Gerardo Antonio Roque-Carranza v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 778 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
Gerardo Antonio Roque-Carranza v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 778 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
158 citation events (30 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
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At page 1374 Procedural requirements for challenging administrative decisions70 citing cases“will avoid any premature interference with the agency's processes and, in addition to affording the parties and courts the benefit of the agency's expertise, it will compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.”5 citing courts quote it · passage not found verbatim in the opinion (71%) · 37 listed here
  • Myers v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2011). 2 cites
    See Aguilar-Escobar v. INS, 136 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998) (staying the mandate until the petitioner's application before the BIA is disposed of); Alvarez-Ruiz v. INS, 749 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir.1984) (staying the mandate sixty days…
  • Mathias Etchu-Njang v. John Ashcroft, No. 04-1054 (8th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005).
    See Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2001); Bernal- Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 1999); Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Stewart v. INS, 181 F.3d 587, 596 (4th Cir. 1999);…
  • Mathias Njang Etchu-Njang v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney Gen. of the United States of Am., 1, 403 F.3d 577 (8th Cir. 2005).
    See Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.2001); Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir.1999); Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 (10th Cir.1999) (per curiam); Stewart v. INS, 181 F.3d 587, 596 (4th Cir.1999); Arang…
  • Erlinda Gerardo Zara v. John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., 383 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2004). 2 cites
    If we were to hold that the BIA’s streamlining decision excused the administrative requirement of exhaustion of remedies, we would legitimize the very vice the exhaustion requirement was designed to prevent, namely, “premature interference…
  • Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2001). 2 cites
    Goonsuwan must first present his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the BIA, either on direct appeal or through a motion to reopen, otherwise § 106(c) precludes judicial review of the issue. 13 See Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3…
  • Vallejo v. INS, No. 99-1211 (1st Cir. Nov. 2, 1999).
    (discussing exhaustion requirement where alien asserts due process claim based upon ineffective assistance)
  • Bernal-Vallejo v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 195 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 1999).
    (discussing exhaustion requirement where alien asserts due process claim based upon ineffective *64 assistance)
  • Efran Pangilinan Sanga v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 132 F.3d 40 (9th Cir. 1997).
    Cf. Rogue-Carranza, 778 F.2d at 1374
  • Stanislaw Opoka v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 94 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 1996).
    See Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142 , *396 145-46 (7th Cir.1993); Roque-Carranza v. INS, 778 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9th Cir.1985).
  • Raul Aguirre-Moreno v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 89 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 cites
    Roque-Carranza v. INS, 778 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9th Cir.1985), quoting INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 , 143 n. 5 (1981).
Show 27 more citing cases
At page 1373 “must first submit a motion to reopen to the bia and state the new facts to be proved at the reopened hearing.”12 citing casesthe opinion's own words at *1373, quoted by 1 later opinions
  • Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2007).
    "A motion to reopen is the procedural vehicle through which a petitioner may bring, usually for the first time, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the BIA." Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS, 213 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir.2000); see als…
  • Gama Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2007).
    “A motion to reopen is the procedural vehicle through which a petitioner may bring, usually for the first time, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the BIA.” Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS, 213 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir.2000); see als…
  • Fisher v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).
    Roque-Carranza v. INS, 778 F.2d 1373, 1373-74 (9th Cir.1985); cf. Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir.1991) (asylum applicant cannot raise new evidence on appeal from Board’s decision to contest officially noticed facts).
  • 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2252, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3751 Saideh Fisher, AKA Saideh Hassib-Tehrani Kian Hosseini Lavasani v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).
    Roque-Carranza v. INS, 778 F.2d 1373, 1373-74 (9th Cir.1985); cf. Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir.1991) (asylum applicant cannot raise new evidence on appeal from Board's decision to contest officially noticed facts). 35 In…
  • Luan Berisha v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 35 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 1994). 2 cites
    Rogue-Carranza v. INS, 778 F.2d 1373, 1373-74 (9th Cir.1985).
  • Khosrow Gharib Rashtabadi v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 23 F.3d 1562 (9th Cir. 1994).
    Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir.1986) (discussing raising ineffective assistance claims before the BIA on a motion to reopen after substituting counsel); Roque-Carranza v. INS, 778 F.2d 1373, 1373-74 (9th Cir.1985) (same);…
  • Francisco Murillo-Cabrera v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1994).
    Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir.1986); Roque-Carranza v. I.N.S., 778 F.2d 1373, 1373-74 (9th Cir.1985); see 8 C.F.R.
  • Felix Pedro Flores-Molina v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 985 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1993).
    Accordingly, we have jurisdiction. 5 Our review of the Board's decision is governed by Castillo-Villagra v. INS, which held (1) the opportunity to move to reopen the Board's decision in order to present evidence to rebut the administrative…
  • Early Efrain Rodriguez-Haycerth v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 985 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1993).
    Accordingly, we have jurisdiction. 5 Our review of the Board's decision is governed by Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.1992), which held (1) the opportunity to move to reopen the Board's decision in order to present eviden…
  • Marvin Antonio Aragon-Aviles v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 985 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1993).
    Accordingly, we have jurisdiction. 5 Our review of the Board's decision is governed by Castillo-Villagra v. INS, which held (1) the opportunity to move to reopen the Board's decision in order to present evidence to rebut the administrative…
Show 2 more citing cases
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Gerardo Antonio ROQUE-CARRANZA, Petitioner,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent
83-7281.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Dec 17, 1985.
778 F.2d 1373
1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 25563
Jack Brand, Point Richmond, Cal., for petitioner., Joseph C. Ciolino, Atty., Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Browning, Anderson, Nelson.
Cited by 114 opinions  |  Published
J. BLAINE ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Gerardo Antonio Roque-Carranza is a native of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection. At his deportation proceedings, petitioner was represented by a non-attorney certified representative. On July 20, 1982, following a hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied petitioner’s application for asylum (8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)) and withholding of deportation (8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)). Petitioner’s representative appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the BIA eventually dismissed the appeal for failure to specify grounds. Petitioner’s representative had not filed a brief or requested oral argument.

On appeal to this court, petitioner argues that he was denied a full and fair hearing due to the ineffective assistance of his counsel below. To support this claim, petitioner proffers new evidence which he believes his representative should have discovered and presented at the hearing. This evidence, petitioner argues, would prove at least a well-founded fear of persecution.

INS regulations set out a mechanism for the reopening or reconsideration of deportation hearings. The petitioner must submit a motion to reopen to the BIA and state the new facts to be proved at the reopened[*1374] hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1985). The BIA is vested with the discretion to determine when a hearing should be reopened, INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 143 n. 5, 101 S.Ct. 1027, 1030 n. 5, 67 L.Ed.2d 123 (1981), based upon its evaluation of whether the evidence sought to be introduced is material and was previously unavailable. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1985). We have held that in circumstances such as at bar we will not supersede this ordinary reopening procedure by compelling the BIA to reopen the hearing. Ramirez-Gonzalez v. INS, 695 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir.1983). Thus, the petitioner must follow the INS regulations and file a motion to reopen or for reconsideration with the BIA.

In assessing petitioner’s due process claim, we must take these procedures for reopening into account.

“Only if we could say in advance of resort to the statutory procedure that it is incapable of affording due process to petitioned ] could we conclude that [he has] shown any legal excuse for [his] failure to resort to it or that [his] constitutional rights have been or will be infringed.”

Bakersfield City School District v. Boyer, 610 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 434-435, 64 S.Ct. 660, 672, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944)); see also Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir.1985). If the additional evidence petitioner seeks to present is material, he may obtain review of it by presenting it in a motion to reopen, citing his counsel’s incompetence and abandonment of his case as the reason the new evidence “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing____” 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1985). This procedure will avoid any premature interference with the agency’s processes and, in addition to affording the parties and courts the benefit of the agency’s expertise, it will compile a record which is adequate for judicial review. Rodrigues, 769 F.2d at 1349 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2466, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975)).

If his motion to reopen is denied, petitioner may challenge in this court the BIA’s decision as violative of due process through a petition to review the BIA’s refusal to reopen. See Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 412-15 (9th Cir.1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919, 937-39, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2777-78, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). At such a time, this court would be able to consider de novo, Lord Jim’s v. NLRB, 772 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.1985), and on a full record “the risk of an erroneous deprivation . . . through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards . . . .” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED and the decision of the BIA is AFFIRMED. The order of deportation shall be stayed for sixty days from the filing of this opinion, to allow time for petitioner to file a motion to reopen and, if a motion to reopen is filed with the BIA, for such further time as is necessary for the disposition of the motion by the BIA. See Alvarez-Ruiz v. INS, 749 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir.1984) (as amended) (per curiam).