Johnny Traylor, Individually & in His Capacity as Chairman of the Bd. of Directors for Bros. & Sisters Combined, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Johnny Traylor, Individually & in His Capacity as Chairman of the Bd. of Directors for Bros. & Sisters Combined, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Michael Atraqchi v. USA (ca11, 2025-06-03)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Atraqchi v. USA (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
We have allowed district courts “consider- able discretion” to restrict “the filing and litigating of patently friv- olous lawsuits by overly litigious pro se litigators.” Traylor v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420, 1421 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brian Swanson v. United States
11th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
See Miller, 541 F.3d at 1098 (holding that an injunction was overbroad because it was not limited to the areas in which the plaintiff had a history of abusive litigation); Traylor v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding an injunction pre- venting the plaintiff from filing complaints against certain defend- ants based on a set of factual circumstances already litigated and adjudicated).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) WILLIAMS v. LAND
M.D. Ga. · 2020 · confidence medium
In Traylor v. City of Atlanta, the court upheld an injunction restricting the plaintiff from filing additional complaints that attempted to relitigate specific claims arising from “the same set of factual circumstances” that had been litigated in the plaintiff’s previous three federal cases. 805 F.2d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alex Higdon v. Fulton County, Georgia, USA (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
See Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390, 391 (11th Cir. 1991) (involving a litigant, attempting to proceed in forma pauperis, who “deluge[d]” the district court with complaints and other filings); Traylor v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding an injunction preventing the plaintiff from filing additional complaints against certain defendants based upon a set of factual circumstances that had been litigated and adjudicated in the past).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ann Marie DeSouza v. JPMorgan Chase Home Lending Division
11th Cir. · 2015 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Miller, 541 F.3d at 1098 ; cf. Traylor v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir.1986) (upholding injunction where it was clear that the district court intended only to prohibit party from “attempting to relitigate specific claims arising from the same set of factual circumstances that [had] been litigated and adjudicated in the past”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert Ree Smith v. United States
11th Cir. · 2010 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See id. (discussing United States v. Flint, 178 Fed.Appx. 964, 970 (11th Cir.2006)); cf. Traylor v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir.1986) (upholding injunction where it was clear that the district court intended only to prohibit party from “attempting to relitigate specific claims arising from the same set of factual circumstances that [had] been litigated and adjudicated in the past”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lorenzo E. Flint, Jr.
11th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
We have upheld lesser injunctive restrictions on frequent litigants, including pre-screening restrictions, Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390, 391 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam), and restrictions of access to the United States Marshals for service of process, Traylor v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420, 1421-21 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see" Dean v. ARA Environmental Services, Inc.
N.D. Ga. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Traylor v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Alexander Johnson v. 27th Avenue Caraf, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Id. at 518 (emphasis added); see also Traylor v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420, 1421 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“[A] district court has considerable discretion in restricting the filing[] of” “patently frivolous lawsuits[.]”); Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074 (holding that an abusive litigant may be “severely restricted as to what he 28 USCA11 Case: 19-14353 Date Filed: 08/17/2021 Page: 29 of 33 may file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial relief.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Johnny TRAYLOR, Individually and in His Capacity as Chairman of the Board of Directors for Brothers and Sisters Combined, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF ATLANTA, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
86-8181, 86-8235.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Nov 19, 1986.
805 F.2d 1420
1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 34735
Malcolm J. Hall, City Attorney’s Office, Albert L. Kemp, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
Godbold, Vance, Johnson.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

This Court’s order of consolidation merged two appeals from judgments of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia concerning Johnny Traylor’s 1981 employment termination from the City of Atlanta. The record in these cases reflects that appellant has filed three federal district court cases based on his employment termination, and he has recently filed two adversarial proceedings in bankruptcy court seeking to relitigate his employment termination and request for reinstatement.

On March 12, 1986, the district court acted in response to a motion of the defendants for injunctive relief urging the district court to prevent Traylor from filing further documents in the district court or bankruptcy court. The motion also requested the district court to prevent the filing of documents with the appellate court without first requesting and receiving leave of the district court to do so. A hearing was held on the defendants’ motion. Traylor, although notified of the hearing, did not attend. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court entered the following order in each of these cases:

(1) Plaintiff, Johnny Traylor, is not enjoined from filing anything;
(2) Plaintiff, however, is not to have the benefit of the service process of the United States Marshal’s office;
(3) None of the defendants named in this Order will have to respond to anything plaintiff Johnny Traylor files in this court or any bankruptcy court.
(4) A copy of this Order shall be immediately served on plaintiff Johnny Traylor by the United States Marshal.

Recently this Court dealt with the problems of the district courts throughout the Circuit in attempting to stem the filing and litigating of patently frivolous lawsuits by overly litigious pro se litigators. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc). Although this Court did decline to design an injunction that would be appropriate in an effort to bar the filing of such litigation, we did hold that a district court has considerable discretion in restricting the filings of such a litigator. He may be “severely restricted as to what he may file and how he must behave in his applica[*1422] tions for judicial relief. He just cannot be completely foreclosed from any access to the court.” 792 F.2d at 1079.

If the district court’s order as entered in these cases is interpreted as prohibiting appellant Johnny Traylor from having the benefit of the service process of the United States Marshal in any litigation that he may file in the future, and if it is interpreted to mean that none of the defendants named in the order will at any time and in any type of litigation be required to respond to anything that plaintiff Johnny Traylor files in the district court for the Northern District of Georgia, then it is clear that the order is overbroad within the meaning of Procup. However, a study of the record in these cases reflects that the district court is not prohibiting Traylor from “filing anything.” It is clear from the record that the district court is prohibiting Traylor only from having the benefit of the service process of the United States Marshal and prohibiting Traylor from continuing to harass the defendants that were involved in Traylor’s 1981 employment termination from the City of Atlanta. Interpreting the district court’s orders in these cases in such a manner, it is clear that the district court has “screened” the complaints and has determined that Traylor is attempting to relitigate specific claims arising from the same set of factual circumstances that have been litigated and adjudicated in the past. As this Court said in Procup, “There should be little doubt that the district court has the jurisdiction to protect itself against the abuses that litigants like Procup visit upon it. Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.”

In these cases we find from the record that Johnny Traylor has, by filing this repetitive litigation, attempted to abuse the judicial processes. The judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED.