Pauline W. Kitts, as Pers. Rep. of the Est. of Willard F. Kitts, Deceased v. Gen. Motors Corp., Prod. Liab. Advisory Council, Inc., Auto. Importers of Am., Inc., & Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc., Amicus Curiae. Wayne M. Richart, as Pers. Rep. of the Estates of Norman J. Richart, Deceased, & Jean R. Richart, Deceased v. Ford Motor Co., the Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am. Trial Lawyers for Pub. Just. & United States of Am., Amici Curiae, 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
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Pauline W. Kitts, as Pers. Rep. of the Est. of Willard F. Kitts, Deceased v. Gen. Motors Corp., Prod. Liab. Advisory Council, Inc., Auto. Importers of Am., Inc., & Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc., Amicus Curiae. Wayne M. Richart, as Pers. Rep. of the Estates of Norman J. Richart, Deceased, & Jean R. Richart, Deceased v. Ford Motor Co., the Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am. Trial Lawyers for Pub. Just. & United States of Am., Amici Curiae, 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1993 · …allowing a common law action holding manufacturers liable for failing to install air bags in motor vehicles would be tantamount to establishing a conflicting safety standard that necessarily encroaches upon the goal of uniformity specifically set forth by congress in this area. ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1992 · …because we believe wood directly addresses and correctly resolves the issue before us, we follow the general principles articulated in wood and adopt the implied preemption rule of the first circuit. at p. 789 ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1997 · …did not have a passive restraint system, i.e., air bags, in addition to or instead of federally approved safety belts. ✓
96 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 32 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Choate v. Champion Home Builders Company
10th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 , 1417 (10th Cir. 1996); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir. 1989). 8 In Cipollone, the Supreme Court stated that [w]hen Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legislation.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Choate v. Champion Home Builders Co.
10th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 , 1417 (10th Cir.1996); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989). 8 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Geier, Alexis v. Amer Honda Mtr Co (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1121 (3d Cir.); Taylor, 875 F.2d at 823-25 (11th Cir. ); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989); Wood, 865 F.2d at 401 (1st Cir.). 12 Ultimately, we need not resolve whether Geier’s claim is expressly pre-empted, however, because we conclude that a verdict in her favor would stand as an obstacle to the federal government’s chosen method of achieving the Act’s safety objectives, and consequently, the Act impliedly pre-empts her lawsuit.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp.
NY · 1998 · confidence medium
Our conclusion that the Safety Act does not expressly preempt common-law claims is also in accord with the predominant holdings of the Federal Circuit Courts that have considered the question ( see , Pokorny v Ford Motor Co. , 902 F.2d 1116, 1121 [3d Cir], cert denied 498 US 853 ; Taylor v General Motors Corp. , 875 F.2d 816, 825 [11th Cir], cert denied 494 US 1065 ; Kitts v General Motors Corp. , 875 F.2d 787, 789 [10th Cir], cert denied 494 US 1065 ; Wood v General Motors Corp. , 865 F.2d 395, 402 [1st Cir], cert denied 494 US 1065 ; see also , Irving v Mazda Motor Corp. , 136 F.3d 764 [11th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 15,189, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1117 Juliette Irving, as Guardian of the Persons and Property of Bryana Bashir, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Bonita L. Irving, Deceased v. Mazda Motor Corp. A.K.A. Mazda Motors Corp. F.K.A. Toyo Kogyo, Ltd., Mazda (North America), Inc.
11th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Perry, 957 F.2d at 1264 ; Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1121 ; Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989) (adopting Wood v. General Motors Corp.); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir.1988) 4 If a claim was asserted that two-point systems (such as that installed in the Mazda MX-6) were not defective in general, but that the specific design selected by Mazda for its two-point system was unreasonably dangerous, preemption would be less clear 5 The option selected by Defendants permitted passive protection for frontal crashes--either air bags or passive…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Irving v. Mazda Motor Corporation
11th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Perry, 957 F.2d at 1264 ; Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1121 ; Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir. 1989) (adopting Wood v. General Motors Corp.); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir. 1988). 17 Conflict preemption exists where state law actually conflicts with federal law, making it impossible to comply with both, or where the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1500 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Irving v. Mazda Motor Corporation
11th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Perry, 957 F.2d at 1264; Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1121 ; Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989) (adopting Wood v. General Motors Corp.); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir.1988). 4 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cooper v. General Motors Corp.
Miss. · 1997 · confidence medium
Kitts, 875 F.2d at 789 ( quoting Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir.1988)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp.
D.P.R. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 , 1417 (10th Cir.1996); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 826-28 (11th Cir.1989); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 412-14 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Montag ex rel. Montag v. Honda Motor Co.
10th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
We have previously held that 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the “Safety Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (“FMVSS” or “Standard” 208) impliedly preempt air bag claims. 1 Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 43 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1065, prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 14,473 the Estate of Diane Montag, by and Through Michael Montag, Her Personal Representative of the Estate Michael Montag, Individually, United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, a Nebraska Corporation, as Subrogee of the Estate of Diane Montag, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant v. Honda Motor Company, Ltd., a Japanese Corporation American Honda Motor Co., Inc., a California Corporation Doing Business in Colorado Honda Research & Development Co., Ltd., a Japanese Corporation, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Public Citizen, Center for Auto Safety, Motor Voters, Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Amici Curiae
10th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Plaintiffs claim that this decision was erroneous. 6 We have previously held that 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the "Safety Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 ("FMVSS" or "Standard" 208) impliedly preempt air bag claims. 1 Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. General Motors Corp. (2×)
W.D. Okla. · 1995 · confidence medium
For this proposition, Defendant relies upon Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (“Tenth Circuit”) held that a plaintiffs products liability action based upon a manufacturer’s failure to install air bags in a motor *457 vehicle, where no air bag is required by federal law, is impliedly pre-empted under the Safety Act.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gills v. Ford Motor Co.
W.D. Ky. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1118, 1123-25 ; Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827 ; Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir. 1989); and Wood, 865 F.2d at 402, 411 ; see also Baird, 654 F.Supp. at 32 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ramsey v. Lucky Stores, Inc.
Tex. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Pokorny v. Ford, 902 F.2d 1116, 1119 (3d Cir.1990); Kitts v. G.M., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989); Taylor v. G.M., 875 F.2d 816, 826 (11th Cir.1989); Wood v. G.M., 865 F.2d 395 , 402-403 and 409-10 (1st Cir.1988); Surles v. Ford, 709 F.Supp. 732, 734 (N.D.Tex.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lynda D. Perry v. Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc. And Abc Insurance Company (2×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
With little discussion, the Tenth Circuit followed Wood , stating: “Because we believe Wood directly addresses and correctly resolves the issue before us, we follow the general principles articulated in Wood and adopt the implied preemption rule of the First Circuit.” Id. at 789.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Myrick v. Fruehauf Corp. (2×)
N.D. Ga. · 1992 · confidence medium
Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827 n. 20. 4 See also Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1124 (3d Cir.1990) (allowing manufacturer choice of restraint systems was an essential element of regulatory framework and preempted common law product liability claims); Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F.Supp. 1135 (S.D.Ga.1990).
discussed Cited "see" Marrs v. Ford Motor Co. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990).
cited Cited "see" Perry v. Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc.
5th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 , 788 n. 2 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 , 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990).
discussed Cited "see" Amrhein v. Quaker Oats Co.
E.D. Mo. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989) (Safety Act preempts state tort law claim against automobile manufacturer for failure to install air bags); Staggs v. Chrysler Corp., 678 F.Supp. 270 (N.D.
discussed Cited "see" Welsh Ex Rel. Welsh v. Century Products, Inc.
D. Maryland · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462 (D.N.M.1988), rev'd by Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.1989), ce rt. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407 (D.Md.1987); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F.Supp. 1108 (D.Mass.1987), rev’d, 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1781 , 108 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 389 Pa.Super. 328 , 567 A.2d 312 (1989). 5 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Osman v. Ford Motor Co.
Ill. App. Ct. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
Option One is a frontal/angular automatic protection system, i.e. , automatic seat belts with or without air bags. 49 C.F.R. ྷ571.208, S4.1.2.1 (1987); see also Kitts v. General Motors Corp. , 875 F.2d 787 , 788 n.2 (10th Cir. 1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Osman v. Ford Motor Co.
Ill. App. Ct. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
Option One is a frontal/angular automatic protection system, i.e., automatic seat belts with or without air bags. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 , S4.1.2.1 (1987); see also Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 , 788 n.2 (10th Cir. 1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gingold v. Audi-Nsu-Auto Union, A.G.
Pa. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.1989); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir.1988); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corporation, 702 F.Supp. 532 (E.D.Pa.1988); Staggs v. Chrysler Corp., 678 F.Supp. 270 (N.D.Ga.1987).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Pauline W. Kitts, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Willard F. Kitts, Deceased
v.
General Motors Corporation, Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Automobile Importers of America, Inc., and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., Amicus Curiae. Wayne M. Richart, as Personal Representative of the Estates of Norman J. Richart, Deceased, and Jean R. Richart, Deceased v. Ford Motor Company, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America Trial Lawyers for Public Justice and United States of America, Amici Curiae
88-1900.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
May 19, 1989.
875 F.2d 787
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published

875 F.2d 787

57 USLW 2684, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 12,243

Pauline W. KITTS, as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Willard F. Kitts, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Automobile
Importers of America, Inc., and Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association of the United
States, Inc., Amicus Curiae.
Wayne M. RICHART, as Personal Representative of the Estates
of Norman J. Richart, Deceased, and Jean R.
Richart, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America; Trial Lawyers
for Public Justice; and United States of America,
Amici Curiae.

Nos. 87-2517, 88-1900.

United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.

May 19, 1989.

Joseph Goldberg of Carpenter & Goldberg, P.A., Albuquerque, N.M. (William H. Carpenter and David J. Stout of Carpenter & Goldberg, P.A., and William E. Snead of Ortega & Snead, P.A., Albuquerque, N.M., with him on the briefs), for plaintiff-appellant in No. 87-2517.

David M. Heilbron of McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, San Francisco, Cal. (Leslie G. Landau of McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, San Francisco, Cal., Thomas E. Fennell of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Dallas, Texas; John P. Raleigh and Nicholas J. Wittner of General Motors Corp., Detroit, Mich., Russell D. Mann and Bob F. Turner of Atwood, Malone, Mann & Turner, Roswell, N.M., with him on the brief), for defendant-appellee in No. 87-2517.

(William H. Crabtree and Edward P. Good, Detroit Mich., Charles H. Lockwood II, Arlington, Va., and Paul M. Bator and Stephen M. Shapiro of Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Ill., on the brief, for amicus curiae in No. 87-2517.)

Malcolm E. Wheeler of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Los Angeles, Cal. (Robert G. McCorkle of Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, N.M., with him on the briefs), for defendant-appellant in No. 88-1900.

Walter J. Melendres of Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Santa Fe, N.M., for plaintiff-appellee in No. 88-1900.

(Arthur H. Bryant of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Washington, D.C., on the brief, for amicus curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P.C. in No. 88-1900.)

(Larry E. Coben of Litvin, Blumberg, Matusow & Young, Philadelphia, Pa., and Eugene E. Pavalon, President, The Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America, Chicago, Ill., on the brief, for amicus curiae Association of Trial Lawyers of America in No. 88-1900.)

(B. Wayne Vance, Gen. Counsel, and Kenneth N. Weinstein, Deputy Asst. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Transp., Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel, and David W. Allen, Asst. Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Washington, D.C., William L. Lutz, U.S. Atty., D. New Mexico, John R. Bolton, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Douglas Letter, Appellate Litigation Counsel, Civil Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on the brief, for amicus curiae U.S. in No. 88-1900.)

Before McKAY, McWILLIAMS, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

McKAY, Circuit Judge.

[*~787]1

Kitts v. General Motors Corp., No. 87-2517, and Richart v. Ford Motor Co., No. 88-1900, were separately submitted to us. On our own motion we consolidate for purposes of disposition of the preemption issue before us in both cases.

2

Although the cases before us are not factually identical, appellants raise the same issue on appeal: whether section 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the "Safety Act"), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1381 et seq. (1982), preempts state tort claims against automobile manufacturers who comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards ("FMVSS") regarding occupant crash protection but fail to install air bags as well. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1392(d) (1982)[1] and FMVSS 208, 49 C.F.R. Sec. 571.208, S4.1.2 (1987).[2] In each case the plaintiff sued an automobile manufacturer under New Mexico tort law alleging that an automobile manufactured by it was negligently and defectively designed because it did not have a passive restraint system, i.e., air bags, in addition to or instead of federally approved safety belts.[3]

3

Both defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that the Safety Act preempts plaintiffs' air bag claims.[4] See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1392(d) (1987). In response to defendants' motions, each plaintiff argued that its claim was a common law tort claim expressly saved by section 108(c) of the Safety Act. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1397(c) (1982).[5] The district courts reached opposite conclusions: The trial court in Kitts held that the Safety Act preempts plaintiff's air bag claim; the trial court in Richart, 681 F.Supp. 1462 (1988), held that the Safety Act does not preempt plaintiff's air bag claim.

4

We conclude that the Safety Act preempts plaintiff's air bag claim. See Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir.1988). For our purposes, Wood is almost identical to the cases before us: the plaintiff alleged under state law that the automobile manufactured by the defendant was defective because it was equipped with safety belts rather than air bags or another passive restraint system (e.g., automatic safety belts). The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Safety Act and FMVSS 208 promulgated under the Act preempt plaintiff's claim.

5

In Wood, the First Circuit rejected an express preemption claim, but held that section 103(d) of the Safety Act and FMVSS 208 impliedly preempt plaintiff's passive restraint claim. The Court found that

6

Congress's purposes, as revealed in the Safety Act and in the legislative history, plainly imply a preemptive intent.

7

Such an action is ... impliedly preempted because it would effectively circumvent section 1392(d)'s prohibition of nonidentical state standards covering the same aspect of performance as a federal safety standard. Allowing a common law action holding manufacturers liable for failing to install air bags in motor vehicles would be tantamount to establishing a conflicting safety standard that necessarily encroaches upon the goal of uniformity specifically set forth by Congress in this area.

8

Id. at 402 (emphasis in original). Because we believe Wood directly addresses and correctly resolves the issue before us, we follow the general principles articulated in Wood and adopt the implied preemption rule of the First Circuit.

[*~788]9

In view of our determination that the Safety Act preempts plaintiff's air bag claim, we affirm the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the defendant in Kitts and reverse the trial court's denial of partial summary judgment to the defendant in Richart. We also direct the trial court in Richart to enter partial summary judgment for the defendant.

1

Section 1392(d) states in pertinent part:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.

15 U.S.C. Sec. 1392(d) (1982).

2

FMVSS 208 details the occupant crash protection options a manufacturer may install in passenger vehicles in order to comply with federal motor vehicle safety standards. At the time these automobiles were manufactured, a manufacturer could comply with FMVSS 208 by installing (1) a complete passive protection system for front and lateral crashes; (2) passive protection for frontal crashes plus lap belts with belt warning for side crashes and rollovers; or (3) manual lap and shoulder belts with belt warning. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 571.208, S4.1.2 (1987)

3

In Richart, plaintiff alleged that the car was negligently designed, and not crashworthy, because it lacked air bags. In Kitts, plaintiff alleged that the car was defective and unreasonably dangerous because the manufacturer failed to utilize available technology, i.e., air bags, which would have prevented the death of plaintiff's decedent

4

The Richart defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the additional ground that the Safety Act and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 impliedly preempt plaintiff's air bag claim. The Kitts defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the additional ground that it owed no duty to the decedent under New Mexico law. Due to our disposition of the preemption issue, we need not reach Kitts' second ground. See discussion infra

5

Section 1397(c) states: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1397(c) (1982)