MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Silva Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

In this forcible detainer action, appellant Cynthia V. Bolinger appeals the trial

court’s judgment awarding appellee Maria Guadalupe Contreras possession of certain real property. Upon review of the documents before the Court, it appeared that the appeal was moot, and the Court thereafter requested a response from Bolinger. Bolinger has not responded. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2021, a judgment of eviction against Bolinger and in favor of Contreras was issued by the justice of the peace court. An appeal bond was set at $1,500, and Bolinger was further ordered to pay $300, a monthly rental amount during the pendency of her appeal.

On March 15, 2021, Bolinger appealed the judgment of eviction to the county court.

Contreras subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Bolinger’s appeal on April 12, 2021, citing Bolinger’s failure to timely execute an appeal bond or file a compliant affidavit of inability to pay. ^[1] See TEX. R CIV. P. 143a (requiring an appellant “to pay the costs on appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace or small claims court within twenty (20) days”); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0052 (requiring an affidavit claiming indigency in an appeal of judgment from the justice court to be filed no later than the fifth day after judgment is signed and setting out what information must be contained in the affidavit).

On April 29, 2021, Contreras filed a request for writ of possession of the subject property.

On May 12, 2021, following a hearing on Contreras’s pending motions, the county court dismissed the cause and granted Contreras’s motion for writ of possession in a single order that included several findings of fact and conclusions of law. ^[2] See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 510.13. In relevant part, the order stated: Bolinger’s affidavit of inability to pay the appeal bond did not meet statutory requirements; Bolinger failed to pay her court-ordered rent during the pendency of the appeal; Bolinger was invited into the subject property as a guest for a period of two weeks and thereafter refused to leave; Bolinger never paid rent in the fourteen months that she resided at the subject property; Bolinger was not credible in her testimony because “no reasonable person would believe [a lease] does not require any rental payments”; and Bolinger may be removed from the subject property, alternatively, on grounds that she is a “squatter and trespasser.”

Bolinger filed an appeal to this Court. On May 27, 2021, Bolinger filed a motion for emergency stay wherein she requested a stay of the execution of the writ of possession.

Following Bolinger’s implicit representations that the writ had not yet been executed and that she had actual possession of the subject property, 3 this Court granted Bolinger’s request for stay on May 28, 2021, pending further order of this Court or until this case was finally decided. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b) (“Unless vacated or modified, an order granting temporary relief is effective until the case is finally decided.”). This Court additionally ordered Contreras to submit a response within ten days of the order.

On June 4, 2021, Contreras informed this Court that Bolinger vacated the premises

prior to her request for emergency stay and that Bolinger is no longer in possession of the subject property. Contreras prayed, in part, that this Court dismiss Bolinger’s appeal.

On June 7, 2021, the Clerk of this Court notified Bolinger that this Court was without jurisdiction to proceed if Bolinger was not in possession of the subject property or able to

demonstrate a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the subject property. Bolinger was advised that, if this Court did not receive a response within ten days from the date of receipt of the notice confirming the existence of Bolinger’s meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the subject property, Bolinger’s appeal would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c)

(providing the appellate court may dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction or “because

the appellant has failed to comply with . . . a notice from the clerk requiring a response or other action within a specified time”). More than ten days have elapsed, and Bolinger has not filed a response.

II. MOOTNESS

Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot controversies and render advisory opinions. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; In re J.J.R.S., No. 20-0175, __ S.W.3d __, __, 2021

WL 2273722, at[*11] (Tex. June 4, 2021); see also State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d

1, 7 (Tex. 2018) (providing that appellate courts must consider our jurisdiction sua sponte 4). A case becomes moot if at any stage there ceases to be an actual controversy between the parties. Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Grp., LP, 575 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Tex. 2019);

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). Whether a plaintiff’s claims have become moot is a question of law that we review de novo. Alanis v. Wells

Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 616 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied).

The only issue in an action for forcible detainer is the right to actual possession of the premises. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex.

2006); Abraham v. Victory Apartments, 578 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Where a defendant is no longer in possession of the subject property, an appeal from the judgment in a forcible detainer case is moot unless the defendant can nonetheless assert a “potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession.”

Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787; see also Quezada v. KGMH Prop. Invs., LLC, No. 13-19-

00478-CV, 2020 WL 3396601, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing an appeal for want of jurisdiction after appellant failed to

assert a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession following the execution of a writ of possession).

Here, Bolinger does not dispute that she is no longer in possession of the subject property nor does she assert a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the premises following this Court’s request that she address the possible jurisdictional defect. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787; see also Anthony v. Seaside

Rentals, No. 13-17-00178-CV, 2019 WL 303037, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Jan. 24, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is not intended to be a final determination of whether the eviction is wrongful; rather it is a determination of the right to immediate possession.”).

Even liberally construing Bolinger’s notice of appeal, 5 wherein she lists several arguments we presume she intended to raise in her brief on appeal, Bolinger’s enumerated complaints would not support a right to current, actual possession. Bolinger

argues: (1) the county court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal from the justice of the peace court, citing to an appellate case from North Carolina; 6 (2) the case should have been tried before a jury, and the county court’s failure to do so was in violation of federal rules of civil procedure; 7 (3) the county court committed fraud and violated the “Judicial

Code of Ethics” when the court “handed over writing his judgment to the prosecution lawyer”; 8 (4) “unlawful judgments have been passed in favor of such fraud upon the court as well as motions which clearly violate the controlling statutory limitations”; 9

(5) Contreras and the county court could not “maintain a basis of argu[]ment for the cause

(tenant, squatter, or trespasser)”; 10 (6) the county court prematurely issued a judgment following a hearing on Contreras’s motion for writ of possession, which superseded a previously scheduled “Final Court Tr[ia]l” date; 11 (7) the eviction action was retaliatory; 12 and (8) the CDC moratorium on evictions applies. ^[13]

Having considered the aforementioned, we conclude that the issue of current, actual possession is moot. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787; see also Cholick v. TSPC

Bros., LLC, No. 13-17-00622-CV, 2018 WL 1325795, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Mar. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing an appeal for want of jurisdiction after appellant failed to respond to the Court’s inquiry as to its jurisdiction and failed to

assert a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession). Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(e); Glassdoor, 575 S.W.3d at 527 (“If a case becomes moot, the court must vacate all previously issued orders and judgments and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.”); Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 788 (“One purpose of vacating the underlying judgment if a case becomes moot during appeal is to prevent prejudice to the rights of parties when appellate review of a judgment on its merits is precluded.”).

III. CONCLUSION

We vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

CLARISSA SILVA Justice Delivered and filed on the 5th day of August, 2021.