Lucero v. City Of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
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Lucero v. City Of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 13× by 13 distinct cases, 1990–2022 · 4 courts↑ Rising · …the establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area. at p. 1385 ✓ Topic ↗
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2022–2024 · …if the district court does not have before it adequate evidence of prevailing market rates may the court, in its discretion, use other relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to establish the rate. at p. 1385 ⚠ not in text
101 citation events (40 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Morgan v. Morgan (utd, 2021-10-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Morgan v. Morgan
D. Utah · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nursa, Inc. v. Optima Care Jersey City LLC dba Optima Care Harborview; DOES I–X
D. Utah · 2026 · confidence medium
Instead, the parties should submit, and the district court must consider, evidence of the hourly rate the attorneys would be able to charge if working in the [relevant] field.”); Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1160 (10th Cir. 1990) (“A lawyer’s customary billing rate is a relevant but not conclusive factor.”), abrogated on other grounds by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993); Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987) (affirming the district court’s reduction of hourly rates because the law firm seeking attorney’s fees “provided the court…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ellis v. Grimes
N.D. Okla. · 2024 · confidence medium
Case, 157 F.3d at 1257 (citing Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) C & J Equipment Manufacturing Corporation v. Grady
D.N.M. · 2024 · confidence medium
“The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The setting of a reasonable hourly rate is within the district court’s discretion.”). “[I]f the district court does not have before it adequate evidence of prevailing market rates may the court, in its discretion, use other relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to establish …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charlie v. Rehoboth McKinley Christian Health Care Services
D.N.M. · 2023 · confidence medium
“The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The setting of a reasonable hourly rate is within the district court’s discretion.”). “[I]f the district court does not have before it adequate evidence of prevailing market rates may the court, in its discretion, use other relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to establish …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Legacy Mills, LLC v. National Surety Corporation
D.N.M. · 2022 · confidence medium
“The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The setting of a reasonable hourly rate is within the district court’s discretion.”). “[I]f the district court does not have before it adequate evidence of prevailing market rates may the court, in its discretion, use other relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to establish …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vitelli v. Medicredit
D. Utah · 2022 · confidence medium
Second, the fact that a judge in this court has determined as reasonable an hourly rate of $450.00 for lead counsel in a class action case involving claims under the FDCPA and UCSPA does not persuade the court to hourly rate the attorneys would be able to charge if working in the [relevant] field.”); Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1160 (10th Cir. 1990) (“A lawyer’s customary billing rate is a relevant but not conclusive factor.”), abrogated on other grounds by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993); Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987) (affi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Las Cruces v. United States of America (2×)
D.N.M. · 2022 · confidence medium
“The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987).1 The rate “should reflect rates in effect at the time the fee is being established by the court, rather than those in effect at the time the services were performed.” Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pruess v. Presbyterian Health Plan, Inc.
D.N.M. · 2022 · confidence medium
Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987) (in §1983 case, “[t]he establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rivera-Cordero v. Management and Training Corporation
D.N.M. · 2022 · confidence medium
“The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987).1 The rate “should reflect rates in effect at the time the fee is being established by the court, rather than those in effect at the time the services were performed.” Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Las Cruces v. United States of America
D.N.M. · 2021 · confidence medium
“The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987).1 The rate “should reflect rates in effect at the time the fee is being established by the court, rather than those in effect at the time the services were performed.” Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chuck McCune and Chuthamard McCune
Bankr. D.N.M. · 2021 · confidence medium
For the same reason, Creditor contends that the paralegal time should be disallowed because nearly all the 6 Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120, 1122 (10th Cir. 1990)(noting that “[t]he establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” (quoting Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1384 (10th Cir. 1987) and acknowledging that “[a] district judge . . . may also ‘turn to her own knowledge’ to supplement the evidence.” (quoting Bee v. Greaves, 910 F.2d 686 , 689…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rolling Hills Bank and Trust v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Wyoming - Cheyenne
10th Cir. BAP · 2020 · confidence medium
July 19, 2019) (internal citations omitted) (unpublished). 65 Id. at 1122 (quoting Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987)). 21 authority is overly restrictive and would unduly limit the Bankruptcy Court’s discretion in determining the applicable relevant community when considering fee applications.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. $114,700.00 in United States Currency
D. Colo. · 2020 · confidence medium
(Doc. # 134-8.) own knowledge to establish the appropriate rate unless the evidence of prevailing market rates before the court is inadequate.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Case, 157 F.3d at 1257 ) (citing Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) KCI Auto Auction, Inc. v. Anderson
D. Kan. · 2020 · confidence medium
Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Case, 157 F.3d at 1257 )). 19 Gudenkauf, 953 F. Supp. at 1240 (citing Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987)). 20 Rogers, 2014 WL 6632944 , at *2 (quoting Case, 157 F.3d at 1250 ). reduce the number of hours devoted to specific tasks if the number of hours claimed by counsel includes hours that were “unnecessary, irrelevant, and duplicative.”21 If the court reduces the number of hours claimed by counsel, “the court need not identify and justify each disallowed hour but need only articulate reasons for a general…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) KCI Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ephrem
D. Kan. · 2020 · confidence medium
Again, the burden is on the party requesting fees to demonstrate the billed hour are reasonable “by submitting meticulous, contemporaneous time records that reveal . . . all hours for which compensation is requested and how those hours were allotted to specific tasks.”22 In its discretion, the court also examines whether the applicant has exercised “billing judgment,” and may reduce the number of hours devoted to specific tasks if the number of hours claimed by counsel includes hours that were “unnecessary, irrelevant, and duplicative.”23 If the court reduces the number of hours cl…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Tysons Financial, LLC (In Re Botero-Paramo)
4th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
State Teamsters Conference Pension & Ret. *486 Fund, 831 F.2d 407 , 409 (2d Cir.1987) (opining that a district court may rely on its knowledge of private firm hourly rates in the community in assessing the reasonableness of fees); Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988) (“Where documentation is inadequate, the district court is not relieved of its obligation to award a reasonable fee, but the district court traditionally has had the power to make such an award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing.”); Lucero v. City of Tr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vialpando v. Johanns
D. Colo. · 2008 · confidence medium
The Plaintiff has come forward with evidence that a rate of $275 per hour is reasonable for experienced employment attorneys in the Denver area. 14 In response, the Defendant does not adduce contrary evidence, but merely suggests that the Court apply its own “knowledge of prevailing market rates.” In doing so, the Defendant misreads Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385-86 (10th Cir.1987), which permits the Court to turn to other sources of data to determine a reasonable rate where the movant has not come forward with evidence supporting the requested rate.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wirtz v. Kansas Farm Bureau Services, Inc.
D. Kan. · 2005 · confidence medium
Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987). 23 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Erickson v. City of Topeka, Kansas (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Kan. · 2002 · confidence medium
Hourly Rate “The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guaranty National Insurance v. McGuire (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Kan. · 2002 · confidence medium
“The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Godinet v. Management and Training Corp.
D. Kan. · 2002 · confidence medium
Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Heavener v. Meyers
E.D. Okla. · 2001 · confidence medium
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 , 104 S.Ct. 1541 , 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1983); Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conolly v. Harris Trust Co. (In Re MiniScribe Corp.)
Bankr.D. Colo. · 2000 · confidence medium
Lucero v. Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir.1987)(“Absent other evidence of prevailing market rates the district court must rely on all relevant factors known to the court in establishing the reasonable rate to be applied in multiplying the number of hours by the hourly rate to derive the “lodestar” figure.” Id. at 1385.); Bee v. Greaves, 910 F.2d 686 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Copley v.
10th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
As a result, the district court’s “experience with and knowledge about the course of the litigation compels appellate court deference to his determination in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” Brown , 838 F.2d at 453 (citing Lucero v. City of Trinidad , 815 F.2d 1384, 1386 (10th Cir. 1987)) .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.
D. Maryland · 2000 · confidence medium
See Norman v. Housing Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988) (“ ‘The court ... is itself an expert on the question [of reasonableness] and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.’ ” (quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir.1940))); Miele v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that a 'district judge may rely on his own knowledge of private firm hourly rates in the co…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Starlight International, Inc. v. Herlihy
D. Kan. · 1999 · confidence medium
“Absent other evidence of prevailing market rates the district court must rely on all relevant factors known to the court in establishing the reasonable rate to be applied in multiplying the number of hours by the hourly rate to derive the ‘lodestar’ figure.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987). “ Only if the district court ‘does not have before it adequate evidence of prevailing market rates may the court, in its discretion, use other relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to establish the rate.’ ” Ellis v. University of Kan.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) George T. Carlson & Associates v. United States Bankruptcy Court (In Re Ingersoll)
D. Colo. · 1999 · confidence medium
Presumably the pertinent reference is to footnote 4 at page 689 making a somewhat collateral reference to an assertion that an evidentiary hearing is required and noting that in Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) a district judge may rely on' personal knowledge of prevailing market rates as well as other indicia of a reasonable market rate in determining an allowable fee to the prevailing party under the fee transfer provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. City of Edmond (2×)
10th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See id. at 1510 (holding that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to a district court's determination of an attorney's "reasonable hours" and "reasonable hourly rate"); Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120, 1122 (10th Cir.1990); Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1386 (10th Cir.1987); Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir.1986); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 556 (10th Cir.1983). 15 In any fee request under § 1988(b), a claimant must prove two elements: (1) that the claimant was the "prevailing party" in the proceeding; and (2) that the claimant's fee request is…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc.
10th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
“The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance
10th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance, Inc.
10th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Terran v. Kaplan
D. Ariz. · 1997 · confidence medium
Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) LaSelle v. Public Service Co. of Colorado
D. Colo. · 1997 · confidence medium
Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc.
D. Kan. · 1997 · confidence medium
A. Requested Hourly Rates “The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Malloy v. Monahan
10th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Because the district court “is uniquely qualified to establish the reasonable hourly rate multiplier in computing attorneys’ fees,” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1386 (10th Cir.1987), we give great deference to its factual findings.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leon Malloy v. Officer William Monahan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police Officer for the City and County of Denver, and Denver, City and County Of, Officer Mark F. Haney, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police Officer for the City and County of Denver, Leon Malloy, Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant v. William Monahan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police Officer for the City and County of Denver, Defendant-Cross-Appellee. Leon Malloy v. Denver, City and County Of, William Monahan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police Officer for the City and County of Denver, and Officer Mark F. Haney, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Police Officer for the City and County of Denver
10th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
The court based this rate on the affidavits of Malloy's two attorneys and on the testimony of two experts on prevailing fees in Denver that such rates were reasonable. 27 Because the district court "is uniquely qualified to establish the reasonable hourly rate multiplier in computing attorneys' fees," Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1386 (10th Cir.1987), we give great deference to its factual findings.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DAVID C. v. Leavitt
D. Utah · 1995 · confidence medium
Reasonable Hourly Rates “The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the ease and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (citing Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 794 (10th Cir.1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Phelps v. Hamilton
D. Kan. · 1994 · confidence medium
“The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zuchel v. Denver (2×)
10th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
"The reasons do not, however, have to be so specific as to require individual justifications for each of the multipliers used in computing the lodestar figure so long as the reasons given for the award as a whole are adequate to allow for meaningful review." Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert Miller and Penny Miller, Husband and Wife v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Robert Clark, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant
10th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Therefore, "[a] general reduction of hours claimed in order to achieve what the court determines to be a reasonable number is not an erroneous method, so long as there is sufficient reason for its use." Id. at 1203 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 23 With respect to Mr. Clark's request for enhanced fees, we note that although "[t]he establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area," Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (citation omitted), here …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zuchel v. City of Denver (2×)
10th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
“The reasons do not, however, have to be so specific as to require individual justifications for each of the multipliers used in computing the lodestar figure so long as the reasons given for the award as a whole are adequate to allow for meaningful review.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Steven Douglas Hill Mark S. Cambiano v. A.L. Lockhart
8th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Inc. v. Flygt Corp., 925 F.2d 257, 259-60 (8th Cir.1991); Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1386 (10th Cir.1987). .The district court reduced Cambi-ano’s requested hourly rate of compensation from $150 to $85; denied compensation for all services prior to April 21, the effective date of his appointment; denied fees and expenses for services rendered after April 21 in seeking clemency from Arkansas officials; and denied fees and expenses for time spent on issues that the court concluded were not proper subjects for a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Campbell v. Kansas State University
D. Kan. · 1992 · confidence medium
In Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120 (10th Cir.1990), the Tenth Circuit stated: At the outset, we note that “[t]he establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates' in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 794 (10th Cir.1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union
D. Kan. · 1992 · confidence medium
In Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120 (10th Cir.1990), the Tenth Circuit stated: At the outset, we note that “[t]he establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 794 (10th Cir.1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ronald Smith v. Jessie Freeman, Police Officer
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
At the outset, we note that “[t]he establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area.” Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 794 (10th Cir.1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bee v. Greaves (2×) also: Cited "see"
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
The court appropriately distinguished “ ‘raw’ time from ‘hard’ or ‘billable’ time,” Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir.1983), and properly drew on its own experience as well as the affidavits submitted by the parties in setting the hourly rates, 4 see Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daniel Howard Bee v. Dr. Keith Greaves and Medic Keith Hughes, and Dr. Robert Greer, Daniel Howard Bee v. Dr. Keith Greaves, Medic Keith Hughes, and Dr. Robert Greer (2×) also: Cited "see"
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
The court appropriately distinguished " 'raw' time from 'hard' or 'billable' time," Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir.1983), and properly drew on its own experience as well as the affidavits submitted by the parties in setting the hourly rates, 4 see Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987). 12 Bee challenges the district court's decision to reduce by fifty percent the amount derived from multiplying the reasonable hours by the reasonable rates.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Headlee v. Bowen
10th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
See also Harris v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 836 F.2d 496, 498 (10th Cir.1987) (attorney fees to be awarded to successful Social Security claimant involves disputed issues of fact best determined by the district court); Kemp v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 966, 968 (10th Cir.1987) (setting attorney fees awardable under EAJA and Social Security Act is best determined by district court); Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.A.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Headlee v. Bowen
10th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
See also Harris v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 836 F.2d 496, 498 (10th Cir.1987) (attorney fees to be awarded to successful Social Security claimant involves disputed issues of fact best determined by the district court); Kemp v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 966, 968 (10th Cir.1987) (setting attorney fees awardable under EAJA and Social Security Act is best determined by district court); Lucero v. City of Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir.1987) (establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 is within the discretion of the district court who is familiar …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Irene C. Lucero
v.
City of Trinidad, by and Through the Former Members of Its City Council, John Rino, Carlos Chacon, Eugene Duran, Ernest Maio, Joseph Reorda, John Sawaya, and Joseph Terry, Acting in Their Official Capacities, and the Present Members of Its City Council, Roberta Cordova, Jack Dalton, Eugene Duran, Joseph Garbo, Marie George, and John Sawaya, Acting in Their Official Capacities Teddy C. Ryan, Former City Manager, Acting in His Official Capacity William Cordova, Present City Manager, Acting in His Official Capacity Manuel Lujan, Former Chief of Police, Acting in His Official Capacity and Richard Scherwitz, Present Chief of Police, Acting in His Official Capacity
85-1682.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Apr 16, 1987.
815 F.2d 1384
1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 5044
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 78%
Citer courts: D. Utah (1)

815 F.2d 1384

Irene C. LUCERO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF TRINIDAD, by and through the former members of its
City Council, John Rino, Carlos Chacon, Eugene Duran, Ernest
Maio, Joseph Reorda, John Sawaya, and Joseph Terry, acting
in their official capacities, and the present members of its
City Council, Roberta Cordova, Jack Dalton, Eugene Duran,
Joseph Garbo, Marie George, and John Sawaya, acting in their
official capacities; Teddy C. Ryan, former City Manager,
acting in his official capacity; William Cordova, present
City Manager, acting in his official capacity; Manuel
Lujan, former Chief of Police, acting in his official
capacity; and Richard Scherwitz, present Chief of Police,
acting in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-1682.

United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.

April 16, 1987.

Charles M. Johnson (Gregory A. Eurich and A. Bruce Jones, with him on the briefs), of Holland & Hart, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellant.

Bruce Billings, City Atty., City of Trinidad, Colo., for defendants-appellees.

Emily M. Calhoun, University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colo., for amicus curiae, Colorado Lawyers Committee.

Before BARRETT and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and JENKINS, District Judge.[*]

TACHA, Circuit Judge.

[*~1384–1386]1

This appeal involves an award of attorneys' fees in a civil rights case alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The underlying case was settled prior to trial, but the parties failed to reach agreement on the amount of attorneys' fees owed to plaintiff's attorneys. Plaintiff was the "prevailing party" and thus is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The only issue to be resolved on appeal is whether the district court erred in setting the amount of attorneys' fees for the lawyers, law students, and legal assistants who worked on this case.

2

Plaintiff was represented in this case by the law firm of Holland and Hart (Holland) in Denver. In support of the plaintiff's application for attorneys' fees, Holland submitted the affidavit of Mr. Bruce Sattler, a senior partner at Holland, and an attached summary of fees and costs claiming fees at a rate ranging from $65 to $140 per hour for attorneys and $40 per hour for law students and legal assistants. The total amount claimed by Holland was $21,252.50. The district court assessed fees at a rate of $75 per hour for partner and senior associate time, $50 for junior associate time, and $25 for law student and legal assistant time. The district court awarded a total of $14,972.50 in attorneys fees. In this appeal plaintiff challenges the district court's reduction of the hourly rates. We affirm.

3

Attorneys' fees awarded under Sec. 1988 are to be calculated on the basis of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community and not on the basis of the cost of legal services. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). The burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fee is on the applicant. Id. at 897, 104 S.Ct. at 1548. In the present case, Holland provided the court with documentation that showed only the prevailing market rates at the Holland firm. Holland did not submit any evidence that would show that its rates are representative of the prevailing market rates in Denver or in Colorado. We have said that the customary hourly rate of a lawyer in private practice is relevant but not conclusive in determining a reasonable rate. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir.1983).

4

The establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the area. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 794 (10th Cir.1980). Absent other evidence of prevailing market rates the district court must rely on all relevant factors known to the court in establishing the reasonable rate to be applied in multiplying the number of hours by the hourly rate to derive the "lodestar" figure. In Ramos we said that the district court must articulate reasons for fee awards to give us a basis for review. 713 F.2d at 552. The reasons do not, however, have to be so specific as to require individual justifications for each of the multipliers used in computing the lodestar figure so long as the reasons given for the award as a whole are adequate to allow for meaningful review.

[*~1385–1386]5

The district court supplied sufficient reasons for the award in this case. The judge specifically stated in the order awarding attorneys' fees that she could find no basis to award fees at the rates requested by Holland. In reviewing the record we agree with that conclusion because of the absence of relevant information about prevailing market rates in Denver other than the Holland affidavit and summary. Thus, the district judge turned to her own knowledge of prevailing market rates and to other relevant indicia of a reasonable market rate. As an indicia of reasonableness the court recites the rates provided by Congress in the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412 (EAJA). Holland, the party now claiming a higher market rate in Denver, did not provide evidence of the higher market rate other than the evidence relating to Holland's own rates. In the absence of other indicia of the local market rate the district judge compared the EAJA rates with her knowledge of the prevailing market rate and found the EAJA rates reasonable. The judge's order makes clear that she views the EAJA amounts as an indicia of reasonableness in this case. Although additional reasons should have been articulated, we cannot say that reference to the EAJA amounts to an abuse of discretion.

6

The district judge further indicated that she considered a duplication of efforts among the attorneys, law students, and legal assistants as a relevant factor in establishing the hourly rates. She states in her order that although plaintiff can staff the case as she chooses, it would not be reasonable to award fees for all of this time at the highest hourly rate. The district court took this duplication of effort into account in setting the hourly rates for junior associates, law students, and legal assistants.

7

The district court is uniquely qualified to establish the reasonable hourly rate multiplier in computing attorneys' fees. We will disturb the trial court's determination only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion or where the court provides no reasons for the award as a whole. We find no abuse of discretion here. The reasons given by the court are adequate.

8

AFFIRMED.

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The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, United States District Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation