Demetrius Cyrus Georgalis v. Dist. Attorney Donnie Dixon, 776 F.2d 261 (11th Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
Demetrius Cyrus Georgalis v. Dist. Attorney Donnie Dixon, 776 F.2d 261 (11th Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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20 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Craig Evans v. Phillip Mitchell (alnd, 2026-03-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Craig Evans v. Phillip Mitchell
N.D. Ala. · 2026 · confidence medium
A petitioner must exhaust all available state-court remedies before filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kedrick Lamar Murray v. Judge Glenn Goggans
M.D. Ala. · 2026 · confidence medium
Third, “a district court may not grant a § 2241 petition ‘unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.’” Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092 , 1095–96 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); see also Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 812 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Among the most fundamental common law requirements of § 2241 is that petitioners must first exhaust their state court remedies.”) (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eugene Galimore v. Warden, Lee County Jail
M.D. Fla. · 2026 · confidence medium
A district court may not grant a § 2241 petition “unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.” Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258 , 1262 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying the exhaustion requirement to a state pretrial detainee’s section 2241 petition).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martinez v. Chronister (Hillsborough)
M.D. Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 (3rd Cir. 1975), explains that ‘although there is a distinction in the statutory language of §§ 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned.” Accord Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092, 1095-96 (11th Cir. 2022) (“It is by now well-settled that district court may not grant a Section 2241 petition ‘unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.’”’) (quoting Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985)); Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 812 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Among the mos…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Atkinson v. State of Florida
M.D. Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 (3rd Cir. 1975), explains that “although there is a distinction in the statutory language of §§ 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned.” Accord Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092 , 1095–96 (11th Cir. 2022) (“It is by now well-settled that district court may not grant a Section 2241 petition ‘unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.’”) (quoting Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985)); Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 812 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Among the mos…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cabiles v. Warden, Pasco County Detention Center
M.D. Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 (3rd Cir. 1975), explains that “although there is a distinction in the statutory language of §§ 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned.” Accord Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092 , 1095–96 (11th Cir. 2022) (“It is by now well-settled that district court may not grant a Section 2241 petition ‘unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.’”) (quoting Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985)); Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 812 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Among the mos…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Parker v. Judd (Polk County)
M.D. Fla. · 2024 · confidence medium
A federal district court may not grant a § 2241 petition “unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.” Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258 , 1262 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that courts apply the exhaustion requirement to a state pretrial detainee’s § 2241 petition).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jarman v. State of Florida
M.D. Fla. · 2024 · confidence medium
A federal district court may not grant a § 2241 petition “unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.” Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258 , 1262 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that courts apply the exhaustion requirement to a state pretrial detainee’s § 2241 petition).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Derousseau v. State of Florida
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
A. Exhaustion A federal district court may not grant a § 2241 petition “unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.” See Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258 , 1262 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that courts apply the exhaustion requirement to a state pretrial detainee’s § 2241 petition).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mendoza v. Warden, Hernando County Detention Center
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
A. Exhaustion A federal district court may not grant a § 2241 petition “unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.” See Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258 , 1262 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that courts apply the exhaustion requirement to a state pretrial detainee’s § 2241 petition).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moss v. Warden, Hernando County Detention Center
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
A. Exhaustion A federal district court may not grant a § 2241 petition “unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.” See Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258 , 1262 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that courts apply the exhaustion requirement to a state pretrial detainee’s § 2241 petition).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bateman v. Murray
N.D. Ala. · 2022 · confidence medium
The Eleventh Circuit, however, has made clear that “a district court may not grant a § 2241 petition ‘unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.’” Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092 , 1095–96 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johns v. State of Alabama (INMATE3)
M.D. Ala. · 2022 · confidence medium
A petitioner must exhaust all available state- court remedies before filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Combs v. Gualtieri
M.D. Fla. · 2022 · confidence medium
A federal district court may not grant a § 2241 petition “unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies.” See Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258 , 1262 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that courts apply the exhaustion requirement to a state pretrial detainee’s § 2241 petition).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Russell Johnson v. State of Florida
11th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
It is by now well established that a district court may not grant a § 2241 petition “unless the petitioner has exhausted all avail- able state remedies.” See Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258 , 1262 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that we apply the ex- haustion requirement to a state pretrial detainee’s § 2241 petition).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yancey v. Richie (INMATE 3)
M.D. Ala. · 2022 · confidence medium
Exhaustion A petitioner must exhaust all available state-court remedies before filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crandle v. Oliver
S.D. Ala. · 2018 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 443, 456 (1973), Justice Rehnquist states that the situations in which pretrial habeas ‘is justified involve the lack of jurisdiction, under the Supremacy Clause, for the State to bring any criminal charges against the petitioner.’ (emphasis added).” (footnote omitted)); Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[A]bsent special and unique circumstances, federal habeas corpus does not lie to adjudicate the merits of affirmative defenses to state criminal charges.” (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 489 ) (emphasis added)). corpus,…although the requirement of exhausti…
discussed Cited "see" HUNT v. CASTRO
N.D. Fla. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985) (remedies not exhausted where petitioner is raising speedy trial as an affirmative defense); Brown v. Estelle 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976) (an attempt to force the state to go to trial is attainable through federal habeas corpus but an attempt to abort a state proceeding is not).
discussed Cited "see" Ashford v. Warden, Osceola County Jail
M.D. Fla. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Georgalis v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261, 262 (11th Cir. 1985). 5In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered prior to October 1, 1981.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Demetrius Cyrus GEORGALIS, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
District Attorney Donnie DIXON, Et Al., Respondents-Appellees
84-8808.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Nov 13, 1985.
776 F.2d 261
1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 23896
Demetrius Cyrus Georgalis, pro se., Harry D. Dixon, Jr., Waycross, Ga., for respondents-appellees.
Fay, Johnson, Clark.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Petitioner appeals from an order of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He filed the writ in order to prevent the State of Georgia from trying him on certain criminal charges, maintaining that the State had violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C.App., by failing to extradite and try him within 120 days after a request was made.

[*262] Petitioner was originally arrested on a Georgia warrant on January 21, 1981. He posted bond but the warrant was later dismissed. On April 10, 1981, Georgia issued a second warrant, alleging the same crime, but a different date. In May of 1981, petitioner began serving a federal sentence at the prison camp at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. On May 26 of that year the District Attorney for the Waycross, Georgia Judicial Circuit requested a governor’s warrant for extradition; the warrant was issued on June 4, 1981. Georgia took no action on the arrest warrant until August 10, 1982, when it filed a request for custody, providing that the prisoner would be tried within the statutory time contemplated by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. However, on August 20,1982, the State of Georgia withdrew this request. [1]

On August 3, 1983, the district court ordered the Warden of the Eglin Air Force Base Prison Camp not to comply with any Georgia detainer that had been lodged against the petitioner, but to release him upon expiration of his federal sentence. Petitioner was subsequently released from federal custody. [2] On September 11, 1984, the district court denied petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, primarily based upon the fact that he had failed to exhaust his available state remedies. We affirm.

A federal court will not granli habeas corpus relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies. See Walker v. Zant, 693 F.2d 1087, 1088 (11th Cir.1982); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). In this case, the Georgia courts have not been given an opportunity to consider petitioner’s allegations. Although petitioner apparently filed motions to discharge the detainer and thus bar prosecution in the state courts, no evidentiary hearing was ever held due to his failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the state court. Thus, it would appear that he has failed to satisfy

the exhaustion requirement. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). In Braden, the Court found that petitioner had satisfied the practical demands of the exhaustion requirement by making repeated demands upon the state to try him. In this case, however, petitioner has not repeatedly sought to assert his right to a speedy trial, but rather he used his Speedy Trial right as a defense to pending criminal charges. However, absent special and unique circumstances, federal habeas corpus does not lie to adjudicate the merits of affirmative defenses to state criminal charges. Braden, supra, 410 U.S. at 489, 93 S.Ct. at 1126; See also Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886).

Petitioner’s claims will still be available to him at any proceeding in which he contests extradition or upon his trial in the State of Georgia. Therefore, finding that the adjudication of petitioner’s claims would be premature at this time, the decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

1

. The State of Georgia did indicate, however, that it was still interested in prosecuting petitioner at the completion of his federal sentence.

2

. Petitioner alleges that he is still on probation for his federal sentence. However, the record is unclear as to petitioner’s status as a federal prisoner.