Biondo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 458 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1983). · Go Syfert
Biondo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 458 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
152 citation events (66 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
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60 N.Y.2d at 834 Determining when a statutory period begins running45 citing cases[F]or the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not the determination was intended to be final2 citing courts put it this way · 41 listed here
  • McCrain v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 31394(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2025).unpublished
    ([F]or the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not…)
  • Matter of Lobban v. New York State Dept. of Health Vital Records, 2024 NY Slip Op 51606(U) (N.Y. Sup. Kings 2024).unpublished
    An agency determination is deemed final "when the petitioner is aggrieved by the determination" ( Biondo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983] ).
  • Matter of Shoga v. Annucci, 153 N.Y.S.3d 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2021).published
    As a preliminary matter, petitioner correctly contends that his subsequent release to parole does not render this proceeding moot inasmuch as his status as a parole violator "may have lasting consequences" ( Matter of Biondo v New York Sta…
  • City of Buffalo City Sch. Dist. v. LPCiminelli, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 1832 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2018).published
    Transp. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. , 253 AD2d 330, 337 [1st Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 808 [1999], quoting Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole , 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]), and whether the claims for payment were explici…
  • Matter of Gainey v. Stanford, 2018 NY Slip Op 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2018).published
    Footnotes Footnote 1: The revocation challenge is not moot, however, given that "petitioner was found to have been a parole violator[,] which may have lasting consequences" ( Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole , 60 NY2d 832, 8…
  • Cortes v. Mujica, 55 Misc. 3d 914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).published 2 cites
    In this regard, the Court of Appeals has held that “for the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an a…
  • Scott v. State of New York, 137 A.D.3d 1434 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2016).published
    For accrual purposes, a claimant is deemed to have exhausted all of his or her administrative remedies on the date on which he or she received notice of the final administrative determination (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of P…
  • Matter of Putnam Cnty. Prob. Dept. v. Dimichele, 120 A.D.3d 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2014).published
    At the outset, due to the enduring consequences which may potentially flow from the revocation of the order suspending the father’s commitment, the fact that the father has been released from prison due to the expiration of his commitment…
  • Matter of Benjamin v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 119 A.D.3d 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2014).published
    Supreme Court properly found that the proceeding is time-barred, since it was commenced more than four months after petitioner received notice of the DOE’s determination (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 83…
  • Peck v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1086 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2014).published 2 cites
    Although petitioner’s sentence expired in December 2012 and he was released to the community on strict and intensive supervision and treatment after it was determined that he suffered from a mental abnormality under Mental Hygiene Law § 10…
Show 31 more citing cases
  • McShane v. State, 43 Misc. 3d 320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).published
    Indeed, fundamental fairness would seem to compel the conclusion that a petitioner should not be held to have been dilatory in challenging a determination of which he was not aware.” (Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2…
  • LaSonde v. Seabrook, 89 A.D.3d 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2011).published
    ((F)or the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not…)
  • Morning v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist., 28 Misc. 3d 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).published
    In reversing, the appellate court held that the claim accrued when the defendants expressly denied the plaintiff’s request for payment, as a “ ‘petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agen…
  • Miritello v. Nassau Cnty., 70 A.D.3d 1041 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).published
    The Supreme Court properly denied the petition as untimely, as the proceeding was commenced more than four months after the January 5, 2007, determination denying the petitioner benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c (see CPLR…
  • Singer v. New York State & Local Employees' Ret. Sys., 69 A.D.3d 1037 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2010).published
    Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run when the party receives oral or written notice, or when the party knows or should have known, of the adverse determination (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 83…
  • Mack v. Alexander, 61 A.D.3d 1222 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2009).published
    Petitioner has been released from prison due to the expiration of his sentence, but such does not render this proceeding moot, as “petitioner was found to have been a parole violator which may have lasting consequences despite the expirati…
  • Branch v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 61 A.D.3d 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009).published
    While Branch’s claims thus are time-barred, the statute of limitations was tolled with respect to Viola’s claims after DOE sent Viola another letter on September 13, 2006, thereby creating ambiguity as to the finality of its June 19, 2006…
  • Webster v. Police Dep't, 59 A.D.3d 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009).published
    Corp., 233 AD2d 224, 225 [1996], citing, inter alia, Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]; see also City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 670 [1976]).
  • Catskill Reg'l Off-Track Betting Corp. v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 56 A.D.2d 1027 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2008).published
    Dept., Div. of Parole, 95 NY2d 267, 270 [2000]; Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]).
  • Moore v. Alexander, 53 A.D.3d 747 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2008).published
    Additionally, we note that, although petitioner has since completed serving the delinquent time assessment and has been released, this proceeding is not moot (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]). .
  • Chrysler v. Goord, 49 A.D.3d 1342 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2008).published
    The applicable four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 did not begin to run until petitioner “received notice of the . . . determination” (Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]), and respon…
  • Rapoli v. Vill. of Red Hook, 29 A.D.3d 1007 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).published
    Commn., 44 NY2d 352 [1978]; Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]).
  • New York City Campaign Fin. Bd. v. Snyder, 10 Misc. 3d 841 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 2005).published
    Absent a final Board order imposing a fine upon the candidate (Matter of Martin v Ronan, 44 NY2d 374 , 380 [1978], rearg denied 45 NY2d 776 [1978] [“For a determination to be final ‘upon the petitioner’ it must be clear that the petitioner…
  • Blanche v. State, 17 A.D.3d 1069 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2005).published
    The petitioner is not aggrieved by the mere issuance of an adverse determination, but by the receipt of notice of that determination (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]).
  • Mitchell v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist., 15 A.D.3d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2005).published
    Transp., Inc. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 253 AD2d 330, 337 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 808 [1999], quoting Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]).
  • Berkshire Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Novello, 13 A.D.3d 327 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004).published
    Since any ambiguity created by the defendants must be resolved against them (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]; Mundy v Nassau County Civ.
  • Dey v. New York State Teachers' Ret. Sys., 9 A.D.3d 908 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2004).published
    Petitioner contends that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the date of respondent’s determination set forth in a letter dated March 6, 2003, but instead began to run on the date on which he actually received the determinat…
  • Matter of Metro. Museum Historic Dist. Coalition v. De Montebello, 2004 NY Slip Op 50527(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2004).unpublished
    Reply Ex. 6.) Respondents also submit the affidavit of Commissioner Stern attesting that during his tenure (which expired in 2002), he personally spoke with Ms. Nicholson and "informed her about Parks' decision to approve the plan." (Stern…
  • Heck v. Keane, 6 A.D.3d 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2004).published
    We note that, although the relevant date ordinarily is the date on which the petitioner received notice (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]; Matter of Edwards v Coughlin, 191 AD2d 1044, 1045 [1993]…
  • ATM One v. Landaverde, 307 A.D.2d 922 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2003).published
    (four month statute of limitations governing CPLR art 78 proceedings runs from when aggrieved party receives notice of determination)
  • Mays-Watt v. Hernandez, 196 Misc. 2d 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).published
    (See, Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]; Matter of Martin v Ronan, 44 NY2d 374, 380-381 [1978].) A petitioner is aggrieved once the agency has issued an “unambiguously final decision that puts the pet…
  • Vadell v. City of New York Health & Hospitals Corp., 233 A.D.2d 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1996).published
    Here, for Statute of Limitations purposes, it is the respondent’s burden to establish that it provided notice of termination to the petitioner more than four months prior to October 7, 1994 (Raffaele v Town of Orangetown, supra, at 431 [ci…
  • Abamont v. Cortines, 164 Misc. 2d 599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).published
    Additionally, however, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved upon mere receipt of the determination if the administrative "agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not the determination was intended to be final” (Mat…
  • Chaban v. Bd. of Educ., 201 A.D.2d 646 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994).published
    As noted by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole (supra, at 834): "We have previously held that for the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved…
  • Jackson v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 155 Misc. 2d 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).published
    A determination becomes "final and binding” when the aggrieved party is notified of the determination (New York State Assn. of Counties v Axelrod, 78 NY2d 158 [1991]; Matter of Village of Westbury v Department of Transp., 75 NY2d 62, 72 [1…
  • Nickerson v. City of Jamestown, 178 A.D.2d 1003 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 1991).published
    Further, the notice requirement is strictly enforced because "a petitioner should not be held to have been dilatory in challenging the determination of which he was not aware” (Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, supra, at 834…
  • Edmead v. McGuire, 490 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1986).published 2 cites
    However, where the determination is unambiguous and its effect certain, the statutory period commences as soon as the aggrieved party is notified (see, Matter of Biondo v State Bd. of Parole, supra, p 834).
  • Matter of Just. v. Evans, 135 A.D.3d 1285 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2016).published
    Inasmuch as the Board’s refusal to revisit its “finding that petitioner is a parole violator may have lasting consequences” under these circumstances, the appeal has not been rendered moot even if petitioner has reached the maximum expirat…
  • Covington v. Fischer, 125 A.D.3d 1320 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2015).published 2 cites
    The applicable four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 did not begin to run until petitioner “received notice of the final administrative determination” (Matter of Jackson v Fischer, 67 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2009]; see Matter of…
  • Silvestri v. Hubert, 106 A.D.3d 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2013).published 2 cites
    “A determination generally becomes binding when the aggrieved party is ‘notified’ ” (Matter of Village of Westbury v Department of Transp. of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d 62, 72 [1989]; see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2…
  • Surton Constr. Contracting Corp. v. New York City Sch. Constr. Auth., 81 A.D.3d 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011).published
    “A determination generally becomes binding when the aggrieved party is notified” (Matter of Village of Westbury v Department of Transp. of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d 62, 72 [1989] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Biondo v New…
Other citing cases5 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Sebastian Biondo
v.
New York State Board of Parole
New York Court of Appeals.
Nov 1, 1983.
Published opinion
458 N.E.2d 371
1983 N.Y. LEXIS 3506
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Murray Bogatin for appellant., Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Nancy A. Spiegel and Peter H. Schiff of counsel), for respondent.
Cited by 121 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Albany County, for a hearing to determine when petitioner was informed of the appeal board’s determination.

[*834] The four-month Statute of Limitations did not begin to run until the petitioner received notice of the appeal board’s determination (see, e.g., 8 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 7804.02; Matter of Abramson v Commissioner of Educ., 1 AD2d 366, 371; cf. Matter of Queensborough Community Coll. v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 NY2d 926). The contrary conclusion reached by the courts below, that the running of the statutory period began to run immediately upon the issuance of the determination, overlooks the additional requirement that the petitioner be “aggrieved” by the determination (Matter of Martin v Ronan, 44 NY2d 374, 381). We have previously held that for the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not the determination was intended to be final (Mundy v Nassau County Civ. Serv. Comm., 44 NY2d 352). A similar principle should apply when the petitioner has received no notice, ambiguous or otherwise, of the determination by which he is said to be aggrieved. Indeed, fundamental fairness would seem to compel the conclusion that a petitioner should not be held to have been dilatory in challenging a determination of which he was not aware (cf. Matter of Bianca v Frank, 43 NY2d 168).

We also note that although the petitioner’s sentence has expired it cannot be said, as we recently held in Matter of Tremarco v New York State Bd. of Parole (58 NY2d 968), that the proceeding has been rendered moot. In that case the sentence expired after the article 78 proceeding had been commenced thus rendering academic the only question presented in the petition, namely, whether petitioner was entitled to remain on parole without a further hearing. Here on the other hand, the sentence expired while the petitioner’s case was pending before the appeal board, and the propriety of its decision to dismiss for mootness is the primary issue raised in the petition. Nothing has occurred since the commencement of that proceeding to render that issue moot. Moreover, in contrast to Tremarco, here petitioner was found to have been a parole violator which may have lasting consequences despite the expiration of his sentence.

[*835] Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Meyer, Simons and Kaye concur.

On review of submissions pursuant to rule 500.2 (b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.2 [g]), order reversed, with costs, and matter remitted to Supreme Court, Albany County, for further proceedings in accordance with the memorandum herein.