Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik, a P'ship Including a Prof'l Corp. v. Geraldine Woods & Robert Woods, 865 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
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Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik, a P'ship Including a Prof'l Corp. v. Geraldine Woods & Robert Woods, 865 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …neither fed. r. civ. p. 55(b)(2) nor the sdny local rule requires that, before judgment can be entered, the clerk's certificate be served upon an opposing party who has not appeared. at p. 44 ✓
9 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Off-White LLC. v. Adagio (nysd, 2020-06-08)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Off-White LLC. v. Adagio
S.D.N.Y. · 2020 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
neither fed. r. civ. p. 55(b)(2) nor the sdny local rule requires that, before judgment can be entered, the clerk's certificate be served upon an opposing party who has not appeared.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) OFF-WHITE LLC v. 5HK5584
S.D.N.Y. · 2020 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
neither fed. r. civ. p. 55(b)(2) nor the sdny local rule requires that, before judgment can be entered, the clerk's certificate be served upon an opposing party who has not appeared.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mattel, Inc. v. Uenjoy Limited Liability Company
S.D.N.Y. · 2020 · confidence medium
Where a court determines that a default was willful, such a finding “by itself, support[s] its refusal to vacate the challenged default judgment . . . .” United States v. Chesir, 526 F. App’x 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order); Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik v. Woods, 865 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (affirming district court’s denial of motion to vacate default judgment where defendants “failed to prove that their neglect had been excusable, even though they showed that they had a meritorious defense and that setting aside the judgment would not prejudice [the plaintiff].…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pav v. Moreno
E.D.N.Y · 2019 · confidence medium
“A court need not consider all three criteria, however, because its determination that the default was willful is sufficient to support the denial of a motion to vacate.” Jaramillo v. Vega, 675 F. App’x 76 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2017) (summary order) (citing Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik v. Woods, 865 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam)); see also United States v. Chesir, 526 F. App’x 60, 62 (2d Cir. June 6, 2013) (summary order) (“[T]he district court’s identification of willfulness would, by itself, support its refusal to vacate the challenged default judgment. . . .”); De Curtis …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jaramillo v. Vega
2d Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik v. Woods, 865 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Chesir
2d Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Meritorious Defense While the district court’s identification of willfulness would, by itself, support its refusal to vacate the challenged default judgment, see Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik v. Woods, 865 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir.1989), we identify no abuse of discretion in its determination that Chesir also failed to satisfy the other two criteria for vacatur.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ferraro v. Kuznetz (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.D.N.Y. · 1990 · confidence medium
Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik v. Woods, 865 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 3188 , 105 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989); Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., Ltd., 691 F.2d 653, 656 (3d Cir.1982) (citing 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, at § 2696).
cited Cited "see" United Bank of Kuwait PLC v. Enventure Energy Enhanced Oil Recovery Associates—Charco Redondo Butane
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik v. Woods, 865 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3188 , 105 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
BOBROW GREENAPPLE & SKOLNIK, a Partnership Including a Professional Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Geraldine WOODS and Robert Woods, Defendants-Appellants
531, Docket 88-7740.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jan 9, 1989.
865 F.2d 43
1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 201
John M. Silvestri, Pittsburgh, Pa., (Geraldine and Robert Woods, pro se), for defendants-appellants., Lawrence Greenapple, New York City (Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik, Robert A. Korren, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
Feinberg, Newman, Altimari.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Geraldine and Robert Woods appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, John M. Walker, Jr., J., dated June 30, 1988, denying their motion to set aside a default judgment. Appellee Bobrow Greenapple & Skolnik (“Bobrow”), a law firm, obtained a default judgment on August 28, 1987 for $18,151.20 in its suit against the Woodses for attorneys’ fees. Less than a month after entry of the default, the Woodses moved to have the judgment set aside under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c) and 60(b). The district court denied the motion, holding that the Woodses were not entitled to relief because they failed to prove that their neglect had been excusable, even though they showed that they had a meritorious defense and that setting aside the judgment would not prejudice Bobrow.

Ordinarily, we would have simply affirmed on the basis of the district court’s opinion. However, an issue was raised at oral argument as to whether the default had been properly entered with appropriate notice to the appellant, and whether the less stringent standard for relief from default pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c) was appropriate rather than the more stringent standard for setting aside a judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). See Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274 (2d Cir.1981). Accordingly, we requested letter briefs from the parties on these issues.

We are now satisfied that the default judgment was properly entered. As required by Local Rule 10(b) of the Southern District of New York, the application for entry of default was accompanied by a clerk’s certificate of default. Neither Fed. R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) nor Local Rule 10(b) requires that, before judgment can be entered, the clerk’s certificate be served upon an opposing party who has not appeared. Fed.R.Civ.P. 77(d) expressly exempts the clerk from the obligation to serve notice of entry of orders on a party “in default for failure to appear.” Moreover, default judgment was entered against the appellants in Meehan when they were only ten days late in serving their amended answer, despite their prior appearance in the action. In this case, the Woodses failed to make any appearance in the action, and never responded to any papers served upon them. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in applying the more stringent standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) to appellants’ motion to set aside the default judgment.

AFFIRMED.