Sipple v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964). · Go Syfert
Sipple v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
5 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Cianneh Fahnbullah (kyctapp, 2021-05-20)
Top citers, strongest first. 1 distinct citer. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Cianneh Fahnbullah
Ky. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
RCr 11.42;1 Parrish v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 675, 677 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Sipple v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 332, 332 (Ky. 1964)). 1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 11.42 provides, in relevant part: (1) A prisoner in custody under sentence or a defendant on probation, parole or conditional discharge who claims a right to be released on the ground that the sentence is subject to collateral attack may at any time proceed directly by motion in the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct it. -5- In this case, Fahnbullah was not in the custody of the Commonwealth und…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
William E. SIPPLE
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Nov 25, 1964.
384 S.W.2d 332
William E. Sipple, pro se., Robert Matthews, Atty. Gen., George F. Rabe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Patmore.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
PATMORE, Judge.

The appellant, William E. Sipple, a prisoner at the Kentucky State Reformatory, filed in the Kenton Circuit Court an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate the judgments pursuant to which he was committed. He appeals from an order overruling the motion on the record and without a hearing.

The first two paragraphs of the motion allege matters relating to several previous convictions on which the appellant’s sentences have been completed. The apparent purpose of attacking the executed sentences is to clear his record as a prospective parolee.[1] However, RCr 11.42 does, not provide, expressly or by implication, for the review of any judgment other than the one or ones pursuant to which the movant is being held in custody.

The third paragraph of the motion states that the movant is now serving on sentences totalling six years imposed pursuant to two felony convictions; that in response to each of the two indictments he appeared without counsel and was financially unable to employ counsel; that the trial court did not appoint counsel for him; and that in ignorance of his rights he pleaded guilty.

The Commonwealth’s response* was to the effect, that by reason of the guilty[*333] pleas “there was no necessity for the appointment of counsel to represent the interests of the defendant.” That proposition is not correct. He was entitled to counsel, and unless he was advised or knew of that right and voluntarily waived it the convictions were void. Cf. Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 76 (1964).

The third paragraph of the motion stated grounds for relief entitling appellant to counsel and a hearing.

The cause is reversed for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1

Whether, as a practical matter, such a result would be accomplished seems questionable. Invalidation of the former eon-victions would, of course, open the charges for new trial.