611-12 (6th Cir.199…
  • Ford Motor Co. v. City of Hazelwood, 155 S.W.3d 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).published
    See VanCanagan v. United States, 231 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2000); Dantzler v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 183 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th Cir.1999); Ertman v. United States, 165 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1999); Ott v. United States, 1…
  • William K. Vancanagan, in His Capacity as Pers. Rep. of the Est. of Ford Bovey, & Sharon Bovey v. United States, 231 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).published
    Dantzler v. United States, 183 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th Cir.1999); Ertman v. United States, 165 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1999); Ott v. United States, 141 F.3d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.1998); Gabelman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 86 F.3d 609,…
  • David F. Ertman & Jane Ertman v. United States, 165 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 1999).published
    See Ott v. United States, 141 F.3d 1306, 1309-10 (9th Cir.1998); Gabelman, 86 F.3d at 612-13 ; Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir.1985).
  • David v. United States, 964 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1997).published
    (unpublished)
  • Holtvogt v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Ohio 1995).published
    (estimated income tax remittance submitted on April 15th with application for extension to file return was a payment within the meaning of I.R.C. § 6513(b)(2), not a deposit)
  • Blatt v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 882 (W.D.N.C. 1993).published
    Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir.1985) held: The taxpayers seek to avoid the application of section 6513, however, by claiming that their April 15, 1976 payment was not a payment but a deposit citing Rosenman v. Unit…
Show 3 more citing cases
  • England v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 186 (D. Kan. 1991).published
    In our previous order we concluded that plaintiffs’ request for refund was time-barred if the remittance submitted with their application for extension of time was a “payment of estimated tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 6513 (b); Weigand v. United State…
  • John A. Gabelman v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 86 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 1996).published
    See Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir.1985); Holtvogt v. United States, 887 F.Supp. 994, 999 (S.D.Ohio 1995); Brockamp v. United States, 859 F.Supp. 1283 (C.D.Cal. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir.1…
  • Solomon Blatt, Jr., as of the Est. of Solomon Blatt v. United States, 34 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1994).published
    (rejecting claim that $25,000 estimated payment made at a time when taxes were payable was a deposit)
At page 1073 Determining if remittance constitutes a tax payment7 citing casesremittance with application for extension of time was a “payment” for purposes of Section 65131 citing court put it this way · 6 listed here
  • David v. United States, No. 97-1729 (1st Cir. Dec. 31, 1997).unpublished
    But even if the IRS is incorrect in -3- claiming that the circumstances shown warrant finding of a tax payment as matter of law under I.R.C. 6513(b)(1), which we do not decide, but cf. Gabelman v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 609, 612 (6th Cir. 1…
  • Ertman v. United States, 972 F. Supp. 706 (D. Conn. 1997).published
    (remittance with application for extension of time was a “payment” for purposes of Section 6513)
  • Teresa Marie Pantani & Edmund L. Pantani v. Shirley D. Peterson, Comm'r of Irs & United States of Am., 104 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 1996).unpublished
    See Gabelman v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 86 F.3d 609, 611-13 (6th Cir.1996); Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072, 1073-74 (10th Cir.1985); see also Zeier v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 80 F.3d 1360 , 1363-64 (9th Cir.1996)…
  • Porter v. United States, 919 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Va. 1996).published 2 cites
    Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072, 1073 (10th Cir.1985).
  • Video Training Source, Inc. v. United States, 991 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Colo. 1998).published
    See Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072, 1073 (10th Cir.1985).
  • Sugro, Inc. v. United States, 156 F.R.D. 233 (D. Colo. 1994).published 2 cites
    See Weigand v. United States, 760 F.2d 1072, 1073 (10th Cir.1985).
Other citing cases2 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Michael C. WEIGAND and Lois M. Weigand, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee
84-1224.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
May 1, 1985.
Published opinion
760 F.2d 1072
1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 31047
Timothy P. O’Sullivan of Regan & McGannon, Wichita, Kansas, for plaintiffs-appellants., Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael L. Paup, William S. Estabrook and Elaine F. Ferris, Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., and Benjamin L. Burgess, U.S. Atty., D. Kansas, for defendantappellee.
McKay, Logan, Seymour.
Cited by 27 opinions  |  Published
McKAY, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R. App.P. 34(a), Tenth Circuit R. 10(e). The cause is therefore submitted without oral argument.

The plaintiff taxpayers instituted this suit for a refund of income taxes that they claimed were overpaid for the tax year 1975. On April 15, 1976, the taxpayers submitted a Form 4868 (Application for Automatic Extension of Time to File), which granted them an automatic two-month extension of time in which to file their joint federal income tax return for the year 1975. As required by the regulations, the taxpayers submitted with this form an estimated tax payment of $25,000. On July 6, 1977, the taxpayers filed an unsigned Form 1040 claiming that their tax liability for the year 1975 was only $2,486.86. The unsigned form was returned by the Internal Revenue Service on July 15, 1977, along with a request for further information. The taxpayers’ signed Form 1040 for the year 1975 was not filed until August 10, 1980. Also on that date the taxpayers filed their 1977 tax return, claiming a $22,513.14 credit with respect to their 1975 tax year. On September 19, 1980, the Internal Revenue Service demanded payment of the $22,-513.14 tax for the year 1977 plus interest and penalties, refusing to recognize the credit from the year 1975. On December 21, 1980, the taxpayers filed a claim for refund of the $22,513.14, which was ultimately denied by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Thereafter the taxpayers commenced this suit for refund in the district court. The government filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the district court granted the government’s motion.

We find that the district court properly dismissed this case in reliance upon United States v. Miller, 315 F.2d 354 (10th Cir.1963). The taxpayers tried to distinguish Miller by pointing out that it was decided under the predecessor to the present Internal Revenue Code. However, the operative language in the code as it existed at the time Miller was decided is virtually identical to the code language that now exists. Thus we hold that Miller still controls.

Even in the absence of the Miller decision, the clear language of the statute requires that the plaintiff’s case be dismissed. Section 6511(b)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 bars the recovery of income taxes paid more than three years prior to the filing of a claim for refund, with an additional allowance of time for any extensions that have been granted for filing the return for the year in question. The taxpayers in this case were granted a two-month extension to file their return. Therefore, the statute of limitations would have run on the taxpayers’ claim for a refund with respect to any taxes paid prior to three years and two months before the filing of their claim for refund. At the earliest, the taxpayers’ claim for refund was filed on August 10,[*1074] 1980 when the taxpayers filed their signed 1975 return requesting that the credit from that year be applied to their 1977 income tax liability. A claim for refund with respect to any tax paid before June 10, 1977 would therefore be barred by the three-year two-month statute of limitations.

As was pointed out, the taxpayers’ estimated income tax was actually paid on April 15, 1976. In addition, by virtue of 26 U.S.C. § 6513(b)(2), “[a]ny amount paid as estimated income tax for any taxable year shall be deemed to have been paid on the last day prescribed for filing the return under section 6012 for such taxable year (determined without regard to any extension of time for filing such return).” Thus both the actual date of payment and the statutorily deemed date of payment put the taxpayers’ claimed overpayment outside the statute of limitations.

The taxpayers seek to avoid the application of section 6513, however, by claiming that their April 15,1976 payment was not a payment but a deposit citing Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S. 658, 65 S.Ct. 536, 89 L.Ed. 535 (1944). We rejected that claim on virtually identical facts in Miller and see no reason to accept it now. Miller, 315 F.2d at 358. While the estimated taxes paid in Miller were paid during the tax year under a different provision of the tax code than that pursuant to which these taxpayers made their estimated tax payment, we find that section 6513 applies to any estimated tax payment. Therefore, the taxpayers’ payment was made on April 15, 1976, and the claim filed in the fall of 1980 was beyond the statute of limitations. The decision of the district court is affirmed.