Lyman Lumber Co. v. E. John Hill, Cassie Hill & Seth Hill, 877 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
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Lyman Lumber Co. v. E. John Hill, Cassie Hill & Seth Hill, 877 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1995 · …shall have as his own, free of any interest of his former spouse, his interest in the profit-sharing plan of his employer. at p. 693 ≈ altered
cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1996 · 2 courts · …waive any interest or claim in and to any retirement, pension, profit-sharing and/or annuity plans resulting from the employment of the other party ⚠ not in text
169 citation events (51 in the last 25 years) across 29 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance v. Timbo (njd, 1999-09-30) · Strongest negative: Iron Workers Mid-South Pension Fund v. Stoll (laed, 1991-08-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Iron Workers Mid-South Pension Fund v. Stoll
E.D. La. · 1991 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see, Lymen Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989) [wherein the Eighth Circuit held that the former spouse was entitled to benefits as the primary beneficiary, because the former spouse’s alleged waiver of benefits in the divorce decree was not knowing and voluntary, and therefore without effect.] 7 .
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance v. Timbo (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
D.N.J. · 1999 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a number of courts have held that the spouse's rights as a beneficiary are extinguished only by terms specifically divesting the spouse's right as beneficiary under the policy or plan.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Trustees of Iron Workers Local 451 Annuity Fund v. O'Brien (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
D. Del. · 1996 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a number of courts have held that the spouse's rights as a beneficiary are extinguished only by terms specifically divesting the spouse's right as beneficiary under the policy or plan.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Pens. Plan Guide P 23916h Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Interpleader v. Nancy W. Crysler, Phyllis A. Crysler (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
8th Cir. · 1995 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
none of erisa's express provisions addresses the issue presented in this case
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scott v. Public School Retirement Sys. of Missouri
W.D. Mo. · 2011 · confidence medium
“The ‘spouse’s rights as a beneficiary are extinguished only by terms specifically divesting the spouse’s rights as a beneficiary under the policy or plan.’ ” Arbeitman, 89 F.3d at 500 (quoting Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City and County of San Francisco
9th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
The second resolution called the ad’s statistical assertions “erroneous and full of a public message of intolerance of homosexuality, Molinari did not violate the Establishment Clause.” (quoting Smith, 877 F.2d at 692)); Gheta v. Nassau Co. Comm. College, 33 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[I]t is not unconstitutional to criticize principles that happen to coincide with the religious teachings of certain groups.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan
SCOTUS · 2009 · confidence medium
See, e. g., Melton v. Melton, 324 F. 3d 941, 945-946 (CA7 2003); Clift v. Clift, 210 F. 3d 268 , 271-272 (CA5 2000); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F. 2d 692, 693-694 (CA8 1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McGowan v. NJR Ser Corp (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Altobelli, 77 F.3d at 80 ; Brandon, 18 F.3d at 1325 ; Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 278 ; Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 1989); see also Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249 , 1257 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Firestone authorizes the federal courts to develop federal common law to fill gaps left by ERISA.” (citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989))).
examined Cited as authority (rule) James M. McGowan Sr. v. Njr Service Corporation New Jersey Natural Gas Company (4×)
3rd Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Altobelli, 77 F.3d at 80; Brandon, 18 F.3d at 1325 ; Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 278 ; Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989); see also Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249 , 1257 n. 8 (3d Cir.1993) (‘Firestone authorizes the federal courts to develop federal common law to fill gaps left by ERISA.” (citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 , 109 S.Ct. 948 , 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Strong v. Omaha Construction Industry Pension Plan
Neb. · 2005 · confidence medium
Husband’s IBM pension ....’” But in Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 1989), the court held that language in a decree stating the employee “ ‘shall have as his own, free of any interest of [his wife], his interest in the profit-sharing plan of his employer ...’” did not waive the wife’s beneficiary interest in the profit-sharing plan because the language was not specific enough.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Strong v. OMAHA CONST. INDUSTRY PENSION PLAN
Neb. · 2005 · confidence medium
Husband's IBM pension. . . .'" But in Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989), the court held that language in a decree stating the employee "`shall have as his own, free of any interest of [his wife], his interest in the profit-sharing plan of his employer . . .'" did not waive the wife's beneficiary interest in the profit-sharing plan because the language was not specific enough.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Keen v. Weaver (12×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. · 2003 · confidence medium
Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 280 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 820 , 111 S.Ct. 67 , 112 L.Ed.2d 41 (1990); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693-94 (8th Cir.1989); see also Melton v. Melton, 324 F.3d 941 , 945 (7th Cir.2003) (noting, in post-Egelhoff decision, that “ERISA does not preempt an explicit waiver of interest by a nonparticipant beneficiary of such a plan”). 3 These courts have relied upon common-law principles to conclude that the named beneficiary waived entitlement to plan benefits.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Zienowicz v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
D.N.J. · 2002 · confidence medium
Co. v. Hanslip, 939 F.2d 904, 907 (10th Cir.1991); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693-94 (8th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Heggy v. American Trading Employee Retirement Account Plan
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Workers’ Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 281-82 (7th Cir.1990); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weaver v. Keen (2×)
Tex. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Brandon, 18 F.3d at 1326 ; Fox Valley & Vicinity Const. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir.1990); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stewart v. Stewart
N.C. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 41 (1990) (finding that a nonparticipant beneficiary may waive her benefits pursuant to specific language in a divorce settlement); cf. Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693-94 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding, without addressing the anti-alienation clause, that an ex-spouse beneficiary can waive her pension benefits in a divorce settlement if the waiver specifically refers to and modifies the beneficiary interest); Metropolitan Life Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Connecticut General v. Clift (2×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
The Hills’ divorce decree stated that Jeffrey “ ‘shall have as his own, free of any interest of [Colleen], his interest in the profit-sharing plan of his employer....’” Id. at 693 (alteration in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clift v. Clift (2×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
The Hills' divorce decree stated that the Jeffrey "'shall have as his own, free of any interest of [Colleen], his interest in the profit-sharing plan of his employer . . . .'" Id. at 693 (alteration in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 22 Employee Benefits Cas. 1765, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6468, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6892, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9544, Pens. Plan Guide (Cch) P 23947e Gary Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Company, a Corporation Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a Corporation Alex Stencel
9th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Soc. v. Crysler, 66 F.3d 944, 948-49 (8th Cir.1995) (looking to state law for guidance in fashioning federal common law); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989) (same). 23 Under the majority approach of those opinions, application of California law concerning the designation of a beneficiary has a connection with ERISA and would therefore be preempted.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co.
9th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Soc. v. Crysler, 66 F.3d 944, 948-49 (8th Cir.1995) (looking to state law for guidance in fashioning federal common law); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989) (same).
cited Cited as authority (rule) IBP, Inc. v. Foust
N.D. Iowa · 1997 · confidence medium
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 , 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1557 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) 21 Employee Benefits Cas. 1794, Pens. Plan Guide (Cch) P 23937p John Hill v. At&t Corporation
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Retirement Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496 , 500 (8th Cir.1996); Mohamed, 53 F.3d at 914 ; Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) John Hill v. AT&T Corp.
8th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Retirement Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496 , 500 (8th Cir.1996); Mo hamed, 53 F.3d at 914; Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Health & Welfare Plan for Employees of REM, Inc. v. Ridler
D. Minnesota · 1996 · confidence medium
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 , 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1557-58 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 20 Employee Benefits Cas. 1614, Pens. Plan Guide P 23922m National Automobile Dealers and Associates Retirement Trust Anthony Ursomarso Stephen M. Qua Frank R. Anderson, Jr. William S. Dodge David E. Gezon Ray Green Mark Miller Jimmy C. Payton Jack T. Price Richard R. Smith Frank E. McCarthy Patricia A. Arbeitman Brooke Ann Arbeitman Christopher Michael Arbeitman, Appellee/cross-Appellants v. Donna M. Arbeitman, Appellant/cross-Appellee (2×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
B. 21 Donna next argues that Patricia forfeited her rights as designated beneficiary when she executed a separation agreement which stated that she "relinquishe[d] any right, title or interest in and to any ... pension plans...." The same paragraph also provides that the agreement was executed "in full satisfaction of all property rights and all obligations for support otherwise arising out of the[ ] marital relationship." 22 In our circuit, "a property settlement entered into pursuant to a dissolution may divest former spouses of beneficiary rights in each other's [ERISA benefits], if the agr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) National Automobile Dealers & Associates Retirement Trust v. Arbeitman (2×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Donna next argues that Patricia forfeited her rights as designated beneficiary when she executed a separation agreement which *500 stated that she “relinquished] any right, title or interest in and to any ... pension plans_” The same paragraph also provides that the agreement was executed “in full satisfaction of all property rights and all obligations for support otherwise arising out of the[ ] marital relationship.” In our circuit, “a property settlement entered into pursuant to a dissolution may divest former spouses of beneficiary rights in each other’s [ERISA benefits], if the…
cited Cited as authority (rule) 20 Employee Benefits Cas. 1097, Pens. Plan Guide (Cch) P 23919g Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Mary M. Pressley, Personal Representative for the Estate of Alvin J. Pressley, Deceased, Barbara J. Pressley
6th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Co. v. Hanslip, 939 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir.1991); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989); MacLean v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723, 727 (7th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Emmens v. Johnson (2×)
Tex. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2)(A), (3); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Pressley
6th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Co. v. Hanslip, 939 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir.1991); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989); MacLean v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723, 727 (7th Cir.1987).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Altobelli v. International Business MacHines Corp. (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
4th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693-94 (8th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Czarski v. Bonk
E.D. Mich. · 1996 · confidence medium
Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 282 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 820 , 111 S.Ct. 67 , 112 L.Ed.2d 41 (1990); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Altobelli v. International Business Machines Corp. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
3rd Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693-94 (8th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Estate of Lanken
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1996 · confidence medium
Fox Valley, supra, 897 F. 2d at 281 ; Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mohamed v. Kerr
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Applying federal common law, the Court concluded that the divorce decree gave the decedent "his entire interest in the Plan free of any interest of" his former wife, but did not "specifically refer to and modify the beneficiary interest." Id. at 693, 694 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mohamed v. Kerr
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Applying federal common law, the C^fcrt concluded that the divorce decree gave the decedent “his entire interest in the Plan free of any interest of’ his former wife, but did not “specifically refer to and modify the beneficiary interest.” Id. at 693, 694 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Barlow
E.D. Mich. · 1995 · confidence medium
Co., 18 F.3d 1321 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied; — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 732 , 130 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 , 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2899-2900 , 77 L.Ed.2d- 490 (1983); Fox Valley, supra; Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Provident Life & Accident Insurance v. Williams
W.D. Ark. · 1994 · confidence medium
Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brandon v. Travelers Insurance
5th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11, 15 (2nd Cir.1993); MacLean v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723 (7th Cir.1987); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Pearson
E.D. Mich. · 1994 · confidence medium
See Fox Valley, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc); Lyman Lumber [v. Hill], 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Henry W. Reid v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company
8th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, since the parties are not in disagreement, the matter has not been briefed, and Missouri law appears to be the most favorable to Reid 3 insofar as its treatment of late claims is concerned, we assume, without deciding, that Missouri law is representative of the “federal common law.” See, e.g., Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989) (in fashioning a body of federal common law, court may look to state law for guidance); Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 877 (8th Cir.1987); Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1351 (8th Cir.1980) …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co.
2d Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir.) (in bane), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 820 , 111 S.Ct. 67 , 112 L.Ed.2d 41 (1990); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kumar Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Company
2d Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 820 , 111 S.Ct. 67 , 112 L.Ed.2d 41 (1990); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert E. Slice v. Sons of Norway
8th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Slice replies that ERISA preempts state laws, not claims, and preemption merely means that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over rights and obligations governed by ERISA; thus, the federal court must determine, e.g., whether Slice’s contract claims state a cause of action under ERISA or any existing federal common law, or whether the court should fashion new federal common law, “lookpng] to state law for guidance.” Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garred v. General American Life Insurance
W.D. Ark. · 1991 · confidence medium
In so doing it noted: While it is true that state law can be used as a guide for fashioning the federal common law applicable to ERISA, Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989), state law cannot be used if it is contrary to the provisions of ERISA.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cochran v. AT&T TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
E.D. Mo. · 1991 · confidence medium
Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brewer ex rel. Brewer v. Lincoln National Life Insurance
8th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
DISCUSSION Initially, we must determine whether the district court properly utilized Missouri’s rule of construction requiring that ambiguities in insurance contracts be resolved in favor of the insured (the “contra insurer rule”). 1 While it is true that state law can be used as a guide for fashioning the federal common law applicable to ERISA, Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989), state law cannot be used if it is contrary to the provisions of ERISA.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert P. Brewer, Natural Guardian and Duly Appointed Next Friend of Robert C. Brewer v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, Robert P. Brewer, Natural Guardian and Duly Appointed Next Friend of Robert C. Brewer v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company
8th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
DISCUSSION 7 Initially, we must determine whether the district court properly utilized Missouri's rule of construction requiring that ambiguities in insurance contracts be resolved in favor of the insured (the "contra insurer rule"). 1 While it is true that state law can be used as a guide for fashioning the federal common law applicable to ERISA, Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989), state law cannot be used if it is contrary to the provisions of ERISA.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mcmillan v. Parrott (2×)
6th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989). 9 The court must therefore look to either the statutory language or, finding no answer there, to federal common law which, if not clear, may draw guidance from analogous state law.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McMillan v. Parrott (2×)
6th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brewer v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co.
E.D. Mo. · 1989 · confidence medium
Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir.1989) (court may look to state law to fashion federal common law principles applicable to an ERISA case); Rockney v. Blohorn, 877 F.2d 637, 643-44 (8th Cir. 1989) (court may look to appropriate state contract law to govern the interpretation and enforcement of employer benefit plans so long as application of that law would not be contrary to ERISA's provisions).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
LYMAN LUMBER COMPANY, Appellee,
v.
E. John HILL, Cassie Hill and Seth Hill, Appellants
88-5293.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Jun 14, 1989.
877 F.2d 692
1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 8488
1989 WL 62535
John W. Zweber, Roseville, Minn., for appellants., James E. Bowlus, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Gibson, Wollman, Bright.
Cited by 71 opinions  |  Published
[*693] WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

On April 18, 1978, Jeffrey Hill designated his wife, Colleen, as his primary beneficiary under the Lyman Lumber and Affiliated Companies Profit Sharing Plan (Plan). He named as contingent beneficiaries his parents, E. John and Cassie Hill, and his brother, Seth Hill. Jeffrey and Colleen were divorced on June 20, 1983. The divorce decree stated that Jeffrey “shall have as his own, free of any interest of [Colleen], his interest in the profit-sharing plan of his employer * * *.” Jeffrey died on December 15, 1984, without having changed his Plan beneficiary designation after the divorce.

On July 3, 1986, the Plan trustees informed Colleen that they had decided to distribute the Plan benefits to the contingent beneficiaries. They advised her that she could appeal the decision and asked her to indicate whether she accepted the trustees’ determination that she was not entitled to the Plan benefits. On July 9, 1986, Colleen indicated that she accepted the trustees’ determination. On October 10, 1986, before the trustees distributed the benefits, Colleen revoked her waiver of rights to the benefits. Faced with conflicting claims, the trustees were uncertain as to the proper party or parties to whom the benefits should be paid. They therefore filed an interpleader action in the district court and deposited the benefits with the court.

The district court [1] found that Colleen’s waiver was not knowing and voluntary and therefore was without effect. The court then held that the relevant language in the decree did not revoke the beneficiary designation to Colleen. Accordingly, the district court awarded the Plan benefits to Colleen. The contingent beneficiaries appeal this portion of the district court’s decision. We affirm.

The Plan is an employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (ERISA). See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A), (3). None of ERISA’s express provisions addresses the issue presented in this case. We therefore must ascertain the proper federal common law principles that should govern. Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 877 (8th Cir.1987). In fashioning a body of federal common law, we may look to state law for guidance. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 918, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir.1985).

Under the Plan, each participant may name the beneficiaries who will receive the remainder of his vested account balances upon his death. Plan § 12.01. In the closely analogous area of law involving a former spouse’s right to recover life insurance benefits, the general rule is that a divorce does not affect a beneficiary designation in a life insurance policy. See Fox Valley and Vicinity Constr. Wkrs. Pension Fund v. Brown, 684 F.Supp. 185, 188 (N.D.Ill.1988) (Fox Valley). The spouse’s beneficiary interest can be divested, however, pursuant to a property settlement in a divorce judgment. Id. A number of courts have held that the spouse’s rights as a beneficiary are extinguished only by terms specifically divesting the spouse’s rights as a beneficiary under the policy or plan. See, e.g., id. (applying federal common law); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cooper, 666 F.Supp. 190, 192 (D.Idaho 1987) (applying Idaho law), aff'd, 859 F.2d 154 (9th Cir.1988); Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Blight, 399 F.Supp. 513, 515 (E.D.Pa.1975) (applying Pennsylvania law), aff'd, 538 F.2d 319, 322 (3d Cir.1976); Keeton v. Cherry, 728 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo.Ct.App.1987); Haley v. Schleis, 97 N.M. 561, 562, 642 P.2d 164, 165 (1982).

Applying those principles to this case, we conclude that the divorce decree did not divest Colleen of her beneficiary interest in the Plan proceeds. The decree gave Jeffrey his entire interest in the Plan free of any interest of Colleen. It did not, how[*694] ever, specifically refer to and modify the beneficiary interest. See, e.g., Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 399 F.Supp. at 515-16; National W. Life Ins. Co. v. Schmeh, 749 P.2d 974, 976 (Colo.Ct.App.1987); cf. Fox Valley, 684 F.Supp. at 188 (interpreting settlement agreement as specifically modifying beneficiary interest); Keeton, 728 S.W.2d at 697 (same). The divorce decree thus did not revoke the beneficiary designation, and Colleen is entitled to the Plan benefits.

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

1

. The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.