Robert J. Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, D/B/A Martin Marietta Aerospace, Orlando, Florida, 833 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
Search
Robert J. Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, D/B/A Martin Marietta Aerospace, Orlando, Florida, 833 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …completely disregards the proper analysis at p. 1489 ⚠ not in text
19 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v. The Florida Friory of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, the Ecumenical Order (ca11, 2012-12-18) · Strongest negative: Charles N. Baker, Kennan G. Dandar, Movant-Appellant v. Ronald Alderman, Individually and Officially as Hillsborough County Property Appraiser, and Hillsborough County Civil Service Board, Kennan G. Dandar, Movant-Appellant v. Ronald Alderman, Hillsborough County Civil Service Board, Charles N. Baker v. Ronald Alderman, Hillsborough County Civil Service Board (ca11, 1998-10-19)
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Charles N. Baker, Kennan G. Dandar, Movant-Appellant v. Ronald Alderman, Individually and Officially as Hillsborough County Property Appraiser, and Hillsborough County Civil Service Board, Kennan G. Dandar, Movant-Appellant v. Ronald Alderman, Hillsborough County Civil Service Board, Charles N. Baker v. Ronald Alderman, Hillsborough County Civil Service Board (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
11th Cir. · 1998 · signal: but see · confidence high
Therefore, whether or not the 1993 amendments were applied, there was no specific time limit provided for the motion for sanctions under Rule 11 33 Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(1983 amendment) 34 Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee notes (1983 amendment) 35 Brown v. City of Palmetto, Georgia, 681 F.2d 1325, 1326-1327 (11th Cir.1982) 36 Gordon v. Heimann, 715 F.2d 531, 538-539 (11th Cir.1983) (also noting that fee requests may be made in the initial pleadings, by motion during the litigation, or in a separate subsequent action) 37 Id. at 537 (finding no prejudice where the plaintiffs were aware of a re…
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v. The Florida Friory of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, the Ecumenical Order (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
we may affirm an ultimate finding on the issue of confusion that is not clearly erroneous, even when the district court fails to consider all seven factors.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Murphy v. BOARD OF EDUC. ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL
W.D.N.Y. · 2006 · confidence medium
See Miller v. Los Angeles Co. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir.1987); Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir. 1987); Patton v. County of Kings, 857 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.1988); Arnold v. Burger King Corp., 719 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 , 105 S.Ct. 108 , 83 L.Ed.2d 51 (1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baker v. Alderman (2×)
11th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533, 537 (11th Cir.1990) (also stating that sanctions are not warranted if the claim was brought as a result of "poor judgment”); hut see Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir.1987) (indicating that, although the plaintiff’s claim may have been characterized as without foundation, the court would reverse if the award were based on Rule 11 only because there was no evidence that the plaintiff, who was proceeding pro se, brought the action in bad faith or "for any purpose other than to receive what he thought he was entitled to under the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re KTMA Acquisition Corp.
Bankr. D. Minn. · 1993 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 550-51 , 111 S.Ct. at 933 ; Flournoy v. Kelly, 840 F.2d 16 (6th Cir.1988) (unpublished disposition); Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir.1987); Roberts v. Walter E.
cited Cited as authority (rule) DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey-In-The-Hills
M.D. Fla. · 1989 · confidence medium
Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) James Thomas Patterson, Sr. v. Lawrence L. Aiken
11th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited "see" Gartman v. Cheatham
M.D. Ala. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“The amount of attorney’s fees [awarded against the Title VII plaintiff] was properly modified by the district court in consideration of the plaintiff’s ability to pay.”).
cited Cited "see" Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v. The Florida Priori of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, the Ecumenical Order
11th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wesco Mfg., 833 F.2d at 1489.
discussed Cited "see" Hughes v. Regents of the University of Colorado
D. Colo. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (1 1th Cir.1987) (plaintiff’s title VII claim without foundation where he could not show that other similarly situated members of the unprotected class were treated preferentially).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Young v. Suffolk County
E.D.N.Y · 2013 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir.1987) (finding Rule 11 sanctions unwarranted and, in so doing, noting that “[t]he evidence [plaintiff] presented not only failed to indicate discriminatory treatment, but instead revealed that [plaintiff] received several salary increases and promotions during his tenure. [Plaintiff] made no showing that other similarly situated members of the unprotected class were treated preferentially nor did he present evidence of retaliation.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lax v. 29 WOODMERE BOULEVARD OWNERS, INC.
E.D.N.Y · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Nor did they constitute the type of abuse of the adversary system that Rule 11 was designed to guard against.”); see also Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir.1987) (finding Rule 11 sanctions unwarranted, even when “[t]he evidence [plaintiff] presented not only failed to indicate discriminatory treatment, but instead revealed that [plaintiff] received several salary increases and promotions during his tenure. [Plaintiff] made no showing that other similarly situated members of the unprotected class were treated preferentially nor did he present evidence of re…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Umar Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Carlson & Carlson, Inc.
E.D.N.Y · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Nor did they constitute the type of abuse of the adversary system that Rule 11 was designed to guard against.”); see also Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d 1489, 1491 (11th Cir.1987) (finding Rule 11 sanctions unwarranted, even when “[t]he evidence [plaintiff] presented not only failed to indicate discriminatory treatment, but instead revealed that [plaintiff] received several salary increases and promotions during his tenure. [Plaintiff] made no showing that other similarly situated members of the unprotected class were treated preferentially nor did he present evidence of re…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Robert J. NESMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARTIN MARIETTA AEROSPACE, D/B/A Martin Marietta Aerospace, Orlando, Florida, Defendant-Appellee
86-3652.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Dec 15, 1987.
833 F.2d 1489
1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16277
Robert J. Nesmith, pro se., Thomas C. Garwood, Garwood & McKen-na, Orlando, Fla., for defendant-appellee.
Roney, Hill, Fay.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: #20,326 of 633,719
Citer courts: Eleventh Circuit (3)
PER CURIAM:

This appeal is from a judgment for defendant after a bench trial of this Title VII action brought by plaintiff Robert J. Nes-mith. Nesmith alleges that his employer, Martin Marietta Aerospace (MMA), discriminated against him because of his race and discharged him in retaliation for filing a discrimination suit with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. We affirm the judgment on the merits and the award of $2,000 in attorney’s fees against plaintiff.

Representing himself at a consolidated trial of separate actions for discrimination and retaliation, Nesmith called a number of witnesses, including an MMA official, for cross-examination. Nesmith also testified. MMA then moved for a dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) on the ground that Nes-mith had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or of retaliation and asked for an award of attorney’s fees and costs. The court entered judgment, based on findings of fact and conclusions of law, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and awarding MMA attorney's fees and costs.

The law is clear concerning the requirements for proving cases of this kind. See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir.1984); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The trial testimony and the documentary evidence support the court’s conclusion that neither Nesmith’s race nor his filing charges played a role in MMA’s actions toward him. There is little that need be said of the district court’s findings in this regard. Nesmith’s career thrived, with many promotions and salary increases, during the presidency of Robert Whalen, his mentor, and faltered when Whalen left the company. Whalen’s endorsement, not Nesmith’s abilities, explained his rapid advancement during Whalen’s tenure at MMA. Nesmith had been promoted to a level at which he was unable to perform satisfactorily and, as a consequence, he experienced periods without assignments despite MMA's efforts to accommodate him.

[*1491] Nesmith was away from his job on medical leave, at a salary of over $40,000 a year, during much of 1984-85. Following MMA’s last effort to find a suitable position for him in the manufacturing department, Nesmith began a period of paid medical leave which lasted six months, with extensions. At the conclusion of Nesmith’s leave, he was terminated. There is no evidence which requires a finding that MMA’s action was based on race.

The record also supports the district court’s finding that Nesmith was not fired in retaliation for his equal employment opportunity activities at the company. Indeed, the court found that his early rapid advancement at MMA was related to his efforts on behalf of black and female employees of MMA. Even in his last years there, the company appeared to be extremely tolerant in attempting to find a satisfactory position for him and in according him leave for his medical problems.

Not being clearly erroneous, the district court’s findings, including its finding on the “ultimate” issue of intentional discrimination, must be affirmed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982).

The district court held that MMA was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under both Title VII and Federal Rule Civil Procedure 11. Were the award based on Rule 11 only, we would be inclined to reverse. ThaLRule-is-a-sanction -against bad faith litigation. The Rule provides that a lawyer, or a party, if unrepresented, must sign every pleading which means that:

to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.

The standard for imposing Rule 11 sanctions is more stringent than other attorney’s fees statutes because it requires the additional element of bad faith. The amended rule incorporates an objective standard in assessing bad faith. See Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir.1987) (in banc). The standard requires a determination as to whether the party’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Id.

The district court without discussion determined that Nesmith’s suit was brought for an improper purpose. There is insufficient evidence to support this conclusion. The evidence Nesmith presented not only failed to indicate discriminatory treatment, but instead revealed that Nesmith received several salary increases and promotions during his tenure. Nesmith made no showing that other similarly situated members of the unprotected class were treated preferentially nor did he present evidence of retaliation. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that Nesmith’s claim may be characterized as without foundation, but there is no evidence that he was in bad faith in bringing the claim, or that it was brought for any purpose other than to receive what he thought he was entitled to under the law.

The standards for awarding Title VII attorney’s fees under the statutory provisions of Title VII have a different base. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) the Supreme Court held that “a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” It appears clear from the facts in this case that the district court was well within its discretion in imposing attorney’s fees under the Christiansburg standard.

The amount of attorney’s fees was properly modified by the district court in consideration of the plaintiff’s ability to pay. See Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc. 678 F.2d 911, 917 (11th Cir.1982).

AFFIRMED.