Mohammad Saleem Shah v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 788 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Mohammad Saleem Shah v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 788 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1989 · …when one voluntarily chooses not to attend a deportation hearing which may affect him adversely, he is hardly in a position to complain that an order made pursuant to the hearing is invalid because of his absence at p. 972 ⚠ not in text
11 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bakal v. Ashcroft (ca6, 2003-01-09)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bakal v. Ashcroft
6th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
E.g., Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 333 (D.C.Cir. 1989) (“An in absentia deportation is legitimate if the alien had a reasonable opportunity to be present and failed to provide reasonable cause for his absence.”); Shah v. INS, 788 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.1986) (affirming an in absentia deportation order where the alien had reasonable opportunity to attend the hearing); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.1986) (“The fact that the hearing was held in absentia is not per se violative of due process.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pablo Perez-Casas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Cf. Wijeratne, 961 F.2d at 1347 (explanation of having sought a change of venue because hearing too far away and too expensive to reach, insufficient); Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 335-37 (same); Patel, 803 F.2d at 806 (explanation of relying on attorney's advice not to attend insufficient); Shah v. INS, 788 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.1986) (belief that "proceeding should not have gone forward until [BIA] had reviewed the [IJ's] decision to deny motion for change of venue ... not reasonable cause").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen M. Wijeratne, Formerly Known as Allen M. Lowe v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
7th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 335 (“mere submission of a motion for change of venue does not provide reasonable cause for absence of an alien or his counsel”); Patel, 803 F.2d at 806 (“mere submission of a motion for continuance does not relieve an alien or his counsel of the obligation to appear for a noticed hearing”); Shah, 788 F.2d at 972 (pending appeal of IJ’s denial of motion to change venue is not reasonable cause for failing to appear).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pablo Maldonado-Perez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
See also Patel, 803 F.2d at 806 ("[t]he fact that [a deportation] hearing [is] held in absentia is not per se violative of due process"); Shah v. INS, 788 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.1986) (when alien fails to appear at a deportation proceeding after afforded a reasonable opportunity to appear, immigration judge may deport the alien in absentia ); United States v. Dekermenjian, 508 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1974) ("[w]hen one voluntarily chooses not to attend a deportation hearing which may affect him adversely, he is hardly in a position to complain that an Order made pursuant to the hearing is inval…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Munoz-Giron (2×)
E.D. Va. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Shah v. I.N.S., 788 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.1986); see also Patel v. I.N.S., 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.1986). 12 Notice must be consistent with statutory requirements; among other things, it must apprise the alien of: (1) the nature of the proceeding; (2) the charges against the alien; (3) the alien’s right to be represented by privately re- tamed counsel; (4) the alien’s obligation to provide the INS with a written record of current contact information, and the consequences for failure to do so; (5) the time and place of the hearing; and (6) the consequences for failing to appear at t…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Mohammad Saleem SHAH, Petitioner,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent
84-2306.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Mar 14, 1986.
788 F.2d 970
1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 23040
Edward N. Leavy on brief, for petitioner., Richard K. Willard, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., James A. Hunolt, Acting Asst. Director, Millicent Y. Clark, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., on brief, for respondent.
Winter, Sprouse, Chapman.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published
CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge:

Mohammad Saleem Shah appeals the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals that the immigration judge acted properly in ordering him deported in absentia. Shah claims that his due process rights were violated. We disagree and affirm the Board of Immigration Appeals.

I

Shah is a citizen of Pakistan who entered the United States on January 29,1983 without inspection by immigration officials. He was apprehended and placed in deportation proceedings. On March 22, 1983, Shah appeared at his deportation hearing in El Paso, Texas, but he was not represented by counsel, Shah was found to be deportable and was ordered deported to Pakistan.

Shah obtained the services of an attorney on March 30, 1983 and moved both to reopen the deportation proceedings and to apply for asylum. The immigration judge granted Shah’s motion and reopened the deportation proceeding. In his order, the immigration judge warned that if, after proper notification, Shah failed to appear at his reopened proceeding, “any and all applications for relief from deportation shall be deemed abandoned.” Through a second attorney, Shah moved for a change in his custody status pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 242.-2(b), (c). By an order dated April 26, 1983, the immigration judge ordered Shah released under a $3,000 bond.

[*972] Upon his release, Shah moved to Alexandria, Virginia, to the home of a friend who had provided him with bond money. Acting through a third attorney, Shah filed a motion for change of venue to the District of Columbia on June 13, 1983, stating that he had taken up residence in Alexandria. On October 13, 1983, Shah’s motion was denied. In his order, the immigration judge reiterated that should Shah fail to appear for his reopened deportation hearing, any and all applications for relief would be deemed abandoned. The judge rescheduled the reopened deportation hearing for December 1, 1983. A copy of this order was served by certified mail on each of the three attorneys who had represented Shah before the immigration judge.

On October 25, 1983, Shah appealed the denial of his motion for change of venue to • the Board of Immigration Appeals. The reopened hearing was convened before the immigration judge on December 1st, but neither Shah nor any of his attorneys appeared, and he was ordered deported to Pakistan in absentia. Shah appealed the deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals which dismissed both of his appeals by decision dated October 4, 1984.

The Board found the immigration judge’s denial of the motion for change of venue was reasonable under the circumstances. As to Shah’s absence, the Board relied upon 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982), which provides that:

If any alien has been given a reasonable opportunity to be present at a proceeding under this section, and without reasonable cause fails or refuses to attend ... the special inquiry officer may proceed to a determination in like manner as if the alien were present.

The Board noted that the immigration judge’s decision of October 13, 1983 had provided Shah with notice of the time and place of his reopened hearing and that it warned Shah for the second time of the consequences he faced if he failed to appear. The Board could find no “reasonable cause” which would excuse Shah’s failure to appear.

II

Shah agrees that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) is controlling in this case. Shah was given proper notice of the time and place of his reopened hearing, and he was twice warned of the consequences he faced if he failed to appear. Because Shah had a reasonable opportunity to be present at his reopened hearing, the question becomes whether there was reasonable cause for his failure to be present.

Shah offers only one excuse for his failure to appear at the reopened proceeding. He claims that the proceeding should not have gone forward until the Board of Immigration Appeals had reviewed the immigration judge’s decision to deny his motion for change of venue. Shah’s appeal of the venue ruling, however, did not stay the reopened deportation proceedings, and is not reasonable cause within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).

We hold that since Shah had reasonable opportunity to appear at the reopened proceeding, and since there was no reasonable cause for his failure to appear, the immigration judge acted properly by proceeding in absentia. Further, Shah’s motion to remand and the motion of the INS to strike the rebuttal of the petitioner are denied. For the reasons foregoing, the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals is

AFFIRMED.