seat belt instruction in Illinois

1976App. 2d 107, 109 , 255 N.E.2d 620, 621 , a seat belt instruction was held to be error because the record was “completely silent as to whether the plaintiff did or did not wear a seat belt.

1975The court said that a seat belt instruction could only be given “on the-assumption that the plaintiff did not wear the seat belt.” ( 120 Ill.App.2d 107, 110 .) The court stated that by giving such an instruction the trial court, in effect, implied that the seat belt was not used and directed the jury thát it might consider this nonuse to reduce the verdict.

2005Option Two is a head-on automatic protection system, i.e., automatic shoulder belts or air bags, plus manual lap belts for lateral crashes and rollovers, with a seat-belt warning system. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 , S4.1.2.2 (1987); Kitts, 875 F.2d at 788 n.2.

2005Option Three is a lap and shoulder-belt protection system with a seat-belt warning system. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 , S4.1.2.3 (1987); Kitts, 875 F.2d at 788 n.2.

1976In Heiser v. Chastain (1972), 6 Ill.

1975In addition, the court agreed with the observation made in Mount that the question of seat belts has no relevancy in determining the cause of an accident. ■ In Heiser v. Chastain, 6 Ill.App.3d 552 , 285 N.E.2d 601 , the trial court refused to instruct the jury that it was the duty of the plaintiff to use available seat belts so as to avoid injury to herself.

2020BACKGROUND 2020 IL App (2d) 160722 ¶3 In July 2014, defendant and his two young children were passengers in a car driven by his wife when they were pulled over for a seat belt violation.

1985He argues that the “present Illinois rule that the seat belt defense can be considered in mitigation of damages is unsound.” (See Mount v. McClellan (1968), 91 Ill.

1985He argues that the "present Illinois rule that the seat belt defense can be considered in mitigation of damages is unsound." (See Mount v. McClellan (1968), 91 Ill.

1985(See Wagner v. Zboncak (1982), 111 Ill.

1985In considering the issue, the court made note that while seat belts were required to be installed in the front seat of the automobile operated by plaintiff in that case, there was then no requirement it be used, and the presence of the seat belt created no duty on the part of plaintiff to wear it “any more than would the presence in the automobile of a protective helmet create a duty to wear that.” (Clarkson v. Wright (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 129, 133 .) In the present case, of course, there was no statute at the time of the occurrence which required a motorcycle rider to wear a protective helmet,

1982The court first reviewed the relationship between the Structural Work Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act and then stated that “the Act should not be interpreted so that it is extended unnecessarily to cover neoteric theories of liability where the existing workmen’s compensation and tort remedies protect and give reasonable and satisfactory relief to construction workers.” ( 100 Ill.

1982The court first reviewed the relationship between the Structural Work Act and the Workers' Compensation Act and then stated that "the Act should not be interpreted so that it is extended unnecessarily to cover neoteric theories of liability where the existing workmen's compensation and tort remedies protect and give reasonable and satisfactory relief to construction workers." ( 100 Ill.

1978App. 3d 587 , 335 N.E.2d 774 , which establish the following rules: (1) The seat belt defense is to be rejected on the issue of contributory negligence; and (2) Although reference to use of seat belts may be permissible on the issue of damages, even for that purpose it should be admitted only where a defendant has established by competent evidence a causal connection between the plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt and the injuries he sustained.

1976App. 3d 1091 , 288 N.E.2d 677 ; Blitz v. Checker Taxi Co. (1972), 8 Ill.

1976App. 3d 639 , 338 N.E.2d 231 , a seat belt instruction was held to have been properly refused where there was neither evidence that the automobile was equipped with seat belts nor that plaintiff’s damages might have been mitigated by their use.

1976Moreover, an instruction on the seat belt defense, even when limited to the issue of damages, has been held to be error when the instruction or the closing argument could have so confused the jury as to lead them “to consider the issues of contributory negligence and mitigation of damages as a single question whose answer was to be determined in part by whether plaintiff did or did not wear a seat belt.” Yocco v. Barris (1973), 16 Ill.

1976App. 3d 113, 117 , 305 N.E.2d 584 ; see also Allison v. Howell (1974), 22 Ill.

1976Although there is still a sharp split among the States as to the admissibility and weight to be accorded to seat belt evidence (see 15 A.L.R.3d 1428 (1967)), subsequent Illinois cases have adhered to the principle announced in Mount and have consistently held that the seat belt defense could not be established on the issue of contributory negligence (Josel v. Rossi (1972), 7 Ill.

1976App. 3d 1091 , 288 N.E.2d 677 ; Blitz v. Checker Taxi Co. (1972), 8 Ill.

1972The court explicitly refused to decide whether there exists a duty for an automobile passenger to wear an available seat belt, but did indicate its agreement with the Mount language that the installation or use of the seat belts had no bearing on the “cause of the accident.” In Hole v. Cravens, 129 Ill.App.2d 466 , 263 N.E.2d 593 , the Fourth District Appellate Court, after reversing a judgment for the defendant and remanding for a determination of damages, advised that upon remand the trial court should not repeat that instruction which had allowed the jury to consider, on the issue of both d

1972The court explicitly refused to decide whether there exists a duty for an automobile passenger to wear an available seat belt, but did indicate its agreement with the Mount language that the installation or use of the seat belts had no bearing on the “cause of the accident.” In Hole v. Cravens, 129 Ill.App.2d 466 , 263 N.E.2d 593 , the Fourth District Appellate Court, after reversing a judgment for the defendant and remanding for a determination of damages, advised that upon remand the trial court should not repeat that instruction which had allowed the jury to consider, on the issue of both d