People ex rel. J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). · Go Syfert
People ex rel. J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
35 citation events (35 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Peo in Interest of KW (coloctapp, 2026-01-22)
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2011 2018 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Peo in Interest of KW
Colo. Ct. App. · 2026 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in deciding whether . . . less drastic alternatives exist, a trial court may recognize differences between the parents, as well as differences between the children, and base its decision upon the best interests of the children.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Peo in Interest of GS
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
parental rights are personal between each parent and each child.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People in Interest of H.L.B.
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
See A.R., ¶ 38. ¶ 27 To highlight the complexity and range of what a juvenile court considers when determining whether a less drastic alternative is in the child’s best interests, we note that divisions of this court have looked favorably upon juvenile courts resting their best interest determinations on the following findings: (1) it was important for the child to maintain an ongoing relationship with a parent, see id.; (2) the child was bonded to the parent or interested in maintaining a relationship, see People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12 , ¶ 36, aff’d sub nom., R.W. v. People I…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peo in Interest HHM
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
In considering less drastic alternatives, the court must base its 17 decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs. § 19-3-604(3); People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1126 (Colo. App. 2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peo in Interest of MV
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
A juvenile court may consider and weigh various factors in determining the viability of a less drastic alternative, including (1) whether an alternative is available, People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351 , 356 (Colo. App. 2007); (2) the parent’s fitness to care for the child, People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M , ¶ 38; (3) whether an ongoing relationship with the parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child, People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006); and (4) 3 whether an alternative would provide adequate permanence while meeting the child’s p…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Peo in Interest of FS
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peo in Interest of AG
Colo. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006). “[I]n deciding whether to terminate or whether less drastic alternatives exist, a trial court may recognize differences between the parents . . . and base its decision upon the best interests of the children.” Id.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Peo in Interest of AE (5×) also: Cited "see"
Colo. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
J.L.M. , 143 P.3d at 1127. 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peo in Int of AF
Colo. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
The court found that an ongoing relation ship with the parents would not be beneficial to the child, see People in Interest of J.L.M. , 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006), and that 20 the child needed the type of permanency that only an adoption provided her .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peo in Int of AF
Colo. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
The court found that an ongoing relation ship with the parents would not be beneficial to the child, see People in Interest of J.L.M. , 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006), and that 20 the child needed the type of permanency that only an adoption provided her .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peo in Interest of NT (2×) also: Cited "see"
Colo. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
I n considering less drastic alternatives, courts must give prima ry consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). ¶ 37 A juvenile court may consider and weigh various factors in de termining the viability of a less drastic alternative, including whether (1) an ongoing relationship with a parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child, People in Interest of J.L.M. , 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006); and (2) the alternative option provides the child with adequate permanence or meets the child’s needs, People in Interest of T…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peo in Interest of NT (2×) also: Cited "see"
Colo. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
I n considering less drastic alternatives, courts must give prima ry consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). ¶ 37 A juvenile court may consider and weigh various factors in de termining the viability of a less drastic alternative, including whether (1) an ongoing relationship with a parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child, People in Interest of J.L.M. , 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006); and (2) the alternative option provides the child with adequate permanence or meets the child’s needs, People in Interest of T…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Petitioners: The People of the State of Colorado, In the Interest of Minor Child: A.M. and A.M., Minor Child v. Respondent: T.M.
Colo. · 2021 · confidence medium
Cases concluding that long-term or permanent placement may not be appropriate when it does not provide adequate permanence or otherwise meet the child's best interests include, but are certainly not limited to: People in Interest of S.N-V . , 300 P.3d 911 , 920 ( Colo. App. 2011 ) ; People in Interest of D.P . , 160 P.3d 351 , 356 ( Colo. App. 2007 ) ; People in Interest of J.L.M . , 143 P.3d 1125, 1126-27 ( Colo. App. 2006 ) ; People in Interest of D.B-J . , 89 P.3d 530 , 532 ( Colo. App. 2004 ) ; M.B . , 70 P.3d at 627 ; People in Interest of E.I.C . , 958 P.2d 511, 515 ( Colo. App. 1998 ) ;…
cited Cited as authority (rule) in Interest of Z.M
Colo. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1126 (Colo. App. 2006). ¶ 30 Determining whether to order permanent placement as an alternative to termination depends on the child’s best interests.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People in the Interest of A.N-B
Colo. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M , ¶ 29; People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People Ex Rel. Rd
Colo. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1126-27 (Colo.App. 2006). [5] Included in the list of "majority jurisdictions" is Williams v. Bentley, 26 A.D.3d 441 , 809 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206-07 (N.Y.App.Div.2006), which appears to involve the absence of mother's counsel in a child custody dispute between two parents, rather than the termination of parental rights. [6] Lack of mental capacity of an unrepresented parent may be sufficient to require appointment of counsel as a matter of due process.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People ex rel. R.D
Colo. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1126-27 (Colo.App.2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People ex rel. J.C.R.
Colo. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo.App.2006) - Permanent placement is not a viable less drastic alternative to termination if the children need a stable, permanent home that can only be assured by adoption.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People Ex Rel. Jcr
Colo. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo.App.2006).
cited Cited as authority (rule) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellee,In the Interest of J.C.R., N.M–E., and N.M–E, Children,andConcerning B.R. and T.R., Respondents–Appellants.
Colo. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo.App.2006).
cited Cited as authority (rule) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellee,In the Interest of J.C.R., N.M–E., and N.M–E, Children,andConcerning B.R. and T.R., Respondents–Appellants.
Colo. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo.App.2006).
discussed Cited "see" Peo in Interest of ZRM
Colo. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
And, although the kinship placement provider testified their preference was for ad option, the court did not mention this preference in either its oral or written judgment. 21 ¶ 48 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that the child “would be subject to instability with an APR rather than a termination or adoption” because, if true, “the entire domestic relations system under Title 14 provides instability to child ren.” Mother does not provide, and we are not aware of, any support for her contention. ¶ 49 While an APR can provide adequate permanency for some child…
discussed Cited "see" Peo in Interest of ZRM
Colo. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
And, although the kinship placement provider testified their preference was for ad option, the court did not mention this preference in either its oral or written judgment. 21 ¶ 48 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that the child “would be subject to instability with an APR rather than a termination or adoption” because, if true, “the entire domestic relations system under Title 14 provides instability to child ren.” Mother does not provide, and we are not aware of, any support for her contention. ¶ 49 While an APR can provide adequate permanency for some child…
discussed Cited "see" People ex rel. A.R.
Colo. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See People in Interest of 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo.App.2006) (upholding court’s order finding that permanent placement with the maternal grandparents was a viable less drastic alternative to termination of mother’s parental rights but not as to termination of father’s parental rights).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Peo in Interest of AR
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See T.T., 128 P.3d at 331 (noting that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts, even though one of the children remained in the mother’s care); see also People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that the parent-child legal relationship is “personal between each parent and each child” and a court may consider “differences between the children”). 9 ¶ 19 Finally, we disagree with the parents’ assertion that the evidence was insufficient because it did not establish that the child tested positive for substances at birth.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." in Interest of A.M
Colo. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Because the determination of less drastic alternatives is implied in the statutory criteria for termination, the court must also strictly comply with the appropriate standards when determining less drastic alternatives. ¶ 22 As with all other criteria, when considering whether any less drastic alternatives to termination are viable, the juvenile court must “give primary consideration to the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child.” § 19-3-604(3); see also People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1126-27 (Colo. App. 2006).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, In the Interest of J.L.M., J.W.M., J.M., and J.A.M., Children, and Concerning J.M.
No. 06CA0454.
Colorado Court of Appeals.
Jul 27, 2006.
143 P.3d 1125
George N. Monsson, County Attorney, David W. Bute, Assistant County Attorney, Fort Morgan, Colorado, for Petitioner-Ap-pellee., Epperson and McClary, P.C., Andrew F. McClary, Fort Morgan, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant.
Carparelli, Casebolt, Román.
Cited by 695 opinions  |  Published

Opinion by

Judge ROMÁN.

J.M. (father) appeals from a judgment terminating the parent-child legal relationship between him and his children, J.L.M., J.W.M., J.M., and J.A.M., while finding that a less drastic alternative to termination exists for the mother. We affirm.

This dependency or neglect proceeding was initiated in June 2004 after a home health nurse arrived for a scheduled appointment to address concerns about the youngest child’s failure to thrive. The nurse heard a child crying inside, found two children watching television unattended, one of whom was in a swing soaked with urine and caked with formula. Father, who was responsible for the children while mother was attending school, was asleep in the bedroom.

Father stipulated to the children’s adjudication, and a treatment plan was approved in August 2004. Although father partially complied with the plan, he failed to make any sustained improvement in his ability to provide safe, nurturing care for the children. In February 2005, a motion to terminate the parent-child legal relationship was filed.

After a three-day hearing in February 2006, the trial court terminated father’s parental rights, but did not terminate mother’s parental rights. In so doing, the court found that an ongoing relationship with father would be of no benefit to the children.

Father contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights while at the same time determining that a less drastic alternative existed as to termination of mother’s parental rights. We find no error.

Before terminating parental rights, the trial court must consider and eliminate less drastic alternatives. Section 19-3-604(1)(c) C.R.S.2005; C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627 (Colo.2004); People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108 (Colo.1986). In so doing, the trial court must give primary consideration to the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child. People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530 (Colo.App.2004).

[*1127] Parental rights are personal between each parent and each child, People in Interest of M.M., 184 Colo. 298, 520 P.2d 128 (1974); People in Interest of J.M.B., 60 P.3d 790 (Colo.App.2002), and the statutes governing termination of the parent-child legal relationship do not proscribe termination of only-one parent’s rights. See § 19-3-601, et seq., C.R.S.2005. Therefore, in deciding whether to terminate or whether less drastic alternatives exist, a trial court may recognize differences between the parents, as well as differences between the children, and base its decision upon the best interests of the children. See People in Interest of L.D., 671 P.2d 940 (Colo.1983).

The credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are within the discretion of the trial court. Thus, a trial court’s findings and conclusions will not be disturbed on review if the record supports them. People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603 (Colo.1982).

Here, the trial court found that permanent placement with the maternal grandparents was a viable less drastic alternative to termination of mother’s parental rights but not as to termination of father’s parental rights. In making these findings, the court determined that an ongoing relationship with mother would not be detrimental to the children, noting that mother was employed; that she had custody of the children’s younger sibling; that ongoing contact would facilitate a relationship between all the children; that she could improve her parenting skills; and that the maternal family was a close, multi-gener-ational, extended family that provided mutual support.

In addition, mother had a full-time job, had always been responsible for paying the family’s monthly expenses, and had a close relationship with the maternal grandmother, who provided transportation and financial support when needed.

With respect to father, however, the court determined that an ongoing relationship would be of no benefit to the children, citing his lack of financial support, his ineffective parenting abilities, and his disinclination to effectuate any change in his situation.

The trial court’s findings are supported by evidence that father did not maintain regular employment and relied on the children’s mother and on his current wife, who was not the children’s mother, for financial support; and that he reached a plateau in mental health treatment, quit attending therapy for six months, and did not reengage in treatment until shortly before the hearing. In addition, father did not consistently incorporate the skills taught in parenting classes, and he informed the caseworker and the parenting skills instructor that he would parent the children as he saw fit.

There being no statutory prohibition against termination of only one parent’s rights, the trial court’s findings of fact, which have support in the record, and its conclusions of law will not be disturbed on review. See People in Interest ofC.A.K., supra.

The judgment is affirmed.

Judge CASEBOLT and Judge CARPARELLI concur.