United States v. Rosario, 820 F.2d 584 (1987). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Rosario, 820 F.2d 584 (1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
19 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Barnes (nysd, 2007-10-17)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Barnes
S.D.N.Y. · 2007 · confidence medium
See id. at 655-56 ; see also United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 678 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Rosario, 820 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir.1987); Anderson v. Casscles, 531 F.2d 682, 685 (1976); United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 66 (1974).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Concepcion v. United States
E.D.N.Y · 2002 · confidence medium
United States v. Rosario, 820 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 64-66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 420 U.S. 925 , 95 S.Ct. 1119 , 43 L.Ed.2d 394 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Maldonado-Rivera
unknown court · 1990 · confidence medium
Though defendants urge us to find that Jenkins is no longer the benchmark for claims of unconstitutional under-representation, relying on language in Alston v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1084 , 107 S.Ct. 1285 , 94 L.Ed.2d 143 (1987), to the effect that “the absolute disparity approach employed in Jenkins may be outmoded and should be discarded,” id. at 259, we have more recently declined to reexamine the Jenkins approach, see United States v. Rosario, 820 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir.1987), and we decline to do so here.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Maldonado-Rivera
unknown court · 1990 · confidence medium
Though defendants urge us to find that Jenkins is no longer the benchmark for claims of unconstitutional underrepresentation, relying on language in Alston v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1084 , 107 S.Ct. 1285 , 94 L.Ed.2d 143 (1987), to the effect that "the absolute disparity approach employed in Jenkins may be outmoded and should be discarded," id. at 259, we have more recently declined to reexamine the Jenkins approach, see United States v. Rosario, 820 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir.1987), and we decline to do so here. 183 Defendants have not shown any error in the dis…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Vallas
Conn. App. Ct. · 1988 · confidence medium
On the basis of the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing, the order and its appurtenant supporting documents, the court concluded that the intent of the wiretap panel was to authorize a twenty-four hour wiretap. 4 The trial court was correct in its determination that the term “12:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.” is inherently ambiguous. 5 See, e.g., United States v. Rosario, 820 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir. 1987); Warshaw v. Atlanta, 250 Ga. 535 , 299 S.E.2d 552 (1983); Hurwitz v. Boyle, 117 N.J.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Biaggi (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rosario, 820 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir.1987) (assuming that the Jenkins test applies to sixth amendment claims); Alston, 791 F.2d at 258-59 (same); LaChance, supra (same).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Manuel Rosario, Marta Serrano, Jose Antonio Vasquez A/K/A \Jose Ramon Vasquez
Jun 10, 1987.
820 F.2d 584
\" Jesus Batista-Sanchez
Iris Ortiz

820 F.2d 584

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Manuel ROSARIO, Marta Serrano, Jose Antonio Vasquez a/k/a
"Jose Ramon Vasquez," Hipolito Diaz, a/k/a "Polo," Porfiria
Lopez, a/k/a "Giga," Floribell Colon, a/k/a "The Blonde,"
Jesus Batista-Sanchez, Iris Ortiz, a/k/a "Edie,"
Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 1206-1213, Docket Nos. 87-1023 to 87-1026, 87-1036,
87-1041, 87-1090 and 87-1110.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

Argued May 28, 1987.
Decided June 10, 1987.

Kathleen Eldergill, Manchester, Conn.; David N. Rosen, New Haven, Conn. (Richard S. Cramer, Hartford, Conn.; Thomas Dennis, Federal Public Defender, Hartford, Conn.; V. James Ferraro, New Haven, Conn.; David Gussak, East Hartford, Conn.; Gerald Klein, Hartford, Conn.; John D. Maxwell, Hartford, Conn.; Terrence Ward, Hartford, Conn., of counsel), for defendants-appellants.

Donna L. Fatsi, Holly B. Fitzsimmons, Asst. U.S. Attys., for D. Conn. (Stanley A. Twardy, Jr., U.S. Atty., for D. Conn., of counsel), for appellee.

Before LUMBARD, WINTER and MINER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

1

Appellants pleaded guilty in the District of Connecticut to violations of the federal narcotics laws. They reserved their right to appeal from Judge Cabranes' refusal to suppress wiretap evidence and to dismiss the indictment because of alleged racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury.

2

Appellants contend that state law enforcement officials exceeded their authority in conducting 24-hour wiretaps pursuant to an order authorizing wiretaps during the period "12:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m." We disagree. It is clear to us that the use of the ambiguous phrase "12:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m." was a mere clerical error insufficient to warrant suppression. The wiretap application and supporting affidavits unequivocally establish that 24-hour interception of appellants' telephone conversations was requested by the prosecutor who sought the wiretaps. The panel of state judges that authorized the wiretaps have since stated that they intended to authorize 24-hour interception. Indeed, as the Connecticut Superior Court observed in denying a motion to suppress wiretap evidence predicated on similar grounds, "[t]he suggestion of a twelve hour wiretap order concerning this type of narcotics operation--particularly an order authorizing interceptions solely between midnight and noon--would not be consistent with common sense and normal experience." State of Connecticut v. Calash, No. CR8-74222, slip op. at 20 (Conn.Super.Ct. Dec. 17, 1986).

3

Appellants also contend that the indictment should have been dismissed because of alleged underrepresentation of blacks on grand juries in the District of Connecticut. However, they concede that they have failed to offer sufficient evidence of black underrepresentation to establish a prima facie violation of the sixth amendment or the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1861 et seq. (1982), under the standard set forth in United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 64-66 (2d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925, 95 S.Ct. 1119, 43 L.Ed.2d 394 (1975). We see no reason to reexamine our holding in Jenkins.[1] Accordingly, we must therefore affirm.

1

We need not address whether appellants have made a stronger showing of black underrepresentation under a "standard deviation" analysis than did appellant in United States v. LaChance, 788 F.2d 856 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93 L.Ed.2d 248 (1986). The panel's discussion in LaChance of the deficiencies in appellant's showing was dictum, as the panel noted that appellant had failed to state sufficient facts "to enable us or the court below to apply either the 'absolute numbers' analysis of Jenkins or the 'standard deviation' analysis which he urges on us." Id. at 867. We decline to elaborate on LaChance 's discussion of what kind of submission might satisfy a "standard deviation" test while Jenkins remains the law in this circuit