60 N.Y.2d at 834 Determining when a statutory period begins running45 citing cases[F]or the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not the determination was intended to be final
- McCrain v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 31394(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2025).unpublished([F]or the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not…)
- Matter of Lobban v. New York State Dept. of Health Vital Records, 2024 NY Slip Op 51606(U) (N.Y. Sup. Kings 2024).unpublishedAn agency determination is deemed final "when the petitioner is aggrieved by the determination" ( Biondo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983] ).
- Matter of Shoga v. Annucci, 153 N.Y.S.3d 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2021).publishedAs a preliminary matter, petitioner correctly contends that his subsequent release to parole does not render this proceeding moot inasmuch as his status as a parole violator "may have lasting consequences" ( Matter of Biondo v New York Sta…
- City of Buffalo City Sch. Dist. v. LPCiminelli, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 1832 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2018).publishedTransp. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. , 253 AD2d 330, 337 [1st Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 808 [1999], quoting Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole , 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]), and whether the claims for payment were explici…
- Matter of Gainey v. Stanford, 2018 NY Slip Op 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2018).publishedFootnotes Footnote 1: The revocation challenge is not moot, however, given that "petitioner was found to have been a parole violator[,] which may have lasting consequences" ( Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole , 60 NY2d 832, 8…
- Cortes v. Mujica, 55 Misc. 3d 914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).published In this regard, the Court of Appeals has held that “for the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an a…
- Scott v. State of New York, 137 A.D.3d 1434 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2016).publishedFor accrual purposes, a claimant is deemed to have exhausted all of his or her administrative remedies on the date on which he or she received notice of the final administrative determination (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of P…
- Matter of Putnam Cnty. Prob. Dept. v. Dimichele, 120 A.D.3d 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2014).publishedAt the outset, due to the enduring consequences which may potentially flow from the revocation of the order suspending the father’s commitment, the fact that the father has been released from prison due to the expiration of his commitment…
- Matter of Benjamin v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 119 A.D.3d 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2014).publishedSupreme Court properly found that the proceeding is time-barred, since it was commenced more than four months after petitioner received notice of the DOE’s determination (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 83…
- Peck v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1086 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2014).published Although petitioner’s sentence expired in December 2012 and he was released to the community on strict and intensive supervision and treatment after it was determined that he suffered from a mental abnormality under Mental Hygiene Law § 10…
Show 31 more citing cases
- McShane v. State, 43 Misc. 3d 320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).publishedIndeed, fundamental fairness would seem to compel the conclusion that a petitioner should not be held to have been dilatory in challenging a determination of which he was not aware.” (Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2…
- LaSonde v. Seabrook, 89 A.D.3d 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2011).published((F)or the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not…)
- Morning v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist., 28 Misc. 3d 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).publishedIn reversing, the appellate court held that the claim accrued when the defendants expressly denied the plaintiff’s request for payment, as a “ ‘petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agen…
- Miritello v. Nassau Cnty., 70 A.D.3d 1041 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).publishedThe Supreme Court properly denied the petition as untimely, as the proceeding was commenced more than four months after the January 5, 2007, determination denying the petitioner benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c (see CPLR…
- Singer v. New York State & Local Employees' Ret. Sys., 69 A.D.3d 1037 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2010).publishedGenerally, the statute of limitations begins to run when the party receives oral or written notice, or when the party knows or should have known, of the adverse determination (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 83…
- Mack v. Alexander, 61 A.D.3d 1222 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2009).publishedPetitioner has been released from prison due to the expiration of his sentence, but such does not render this proceeding moot, as “petitioner was found to have been a parole violator which may have lasting consequences despite the expirati…
- Branch v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 61 A.D.3d 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009).publishedWhile Branch’s claims thus are time-barred, the statute of limitations was tolled with respect to Viola’s claims after DOE sent Viola another letter on September 13, 2006, thereby creating ambiguity as to the finality of its June 19, 2006…
- Webster v. Police Dep't, 59 A.D.3d 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009).publishedCorp., 233 AD2d 224, 225 [1996], citing, inter alia, Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]; see also City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 670 [1976]).
- Catskill Reg'l Off-Track Betting Corp. v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 56 A.D.2d 1027 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2008).publishedDept., Div. of Parole, 95 NY2d 267, 270 [2000]; Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]).
- Moore v. Alexander, 53 A.D.3d 747 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2008).publishedAdditionally, we note that, although petitioner has since completed serving the delinquent time assessment and has been released, this proceeding is not moot (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]). .
- Chrysler v. Goord, 49 A.D.3d 1342 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2008).publishedThe applicable four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 did not begin to run until petitioner “received notice of the . . . determination” (Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]), and respon…
- Rapoli v. Vill. of Red Hook, 29 A.D.3d 1007 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).publishedCommn., 44 NY2d 352 [1978]; Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]).
- New York City Campaign Fin. Bd. v. Snyder, 10 Misc. 3d 841 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 2005).publishedAbsent a final Board order imposing a fine upon the candidate (Matter of Martin v Ronan, 44 NY2d 374 , 380 [1978], rearg denied 45 NY2d 776 [1978] [“For a determination to be final ‘upon the petitioner’ it must be clear that the petitioner…
- Blanche v. State, 17 A.D.3d 1069 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2005).publishedThe petitioner is not aggrieved by the mere issuance of an adverse determination, but by the receipt of notice of that determination (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]).
- Mitchell v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist., 15 A.D.3d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2005).publishedTransp., Inc. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 253 AD2d 330, 337 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 808 [1999], quoting Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]).
- Berkshire Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Novello, 13 A.D.3d 327 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004).publishedSince any ambiguity created by the defendants must be resolved against them (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]; Mundy v Nassau County Civ.
- Dey v. New York State Teachers' Ret. Sys., 9 A.D.3d 908 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2004).publishedPetitioner contends that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the date of respondent’s determination set forth in a letter dated March 6, 2003, but instead began to run on the date on which he actually received the determinat…
- Matter of Metro. Museum Historic Dist. Coalition v. De Montebello, 2004 NY Slip Op 50527(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2004).unpublishedReply Ex. 6.) Respondents also submit the affidavit of Commissioner Stern attesting that during his tenure (which expired in 2002), he personally spoke with Ms. Nicholson and "informed her about Parks' decision to approve the plan." (Stern…
- Heck v. Keane, 6 A.D.3d 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2004).publishedWe note that, although the relevant date ordinarily is the date on which the petitioner received notice (see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]; Matter of Edwards v Coughlin, 191 AD2d 1044, 1045 [1993]…
- ATM One v. Landaverde, 307 A.D.2d 922 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2003).published(four month statute of limitations governing CPLR art 78 proceedings runs from when aggrieved party receives notice of determination)
- Mays-Watt v. Hernandez, 196 Misc. 2d 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).published(See, Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]; Matter of Martin v Ronan, 44 NY2d 374, 380-381 [1978].) A petitioner is aggrieved once the agency has issued an “unambiguously final decision that puts the pet…
- Vadell v. City of New York Health & Hospitals Corp., 233 A.D.2d 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1996).publishedHere, for Statute of Limitations purposes, it is the respondent’s burden to establish that it provided notice of termination to the petitioner more than four months prior to October 7, 1994 (Raffaele v Town of Orangetown, supra, at 431 [ci…
- Abamont v. Cortines, 164 Misc. 2d 599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).publishedAdditionally, however, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved upon mere receipt of the determination if the administrative "agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not the determination was intended to be final” (Mat…
- Chaban v. Bd. of Educ., 201 A.D.2d 646 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994).publishedAs noted by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole (supra, at 834): "We have previously held that for the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved…
- Jackson v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 155 Misc. 2d 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).publishedA determination becomes "final and binding” when the aggrieved party is notified of the determination (New York State Assn. of Counties v Axelrod, 78 NY2d 158 [1991]; Matter of Village of Westbury v Department of Transp., 75 NY2d 62, 72 [1…
- Nickerson v. City of Jamestown, 178 A.D.2d 1003 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 1991).publishedFurther, the notice requirement is strictly enforced because "a petitioner should not be held to have been dilatory in challenging the determination of which he was not aware” (Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, supra, at 834…
- Edmead v. McGuire, 490 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1986).published However, where the determination is unambiguous and its effect certain, the statutory period commences as soon as the aggrieved party is notified (see, Matter of Biondo v State Bd. of Parole, supra, p 834).
- Matter of Just. v. Evans, 135 A.D.3d 1285 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2016).publishedInasmuch as the Board’s refusal to revisit its “finding that petitioner is a parole violator may have lasting consequences” under these circumstances, the appeal has not been rendered moot even if petitioner has reached the maximum expirat…
- Covington v. Fischer, 125 A.D.3d 1320 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2015).published The applicable four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 did not begin to run until petitioner “received notice of the final administrative determination” (Matter of Jackson v Fischer, 67 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2009]; see Matter of…
- Silvestri v. Hubert, 106 A.D.3d 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2013).published “A determination generally becomes binding when the aggrieved party is ‘notified’ ” (Matter of Village of Westbury v Department of Transp. of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d 62, 72 [1989]; see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2…
- Surton Constr. Contracting Corp. v. New York City Sch. Constr. Auth., 81 A.D.3d 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011).published“A determination generally becomes binding when the aggrieved party is notified” (Matter of Village of Westbury v Department of Transp. of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d 62, 72 [1989] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Biondo v New…
Other citing cases
- Argo v. New York City Employees Ret. Sys. NYCERS, 2025 NY Slip Op 06151 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2025).published
- Archer v. Metro. Transp. Auth. (MTA), 2025 NY Slip Op 51680(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2025).unpublished
- Covington, Ronnie v. Fischer, Brian, No. CA 12-02141 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't Feb. 6, 2015).published
- Wasielewski v. Vossler, 199 A.D.2d 1044 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 1993).published
- Di Cocco v. City of Schenectady, 175 A.D.2d 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 1991).published
v.
New York State Board of Parole
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Albany County, for a hearing to determine when petitioner was informed of the appeal board’s determination.
[*834] The four-month Statute of Limitations did not begin to run until the petitioner received notice of the appeal board’s determination (see, e.g., 8 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 7804.02; Matter of Abramson v Commissioner of Educ., 1 AD2d 366, 371; cf. Matter of Queensborough Community Coll. v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 NY2d 926). The contrary conclusion reached by the courts below, that the running of the statutory period began to run immediately upon the issuance of the determination, overlooks the additional requirement that the petitioner be “aggrieved” by the determination (Matter of Martin v Ronan, 44 NY2d 374, 381). We have previously held that for the purposes of the commencement of the statutory period, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of a determination when the agency itself has created an ambiguity as to whether or not the determination was intended to be final (Mundy v Nassau County Civ. Serv. Comm., 44 NY2d 352). A similar principle should apply when the petitioner has received no notice, ambiguous or otherwise, of the determination by which he is said to be aggrieved. Indeed, fundamental fairness would seem to compel the conclusion that a petitioner should not be held to have been dilatory in challenging a determination of which he was not aware (cf. Matter of Bianca v Frank, 43 NY2d 168).
We also note that although the petitioner’s sentence has expired it cannot be said, as we recently held in Matter of Tremarco v New York State Bd. of Parole (58 NY2d 968), that the proceeding has been rendered moot. In that case the sentence expired after the article 78 proceeding had been commenced thus rendering academic the only question presented in the petition, namely, whether petitioner was entitled to remain on parole without a further hearing. Here on the other hand, the sentence expired while the petitioner’s case was pending before the appeal board, and the propriety of its decision to dismiss for mootness is the primary issue raised in the petition. Nothing has occurred since the commencement of that proceeding to render that issue moot. Moreover, in contrast to Tremarco, here petitioner was found to have been a parole violator which may have lasting consequences despite the expiration of his sentence.
[*835] Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Meyer, Simons and Kaye concur.
On review of submissions pursuant to rule 500.2 (b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.2 [g]), order reversed, with costs, and matter remitted to Supreme Court, Albany County, for further proceedings in accordance with the memorandum herein.