Patrick Johnson v. Louie L. Wainwright, Sec'y of Florida Dep't of Offender Rehab., & Kenneth Simmons, Etc., 772 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
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Patrick Johnson v. Louie L. Wainwright, Sec'y of Florida Dep't of Offender Rehab., & Kenneth Simmons, Etc., 772 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
8 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Joseph Tooma v. Monica David (ca11, 2010-06-10)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Joseph Tooma v. Monica David
11th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Johnson v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 826, 827 (11th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tooma v. Florida Parole Commission
S.D. Fla. · 2009 · confidence medium
In Paschal , the Court held that because the ultimate discretion about granting parole remains with the FPC, and because the parole guidelines (which were being challenged) “merely made a procedural change in how this discretion was exercised there was no ex post facto violation.” Johnson v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 826, 827 (11 Cir.1985), explaining Paschal.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen L. Penoyer v. Debra D. Briggs
11th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
In 1985, for example, we held that laws adopted two years earlier “in an effort to eliminate the arbitrariness and capriciousness that had crept into the old system,” did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause because they did nothing to change the fact that “the ultimate discretion on parole remained with the [C]ommission,” and the changes to the law only affected “the manner in which it exercise[d] this power.” Johnson v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 826, 827 (11th Cir.1985); see also Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Huston Jones, and All Others Similarly Situated v. Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles
11th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See also Paschal v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1173, 1178-81 (11th Cir.1984) (rejecting ex post facto challenge to Florida’s transition from ad hoc parole system to one employing presumptive release date grid because plaintiff prisoners could not demonstrate a sufficient risk of increased punishment: "most important for our purposes, the ultimate parole decision remains committed to the Commission’s discretion”); Damiano v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 785 F.2d 929, 933 (11th Cir.1986) (following Paschal) (rejecting ex post facto challenge to same Florida rule change because "parol…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Patrick JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary of Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation, and Kenneth Simmons, Etc., Respondents-Appellees
85-5052.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Sep 30, 1985.
772 F.2d 826
Sheryl J. Lowenthal, Coral Gables, Fla., for petitioner-appellant., Frank Migliore, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, Fla., for L. Wainwright., Kurt Ahrendt, Tallahassee, Fla., for Florida Parole.
Godbold, Hill, Anderson.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Appellant contends that when Florida adopted the Objective Parole Guidelines Act (OPGA), Fla.Stat.Ann. 947.001-.24 (1983 Supp.), and applied them to him, it violated the constitutional prohibition against passing ex-post-facto laws. Prior to OPGA the parole commission had discretion to release prisoners on a case-by-case basis in light of several relevant factors. OPGA, in an effort to eliminate the arbitrariness and capriciousness that had crept into the old system, required the commission to establish presumptive release dates based on the “seriousness of the offense” and “the likelihood of a favorable parole outcome.”

This court in Paschal v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1173 (11th Cir.1984), upheld OPGA against an ex-post-facto attack. We held that under both the new and old law the ultimate discretion on parole remained with the commission and that because the OPGA merely made a procedural change in how this discretion was exercised there was no ex post facto violation.

Appellant concedes that Paschal held that the ultimate discretion still remains with the commission but contends that his ex-post-facto rights have been violated because OPGA imposes new standards on the exercise of this discretion. Specifically, he relies on the fact that under the old system the goal of rehabilitation played a larger role in determining release dates than it does under the new system. This attempted distinction fails. The guidelines have clarified the commission’s exercise of its discretion. Paschal at 1179. The commission has created a system by which it attempts to use its discretion in a more uniform manner than previously. The substantive power of the commission remains unchanged; only the manner in which it exercises this power has been altered. Accordingly, the district court correctly held that its decision was controlled by Paschal.

AFFIRMED.