INMAN, Judge.

“It is desirable in criminal maters to adhere to the established practice.

Innovations usually result in prolonged litigation.” State v. Benton, 226 N.C. 745, 747-48, 40 S.E.2d 617, 618 (1946) (citation omitted). The wisdom of our Supreme

Court’s words more than 70 years ago is manifest in this appeal, which stems from a trial court’s decision to forego its statutory duty to charge the jury by instead having a courtroom clerk read aloud significant portions of the instructions to the jury.

Although we agree with Defendant that the judge’s act constituted error—one that

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Opinion of the Court

we emphasize should not be repeated by members of the trial bench in the future— we hold that Defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice warranting a new trial. Defendant also requests we remand this case for resentencing pursuant to a motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) filed with this Court. Because Defendant’s MAR raises an evidentiary question and relies on matters not found in the settled record on appeal, we dismiss his MAR without prejudice to him re-filing one with the trial court. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The evidence introduced at trial discloses the following: On 23 June 2016, Joseph Allen purchased opioids from Defendant at Allen’s home in Snead’s Ferry. After Defendant left the premises, Allen took a dose and collapsed on the bathroom floor. Allen’s girlfriend, Shannon Connor, found him unconscious in the bathroom and phoned Defendant for help; Defendant answered, told Connor to call 9-1-1, and returned to the house with two women a short time later. Defendant and one of the women attempted to resuscitate Allen but were unsuccessful. Defendant left the scene before paramedics arrived. Allen was taken to the hospital, and the next day providers pronounced him brain dead from prolonged cardiac arrest caused by a drug overdose. A few weeks later, on 22 July 2016, police detained Defendant and his girlfriend during a routine traffic stop. During the stop, Defendant’s girlfriend

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informed police that she was hiding heroin inside her pants. A search of Defendant, his girlfriend, and the vehicle uncovered 106 individual bags of opioids. Defendant was arrested and indicted on charges arising from both the traffic stop and Allen’s death, including, among others: (1) felony conspiracy to possess heroin; (2) maintaining a vehicle; (3) possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin; (4) possession with intent to sell or deliver fentanyl; (5) selling fentanyl; (6) delivering fentanyl; and (7) second-degree murder. Defendant’s charges were joined for trial beginning 14 January 2019. After all evidence had been presented, counsel had participated in a charge conference, and closing arguments were presented to the jury, the trial court called a five-minute recess. Following the recess, but before the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial judge engaged in the following discussion with counsel: THE COURT: I’m going to have the clerk to help me with the reading. Any objection from the [S]tate? [THE STATE]: Not from the [S]tate, Judge. THE COURT: Any objection? [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: I’m sorry, Judge, I was talking. THE COURT: I’m going to have the clerk to help me with reading the instructions to the jury. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: No objection.

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Opinion of the Court

The trial court called the jury back into the courtroom and announced that, “I’m going to read you the instructions, and the clerk is going to help me to read some of these instructions. So listen to the instructions as she is reading them.” The clerk then read a significant portion of the jury instructions, including instructions on: (1) the function of the jury; (2) the presumption of innocence; (3) the State's burden of proof and the definition of reasonable doubt; (4) the jury’s duty in evaluating the credibility of witnesses; (5) the weight of the evidence; (6) the definitions of direct and circumstantial evidence; and (7) the effect of Defendant's decision not to testify. When the clerk misread some of these instructions, the judge interjected to offer corrections. The clerk concluded reading her portion of the instructions, after which the trial judge read the remainder of the instructions focusing on the specific charges and factual findings required by the jury to convict Defendant.^[1] The jury ultimately returned guilty verdicts on each charge with the exception of second-degree murder; the jury instead found Defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a lesser-included offense. Defendant timely appealed. II. ANALYSIS A. Preservation Defendant’s single argument on appeal posits that the trial court violated its statutory duty to instruct the jury consistent with N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1231 and -

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1232. The State contends that Defendant’s trial counsel did not preserve this issue and, because counsel affirmatively stated he had no objection, invited any alleged error. See, e.g., State v. Barber, 147 N.C. App. 69, 74, 554 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2001) (“[A] defendant who invites error has waived his right to all appellate review concerning the invited error, including plain error review.” (citation omitted)). We are not persuaded that Defendant’s trial counsel invited error because it is not clear from the record that the judge put counsel on notice that she actually intended to relinquish to the clerk her duty to charge the jury. A practitioner could very easily interpret the judge’s statement that she would “have the clerk to help me with reading” to mean that the judge would read the full instructions with some other form of assistance from the clerk. For example, one could easily take the statement to mean that the judge would read the instructions while the clerk handed printed copies up to the bench or, alternatively, followed along silently to catch any mistakes made by the judge in reading the instructions aloud. Defendant could reasonably presume that the trial court would still perform its necessary judicial functions in charging the jury and, given that the trial court’s statement is subject to straightforward interpretations that do not involve an abdication of any necessary statutory duties, we decline to hold that Defendant’s failure to object to the trial court’s statement amounts to invited error.

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We are not persuaded that Defendant was required to object sua sponte once the courtroom clerk spoke in place of the trial court during portions of the instructions because a trial court’s violation of a statutory mandate is automatically preserved for appellate review. See, e.g., State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 39, 331 S.E.2d 652, 659 (1985) (“[W]hen a trial court acts contrary to a statutory mandate and a defendant is prejudiced thereby, the right to appeal the court’s action is preserved, notwithstanding defendant’s failure to object at trial.”). B. Standard of Review Defendant argues that the trial court violated the statutory mandates found in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1231 and -1232 by allowing the clerk to read some jury instructions and, in doing so, gave the jury the impression that those instructions were less important than those read aloud by the judge herself. Whether a trial court violated a statutory mandate is subject to de novo review. State v. Lyons, 250 N.C. App. 698, 705, 793 S.E.2d 755, 761 (2016) (citation omitted). To obtain relief for this type of error, Defendant must show that he was prejudiced. “Whether the judge’s comments, questions or actions constitute reversible error is a question to be considered in light of the factors and circumstances disclosed by the record, the burden of showing prejudice being upon the defendant.” State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 236, 333 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1985) (citations omitted). “[I]n a criminal case it is only when the jury may reasonably infer from the evidence

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before it that the trial judge’s action intimated an opinion as to a factual issue, the defendant’s guilt, the weight of the evidence or a witness’s credibility that prejudicial error results.” Id. (citing State v. Yellorday, 297 N.C. 574, 256 S.E.2d 205 (1979)). The intimated opinion must “ ‘have had a prejudicial effect on the result of the trial’ ” to warrant reversal. State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 155, 456 S.E.2d 789, 808 (1995) (quoting State v. Perry, 231 N.C. 467, 471, 57 S.E.2d 774, 777 (1950)). Otherwise, “ ‘the error will be considered harmless.’ ” Id. We note that Defendant does not argue the error in this case amounts to structural error, which “is a rare form of constitutional error resulting from structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism which are so serious that a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.” State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 409, 597 S.E.2d 724, 744 (2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Structural error, no less than other constitutional error, should be preserved at trial,” id. at 410, 597 S.E.2d at 745 (citations omitted), and Defendant did not argue the existence of a structural constitutional error before the trial court. C. Error The trial court committed error in failing to instruct the jury consistent with our General Statutes. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1231(c) plainly states that “the judge must instruct the jury in accordance with G.S. 15A-1232[,]” (emphasis added), and

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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1232 provides that “[i]n instructing the jury, the judge shall not express an opinion[.]” (emphasis added). Our caselaw also holds that “[a] trial judge is required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1231 and N.C.G.S. § 15A-1232 to instruct the jury on the law arising on the evidence.” State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 195, 376 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1989) (emphasis added). Said differently, “[a] judge has the obligation to instruct the jury on every substantive feature of the case.” State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341, 347, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has directed “the members of the trial bench to refrain from avoiding the necessity for instructing the jury[.]” State v. Fletcher, 370 N.C. 313, 326 n. 6, 807 S.E.2d 528, 538 n. 6 (2017) (emphasis added). One of the instructions delegated to the clerk described the State’s burden of proof. This Court has previously held that there is “a duty upon the presiding judge to instruct the jury as to the burden of proof upon each issue arising upon the pleadings.” State v. Tyson, 195 N.C. App. 327, 335, 672 S.E.2d 700, 706 (2009) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Simply put, the error in this case is manifest. D. Prejudice Whether the trial court’s error amounts to prejudicial error is the more difficult question posed by this appeal. Complicating matters is the importance that the trial judge give the jury charge—and the significance of the particular delegated instructions. As we have recently recognized, “[t]he jury charge is one of the most

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critical parts of a criminal trial. The trial court’s duty is momentous: to deliver a clear instruction on the law arising from all the evidence presented, and to do so in such a manner as to assist the jury in understanding the case and in reaching the correct verdict.” State v. Corbett, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 839 S.E.2d 361, ___ (2020) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241, 252 (1981) (recognizing the “unique power of the jury instruction” in protecting criminal defendants’ constitutional rights). Several of the jury instructions that the trial judge delegated to the clerk are so foundational as to be given in virtually every case. For example, our Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he rule as to the burden of proof is important and indispensable in the administration of justice, and constitutes a substantial right of the party upon whose adversary the burden rests. It should, therefore, be jealously guarded and rigidly enforced by the courts.” State v. Falkner, 182 N.C. 793, 798, 108 S.E. 756, 758 (1921). The necessity that the jury understand this burden is beyond any serious dispute. See, e.g., Hope v. Cartledge, 857 F.3d 518, 527 (4th Cir. 2017) (observing that “the Supreme Court [of the United States has] recognized the importance of accurate, explicit, and complete jury instructions where laymen are required to understand the government’s burden”). Further, at least one of the instructions given by the clerk in this case was required to vindicate Defendant’s constitutional rights. See Carter, 450 U.S. at 303, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 252 (holding that

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when a defendant declines to testify and requests an instruction on that point, a trial judge must give such an instruction under the Fifth Amendment, as “[a] trial judge has a powerful tool at his disposal to protect the constitutional privilege—the jury instruction—and he has an affirmative constitutional obligation to use that tool when a defendant seeks its employment.”). The fact that some of the instructions given by the clerk may not have been strictly required in all cases2 does not deprive them of their value to the jury. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468, 474 (1978) (“While the legal scholar may understand that the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proof are logically similar, the ordinary citizen well may draw significant additional guidance from an instruction on the presumption of innocence.”). Although the procedure employed by the trial court in this case carries with it a high risk of prejudice, we nonetheless hold that Defendant has not shown prejudicial error in this case. We agree with Defendant that the delegation of certain instructions to the clerk could possibly have lead jurors to “reasonably infer . . . that the trial judge’s action intimated an opinion” that those instructions were of