Henry Benitez v. D. Wolff, J. Kihl, 907 F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1990). · Go Syfert
Henry Benitez v. D. Wolff, J. Kihl, 907 F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
44 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Richard A. LIVINGSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ADIRONDACK BEVERAGE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee (ca2, 1998-04-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 39 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Richard A. LIVINGSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ADIRONDACK BEVERAGE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
2d Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where a colorable claim is made out, sua sponte dismissal is improper prior to service of process and the defendants' answer.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marc Anthony Mascuzzio v. Dr. Freddy E. Notarnicola Sr., John Notarnicola, and Amanda Notarnicola
E.D.N.Y · 2025 · confidence medium
An action is frivolous when the claim is based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory”—that is, when it “lacks an arguable basis in law . . . or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (first quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); then citing Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); and then citing Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Negrito Paul Noel v. Trooper Kevin D. Laibach, et al.; Negrito Paul Noel and Donna Jenkins v. Trooper P.D. Steadman, et al.
W.D.N.Y. · 2025 · confidence medium
Where a colorable claim is made out, dismissal is improper prior to service of process and the defendants’ answer.” Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citation modified).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Negrito Paul Noel v. Trooper Kevin D. Laibach, et al.; Negrito Paul Noel and Donna Jenkins v. Trooper P.D. Steadman, et al.
W.D.N.Y. · 2025 · confidence medium
Where a colorable claim is made out, dismissal is improper prior to service of process and the defendants’ answer.” Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citation modified).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Russian Federation v. United States
N.D.N.Y. · 2024 · confidence medium
An action is legally frivolous when either (1) “the factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy;” or (2) “the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,” such as when it either “lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) ° (per curiam), Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Futia v. Roberts
S.D.N.Y. · 2023 · confidence medium
Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Erie County City Court
W.D.N.Y. · 2023 · confidence medium
As the Second Circuit has noted, “[s]ua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McArthur v. Summit Security
D. Conn. · 2022 · confidence medium
The Second Circuit has advised that “[s]ua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device, which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (cleaned up).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Graesser v. LoVallo
W.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
This is to ensure “that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” (citations omitted)); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that dismissal under Federal…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fusco v. Cuomo
S.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
“A claim is based on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the fact of the complaint.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vidurek v. Cassadine
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
The Court recognizes that “[s]ua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint . . . is a draconian device, which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (cleaned up), but that is the case here.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reid v. The City of New York
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McFadden v. Noeth (2×)
2d Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baxter v. Wagner
2d Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
While we do not consider the viability of these claims, it is difficult to imagine that the "draconian device" of sua sponte dismissal, Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted), was appropriate here, particularly considering that the court did not address all of Baxter's claims.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brewster v. Ontario County Dept. of Social Services
W.D.N.Y. · 2019 · confidence medium
Dismissal is not appropriate under section1915(e)(2), however, if the plaintiff has made “colorable claim[s].” See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” (citations omitted)); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) may still be appropriate no…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aikens v. Cerrito
E.D.N.Y · 2019 · confidence medium
“Where a colorable claim is made out, dismissal is improper prior to service of process and the defendants’ answer.” Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); see McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We have frequently reiterated that sua sponte dismissal of pro se prisoner petitions which contain non-frivolous claims without requiring service upon respondents or granting leave to amend is disfavored by this Court.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Under § 1915(e)(2), a district court ʺshall dismiss [a] case at any time if the court determines thatʺ the action ʺ(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.ʺ 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). ʺSua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a ʹdraconian device,ʹ which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.ʺ Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citations and int…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patterson v. Rodgers
D. Conn. · 2010 · confidence medium
A claim is based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir.1990) (per curiam), or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint, Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barber v. United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District
2d Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
A complaint may be dismissed if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief,” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 , 78 S.Ct. 99 , 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), or if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1294 (2d Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Osuch v. Gregory
D. Conn. · 2004 · confidence medium
A claim is based on an “indisputably merit-less legal theory” when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir.1990) (per curiam), or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) O'Keefe v. Goord
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
We review sum sponte dismissals ordered pursuant to §§ 1915(e) or 1915A de novo, see Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir.2001), mindful that “[s]ua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir.1990) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peter L. Carr v. Jeffrey M. Dvorin, Assistant Nys Attorney General
2d Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
We do note that "[w]here a colorable claim is made out, [sua sponte] *117 dismissal is improper prior to service of process and the defendants’ answer.” Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir.1990); accord Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir.1998).
discussed Cited "see" Eckert v. City of Buffalo
W.D.N.Y. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device [that] is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” (internal citations, internal quotation marks, and italics omitted)); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) still may be appropriate notwithstanding a court’s earlier finding that the complaint was not �…
discussed Cited "see" Eckert v. City of Buffalo
W.D.N.Y. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device [that] is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” (internal citations, internal 40 Because this Court is allowing Eckert to add Wojtanik as a defendant, her second amended complaint shall be deemed to incorporate the allegations she included in her motion for joinder.
discussed Cited "see" Allen v. Erie County Medical Center Corporation
W.D.N.Y. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a ‘draconian device’... which is warranted only when the complaint ‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”’) (citations omitted); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 58 (2d Cir. 1995) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) may still be appropriate notwithstanding a court’s earlier finding that the complaint was not “frivolous” for purposes of Section 1915(e)(2)).
discussed Cited "see" Williams v. Ritts
W.D.N.Y. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device, which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
discussed Cited "see" Jude v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
W.D.N.Y. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device [that] is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” (internal citations, internal quotation marks, and italics omitted)); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) still may be appropriate notwithstanding a court’s earlier finding that the complaint was not �…
discussed Cited "see" Gordon v. The State University at Buffalo
W.D.N.Y. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” (citations omitted)); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) still may be appropriate notwithstanding a court’s earlier finding that the complaint was not “frivolous” for purposes of section 1915(e)(2))…
discussed Cited "see" Moore v. Capital Realty Group, Inc.
W.D.N.Y. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) still may be appropriate notwithstanding a court’s earlier finding that the complaint was not “frivolous” for pu…
discussed Cited "see" New v. M&T Bank Corporation
W.D.N.Y. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 1 The electronic docket names the plaintiff as “.
discussed Cited "see" Moore v. United State of America
W.D.N.Y. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” (citations omitted)); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) still may be appropriate notwithstanding a court’s earlier finding that the complaint was not “frivolous” for purposes of section 1915(e…
discussed Cited "see" Moore v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority,Inc.
W.D.N.Y. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” (citations omitted)); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) still may be appropriate notwithstanding a court’s earlier finding that the complaint was not “frivolous” for purposes of section 1915(e…
discussed Cited "see" Moore v. Capital Realty Group, Inc.
W.D.N.Y. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial.” (citations omitted)); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) still may be appropriate notwithstanding a court’s earlier finding that the complaint was not “frivolous” for purposes of section 1915(e…
cited Cited "see" Pedro Pino v. Patrick Ryan, Deputy Superintendent of Programs, and David Barrenger, Senior Recreation Supervisor at Washington Correctional Facility
2d Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1294 (2d Cir.1990); Elliott v. Bronson, 872 F.2d 20, 21 (2d Cir.1989); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.1983).
cited Cited "see" Henry Benitez v. D. Wolff, J. Kihl
2d Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See 907 F.2d at 1294-95 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Matava v. CTPPS, LLC
D. Conn. · 2022 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jordan v. Greater Buffalo United Accountable Network
W.D.N.Y. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Under that provision, a court “shall dismiss [a] case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B); see also Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [or is] frivolous o…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Linares v. Annucci
2d Cir. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Temple of Am., Inc. v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian, device, which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Guy McEachin v. Michael McGuinnis Superintendent, W.E. Wilcox, Acting Dep. Supt. Of Security, Southport, J. Irizarry, Food Service Administrator
2d Cir. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Temple of Am., Inc. v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir.1982) (citing cases); see also Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir.1990) (per curiam) (“Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a draconian device, which is warranted only when the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Henry BENITEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
D. WOLFF, J. Kihl, Defendants-Appellees
1434, Docket 90-2014.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jun 28, 1990.
907 F.2d 1293
1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 10932
Henry Benitez, Dannemora, N.Y., plaintiff-appellant pro se.
Meskill, Winter, Pratt.
Cited by 38 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Henry Benitez, plaintiff pro se, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, Michael A. Telesca, Chief Judge, dismissing, sua sponte, his § 1983 complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Because the district court misconstrued Beni-tez’s complaint, we reverse and remand.

Benitez is currently incarcerated at Auburn Correctional Facility. On February 27, 1988, during his incarceration at Attica Correctional Facility, a misbehavior report was filed against him; a copy was delivered to him the next morning. Later that day, a second misbehavior report was filed, and Benitez was taken to the Special Housing Unit (SHU). He was not allowed to bring his copy of the first misbehavior report with him to SHU. The next morning, March 1, Benitez received a copy of the second misbehavior report, but that afternoon, he was moved to another cell and again was prevented from taking his copy of the report with him. Benitez’s disciplinary hearing on the charges in both reports was held on the afternoon of March 2. He was found guilty on all but one of the misbehavior charges; for punishment, he lost telephone privileges as well as good time credits and was remanded to SHU for 180 days.

Benitez filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the hearing officer and the corrections officer in SHU had violated his due process rights, because they did not allow him to have the reports for 24 hours prior to the hearing, thus hampering his ability to know of the specific charges and to prepare his defense.

Upon reviewing Benitez’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court construed his complaint as alleging that “defendants failed to provide him with adequate notice of disciplinary charges lodged against him.” Believing that Benitez claimed he had not been served with the misbehavior reports at least 24 hours prior to the disciplinary hearing, as required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); and finding that it was indisputable that Beni-tez had been given at least 24 hours’ notice of both reports; the district court dismissed Benitez’s complaint sua sponte as frivolous, and therefore did not order service of process on the defendants. Such dismissal was improper.

Although the small printing of his hand-written complaint is difficult to read, careful study of Benitez’s ' claims shows that he is not complaining of a complete lack of service or notice, but that he “was denied [possession of] both misbehavior reports on the very days of service of the same”, and this violated “his due process rights to no less than 24-hours with possession of the formal charges to prepare a proper defense thereto” (emphasis added). Benitez’s complaint thus focuses on his right to prepare his defense against the disciplinary charges, not on their timely service. This is a colorable claim of right, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2978 (inmate has a right to written statement of the charges prior to a disciplinary hearing[*1295] in order to prepare a defense); see also Eng v. Coughlin, 858 F.2d 889, 897-98 (2d Cir.1988) (inmate is entitled to assistance in presenting a defense to disciplinary-charges when confined in SHU), that deserves more than summary dismissal before the filing of an answer. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint prior to service of process is a “draconian device”, Elliott v. Bronson, 872 F.2d 20, 21 (2d Cir.1989); Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1983), which is warranted only when the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke, 109 S.Ct. at 1831; see Robles, 725 F.2d at 14 (“frivolous on its face or wholly insubstantial”). Where a colorable claim is made out, dismissal is improper prior to service of process and the defendants’ answer. Robles, 725 F.2d at 16; Cunningham v. Ward, 546 F.2d 481, 482 (2d Cir.1976); see Neitzke, 109 S.Ct. at 1834. Benitez has stated a colorable claim that his due process rights were violated because he was hampered in the preparation of his defense to misbehavior charges by being deprived of possession of the misbehavior reports soon after they were served upon him. Therefore, it was not frivolous and should not have been dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Without commenting on the merits of Benitez’s complaint, or even on whether it can survive a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.