United States v. Monnie M. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Monnie M. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1993 · …may have aided the jury in determining the credibility at p. 1444 ✓
G Cite: 2 distinguished/criticized. Strongest: United States v. Sharon Ann Rahm (Cited "but see")
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1991 · …she continued on the journey despite being raped and beaten because she was terrified of the consequences if caught trying to escape. ✓
28 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Angelo Stackhouse (ca9, 2024-06-27) · Strongest negative: United States v. Sharon Ann Rahm (ca9, 1993-05-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 18 U.S.C. § 2421-2422 cited 2× in this case · 8 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" United States v. Sharon Ann Rahm (2×)
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986) (upholding admission of expert testimony that "may have aided the jury in determining the credibility" of victim's claim).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Angelo Stackhouse
9th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
STACKHOUSE States v. Wesson, we similarly concluded that the purpose element under § 2421 was met where the defendant repeatedly raped and beat the victim and offered her services as a prostitute over the radio while travelling by truck across state lines. 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Epstein
D.N.J. · 2015 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950, 952-53 (8th Cir.1990) (finding that although the victim voluntarily agreed to accompany the defendant, she did not consent “to the kind of trip eventually undertaken”); United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. McBryar, 553 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir.) (kidnapping conviction upheld where defendant agreed to take victim to one destination but drove in opposite direction and refused her requests to be let out of automobile), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 , 98 S.Ct. 191 , 54 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977); Martinez v. G…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Si Lu Tian, Also Known as Ah Long
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950, 952 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that victim’s initial consent to accompany kidnapper did not preclude kidnapping conviction where victim was later detained); United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (upholding conviction under Federal Kidnapping statute where victim may have initially agreed to accompany defendant but where victim later expressed her desire to go home).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Phillip Henry Stands, Also Known as Phillip Henry Atkinson, Also Known as Phillip Henry Creek, United States of America v. Waylon Eric Duran, United States of America v. Miguel J. Duran
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
That Torrez agreed to accompany the others is not dispositive, because he "did not consent 'to the kind of trip eventually undertaken.' " United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950, 952 (8th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986)); see also United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 50-51 (8th Cir.1974) (inducing victim to accept ride and remain in vehicle under false pretenses constitutes inveigling or decoying), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 961 , 95 S.Ct. 1349 , 43 L.Ed.2d 437 (1975). 61 We interpret the "or otherwise" language in the kidnapping statute broadly.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Phillip Henry Stands
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
That Torrez agreed to accompany the others is not dis-positive, because he “did not consent ‘to the kind of trip eventually undertaken.’ ” United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950, 952 (8th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986)); see also United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 50-51 (8th Cir.1974) (inducing victim to accept ride and remain in vehicle under false pretenses constitutes inveigling or decoying), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 961 , 95 S.Ct. 1349 , 43 L.Ed.2d 437 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bridget M. Denny-Shaffer (2×)
10th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See United States v. Redmond, 803 F.2d 438, 439 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032 , 107 S.Ct. 1963 , 95 L.Ed.2d 534 (1987); United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986) (per curiam). 22 We agree with these interpretations of § 1201(a) and will accordingly consider the application of the kidnapping statute here to the actions of defendant in carrying out the abduction and also her actions subsequent to the abduction of the infant.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Herbert James Eagle Thunder, United States of America v. Hobart William Garneaux
8th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
In United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986) (per curiam), the court found that although the victim voluntarily agreed to accompany the defendant, she did not consent “to the kind of trip eventually undertaken.” The court noted that the victim later told the defendant she wanted to go home and continued on the journey because she was afraid of the consequences of escaping.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Daniel Rivera
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986) (allowing doctor’s testimony that alleged rape victim’s injuries not consistent with consensual intercourse to “aid[] the jury in determining the credibility of [the alleged victimjs claim that the intercourse was nonconsensual”).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Rimmasch (2×)
Utah · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir.1986) (allowing medical testimony in a rape case to demonstrate that victim's condition was not consistent with consensual intercourse, thereby aiding the jury in determining the credibility of the victim's claim of rape).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Patrick Thomas Redmond
9th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Johnson, 514 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1020 , 96 S.Ct. 459 , 47 L.Ed.2d 344 (1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Anthony Ingram
6th Cir. · 2021 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“[A]lthough she may have agreed initially, she testified she later wanted to go home and told the defendant of her desires.
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. John Abrams
9th Cir. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a); see also United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Monnie M. WESSON, Defendant/Appellant
85-1134.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jan 8, 1986.
779 F.2d 1443
1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21672
Charles F. Hyder, Susan Ehrlich, Asst. U.S. Attys., Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff, appellee., Jose A. de la Yara, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant, appellant.
Browning, Sneed, Hug.
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Appellant Wesson, a long-haul truck driver, took his niece, Tonya Ramirez, nephew, Frank Ramirez, and niece’s friend, Patricia Walton, along with him on one of his trips. He had intercourse with Patricia Walton and beat her repeatedly. He was convicted of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1982), unlawful possession of a firearm, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5871 (1982), and interstate transportation and coercion or enticement of a female, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2422 (1982).

Wesson disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982), arguing that because Ms. Walton and her parents consented to her trip, she was not kidnapped. Neither Ms. Walton nor her parents consented to the kind of trip eventually undertaken. Moreover, Ms. Walton was of an age capable of having a recognizable will, see Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460-62, 66 S.Ct. 233, 235-37, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946), and although she may have agreed initially, she testified she later wanted to go home and told the defendant of her desires. She testified she continued on the journey despite being raped and beaten because she was terrified of the consequences if caught trying to escape.

Appellant also argues that the government did not carry the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant kidnapped Ms. Walton “for the purpose of sexual gratification” as alleged in the indictment. The contention is frivolous.

Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that the purpose of the interstate transportation was prostitution, debauchery or other immoral purpose as required by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421 and 2422 (1982). The testimony revealed frequent sexual intercourse with Ms. Walton. There was also uncontroverted evidence that he offered her services in prostitution over the C.B. radio. Appellant Wesson crossed several state lines while engaging in this immoral conduct. This was sufficient to support the conviction despite evidence that appellant was also engaged in moving commercial freight. See United States v. Snow, 507 F.2d 22, 24 (7th Cir.1974) (“[T]he appropriate inquiry is not merely his reason for making the trip but, more precisely, his reason for taking a female companion with him.”)

Appellant argues that Dr. McGar-ey’s testimony that Ms. Walton’s injuries were not consistent with consensual intercourse was irrelevant. However, appellant argues on appeal that at least some of his intercourse with Ms. Walton was voluntary, and appellant’s brother and sister-in-law testified that while in Delano appellant and Ms. Walton displayed affection toward one another. Dr. McGarey’s expert opinion may have aided the jury in determining the credibility of Ms. Walton’s claim that the intercourse was nonconsensual. It may also have assisted the jury in determining whether Wesson’s conduct constituted “debauchery” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2422 (1982). See Fed.R.Evid. 702.

AFFIRMED.