Ginns v. Savage, 393 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1964). · Go Syfert
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Ginns v. Savage, 393 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1964). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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A defendant is estopped from relying on a statute of limitations if its own conduct induced the delay in commencing an action.

A real estate broker filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge a decision by the Real Estate Commissioner. The Commissioner demurred, arguing the petition was filed after the statutory time limit prescribed by the Government Code. The broker alleged that her delay was caused by her reliance on statements made by the Commissioner's attorney regarding the filing deadline. Although the statutory period for filing mandamus petitions is a statute of limitation rather than a jurisdictional requirement, a defendant cannot avail itself of a delay in commencing action that was induced by its own conduct. Because the broker alleged facts that could estop the Commissioner from relying on the limitation period, the demurrer should have been sustained without leave to amend.

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cited 38× by 33 distinct cases, 1978–2025 · 3 courts↑ Rising · …language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered. at p. 524 ✓
cited 16× by 14 distinct cases, 1990–2022 · 4 courts→ Stable · …an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered at p. 524 ✓
cited 13× by 10 distinct cases, 1985–2021 · 2 courts→ Stable · …an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered. at p. 524 ✓
749 citation events (420 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Clarke v. Yu (calctapp, 2026-03-16) · Strongest negative: Elliott v. Contractors' State License Board (calctapp, 1990-09-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1964 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1964 1995 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited "but see" Elliott v. Contractors' State License Board (3×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: but see · confidence high
(Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 578 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]; United Farm Workers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 347, 350 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 437 ]; but see Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) Appellant does not argue otherwise.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clarke v. Yu (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(Ibid.) Because “an opinion is not authority for a 8 proposition not therein considered” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 (Ginns)), Simpson does not justify ignoring the statutory requirement to put in writing an agreement that, by its terms, cannot be performed in one year.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Picayune Rancheria etc. v. North Fork Rancheria etc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
The scope of the “[l]anguage used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ; Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238 , 1252 [cases are not authority for propositions not considered]; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2021) Appeal, § 530, pp. 563–564 [ratio decidendi and dicta].) Applying these principles, we conclude neither United Auburn nor Stand Up II expressly or impliedly resolved whether t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(Santa Clara, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 370– 371.) “Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ; see Geiser v. 9.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Civil Rights Dept. v. Cathy's Creations
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(Minton, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1165.) Minton expressly limited its holding to “narrower grounds”: “Without determining the right of Dignity Health to provide its services in such cases at alternative facilities, as it claims to have done here, we agree that [the] plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Dignity Health initially failed to do so and that its subsequent rectification of its denial, while likely mitigating [Minton’s] damages, did not extinguish his cause of action for discrimination in violation of the [UCRA].” (Id. at p. 1158.) It is axiomatic that an opinion is not a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Civil Rights Dept. v. Cathy's Creations
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(Minton, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1165.) Minton expressly limited its holding to “narrower grounds”: “Without determining the right of Dignity Health to provide its services in such cases at alternative facilities, as it claims to have done here, we agree that [the] plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Dignity Health initially failed to do so and that its subsequent rectification of its denial, while likely mitigating [Minton’s] damages, did not extinguish his cause of action for discrimination in violation of the [UCRA].” (Id. at p. 1158.) It is axiomatic that an opinion is not a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Villalva v. Bombardier Mass Transit Corp.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See Sonic II, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1129 ; OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 122.) The fact that section 98.2 does not authorize the award of fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff/appellant in superior court says nothing about whether another statute does. 18 As the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly cautioned, an opinion must be “understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ) and where an issue is not presented, cases cannot be treated as “ ‘ “ ‘authority for propositions not considered’ ” ’ ” …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cisneros v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524 [opinion is to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court and is not authority for a proposition not considered].) If this opinion were to state that retroactivity extends to cases with a final judgment, that statement would be dictum.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TRC Operating Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Under those principles, “any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 .) Thus, each statement in an opinion must be considered in its proper context and given an objectively reasonable interpretation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) V Lions Farming, LLC v. County of Kern (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 776, 797 .) The scope of the “[l]anguage used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ; Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238 , 1252 [cases are not authority for propositions not considered]; 17. see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2021) Appeal, § 530, pp. 563–564 [ratio decidendi and dicta].) The first step in analyzing the meaning of a writing is determining whether…
cited Cited as authority (rule) McConnell v. Advantest America
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ; Mercury Ins.
cited Cited as authority (rule) McConnell v. Advantest America CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ; Mercury Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conway v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(Satten v. Webb (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 365, 383 , citing Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 .) 18 Plaintiffs’ reliance on Hittle suffers from another fatal problem: Hittle itself is not an “enactment” as defined by the law that must be the source of any mandatory duty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leenay v. Super. Ct.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Group v. Superior Court (1998) 19 Cal.4th 332, 348 [“A decision, of course, is not authority for what it does not consider”]; Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered”].) Finally, we note that the correct interpretation of section 1281.4 resolves the perpetual stay problem identified by Leenay.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [“an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered”].) As a result, neither decision explicitly addressed the patient’s lack of reasonable access of a material fact.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Corona v. Pacific Coast Building Products CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Becerra v. Native Wholesale Supply Co. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 73, 94, fn. 11 ; Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 .) Plaintiffs cite no authority applying Cragg in the summary judgment context.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Everhart v. Trapac CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1960) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 .) Additionally, section 40 of the Restatement Third of 26 Torts provides that “[a]n actor in a special relationship with another owes the other a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship” and that “[s]pecial relationships giving rise to the duty provided in Subsection (a) include: . . . (…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Podiatric Medical Board etc. v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Code, § 11521, subd. (a); Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 525 [power to grant reconsideration expires on date decision becomes effective].) The trial court granted Dr. Redko’s petition for a writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bichai v. Dignity Health (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
It is well established that “an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 .) Under this principle, we reject Bichai’s argument and will not equate alleged wrongdoing by its Medical Staff with wrongdoing by Mercy Hospital for purposes of Bichai’s claims alleging conspiracy and unfair competition.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fraser v. RV Country, Inc. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ; see generally, 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 509, pp. 572–573 [ratio decidendi and dicta].) Consequently, we conclude that an agreement to proceed in court rather than arbitrate a dispute is enforceable even if the party attempting to proceed with the civil action has not shown he or she would be prejudiced if required to…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yost v. Forestiere
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 .) Second, in Loeffler, the appellate court did not analyze whether the provision for modification or termination of a domestic violence restraining order had 18. been included in the statute as a safeguard counterbalancing the truncated nature of the procedures for obtaining such an order.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Financial Casualty and Surety, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
(See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [“an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered”]; see also People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 680, fn. 12 [same].) “Our primary task in construing a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent. [Citation].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vasquez v. Solo 1 Kustoms, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
(Id. at p. 494.) In relying on Harris, Vasquez ignores a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that “an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ; see Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 343 [“A decision, of course, does not stand for a proposition not considered by the court.”].) The Harris court considered only whether the award of damages was proper; it did not address whether there is a private cause of action for violation of section 9884.9.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cima-Sorci v. Sorci
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
(Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [“[A]n opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.”].) We also reject Father’s contention that section 4951, subdivision (a), which requires the party seeking registration to provide certain documents and information to the trial court, “[i]mpli[es]” a burden on the party seeking registration “to show that the order in question is one from a state recognized by UIFSA.” Subdivision (b) of that section provides: “On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall cause the order to be f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cima-Sorci v. Sorci
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
(Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [“[A]n opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.”].) We also reject Father’s contention that section 4951, subdivision (a), which requires the party seeking registration to provide certain documents and information to the trial court, “[i]mpli[es]” a burden on the party seeking registration “to show that the order in question is one from a state recognized by UIFSA.” Subdivision (b) of that section provides: “On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall cause the order to be f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sanjiv Goel, M.D., Inc. v. Regal Medical Group, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) As discussed above, the issue in Children’s Hospital was whether the trial court improperly limited the jury to considering only the hospital’s fully billed charges rather than what insurers actually paid.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Jose Unified School District v. Santa Clara County Office of Education
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
(Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ]; City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1318 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 ].) Appellants also contend that use of the section 53094 exemption by community college districts supports their reading of the statute.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Carranza
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [“an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered”]; accord, People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 680, fn. 12 .)12 IV.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stand up for California v. State of Cal. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) North Fork next says there are many federal statutes that call on the Governor to take actions without specific authority under state law, and “chaos would ensue” if such specific authority were held to be required.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Carranza
Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
(See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ] [“an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered”]; accord, People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 680, fn. 12 [ 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 833 , 286 P.3d 754 ].) 12 IV.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) V.T. v. M.T. CA4/1 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701-702 [trial court may not reopen case after appellate court's unqualified affirmance].) It is elementary that "[l]anguage used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered." (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ; Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 118 .) A trial court is accorded some flexibility to implement the appellate directions, such as receiving new evidence t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Mr. T. CA4/1 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701-702 [trial court may not reopen case after appellate court's unqualified affirmance].) It is elementary that "[l]anguage used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered." (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ; Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 118 .) A trial court is accorded some flexibility to implement the appellate directions, such as receiving new evidence t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scott v. Yoho
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court has explained: “‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered. [Citation.]’ (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 .)” (Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 118 .) The analysis concerning the 30- day rescission right in Rodriguez has no bearing on the preemption issue presented here. 19 IV.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scott v. Yoho
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court has explained: “ ‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered. [Citation.]’ (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].)” (Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108 , 118 *409 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46 , 117 P.3d 660 ].) The analysis concerning the 30-day rescission right in Rodriguez has no bearing on the preemption issue presented here.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Santa Ana
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(Id. at pp. 1084, 1095.) “Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered. [Citation.]” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) Howard did not establish that the word “sentence” has a universal meaning in all contexts.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marteney v. Union Carbide Corp. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524 (“Language used in any opinion is . . . to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.”].) Furthermore, we conclude that the doctrine in comment (c) is inapplicable to appellants.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Tobacco Cases II
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) Philip Morris has filed a protective cross-appeal, challenging the propriety of class treatment.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rice v. Rancho Palma Grande HOA CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ; Flannery, at p. 581.) Thus, the trial court properly awarded the Association attorney’s fees and costs related to the litigation phase of the case. 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Raicevic v. Geraci CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
"Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered." (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 .) Furthermore, "[a]n appellate decision is not authority for everything said in the court's opinion but only 'for the points actually involved and actually decided.' " (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620 ; see also Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1157 .) Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Geraci's assertion…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Gross
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(Id. at p. 985.) “[A]n opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) Moreover, even if defendant relies on Guillen only by analogy, that reliance is misplaced because defendant ignores a critical distinction between restitution fines and direct victim restitution: restitution fines are punitive in nature; direct victim restitution is not.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
It is well established that “[l]anguage used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ] (Ginns).) We accordingly undertake to analyze each set of definitions with attention to the transactional facts of each case, about the type of goods sold, and the identities of the buyer and seller.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Jackio
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) A 2009 California Supreme Court case summarized the law generally applicable in these circumstances: “ ‘A defendant seeldng to represent himself “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ [Citation].” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 .) “No particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect self-repres…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rusconi
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ] [opinions must be understood in light of the facts and issues before the appellate court; they are not authority for a proposition not considered or analyzed by the court]; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 509, p. 572 [what constitutes a rule of decision].) The absence of any discussion in Vargas of multiple victims of violence is more than an abstract or esoteric distinction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Anderson
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) In People v. Hochanadel (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 997 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 347 ] (Hochanadel), the defendants were operators of a storefront medical marijuana dispensary charged with possession of marijuana for sale, transportation of marijuana, and maintaining a business for the purpose of selling marijuana.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Hubbs CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
However, Otis, Montoya, and Powell 34 must be viewed in light of their particular facts and the issues raised in them.8 (See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 ["[l]anguage used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court"].) As noted, in Otis, the defendant was delusional, and the court upheld counsel's jury waiver over the defendant's objection, opining that the defendant was not capable of making a reasoned decision. ( Otis, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1175-1176.) In Montoya, the court also upheld counsel's waiver…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Fialho (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 17 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348 , 939 P.2d 748 ] [“ ‘[A]n opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered’ ”], quoting Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) And while it is true that prior versions of section 1170.1 contained language requiring that certain enumerated enhancements be “pleaded and proven as provided by law,” the current language of the statute is substantially more exacting in its requirements.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Citizens for Restoration of L Street v. City of Fresno
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ] [opinions must be understood in light of the facts and issues before the appellate court; they are not authority for a proposition not considered or analyzed by the court]; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 509, p. 572 [what constitutes a rule of decision].) 19 This statutory text creates three routes by which an object may come to be regarded as an historical resource for purposes of CEQA.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kaufman v. Diskeeper Corp.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ] [“[A]n opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.”].)
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Settle v. State of California
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(Carroll, at p. 139.) The court in Carroll did not specifically consider whether section 1038 authorized the imposition of defense costs against counsel. “[A]n opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered. [Citations.]” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ]; see In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 916 P.2d 476 ]; People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 302 , 95 P.3d 523 ].) A treatise on government tort liability practice cites Carroll for the proposition…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roman Catholic Bishop of Monterey, CA v. Mansfield CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
“Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 .) Quinn has no bearing here. 2.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
GRACE FISHER GINNS, and
v.
W. A. SAVAGE, as Real Estate Commissioner, and
L. A. No. 27834.
California Supreme Court.
Jul 9, 1964.
393 P.2d 689
1964 Cal. LEXIS 226
D. Brandon Bernstein for Plaintiff and Appellant., Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and Lynn H. Johnson, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Schauer.
Cited by 280 opinions  |  Published
SCHAUER, J.

In this mandamus proceeding plaintiff seeks annulment of an order of defendant Real Estate Commissioner of the State of California revoking plaintiff’s license as a real estate broker. As will appear we have concluded that the trial court erred in sustaining defendant’s[*522] demurrer without leave to amend, and that the ensuing judgment of dismissal should be reversed.

Plaintiff filed an original, and also an “Amended and Supplemental,” petition for the writ. Therein she alleges: Since 1944 she “has been engaged in the City and County of Los Angeles ... as a Real Estate Broker.” On August 24, 1961, defendant commissioner, following written accusation, notice and hearing, rendered a decision revoking plaintiff’s plenary license as a broker and placing her on a restricted license with a provision that she should serve a 180-day period of suspension. This decision was ordered to become effective as of September 14, 1961. On September 8, 1961, the commissioner issued a nunc pro tunc order correcting a clerical error in the decision. On September 11, 1961, at plaintiff’s request the commissioner issued an order staying the effective date of the decision until October 2, 1961. On September 25, 1961, the commissioner disposed of plaintiff’s application for reconsideration of his decision by inserting a proviso into such decision. The proviso stated that if plaintiff rendered an accounting to certain persons she could then obtain a restricted license. The proviso made no reference to service of a period of suspension. The September 25 decision was also ordered to become effective as of October 2, 1961. In a letter dated October 31, 1961, plaintiff requested further reconsideration of the commissioner’s decision. The request was denied on the stated ground that reconsideration having been granted once, the commissioner had no jurisdiction to grant further reconsideration.

On November 2, 1961, plaintiff acting in propria persona, served her original petition for writ of mandate upon the commissioner and, on November 3, 1961, filed such original petition in the trial court. Thereafter she secured an attorney and on January 31, 1962, through such counsel filed her “Amended and Supplemental Petition” for the writ.

Meantime, on November 8, 1961, the commissioner issued an order finding that plaintiff had rendered the accounting mentioned in the September 25 decision; and that upon application she could be granted a restricted license, upon condition that she serve a 180-day period of suspension. On November 21, 1961, the commissioner issued a nunc pro tunc order finding that the 180-day suspension provision had been included in the November 8 order by mistake and inadvertence, and directing that the suspension provision be deleted nunc pro tunc from the November 8 order.

[*523] On February 27, 1962, the commissioner filed his demurrer to “Petition, and Amended Petition” for the writ, stating as the ground that the court “does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action in that” the petition was not filed “within the time limits prescribed by Government Code section 11523.” Section 11523 specifies that judicial review of the commissioner’s decision may be had by filing a petition for a writ of mandate “within 30 days after the last day on which reconsideration can be ordered. ’ ’

On March 20, 1962, the commissioner filed his return by way of answer to the petition and amended petition, in which among other things he again set up alleged failure to file the petition within the time limits provided in Government Code section 11523. More specifically he alleged that the last day on which he could order reconsideration of his decision was October 2, 1961, and that inasmuch as November 3, 1961, on which date plaintiff filed this mandate proceeding, was more than 30 days thereafter, the proceeding was barred.

On April 3, 1962, plaintiff filed her “Reply to Return” (see Scott v. Superior Court (1928) 205 Cal. 525, 527 [1] [271 P. 906]), in which by way of excuse for her failure to file her petition before November 3, 1961, she alleges: In October 1961 she had several conversations with an attorney representing the commissioner, with reference to the time within which to serve and file her petition for mandate. Such attorney had also represented the commissioner at the administrative hearing, at which plaintiff had appeared in propria persona. The attorney stated to her that he had “figured out the time within which she had to file her Petition; [and] he stated that the last day to serve and file the Petition was November 3, 1961.” Plaintiff relied on such statement. On November 1, 1961, she mailed the original petition to the commissioner in care of the attorney, “as suggested by him.” On November 2, 1961, upon the advice of the attorney plaintiff sent a messenger to pick up the original petition “and did proceed to file same with the Clerk of Court, but due to the lateness of the hour and due to the fact that the County Clerk’s office was closed, she did not file the said Petition until November 3, 1961, with the said County Clerk.”

On April 27, 1962, defendant commissioner’s demurrer came on for hearing. The record of the hearing shows that the court heard and considered, without objection by defendant, argument as to whether the above related allegations in[*524] plaintiff’s “Reply to Return’’ were, if and when proved, sufficient to excuse the late filing of her petition. Defendant argued that the time limits of Government Code section 11523 are “jurisdictional,” and that he could neither waive nor by his conduct be estopped to rely upon them.[1] The trial court agreed with this view, sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and rendered judgment of dismissal. This appeal by plaintiff followed.

The law is settled, and clear, that the statutory periods within which mandamus petitions may be filed are not jurisdictional in nature, as are the periods within which appeals may be taken from lower courts (see Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120, 122 [3] [142 P.2d 423, 149 A.L.R. 1250]), but are mere statutes oí limitation. (Hollywood Turf Club v. Daugherty (1950) 36 Cal.2d 352, 356 [1] [224 P.2d 359]; Barlow v. City Council of Inglewood (1948) 32 Cal. 2d 688, 697 [4] [197 P.2d 721]; W. R. Grace & Co. v. California Emp. Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 720, 728-729 [6-7] [151 P.2d 215]; Dillon v. Board of Pension Comrs. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 427, 429-430 [1] [116 P.2d 37, 136 A.L.R. 800]; Hermanson v. Board of Pension Comrs. (1933) 219 Cal. 622, 624-625 [2-3] [28 P.2d 21] and cases there cited: Crow v. City of Lynwood (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 461, 467 [3] [337 P.2d 919]; see also Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1961) 55 Cal.2d 728, 731 [2] [13 Cal.Rptr. 104, 361 P.2d 712]; Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 303-307 [1-2] [196 P.2d 20].)[2] Rules of law relating to limitations of actions are applicable to mandamus proceedings. (Hollywood Turf Club v. Daugherty (1950) supra, 36 Cal.2d 352, 356 [1].)

Where delay in commencing action is induced by conduct of the defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense (Adams v. California Mut. B.& L. Assn. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 487, 489 [1,2] [116 P.2d 75]), even though there was[*525] no designed fraud on the part of the person sought to he estopped. (Benner v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 346, 349 [159 P.2d 24].) Here plaintiff, a real estate broker licensed and supervised by defendant commissioner, alleges that it was in reliance upon representations made to her by his attorney that she delayed until November 3, 1961, the filing of her mandamus petition. It thus appears that she at least undertook to set up facts which would estop the commissioner from relying upon the statutory limitation period. Although they are perhaps ineptly and incompletely alleged, the demurrer should not have been sustained without leave to amend, thereby depriving plaintiff of opportunity to plead her ease more fully and specifically if she be so advised.

Plaintiff argues also that the order of September 25, 1961, designating October 2, 1961, as its effective date, was not a final order, because it provided that if plaintiff thereafter fulfilled certain conditions she would be entitled to apply for and receive a restricted license. This contention is without merit.

Even if plaintiff thereafter should claim to have fulfilled such conditions, and if new hearings were required in order to determine the accuracy of the claim, nevertheless such proceedings would be merely incidental to enforcement of the subject order and would not detract from its finality. The order of November 8, 1961, corrected by that of November 21, 1961, establishing that plaintiff had met the specified conditions, was such an incidental order, and did not operate to extend the time within which plaintiff could file her mandamus petition attacking the final order itself.

Plaintiff further contends that she was entitled to seek reconsideration of the order of September 25, 1961, which was issued on the first reconsideration, and that therefore the date of October 2, 1961, should not govern. This argument is likewise without merit. Regardless of other considerations, the commissioner’s power to order reconsideration expired on October 2, 1961, the date he set as the effective date of his decision. (Gov. Code, § 11521 ;[3] see also Moran v.[*526] Board of Medical Examiners (1948) supra, 32 Cal.2d 301, 304.)

For the reasons above stated the judgment of dismissal is reversed, with directions that plaintiff be granted a reasonable time to further amend her petition for the writ if she be so advised.

Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., MeComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.

1

Counsel for defendant also stated in argument that the attorney mentioned by plaintiff denied making any statements to her that she had until November 3 to file her petition for mandate.

2

Eichman v. Escondido Union Sigh School Dist. (1964) ante, pp. 100, 102 [37 Cal.Rptr. 199, 389 P.2d 727], relied upon by defendant, does not hold to the contrary. The court was not there concerned with distinctions between limitations statutes and jurisdictional periods. Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered. (McDowell & Craig v. City of Santa Fe Springs (1960) 54 Cal,2d 33, 38 [4-5] [4 Cal.Rptr. 176, 351 P.2d 344] and cases there cited.)

3

Section 11521 provides that “power to order a reconsideration shall expire 30 days after the delivery or mailing of a decision to respondent [plaintiff herein], or on the date set by the agency itself as the effective date of the decision if such date occurs prior to the expiration of the 30-day period. ...” Plaintiff alleges that she received the decision “on or about August 25, 1961. ’ ’