William Scott Sours v. Larry Norris, Warden, Tucker Maximum Sec. Unit & A.L. Lockhart, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 782 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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William Scott Sours v. Larry Norris, Warden, Tucker Maximum Sec. Unit & A.L. Lockhart, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 782 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Stephens v. Sarah (moed, 2020-09-15)
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stephens v. Sarah
E.D. Mo. · 2020 · confidence medium
Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1996), Sours v. Norris, 782 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kevin Ward v. Bradley Smith (2×)
8th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
While there is no statutory or constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil cases, Edg ington v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 52 F.3d 111, 780 (8th Cir.1995), we have instructed courts to "give 'serious consideration’ to appointing counsel whenever an indigent plaintiff establishes ... a prima facie case which, if proven, would entitle him to relief,” Sours v. Norris, 782 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir.1986) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kevin Ward v. Bradley Smith
8th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
What might originally have been characterized simply as a dispute over production of a videotape has grown into a wider conflict concerning potential 3 While there is no statutory or constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil cases, Edgington v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 52 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1995), we have instructed courts to "give 'serious consideration' to appointing counsel whenever an indigent plaintiff establishes . . . a prima facie case which, if proven, would entitle him to relief," Sours v. Norris, 782 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). -6- spoliation and Ward'…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jeffrey Bowman v. Michael Bowersox
8th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
We are to review the denial of counsel for abuse of discretion, see Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976 , 978 n. 2 (8th Cir.2011), but here the district court did not explain why it denied Bowman’s motion, see Sours v. Norris, 782 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir.1986) (district court must provide enough reasoning for denying counsel motion to allow court of appeals to determine whether it abused its discretion).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John William Brown v. Gerald Frey, Larry Trickey, Ron Kennedy, John Bain, J. Shanklin, Walter Fisher, Christie Lynch and Bernice Trickey
8th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
In ruling on a request for counsel, the district court must exercise “a reasoned and well-informed discretion” and seriously consider appointing counsel “whenever an indigent plaintiff establishes in his [or her] pleadings a prima facie case which, if proven, would entitle him [or her] to relief.” Sours v. Norris, 782 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir.1986) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Max v. Lawson
E.D. Mo. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Sours v. Norris, 782 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Richard Rayes v. Mark Johnson Steven J. Simons Melvin Rouf Angelo S. Vinci William Fairbanks John Doe, Dr. Dan Danaher, Dr.
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Sours v. Norris, 782 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (discussion of factors); White v. Walsh, 649 F.2d 560, 563 (8th Cir.1981) (same).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
William Scott SOURS, Appellant,
v.
Larry NORRIS, Warden, Tucker Maximum Security Unit and A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellees
85-2278.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Jan 7, 1986.
782 F.2d 106
1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21279
William Scott Sours, pro se., Jerry E. Rose, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Heaney, Bowman, Wollman.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

William S. Sours appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction and appointment of counsel.

Sours is an inmate at the Tucker Maximum Security Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction. He is serving a sentence for a Missouri conviction, but was transferred to Arkansas pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact. Mo.Ann. Stat. § 217.530 (Vernon 1983). He filed this § 1983 suit alleging that his rights as guaranteed by the compact were being violated. He asked for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. The district court denied Sours’ re[*107] quest for a preliminary injunction that would return him to Missouri. The court also denied Sours’ motion for appointment of counsel, but without prejudice and it expressly reserved the right to consider the motion after further development of the facts and legal issues.

We have carefully reviewed Sours’ allegations, and we are unable to say that the district court abused its discretion in denying preliminary relief. See Sierra Club v. United States Corps of Engineers, 771 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir.1985).

We are unable to review Sours’ contention that the trial court erred in denying his request for appointment of counsel because we cannot determine from the record whether the district court exercised “a reasoned and well-informed discretion.” See Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir.1984). A court should give “serious consideration” to appointing counsel whenever an indigent plaintiff establishes in his pleadings a prima facie case which, if proven, would entitle him to relief. Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing, 728 F.2d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 1984). Thus, since Sours’ claim had survived a motion to dismiss, indicating that it was neither malicious nor frivolous, the district court should have considered whether Sours had attempted in good faith to retain counsel and whether the nature of his case was such that Sours as well as the court would benefit from the assistance of counsel. See id.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of preliminary relief and remand the case to the district court for redetermination of Sours’ motion for appointment of counsel in the light of the considerations set forth in Slaughter and Nelson, supra.