U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Gedeon, 2020 NY Slip Op 1660 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). · Go Syfert
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Gedeon, 2020 NY Slip Op 1660 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
53 citation events (53 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States of America v. Estate of Mary J. Jacobson, and Unknown Heirs of Mary J. Jacobson Dec's (DOD 10/15/2022) (nywd, 2026-01-14)
Treatment trajectory · 2020 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2020 2023 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States of America v. Estate of Mary J. Jacobson, and Unknown Heirs of Mary J. Jacobson Dec's (DOD 10/15/2022)
W.D.N.Y. · 2026 · confidence medium
IV v. Tarantola, 144 N.Y.S.3d 196, 198 (2d Dep't 2021) (quoting U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Gedeon, 121 N.Y.S.3d 276, 278 (2d Dep’t 2020)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) NewRez LLC v. Janetta Cumberbatch's Unknown Heirs-at-Law, Next-of-Kin, Distributees, Executors, Admrs., Trustees, Devises, Legatees, Assignees, Lienors, Creditors, & Successors in Interest (2×)
N.Y. Sup. Queens · 2025 · confidence medium
Capital, Inc v 44 Brushy Neck, Ltd , 51 AD3d 857, 858-859 [2d Dept 2008]; U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Gedeon , 181 AD3d 745, 747 [2d Dept 2020]; see also Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Ramdin, 62 Misc 3d 392, 395 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2018]).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy. FSB v. Scaffidi (3×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Additionally, the 2013 action was a nullity as against the borrower, who died intestate in 2012, it was not a nullity for all purposes, as it was commenced against defendants other than the borrower and was still viable against those other named defendants ( Rocha v Figueirido , 50 AD3d 876, 877 [2d Dept 2008]; cf. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Gedeon, 181 AD3d 745, 746 [2d Dept 2020]).
examined Cited as authority (rule) U.S. Bank N.A. v. Heimiller (4×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2025 · confidence medium
Moreover, "[w]here a property owner dies intestate, title to real property is automatically vested in his or her distributees" ( U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Gedeon , 181 AD3d 745, 747; see SC Bromley I, LLC v Sherman , 201 AD3d at 832).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy. v. Jsang Kei Lau (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2024 · confidence medium
Pursuant to RPAPL 1311 (1) the necessary defendants to a foreclosure action are "[e]very person having an estate or interest in possession, or otherwise, in the property as tenant in fee, for life, by the curtesy, or for years, and every person entitled to the reversion, remainder, or inheritance of the real property, or of any interest therein or undivided share thereof, after the determination of a particular estate therein." "Where a property owner dies intestate, title to real property is automatically vested in his or her distributees" ( U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Gedeon , 181 AD3d 745, 747 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Citibank, N.A. v. Bailey
N.Y. App. Div. · 2023 · confidence medium
Further, although here plaintiff also filed and served an amended complaint on defendant solely in his capacity as heir to decedent's estate and not as a representative thereof ( cf. id. at 1157 ; see generally EPTL 3-3.6 [a], [b]; U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v Gedeon , 181 AD3d 745, 747 [2d Dept 2020]), we agree with defendant that the relevant statute of limitations expired prior to the order granting plaintiff's ex parte application for leave to file the amended complaint ( see generally CPLR 213 [4]).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Toiny LLC v. Gill (3×) also: Cited "see"
E.D.N.Y · 2022 · confidence medium
“In certain circumstances, the estate of the mortgagor is not a necessary party to a mortgage foreclosure action.” U.S. Bank Trust, N.A, v. Gedeon, 181 A.D.3d 745, 747 (2d Dep’t 2020).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Battle
W.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
But “[i]n certain circumstances, the estate of the mortgagor is not a necessary party to a mortgage foreclosure action.” U.S. Bank Tr., N.A. v. Gedeon, 181 A.D.3d 745, 747 , 121 N.Y.S.3d 276, 278 (2d Dep’t 2020).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.
v.
Gedeon
2017-01563.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Mar 11, 2020.
2020 NY Slip Op 1660
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Gedeon (2020 NY Slip Op 01660)
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Gedeon
2020 NY Slip Op 01660
Decided on March 11, 2020
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.


Decided on March 11, 2020 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J.
COLLEEN D. DUFFY
BETSY BARROS
LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

2017-01563
(Index No. 503599/13)

[*1]U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., etc., appellant,

v

Sylvanie Gedeon, etc., respondent, et al., defendants.




Stern & Eisenberg, P.C., Depew, NY (Anthony P. Scali and Stacey Weisblatt of counsel), for appellant.



DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Noach Dear, J.), dated January 3, 2017. The order granted the motion of the defendant Sylvanie Gedeon, in effect, to vacate an order of reference of the same court dated December 3, 2015, and a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the same court dated May 20, 2016, and pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(10) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her.

ORDERED that the order dated January 3, 2017, is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the motion of the defendant Sylvanie Gedeon which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(10) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order dated January 3, 2017, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for the joinder of the administrator of the estate of Joseph E. Gedeon as a defendant in this action, without prejudice to its right to assert any defenses or affirmative defenses, and for further proceedings thereafter.

On or about June 27, 2013, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose a mortgage on real property owned by Joseph E. Gedeon, who had died intestate on March 28, 2010. The complaint named as a defendant, among others, "Sylvanie Gedeon, Individually and as Voluntary Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph E. Gedeon" (hereinafter Sylvanie). Sylvanie is the daughter of Joseph E. Gedeon.

Sylvanie interposed an answer, but she did not oppose the plaintiff's subsequent motions for an order of reference and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The Supreme Court issued an order of reference dated December 3, 2015, and subsequently issued a judgment of foreclosure and sale dated May 20, 2016.

Sylvanie thereafter moved, in effect, to vacate the order of reference and the judgment of foreclosure and sale, and pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(10) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for failure to join a necessary party. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court granted the motion.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court was empowered to vacate the order of reference and the judgment of foreclosure and sale, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction [*2](see CPLR 5015[a][4]; see also Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v Podeswik, 115 AD3d 207, 212-213).

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination that, under the circumstances presented, the estate of Joseph E. Gedeon is a necessary party to this action, and that the failure to join the estate of Joseph E. Gedeon warranted vacatur of the order of reference and the judgment of foreclosure and sale. No action may be commenced against a person subsequent to his or her death and prior to the appointment of a personal representative to his or her estate (see Jordan v City of New York, 23 AD3d 436, 437; Arbelaez v Chun Kuei Wu, 18 AD3d 583, 584). Pursuant to RPAPL 1311(1), "necessary defendants" in a mortgage foreclosure action include, among others, "[e]very person having an estate or interest in possession, or otherwise, in the property as tenant in fee, for life, by the curtesy, or for years, and every person entitled to the reversion, remainder, or inheritance of the real property, or of any interest therein or undivided share thereof, after the determination of a particular estate therein."

In certain circumstances, the estate of the mortgagor is not a necessary party to a mortgage foreclosure action. Where a property owner dies intestate, title to real property is automatically vested in his or her distributees (see Matter of Blango, 166 AD3d 767, 768; Matter of Torricini, 249 AD2d 401, 402; Kraker v Roll, 100 AD2d 424, 429). Thus, where a mortgagor/property owner dies intestate and the mortgagee does not seek a deficiency judgment, generally a foreclosure action may be commenced directly against the distributees (see Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp. v Rose, 64 AD3d 539; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Keys, 27 AD3d 247).

Here, however, only one distributee of Joseph E. Gedeon, Sylvanie, is named as a defendant. The record contains insufficient information as to whether Sylvanie is the only distributee of Joseph E. Gedeon. In addition, the plaintiff alleges a default in payment of the mortgage loan subsequent to the death of mortgagor Joseph E. Gedeon. Under these circumstances, the estate of Joseph E. Gedeon is a necessary party to this mortgage foreclosure action (see RPAPL 1311[1]; see also Salomon Bros. Realty Corp. v Alvarez, 22 AD3d 482; Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y. v Luna, 302 AD2d 558).

Further, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, service of the summons and complaint upon Sylvanie as "voluntary administratrix" of the estate did not constitute service upon the estate of Joseph E. Gedeon (see SCPA 1306).

Under these circumstances, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting that branch of Sylvanie's motion which was in effect, to vacate the order of reference and judgment of foreclosure and sale (see CPLR 5015[a][4]; see also Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v Podeswik, 115 AD3d 207, 212-213).

However, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of Sylvanie's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(10) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for failure to join the estate of Joseph E. Gedeon as a defendant. "When a [necesssary party] has not been made a party and is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall order him summoned" (CPLR 1001[b]). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for the joinder of the administrator of the estate of Joseph E. Gedeon and for further proceedings consistent herewith (see CPLR 1001[b]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Bandalos, 173 AD3d 1136, 1138; Central Mtge. Co. v. Davis, 149 AD3d 898, 900).

SCHEINKMAN, P.J., DUFFY, BARROS and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court