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Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Davis
Given that reasonable suspicion, Logue was permitted to ask defendant whether he had any heroin on his person ( see People v Dunbar , 5 NY3d 834, 835 [2005]; People v Mueses , 137 AD3d 1664, 1665 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1136 [2016]; People v Phillips , 46 AD3d 1021, 1023 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 815 [2008]; People v Richardson , 27 AD3d 1168, 1170 [2006]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Davis
Given that founded suspicion, Merrell was authorized to inquire whether there were any additional drugs in the vehicle (see People v Cavanagh, 97 AD3d 980, 981 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1101 [2012]; People v Lowe, 79 AD3d 1676 , 1677 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 833 [2011]) and to ask defendant for his consent to search it (see People v Dunbar, 5 NY3d 834, 835 [2005]; People v Hollman, 79 NY2d at 191-192 ; People v Whalen, 101 AD3d 1167 , 1168 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1105 [2013]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Banks
We dissent because defendant’s parole status and his response to the request for his parole officer’s phone number did not give rise to a founded suspicion of criminality, and there was no adequate basis stated in the troopers’ testimony to justify the further interrogation, delay at the roadside or the canine sniff, all of which occurred after the initial justification for the stop had expired (see People v Garcia, 20 NY3d 317, 322 [2012]; People v Devone, 15 NY3d 106, 110 [2010]; People v Dunbar, 5 NY3d 834, 835 [2005]; People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 191 [1992]; see generally People v …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Banks
We dissent because defendant’s parole status and his response to the request for his parole officer’s phone number did not give rise to a founded suspicion of criminality, and there was no adequate basis stated in the troopers’ testimony to justify the further interrogation, delay at the roadside or the canine sniff, all of which occurred after the initial justification for the stop had expired (see People v Garcia, 20 NY3d 317, 322 [2012]; People v Devone, 15 NY3d 106, 110 [2010]; People v Dunbar, 5 NY3d 834, 835 [2005]; People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 191 [1992]; see generally People v …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Devone
While it is true that, generally speaking, an individual has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in a home (see Yancy, 86 NY2d at 245-246 ), this distinction has never affected the standard required to search areas of a vehicle shielded from outside view, and it should not now justify a search of these private spaces based on mere founded suspicion rather than the reasonable suspicion standard applied to residences and their thresholds (see Dunn, 77 NY2d at 26 ). * Indeed, prior to today, the predicate of founded suspicion of criminality adopted by the majority would have permitted n…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Oldacre
Given that founded suspicion, the agent’s subse quent request to search defendant’s backpack, to which defendant consented, was likewise a proper component of a level two inquiry (see id. at 191-192 ; cf. People v Dunbar, 5 NY3d 834, 835 [2005]; People v Irizarry, 79 NY2d 890, 892 [1992]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Richardson
Based on that reasonable suspicion, the officer was authorized to detain defendant at the scene and to engage in “accusatory questioning” of him (People v Dunbar, 5 NY3d 834, 835 [2005]; see People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234, 237-238 [1986]; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]; see also CPL 140.50 [1]; see generally People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 191-192 [1992]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Smith
"In circumstances justifying a level two encounter, the officer may request an individual's consent to conduct a search, so long as the request is 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place' " ( People v Darby , 234 AD3d 708 , 709-710 [2d Dept 2025], lv denied 43 NY3d 1007 [2025], quoting People v Mercado , 120 AD3d 441, 443 [2d Dept 2014], affd 25 NY3d 936 [2015]; see People v Dibble , 43 AD3d 1363, 1364 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1032 [2008]; see generally People v Dunbar , 5 NY3d 834, 835 [2005]; Hollman , 79 NY2d at 191-192 )…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Darby
In circumstances justifying a level two encounter, the officer may request an individual's consent to conduct a search, so long as the request is "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place" ( People v Mercado , 120 [*2]AD3d 441, 443, affd 25 NY3d 936 ; see People v Dunbar , 5 NY3d 834, 835 ; People v Irizarry , 79 NY2d 890, 892 ).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Madden
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
As the Court of Appeals has repeatedly explained, the “purpose [of] De Bour was to provide clear guidance for police officers seeking to act lawfully in what may be fast-moving street encounters and a cohesive framework for courts reviewing the propriety of police conduct in these situations” (People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 499 [2006] [emphasis added]; see People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77, 83 [1997]; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223 ; see generally People v Dunbar, 5 NY3d 834, 835 [2005]).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Packer
Thus, in Hollman , the Court, after observing that the arresting officer “crossed the line . . . when he asked to search the defendant’s bag,” held that “[b]ecause the defendant’s consent was a product of the improper police inquiry, the Appellate Division was in error when it found that the defendant had in fact consented to the search of his bag (see, People v Gonzalez, 39 NY2d 122, 128 ; see also, 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2 [d] [2d ed])” ( 79 NY2d at 194 ; accord People v Dunbar, 5 NY3d 834, 835 [2005]; People v McIntosh, 96 NY2d at 527 ; People v Turriago, 219 AD2d 383…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Ponder
The record of the suppression hearing establishes that the police had a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and thus were justified in asking defendant if there was anything in the vehicle that the police should know about and in then seeking his consent to search the vehicle (see People v Leiva, 33 AD3d 1021, 1023 [2006]; see generally People v Dunbar, 5 NY3d 834 [2005]; People v Battaglia, 86 NY2d 755, 756 [1995]; People v Abernathy, 224 AD2d 826, 828 [1996]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The People of the State of New York
v.
Harold L. Dunbar
v.
Harold L. Dunbar
New York Court of Appeals.
Oct 20, 2005.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Audra Al-bright and James P. Maxwell of counsel), for appellant., Lawrence A. Wangerman, Syracuse, for respondent.
Cited by 14 opinions | Published
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
The suppression court, affirmed by the Appellate Division, held that the police did not have a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, as needed in order to engage in the more extended, accusatory questioning attendant to a common-law inquiry. As we held in People v Hollman (79 NY2d 181, 191-192 [1992]), a consent to search will not be upheld unless the request to search is supported by a founded suspicion of criminality (see also People v Tejeda, 217 AD2d 932 [4th Dept 1995]; People v Carter, 199 AD2d 817 [3d Dept 1993]; People v Alston, 193 AD2d 883 [3d Dept 1993]; People v Boyd, 188 AD2d 239 [1st Dept 1993]). Here, as the courts determined, defendant granted the police permission to search his person and his car only after questioning that might reasonably have led him to believe that he was suspected (without a founded suspicion) of criminality.
When, as here, there is support in the record for the lower courts’ undisturbed finding as to the lack of a founded suspicion of criminality, our review is at an end.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges G.B. Smith, Ciparick, Rosenblatt, Graffeo, Read and R.S. Smith concur.
Order affirmed in a memorandum.