Peter Henderson Oil Co. & Pinnacle Co. v. City of Port Arthur, Texas, 806 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
Search
Peter Henderson Oil Co. & Pinnacle Co. v. City of Port Arthur, Texas, 806 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
26 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., No. 92-05549 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 1994)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 1275 stating that because appellants waited over five years after the cause of action arose to challenge an unconstitutional delegation, the challenge was barred by laches9 citing cases1 citing court put it this way
  • Virden v. City of Austin Texas, No. 1:21-cv-00271 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2023).
    The City analogizes Virden’s notice of her injury to the plaintiffs Peter Henderson Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, Tex., 806 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir. 1987).
  • Bayou Vista, L.L.C. v. City of Oxford, Mississippi, No. 18-60279 (5th Cir. Apr. 5, 2019).unpublished
    Peter Henderson Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, Tex., 806 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Epes v. City of Bossier City, 979 F.2d 1534 (5th Cir. 1992).
  • Minnifield v. Louisiana Dep't of Educ., 229 F. App'x 277 (5th Cir. 2007).unpublished
    See Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir.1998); Peter Henderson Oil v. City of Port Arthur, 806 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir.1987).
  • Bylinski v. City of Allen Park, 8 F. Supp. 2d 965 (E.D. Mich. 1998).published
    (stating that because appellants waited over five years after the cause of action arose to challenge an unconstitutional delegation, the challenge was barred by laches)
  • Jay Brummett v. Jimmy Camble, Jim Boles, Doug Sanders, Dan Boulware, John R. MacLean First State Bank of Cleburne, Texas, & Johnson Cnty., Texas, 946 F.2d 1178 (1st Cir. 1991).published
    See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267-68 , 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942 , 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (federal courts must select the most appropriate state statute of limitations for § 1983 claims); Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir.1987…
  • Detro v. Roemer, 739 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. La. 1990).published
    Peter Henderson Oil v. City of Port Arthur, 806 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5 Cir.1987).
  • Cathedral of Joy Baptist Church v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 22 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994).published
    See, Peter Henderson Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, Tex., 806 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir.1987)
  • Howard H. Gilbert, Jr. v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51 (1st Cir. 1991).published
    (holding that statute of limitations barred plaintiff's § 1983 suit seeking declaration that municipal drilling ordinance was unconstitutional)
  • Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 745 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1990).published
    See, e.g., Peter Henderson Oil Co. v. Port Arthur, 806 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir.1987); McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453 , 1456-57 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 , 107 S.Ct. 1348 , 94 L.Ed.2d 519 (1987); Altair Corp…
At page 1274 applying two-year limitations period to § 1983 action3 citing cases1 citing court put it this way
At page 1371 Attainment of supervisory status does not alone create a new and distinct employment relation. . . . [T]he change from a non-supervisory to a supervisory position does not suffice by itself to create a new employment relation.1 citing case1 citing court put it this way
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
PETER HENDERSON OIL COMPANY and Pinnacle Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
86-2054.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jan 6, 1987.
Published opinion
806 F.2d 1273
1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 788
Louis Paine, Butler & Binion, Arthur Val Perkins, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants., Kyle Wheelus, Jr., Weller, Wheelus & Green, David L. Tolin, Beaumont, Tex., for defendants-appellees.
Rubin, Johnson, Jones.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

Appellants Peter Henderson Oil Company and Pinnacle Company appeal from a summary judgment rejecting their claims against the City of Port Arthur and various city departments and officials. Because we find that the appellants’ cause of action was time-barred, we affirm.

I.

This case involves an oil and gas well known as the Montrose No. 1 in Jefferson County, Texas. When drilled and completed in 1959, the well lay outside the Port Arthur city limits. Subsequently, the City annexed the land that included the Mont-rose No. 1, and in 1960 the City promulgated its oil and gas ordinance, requiring, inter alia, a city permit for any drilling activity inside the city limits, as well as the consent of all property owners within 700 feet of the proposed well. In 1972, the Montrose No. 1 was plugged and abandoned. Shortly afterwards, the City enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance, which zoned the property on which the Montrose No. 1 was located as SF-1 (single family residential district) and prohibited oil and gas drilling operations in such areas unless Special Use Permits were granted.

In 1978, Appellant Peter Henderson Oil Company sought permission to reenter and rework the well. On April 9,1979, the City Council passed Ordinance 79-23, which granted Appellant a Special Use Permit on the express condition that the requirements of the oil and gas ordinance, including the consent requirement, be met. In 1983, some four years later, Appellants’ agent filed a “Supplemental Drilling Permit Application,” again seeking permission to rework the Montrose No. 1 well, but failed to include the requisite permission from nearby landowners. On February 7, 1984, the city council refused appellant’s request to delete the consent requirement from the Special Use Permit. Shortly thereafter, Appellants’ “Supplemental Drilling Permit Application” was rejected as incomplete due to the absence of the necessary permission from nearby landowners.

Appellants filed suit against the City in September 1984, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various other state and federal civil rights provisions, and seeking to have the consent requirement declared unconstitutional. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. Holding that Ordinance 79-23 did not unconstitutionally delegate the city’s police power under the federal constitution, the district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment on all counts. It rejected a limitations defense. This appeal followed.

II.

In a federal civil rights action, the most appropriate state statute of limitation applies. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). The Texas two-year statute of limitations,[*1275] Tex.Rev.Civ. & Rem.Code § 16.003, has been found to control in such cases, Longo-ria v. City of Bay City, Texas, 779 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir.1986), and the parties here do not dispute its applicability.

The question in this case is when the appellants’ cause of action accrued. Section 1983 actions accrue when the injured party knows or has reason to know of the injury which forms the basis for the action. Longoria, 779 F.2d at 1138. Appellants’ injury in this case is their inability to rework the Montrose No. 1 unless they comply with the assertedly unconstitutional consent requirement of the city oil and gas ordinance. On April 9, 1979, when the city passed ordinance 79-23, Appellants were given explicit, unambiguous notice that the property would be subject to the requirement of consent by nearby landowners. Their injury therefore dates from that time. As suit was not filed until September 1984, more than five years later, Appellants’ action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Appellants’ argument, sans direct supporting authority, that they lacked standing to challenge the ordinance until 1984 is unsound. Accepting, arguendo, the contention that the consent requirement unconstitutionally delegates the city council’s legislative power, any impermissible delegation affecting appellants occurred in 1979, when the City issued the Special Use Permit subject to the consent requirement. This action immediately interfered with appellants’ rights, because it conditioned their use of the property containing the Mont-rose No. 1 well upon an allegedly unconstitutional requirement, thus Appellants had standing to assert a § 1983 cause of action at that time. See Hill v. Trustees of Indiana University, 537 F.2d 248 (7th Cir.1976) (Kunzig, J., concurring) (section 1983 cause of action arises at the time the tortfeasor interferes with the victim’s rights). That the relief sought might have been marginally different in 1979 than in 1984 is of no import: the crucial fact is that appellants could have brought this case in 1979 but chose to wait over five years, until the statute of limitations had run.

As this case is time-barred, we need not pass on the other issues raised by Appellants.

AFFIRMED.