United States v. Rene Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1990). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Rene Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 1992 · 2 courts · …if the defendant is convicted of an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount. at p. 736 ✓
100 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Andre Walters (ca9, 2019-12-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Andre Walters
9th Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
See United States v. Crippen, 961 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1990). 3.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Neale Misquitta
3rd Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 833-34 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Hernandez-Clavel
Colo. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Relying on United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990), and State v. Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn.Ct.App.2002), he argues that such circumstances are not relevant to the nature of the defendant or to the crime and are impermissible factors in the decision whether to grant or deny probation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Kwan
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
UNITED STATES v. KWAN 8565 have had the discretion to grant a downward departure solely on the basis of immigration consequences, United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1990), Kwan was potentially eligible for downward departures on other grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Kwok Chee Kwan, AKA Jeff Kwan
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Specifically, Kwan alleges that “had he known what constituted an ‘aggravated felony,’ he would have discussed with his lawyer the possibility of amending his plea agreement or asking the [sentencing] court for a downward departure.” Although the sentencing judge would not have had the discretion to grant a downward departure solely on the basis of immigration consequences, United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736-37 (9th Cir.1990), Kwan was potentially eligible for downward departures on other grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Kwan
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Specifically, Kwan alleges that “had he known what constituted an ‘aggravated felony,’ he would have discussed with his lawyer the possibility of amending his plea agreement or asking the [sentencing] court for a down- ward departure.” Although the sentencing judge would not have had the discretion to grant a downward departure solely on the basis of immigration consequences, United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1990), Kwan was potentially eligible for downward departures on other grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mojica
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
We were careful to distinguish this, however, from a downward departure solely because a defendant faces future deportation, explaining that “ ‘[t]he possibility of deportation does not speak to the offense in question, nor does it speak to the offender’s character____” ’ Id. at 730-31 (quoting United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Massoudi
9th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury was entitled to come to the conclusion it did. 3) Sentencing Calculation Appellant claimed that the 24.8 kilograms of pseudoephedrine found in the storage locker after his arrest should not have been used to calculate his base offense level because it was not in his possession and its presence was not reasonably foreseeable by him. “[T]he offense level for a conspiracy is determined by the amount [of drugs] that a defendant conspired to sell and not by the amount ultimately sold.” United States v. Alvarez-Cardena…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States of America v. Pedro Sera
8th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
See United States v. Bautista, 258 F.3d 602 , *875 606-08 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Charry Cubillos, 91 F.3d 1342, 1344-45 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Nnanna, 7 F.3d 420, 422 (5th Cir.1993) (per curiam); United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644-47 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pedro Sera v. United States
8th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
See United States v. Bautista, 258 F.3d 602, 606-08 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Charry Cubillos, 91 F.3d 1342, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Nnanna, 7 F.3d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644-47 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Maldonado
1st Cir. · 2001 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Guzman, Maira B.
7th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
United States v. Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 808 (D.C. 1998); United States v. Alvarez- Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Maira Bernice Guzman (2×)
7th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
United States v. Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam); United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 808 (D.C.Cir.1998); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Marmolejos
3rd Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1078 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1369-71 (11th Cir.1990). 5 Therefore, the government argues, the amendment necessarily changed the law by requiring the courts to consider the actual amount of narcotics sold, rather than the amount negotiated, when sentencing defendants convicted of participating in completed deals.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Martinez-Villegas
C.D. Cal. · 1998 · confidence medium
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990), held that the threat of deportation was not an appropriate ground for a downward departure from the Guidelines because the defendant’s crime was no less serious, nor was his history of past actions changed, because he may be subject to deportation proceedings at some point in time.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Bakeas
D. Mass. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Nnanna, 7 F.3d 420, 422 (5th Cir.1993) (“collateral consequences from conviction are not a basis for downward departure”); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1483, 1487 (10th Cir.1993) (failure to depart based simply on the “unduly harsh consequences of imprisonment for deportable aliens” was not ground for remand); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990) (the “possibility of deportation” is not an appropriate grounds for departure); Rivera v. United States, 893 F.Supp. 1238, 1244 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (applying Restrepo to an ar…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Fernando Lopez Landivar, AKA Carlos, United States of America v. Jesus Teofilo Tavizon, AKA the Engineer
9th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
The same reasoning, although not explicitly applied by the court, applies to Tavizon's contention that he was the victim of sentencing entrapment: "[W]e will assume that the district court knows and applies the law correctly, realizes that it does have the authority to depart, but concludes that it would be inappropriate to do so on the facts of the particular case." United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 927 F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir.1991). 19 Landivar and Tavizon contend that the district court should have determined their base offense levels at the 100 kilogram amount that was agreed to at the meetin…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marshall v. Reno
D.D.C. · 1996 · confidence medium
Cir.), cert. denied, —— U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 405 , 126 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1483, 1487 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1552 , 128 L.Ed.2d 201 (1994); United States v. *434 Nnanna, 7 F.3d 420, 422 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Vargas, No. 92 CR 7433, 1995 WL 453021 , at *1 (N.D.Ill.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Stacey C. Koon, Cross-Appellee. United States of America v. Laurence M. Powell, Cross-Appellee
9th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Some individuals may be deported, see United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990), while those who have been convicted of drug or racketeering offenses may lose their homes and their investments to the federal government in forfeiture proceedings.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gustavo Valdez-Soto, United States of America v. Fabio Gomez-Tello (2×)
9th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 985 F.2d 1001, 1002 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jose Luis Reyes-Montoya (2×)
9th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Decided May 25, 1994. 1 Before: BROWNING, and FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and FITZGERALD, District Judge. * 2 MEMORANDUM ** 3 The district court did not err in calculating Reyes' offense level based on the 300 kilograms Garcia initially agreed to purchase rather than the 49.7785 kilograms actually delivered. "[T]he offense level for a conspiracy is determined by the amount that a defendant conspired to sell and not by the amount ultimately sold," U.S. v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Unicom Computer Corp.
9th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Under that rate, IBM would have been liable for only $53,501.25 in prejudgment interest. 28 We have previously held that in the bankruptcy context the prejudgment interest rate is governed by the 52-Week T-Bill auction rate "immediately prior to the date of judgment." In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 902 F.2d at 734 (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Nnanna
5th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644 (2nd Cir. 1993), petition for cert filed, (U.S. Sept. 13, 1993) (No. 93-5968); United States v. Alverez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Soto, 918 F.2d 882, 884-85 (10th Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Cliff Nnanna, A/K/A Johnie D. Travis Etc.
5th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644 (2nd Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 405 , 126 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); United States v. Alverez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Soto, 918 F.2d 882, 884-85 (10th Cir.1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lali Sorrentino Pimentel
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Aguilar
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Ceja-Hernandez, 895 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Robert P. Aguilar, United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Robert P. Aguilar, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Ceja-Hernandez, 895 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jorge Restrepo
2d Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
While we have seen no indication that Congress, which provided for discretionary relief from deportation in limited circumstances, or the Sentencing Commission, which fashioned the Guidelines, considered the interplay between deportability and sentencing provisions, accord United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990) (no guideline section “directly addresses” whether “threat of deportation is a legally permissible ground for departing”), it is difficult to believe that the Commission was not conscious that a large number of defendants sentenced in the federal cou…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ruben Taren-Palma, United States of America v. Ismael Calderon-Perez (2×)
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lonnie Everett, United States of America v. Melvin Ware
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4 ("If a defendant is convicted of a conspiracy or he attempts to commit any offense involving a controlled substance, the offense level shall be the same as if the object of the conspiracy or attempt had been completed"); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 739 (9th Cir.1990) ("the offense level for a conspiracy is determined by the amount that a defendant conspired to sell and not by the amount ultimately sold"; interpreting § 2D1.4).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Maria Koopmans
4th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Soto, 918 F.2d 882, 885 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Francisco Oscar Dessens-Fimbres, United States of America v. Oscar Alfredo Liera, United States of America v. Raul Martinez, United States of America v. Rafael Jose Rivera-Coronado
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
We have stated that "the offense level for a conspiracy is determined by the amount that a defendant conspired to sell and not by the amount ultimately sold." United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990). 46 In this case, the record reflects both the co-conspirators' intent to deliver fifty kilograms of cocaine as well as the fact that they were capable of producing that amount.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Humberto Nunez-Garcia
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F.2d 1375 , 1389 (9th Cir.1991). 4 At the time of sentencing, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4 (Nov. 1, 1989) provided that the base offense level for a defendant convicted of a conspiracy involving a controlled substance be determined as if the object of the conspiracy had been completed. 1 The commentary to section 2D1.4 elaborated that "[if] the defendant is convicted of an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael Let Williams
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, we have not permitted departures based on circumstances that neither bear on “the offense in question, nor ... speak to the offender’s character.” See United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Luis Caceres
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
We have said "[q]uite clearly" that "the offense level for a conspiracy is determined by the amount that a defendant conspired to sell and not by the amount ultimately sold." United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990). 7 That Caceres negotiated to sell a kilogram of cocaine is uncontroverted.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Linda Sue Baker
7th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
As stated in United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990), “[a] defendant’s crime is no less serious”, in this case because she elected to use her confinement to engage in a drug rehabilitation program.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Phillip Luschen, United States of America v. Delbert Crawford
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Indeed, Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4 states: "If the defendant is convicted of an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount." See United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990) (in conspiracy cases, Guidelines level determined by amount defendant conspired to sell, not by amount actually sold).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lautaro Cea
7th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See also United States v. Boyer, 931 F.2d *1032 1201 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990) (“the offense level for a conspiracy is determined by the amount that a defendant conspired to sell and not by the amount ultimately sold.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Richard Crippen
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Julio Alberto Tejada, Mancebo, United States of America v. Winston Cabrera
2d Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Application Note 1 to § 2D1.4 further explains that “[i]f the defendant is convicted of an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount.” Addressing this same issue, the Ninth Circuit, holding that the negotiated amount defined the scope of a conspiracy, stressed that “[t]he fact that a little less is distributed does not affect the computation.” United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Carl Leslie Buggs (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
7th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “a conspiracy conviction does not turn on the question of whether defendant succeeds in doing all he attempted to do,” and therefore “[q]uite clearly the offense level for a conspiracy is determined by the amount that a defendant conspired to sell and not by the amount ultimately sold.” United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Luciano Moreno-Quidera
9th Cir. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1990).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Chao Fan Xu
9th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990) (“a conspiracy conviction does not turn on the question of whether defendant succeeds in doing all he attempted to do.”).
discussed Cited "see" UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Devon LIPMAN, Defendant-Appellant (2×)
9th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990) (deport-ability is not a valid factor for departure because it merely describes the defendant’s *731 status, and does not “affect [defendant’s] culpability or the seriousness of the offense.”); see also United States v. Ceja-Hernandez, 895 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir.1990) (rejecting use of deportability as basis for upward departure).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Severo Zepeda-Valles
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736-37 (9th Cir.1990). 4 To the extent that Zepeda-Valles' claim is cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 , the district court properly declined to construe the § 2255 motion as a § 2241 habeas petition because the court did not have jurisdiction over either Zepeda-Valles or his custodian.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Phelix Henry Frazier
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Raul Lopez-Mesa, Aka: Paul Lopez, United States of America v. Eugenio Fernandez
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1451 (9th Cir.1991).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Felipe Mora-Rivas
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Ng Wah, A/K/A Wah Jai
D.C. Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Adames, 901 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Garcia, 889 F.2d 1454, 1457 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1829 (1990); United States v. Ehret, 885 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 879 (1990); United States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 104-05 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. Sarasti, 869 F.2d 805, 806 (5th Cir.1989)
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Castro-Rivas (2×)
10th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The Restrepo court did not altogether bar a departure based on deportation, but stated, “to the extent that alienage is a characteristic shared by a large number of persons subject to the Guidelines, it is a characteristic that, for sentencing purposes, is not ‘ordinarily relevant.’ It remains, however, a characteristic that may be considered if a sentencing court finds that its effect is beyond the ordinary.” Id. at 644 ; see also United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir.1990) (“[Djeparture for deportation reasons would be inappropriate.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Rene ALVAREZ-CARDENAS, Defendant-Appellant
89-30060.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jul 27, 1990.
902 F.2d 734
1990 WL 52306
Thomas W. Hillier, II, Federal Public Defender, Seattle, Wash., for defendant-appellant., Richard A. Jones, Asst. U.S. Attorney, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellee.
Canby, Wiggins, Fernandez.
Cited by 69 opinions  |  Published
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge:

Alvarez-Cardenas (“Alvarez”) challenges the district court’s acceptance of the probation officer’s presentence report which determined that at least 500 grams of cocaine were involved in his offense for the purpose of computing a base offense level. He also claims that the court failed to make specific findings regarding his objections to the presentence report. Finally, he contends that the district court erred in not making a downward departure from the Guidelines for the possibility of deportation. We affirm.

JURISDICTION

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

BACKGROUND FACTS

Erazo-Cassorla (“Erazo”) was the subject of an ongoing DEA investigation in the spring of 1988. As part of the investigation, a confidential informant (“informant”) arranged to buy 500 grams of cocaine from Erazo for the sum of $13,000. Although Alvarez may not have expected to receive any of the money from the sale, he did become aware of the fact that the sale was to take place. He offered to drive Erazo to the hotel for the stated purpose of making the illegal sale. When they arrived at the hotel, Erazo first went to the hotel room alone. He then returned to the car to get the cocaine and Alvarez. He and Alvarez went to the hotel room where Erazo presented the drugs to the informant to be weighed. A few moments later the police entered the room and arrested both Alvarez and Erazo. The net weight of the cocaine seized from the hotel room was 487.56 grams. An additional 13.3 grams were found in Erazo’s car under the passenger seat where Erazo had been sitting.

Alvarez pled guilty to conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846. [1] A presentence report was prepared. The officer preparing the report computed Alvarez’ base offense level as 26 based upon a total of 500.86 grams of cocaine.

Alvarez challenged the presentence report prior to sentencing and again at sentencing. His primary attack was on the probation officer’s inclusion of the 13.3 grams of cocaine in the initial computation of Alvarez’ base offense level. He also challenged the probation officer’s failure to make a downward departure based upon the possibility that Alvarez would be deported.

[*736] The district court found that the base offense level had been properly computed, awarded a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, a four-point reduction for Alvarez’ minimal participation in the conspiracy, and denied Alvarez’ request for a departure from the Guidelines based upon the possibility of deportation. The court subsequently sentenced Alvarez to a term of 33 months imprisonment and three years supervised release.

DISCUSSION

A. Base Offense Level

Alvarez contends his sentence must be set aside because the district court erred when it failed to specifically explain its inclusion of the 13.3 grams of cocaine in the computation of his base offense level. We disagree.

Alvarez pled guilty to conspiracy. U.S. S.G. § 2D1.4 provides: “If a defendant is convicted of a conspiracy [2] or an attempt to commit any offense involving a controlled substance, the offense level shall be the same as if the object of the conspiracy or attempt had been completed.”

The commentary to § 2D1.4 goes on to explain that, “[i]f the defendant is convicted of an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount.” Quite clearly the offense level for a conspiracy is determined by the amount that a defendant conspired to sell and not by the amount ultimately sold. See United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d 45, 48 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3227, 106 L.Ed.2d 576 (1989) (in a case where some distribution had occurred, the court found that “[ujnder the sentencing guidelines, the amount of the drug being negotiated, even in an uncompleted distribution, shall be used to calculate the total amount in order to determine the base level”). The fact that a little less is distributed does not affect the computation. Indeed, a conspiracy conviction does not turn on the question of whether defendant succeeds in doing all he attempted to do. See 21 U.S.C. § 846.

Alvarez concedes in his opening brief to this court that “on August 18, 1988, the informant made arrangements with Mr. Er-azo-Cassorla for the delivery of one-half kilogram of cocaine.” That concession is proper based upon the statement of the offense set forth in the presentence report. That report indicates that the agreement between Erazo and the informant was for the purchase of one-half kilogram of cocaine, and Alvarez did not contest that fact at the time of sentencing. Furthermore, common sense points in the same direction. We doubt that the informant agreed to purchase 487.56 grams of cocaine, as opposed to a half kilogram, when he struck his bargain with Erazo. Thus, the object of the conspiracy was the distribution of 500 grams of cocaine. Although the district court’s findings could have been more specific, it indicated that the reason that all of the cocaine was included in the computation was because of “the conspiracy charged.” Therefore we find that regardless of the amount of cocaine actually delivered, Alvarez’ base offense level was properly computed on the basis of 500 grams of cocaine. [3]

B. Departure for Deportation Reasons

Alvarez contends that this case should be remanded because the district court did not[*737] understand that departure for deportation reasons was permissible. We review de novo the district court’s decision of whether departure is legally permissible. See United States v. Lira-Barroza, 897 F.2d 981, 984-85 (9th Cir.1990) (step three); United States v. Nuno Para, 877 F.2d 1409, 1413 (9th Cir.1989).

The Guidelines fail to indicate whether the Commission considered the possibility of deportation in drafting particular offense levels. U.S.S.G. Ch. 2, Pt. L lists several immigration offenses, but, the section is silent on whether the threat of deportation is a legally permissible ground for departing from the Guidelines. No other section directly addresses that issue.

Notwithstanding the Guidelines’ silence, Chapter Five of the Guidelines illustrates why departure for deportation reasons would be inappropriate. The possibility of deportation does not speak to the offense in question, nor does it speak to the offender’s character. It is quite unlike the specific considerations listed in U.S.S.G. § 5K2. On the other hand, deportation is quite similar to the factors set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5H1, which are considered inappropriate grounds for departure in most instances. For example, age (§ 5H1.1), mental and physical condition (§§ 5H1.3 and 5H1.4), education (§ 5H1.2), community ties (§ 5H1.6), and, more directly, race, national origin, and socio-economic status (§ 5H1.10) are not proper grounds for departure. The factors in § 5H1, in large part, speak to status issues that merely describe the defendant as opposed to issues that might be thought to describe characteristics that ought to affect his culpability or the seriousness of the offense. Deportation is similar. A defendant’s crime is no less serious, nor is his history of past actions changed because he may be subjected to deportation proceedings at some point in the future. In addition, were we to find that merely being an alien who is subject to possible deportation should affect a sentencing decision, we would be treating aliens differently simply because they are not citizens of this country. We decline to support such an interpretation of the Guidelines. [4]

In the case at hand, it is not clear whether the district judge determined that the possibility of deportation was never a proper ground for departure, or whether she found that the defendant had not submitted sufficient facts to justify departing on that ground. In either event, [5] since we find that the possibility of deportation is not a proper ground for departure, we uphold the decision of the district court.

CONCLUSION

In this case, the object of the conspiracy was 500 grams of cocaine. We find that the district court’s sentence based upon 500 grams was, therefore, correct. In addition, we find that the trial judge did not err when she refused to depart from the Guidelines for the possibility of deportation.

AFFIRMED.

1

. Section 846 provides:

Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchap-ter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.
2

. At the time of sentencing, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4 provided: "If a defendant is convicted of participating in an incomplete conspiracy or an attempt to commit any offense involving a controlled substance, the offense level shall be the same as if the object of the conspiracy or attempt had been completed." The Commission deleted the phrase "participating in an incomplete” and inserted in lieu thereof the word "a” in their November 1, 1989 amendments. The amendment was to clarify the guideline. U.S.S. G.App. C para. 138.

3

. Contrary to the defendant's claim that this case is controlled by this Circuit's recent holding in United States v. Restrepo, 883 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.1989), this is not an aggregation case. In this case, the dispute is over how much cocaine was involved in the conspiracy charge to which the defendant pled guilty, not whether cocaine charged in counts to which the defendant did not plead guilty should be considered in calculating the defendant’s sentence. In any event, that opinion was withdrawn on March 5, 1990. 896 F.2d 1228.

4

. We note that this court has previously decided that deportation is not a proper ground for an upward departure. See United States v. Ceja-Hernandez, 895 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.1990).

5

. If the question here were the district court’s discretionary refusal to depart downward we would not have jurisdiction over the issue. United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99 (9th Cir.1990).