green
Positive treatment
Doctrinal family: United States v. Alan Scop, Raph… ↗
Quoted verbatim 2×
19.6 score
G Cite
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988
2007
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Lou Dibella and Dibella Entertainment, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees v. Bernard Hopkins, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
expert witness statements embodying legal conclusions ' exceedf the permissible scope of opinion testimony under the federal rules of evidence.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
In Re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (Mtbe) Products
repeated statements embodying legal conclusions exceed the permissible scope of opinion testimony under the federal rules of evidence.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Shelton Benoite v. J. Doerer, et al.
Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 5 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 6 B.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
(PC) Christopher G. Valencia v. Clark
Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th 22 Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 , 1260-61 23 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order to file an amended complaint); Carey v. 24 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring 25 pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128 , 26 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 27 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 19…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
(SS) Shaibi v. Commissioner of Social Security
E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 5 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Joyce Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Company
Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir. 2002) (standard of review for Rule 11 motions); Green, 856 F.2d at 665 (standard of review for Rule 60(b) motions).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Joyce Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Company
Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir. 2002) (standard of review for Rule 11 motions); Green, 856 F.2d at 665 (standard of review for Rule 60(b) motions).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Joyce Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Company
Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir. 2002) (standard of review for Rule 11 motions); Green, 856 F.2d at 665 (standard of review for Rule 60(b) motions).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Hoffecker
(3×)
In Scop, the court of appeals found that Federal Rule of Evidence 704 was violated by the admission of testimony of a Government expert witness who was an SEC investigator- and expert in securities trading practices to the extent that his legal conclusion was that the defendants were “active” and “material participants” in a “fraudulent scheme in furtherance of [the] manipulation [of stock].” Id. at 138.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 98,997 United States of America v. Paul Russo, Barbara Hosman, William Petrokansky
In Scop, however, we stated that had the expert “merely testified that controlled buying and selling of the kind alleged here can create artificial price levels ..., no sustainable objection could have been made.” Id. at 140.
cited
Cited "see"
Escobar v. European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
United States v. Diaz, 876 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2017); see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1988), modified on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988).
cited
Cited "see"
Estate of Jaquez v. City of New York
See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 (2d Cir.), modified on reh’g, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988); In re Blech Secs.
cited
Cited "see"
In re Puda Coal Securities Inc., Litigation
See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 (2d Cir.), modified on reh’g, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988); In re Blech Secs.
discussed
Cited "see"
Desilva v. North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System, Inc.
See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 139, 142 (2d Cir.1988), rev’d in part on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988) (expert witness statement “embodying legal conclusion exceeded the permissible scope of opinion testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Fjord v. AMR Corp. (In re AMR Corp.)
Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 608 F.Supp.2d 409, 434-35 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“An expert who simply regurgitates what a party has told him provides no assistance to the trier of fact through the application of specialized knowledge.”); see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir.1988), rev’d in part on reh’g on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988) (“Rule 704 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] was not intended to allow experts to offer opinions embodying legal conclusions.”).
cited
Cited "see"
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Tourre
See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 (2d Cir.1988), modified by 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988); In re Blech Sec.
cited
Cited "see"
Globalrock Networks, Inc. v. MCI Communications Services, Inc.
See Scop, 846 F.2d at 139-40 , modified, 856 F.2d 5 (2d.
cited
Cited "see"
City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
See id. (citing Charles Tilford McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, § 12). .
discussed
Cited "see"
Webb v. Omni Block, Inc.
Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (“The problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness’ unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.”) (citation omitted), rev’d in part on reh’g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant’s conduct was “deadly force” and “unjustified” was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d…
discussed
Cited "see"
Highland Capital Management, L.P. v. Schneider
See 846 F.2d 135, 138, 140 (2d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988); see also Hygh, 961 F.2d at 362 (in civil rights action, expert testimony that defendant’s conduct constituted -“deadly physical force” that was not “justified under the circumstances” and that the defendant’s conduct was “totally improper” not admissible) (internal quotation marks omitted); Andrews, 882 F.2d at 709 (expert testimony that defendant was “negligent” improper in a personal injury action) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited "see"
Lippe v. Bairnco Corp.
See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 (2d Cir.1988), rev’d in part on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988) (citing United States v. Richter, 826 F.2d 206, 208 (2d Cir.1987)); Lumpkin, 192 F.3d at 289 (“Fundamental to the role of juror as trier of fact is the task of assessing witness credibility.”); United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir.1994); GST Telecomms., Inc. v. Irwin, 192 F.R.D. 109, 110-11 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (“[I]t would be inappropriate to consider the experts’ personal assessments of the credibility of the situations involved, the sufficiency of the measures…
discussed
Cited "see"
GST Telecommunications, Inc. v. Irwin
See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir.1988), rev’d in part on reh’g on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988) (“Rule 704 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] was not intended to allow experts to offer opinions embodying legal conclusions.”); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 362-64 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that the expert’s testimony that the defendant “had employed ‘deadly physical force’ whose use was not ‘warranted under the circumstances’ ” and that the defendant’s “ ‘conduct in these circumstances was ‘totally improper”” constituted eoncl…
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Vinal S. Duncan
Generally, the use of expert testimony is not permitted if it will “usurp either the role of the trial judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role of the jury in applying that law to the facts before it.” Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1294 ; accord United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.), rev’d in part on reh’g on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners’ Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 510-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 , 98 S.Ct. 188 , 54 L.Ed.2d 134 (1977).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Norman J. Tannenbaum
See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 138-39 (2d Cir.), overruled in part on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988).
examined
Cited "see"
United States v. Paul A. Bilzerian
(4×)
See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 139-40 , modified, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 510-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 , 98 S.Ct. 188 , 54 L.Ed.2d 134 (1977). 28 As a general rule an expert's testimony on issues of law is inadmissable.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Torres
See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 141-42 (2d Cir.) (reviewing pertinent Second Circuit precedents), rev’d in part on rehearing, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Torres
See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 141-42 (2d Cir.) (reviewing pertinent Second Circuit precedents), rev'd in part on rehearing, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
SLSJ, LLC v. Kleban
See, e.g., United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 139-40 (2d Cir.1988) (holding that the expert’s “repeated statements embodying legal conclusions exceeded the permissible scope of opinion testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence”), on reh’g, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In Re Fosamax Products Liability Litigation
See, e.g., United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 139-40 , modified, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988) (in criminal prosecution for violation of securities laws, overruling admission of expert's testimony that defendants' conduct amounted to a manipulative fraudulent scheme within the meaning of the securities laws); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners’ Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 510-11 (2d Cir.1977) (in dispute over whether defendant breached its contractual obligation to use best efforts, overruling admission of expert's interpretation of the meaning of best efforts within the contract); F.A.A. v. Landy, 705 F…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Eppolito
We must reverse a district court’s postconviction Rule 29 judgment of acquittal if, “ ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Espaillet, 380 F.3d 713, 718 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in Jackson)); see, e.g., United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 138-39 (2d Cir.) (applying same standard to review of claims of “insufficient evidence of overt …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Lesslie
See People v. Gaffney, 769 P.2d 1081 (Colo.1989); People v. Lanari, 926 P.2d 116 (Colo.App. 1996); see also United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.), modified on reh’g, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988) (expert testimony properly excluded where calculated to invade province of court to determine applicable law and instruct the jury).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Juan Jose Pujana-Mena
Thus, Scop prohibits witnesses from “assessing] the trustworthiness or accuracy of testimony given in the same case or [from] offering] opinions based on such an assessment.” Scop, 846 F.2d at 143 (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Scop, 856 F.2d 5, 6 (2d Cir.1988) (on petition for rehearing) (stating previous decision reversed convictions “because the government’s expert witness was wrongly allowed to give opinions that embodied legal conclusions and were based on that witness’s assessment of the credibility of the testimony of other witnesses”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96,082 United States of America v. John A. Mulheren, Jr.
Compare United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 137 (matched orders through fictitious nominees), modified on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.1988); United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94, 95 (2d Cir.1981) (matched orders and wash sales) 5 , cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946 , 102 S.Ct. 2014 , 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982); United States v. Minuse, 114 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir.1940) (fictitious accounts, matched orders, wash sales, dissemination of false literature).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Alan SCOP, Raphael Bloom, Herbert Stone and Jack Ringer, Defendants-Appellants
v.
Alan SCOP, Raphael Bloom, Herbert Stone and Jack Ringer, Defendants-Appellants
393, 391, 408 and 392, Dockets 87-1255, 87-1261, 87-1262 and 87-1270.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Aug 26, 1988.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
WINTER, Circuit Judge:We grant rehearing in the instant case, as requested by defendants Raphael Bloom and Herbert Stone, to reconsider their convictions for perjury. Familiarity with our prior opinion, 846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.1988), is assumed. In that decision, we reversed the conspiracy and mail and securities fraud convictions of defendants because the government’s expert witness was wrongly allowed to give opinions that embodied legal conclusions and were based on that witness’s assessment of the credibility of the testimony of other witnesses. However, we affirmed the convictions of defendants Bloom and Stone for perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1982), after determining that their challenges to those convictions were without merit.
Defendants’ petitions for rehearing argue that the subject of the penury was closely related to the subject of the improper opinion testimony and that the principal witness on the penury count was the witness to whose credibility the government’s expert witness had attested. We agree. The allegedly perjurious answers were to questions that used the term “manipulation,” which was also used in the improper opinion testimony, and that involved the conduct of Sarcinelli, whose credibility was improperly bolstered by the expert.
Specifically, Bloom was charged with perjury based on the following grand jury testimony:
Q. Do you have any knowledge concerning Mr. Sarcinelli manipulating any of the stocks that were discussed here today?
A: I don’t, no. I knew he was active in some of these stocks or he had an active interest in them, but most of them never did anything anyway, so far as I know.
Q: Do you have any knowledge of Mr. Kimmis or Mr. Quinn manipulating the stocks we’ve been talking about?
A: I don’t have any knowledge of that, no.
Q: Do you know [sic] any knowledge of them or anyone else using European Auto, Sundance, TONM, Enerdine for purposes of either manipulating those stocks or for laundering illegal money?
A: I really don’t know.
The indictment maintains that the above statements were perjurious because:
[I]n truth and in fact, as defendant Bloom then well knew, during at least 1980 and 1981, he had participated in a scheme with defendant Sarcinelli and others to manipulate the price of European Auto common stock and had facilitated the matching of trades by defendant Sarcinelli.
Stone was accused of perjury on the basis of testimony similar to that of Bloom. Stone testified as follows:
Q: Were you involved with Mr. Sarcinel-li in attempting to match trades and manipulate the price of European Auto?
A: Absolutely not.
Q: Or Sundance?
A: Absolutely not.
[*7] Q: Any of the others?
A: No stock at all. I’ve never been involved with manipulating anything of any consequence, never.
* * * * * *
Q: Are you familiar at all with anything going on in the New York area by stockbrokers, specifically people like Mr. Scop, Mr. Ringer, Mr. Fagin, people like that, for purposes of manipulating penny stocks?
A: Not to my knowledge.
Q: Do you have any knowledge of any improper involvement on their part on any of the stocks I’ve named previously, Sundance?
A: No.
Q: European Auto?
A: European Auto we were involved in. There was nothing done illegally there, to my knowledge.
******
Q: One question that I generally ask witnesses in your situation, Mr. Stone: Is there anything that you would like to add or any areas that you think we should be looking into in pursuing the inquiry that we are pursuing?
A: All I want to say is that I had no involvement with Mr. Sarcinelli in any way, shape or form in any of the things this man has done. That’s all I can tell you.
Q: I assume by that you also mean you’ve had no involvement with anybody else concerning the manipulation of stock?
A: Absolutely none to manipulate any stock. I’ve had none in his other dealings or anything like that.
The indictment charged that the foregoing statements were false because defendant Stone purportedly knew “he had participated in a scheme with defendant Sarcinelli and others to manipulate the price of European Auto common stock.”
The perjury charges thus focused on two areas: (i) whether the defendants knew of or had participated in the “manipulation” of European Auto Stock; and (ii) whether Bloom and/or Stone knew of Sar-cinelli’s participation in this “manipulation.” We agree with defendants that the improper expert testimony related to the perjury as well as conspiracy and mail and securities fraud charges. The only question, therefore, is whether the failure of defendants to argue on their appeal that a relationship between the improper opinion testimony and their perjury convictions existed bars relief on rehearing. Given the evident injustice in allowing the perjury convictions to stand, the fact that the government has been allowed to respond to the defendants’ petition for rehearing, and that relief can be granted without excessive expenditure of judicial resources, we grant the petition for rehearing and reverse the perjury convictions of defendants Bloom and Stone.