Shirley Randall v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 956 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1992). · Go Syfert
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Shirley Randall v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 956 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2019–2026 · 2 courts · …because of the medical record, we think it unconscionable to remand this eight year old case to the secretary for further review. at p. 109 ✓ Topic ↗
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2019–2020 · …because of the medical record, we think it unconscionable to remand this eight-year-old case to the secretary for further review at p. 109 ✓
73 citation events (65 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Robert Gerald Reeves v. Commissioner of Social Security (tnmd, 2026-05-07) · Strongest negative: Halray Harman v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (ca9, 2000-05-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Halray Harman v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
9th Cir. · 2000 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. Nguyen, 43 F.3d at 1404 (granting affirmative relief to the respondent-Secretary upon the claimant’s appeal of a sentence-four remand) and Randall, 956 F.2d at 109 (5th Cir. 1992) (granting affirmative relief to the respondent-claimant upon ihe Secretary’s appeal of a sentence-four remand).
discussed Cited "but see" Harman v. Apfel
9th Cir. · 2000 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. Nguyen, 43 F.3d at 1404 (granting affirmative relief to the respondent-Secretary upon the claimant’s appeal of a sentence-four remand) and Randall, 956 F.2d at 109 (5th Cir. 1992) (granting affirmative relief to the respondent-claimant upon the Secretary’s appeal of a sentence-four remand).
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Robert Gerald Reeves v. Commissioner of Social Security
M.D. Tenn. · 2026 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
because of the medical record, we think it unconscionable to remand this eight year old case to the secretary for further review.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Kiser v. Commissioner of Social Security
S.D. Ohio · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
because of the medical record, we think it unconscionable to remand this eight year old case to the secretary for further review.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) McAfee v. Commissioner of Social Security
S.D. Ohio · 2020 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
because of the medical record, we think it unconscionable to remand this eight-year-old case to the secretary for further review
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Westfall v. Commissioner of Social Security
S.D. Ohio · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
because of the medical record, we think it unconscionable to remand this eight year old case to the secretary for further review.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Bolio v. Commissioner of Social Security
D. Vt. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
because of the medical record, we think it unconscionable to remand this eightyearold case to the for further review.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Foster v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
S.D. Ohio · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
because of the medical record, we think it unconscionable to remand this eight-year-old case to the secretary for further review
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Masters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
S.D. Ohio · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
because of the medical record, we think it unconscionable to remand this eight-year-old case to the secretary for further review
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Katina Tagert White v. Commissioner of Social Security
S.D. Miss. · 2026 · confidence medium
An ALJ’s “significant reliance” on a serious factual mistake “would render the finding of no disability unsupported by substantial evidence.” Randall v. Sullivan. 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (“A reversal and remand may be required . . . if the ALJ based the decision on serious factual mistakes or omissions.”); Fuller v. Comm’r of Soc.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Commissioner of Social Security (2×)
M.D. La. · 2025 · confidence medium
It is the ALJ’s province to craft the RFC, and “[o]n review, we can not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute our judgement for that of the Secretary.” Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992). the ALJ is not bound by a vocational expert’s responses to questions that are based on assumptions that include unsupported limitations.57 Furthermore, at the end of the ALJ’s follow-up questions, V.E.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kennedy v. Commissioner of Social Security
N.D. Miss. · 2025 · confidence medium
The court must however, despite its limited role, “scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision ... and whether substantial evidence exists to support it.” Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Songy v. Social Security Administration
E.D. La. · 2025 · confidence medium
Law and Analysis A. Applicable Law to Qualification for DIB Benefits To be considered disabled, a claimant must show that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 44 Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005); Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 716 (5th Cir. 2002); Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 390 (5th Cir. 2000); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990). 45 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Perez, 415 F.3d at 461 ; Loza, 219 F.3d at 393 ; Villa, 895 F.2d at 1021–2…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buchanan v. O'Malley, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
W.D. Tex. · 2025 · confidence medium
However despite this Court’s limited function, the Fifth Circuit has explained that “it is imperative that we scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached by the Secretary and whether substantial evidence exists to support it.” Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992); see Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 393 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that inquiry as to an ALJ finding is “whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martinez v. Kijakazi (2×) also: Cited "see"
W.D. Tex. · 2024 · confidence medium
Feb. 27, 2019) (citing Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
S.D. Tex. · 2024 · confidence medium
Tex. Jan. 6, 1994) (declining open-ended remand that “would simply delay receipt of benefits” (citing Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cavazos v. Commissioner of Social Security
S.D. Tex. · 2023 · confidence medium
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.” Randall, 570 F.3d at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Social Security Administration
E.D. La. · 2023 · confidence medium
Law and Analysis To be considered disabled, a claimant must show that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”82 The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that provide procedures for evaluating a claim and determining disability.83 The 77 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Perez, 415 F.3d at 461 ; Loza, 219 F.3d at 393 ; Villa, 895 F.2d at 102…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilkes v. Kijakazi
S.D. Tex. · 2023 · confidence medium
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.” Randall, 570 F.3d. at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Commissioner Of Social Security
S.D. Tex. · 2022 · confidence medium
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.” Randall, 570 F.3d. at 662 (quoting Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Punch v. Social Security Administration
E.D. La. · 2022 · confidence medium
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 , 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1) (extending time to file objections from ten to fourteen days). 68 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). 69 Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005); Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 716 (5th Cir. 2002); Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 390 (5th Cir. 2000); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990). 70 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Perez, 415 F.3d at 461 ; Loza, 219 F.3d at 393 ; Villa, 895 F.2d at 1021–22 (quoting Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lloyd v. Social Security Administration
W.D. La. · 2022 · confidence medium
Entitlement to Benefits The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”10 By regulation, the Administration follows a five-step process to determine whether a claimant is disabled.11 In the first two steps, not at issue here, the claimant must show he is not currently engaged in substantial 4 Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Johnson at 343 n.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wigginton v. Social Security Administration
E.D. La. · 2021 · confidence medium
Law and Analysis A. Law Applicable to Qualification for DIB and SSI To be considered disabled, a claimant must show that she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”122 The Commissioner has promulgated 117 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Perez, 415 F.3d at 461 ; Loza, 219 F.3d at 393 ; Villa, 895 F.2d at 1021 -22 (quoting Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Howen v. Saul
S.D. Tex. · 2021 · confidence medium
Keel, 986 F.3d at 555 (quoting Whitehead v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 2016)). “‘Substantial evidence’ means enough evidence ‘that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Murray v. Astrue, 419 F. App’x 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kellum v. Commissioner of Social Security
N.D. Miss. · 2021 · confidence medium
The court must however, despite its limited role, “scrutinize the record in its entirety “to determine the reasonableness of the decision ... and whether substantial evidence exists to support it.” Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (%the Cir. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Renovato v. Commissioner of Social Security
S.D. Tex. · 2021 · confidence medium
Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992). 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Francis v. Social Security Administration
E.D. La. · 2020 · confidence medium
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 , 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1) (extending time to file objections from ten to fourteen days). 80 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). 81 Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005); Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 716 (5th Cir. 2002); Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 390 (5th Cir. 2000); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990). 82 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Perez, 415 F.3d at 461 ; Loza, 219 F.3d at 393 ; Villa, 895 F.2d at 1021–22 (quoting Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Obeng-Meyers v. Berryhill
S.D. Tex. · 2020 · confidence medium
Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (Sth Cir. 1992). 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carriere v. Social Security Administration
E.D. La. · 2019 · confidence medium
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 , 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1) (extending time to file objections from ten to fourteen days). 11 remanding the cause for a rehearing.”67 Appellate review of the Commissioner’s denial of DIB benefits is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the proper legal standards were used in evaluating the evidence.68 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable min…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. Berryhill
N.D. Miss. · 2019 · confidence medium
The court must, however, “scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision ... and whether substantial evidence exists to support it.” Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Caldwell v. Berryhill
S.D. Tex. · 2019 · confidence medium
Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (Sth Cir. 1992). 3.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Scherer v. Commissioner Of Social Security
S.D. Tex. · 2019 · confidence medium
Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992). 3.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Astrue
N.D. Tex. · 2012 · confidence medium
Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Ransom v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir.1983)) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kim Murray v. Michael Astrue, Commissioner
5th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
“Substantial evidence” means enough evidence “that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.” Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). “[W]e can not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute our judgement for that of the [Social Security Administration].” Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ratliff v. Astrue
N.D. Ohio · 2010 · confidence medium
See Donahue v. Massanari, 166 F.Supp.2d 1143, 1150-1151 (E.D.Mich.2001) (Plaintiff established a prima facie case of entitlement, and Commissioner failed to show good cause for failure to adduce relevant evidence to deny Plaintiff benefits on two occasions); Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310 (3d Cir.2000) (reversing without remand after claimant had two ALJ hearings and ten year delay and “record as a whole indicates that the claimant is disabled and entitled to bene *758 fits”); Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992) (remanding the ease to award benefits where it determined th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Randall v. Astrue
5th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.” Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 , 91 S.Ct. 1420 , 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Weary v. Astrue
5th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weimer v. Astrue
5th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.” Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bullock v. Astrue (2×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.” Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ray v. Barnhart
5th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
See Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir.1995) (reversing grant of summary judgment and remanding to ALJ to determine the extent to which new medical evidence demonstrated the claimant’s inability to perform sedentary work); Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992) (finding a lack of substantial evidence to support a disability determination where the ALJ relied on an improper medical report).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donahue v. Massanari
E.D. Mich. · 2001 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310 (3d Cir.2000) (two ALJ hearings and ten year delay, citing Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 222 (3d Cir.1984), “[t]he decision to direct the district court to award benefits should be made only when the administrative record of the case has been fully developed and when substantial evidence in the record as a whole indicates that the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.”); Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117 (2d Cir.2000) (six year delay); Nielson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.1993) (age and delay); Ragland v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 1056, 1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Loza v. Apfel
5th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 , 91 S.Ct. 1420 , 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992); Rivas, 475 F.2d at 257-58 ; Ward v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 115, 116 (5th Cir.1963).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mericle v. Secretary of HHS
E.D. Tex. · 1995 · confidence medium
Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) KAREN M DALE v. SHIRLEY S CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
unknown court · confidence medium
Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174 ; Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992).
cited Cited "see" Malone v. Commissioner of Social Security
N.D. Miss. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Randall v. Sullivan, M.D., 956 F.2d 105 (5th Cir.1992) (reversing and awarding benefits in eight-year-old case where the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence).
cited Cited "see" Berkowski v. Commissioner of Social Security
E.D. Mich. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992).
cited Cited "see" Higginbotham v. Barnhart
5th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited "see" Desrosiers v. Department of Human Services, 01-1578 (2002)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1992) (because of the mistaken reliance on medical reports and in light of the claimant's extensive medical record, the court found it unconscionable to remand the case for further review and awarded social security disability benefits).
discussed Cited "see" David v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 00-1046 (2001)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1992) (the mistaken reliance on medical reports and in light of the claimant's extensive medical record the court found it unconscionable to remand the case for further review and awarded social security disability benefits).
cited Cited "see" Jimmerson v. Apfel
E.D. Tex. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir.1992).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Shirley RANDALL, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant
91-3451.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jul 6, 1992.
956 F.2d 105
Rodney A. Johnson, Asst. Reg. Cnsl., DHHS Office of Gen. Cnsl., Dallas, Tex., Glenn K. Schreiber, Asst. U.S. Atty., Harry Rosenberg, U.S. Atty., New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellant., Bryan Stephen Pedeaux, Strides & Associates, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-ap-pellee.
Reavley, Higginbotham, Demoss.
Cited by 56 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 76%
Citer courts: S.D. Ohio (2)
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

Shirley Randall applied to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for benefits under 42 U.S.C. section 423(d), claiming disability due to back and neck injuries. The Secretary denied her claim, and she appealed to the district court. The district court adopted the magistrate’s finding that there was no substantial evidence of record to support the Secretary’s decision to deny benefits, and remanded the case back to the Secretary for a rehearing.

[*107] I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Shirley Randall applied to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) for disability insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. section 423(d) on September 1, 1983, claiming disability due to back and neck injuries she allegedly sustained while in the course of her employment. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a decision that Mrs. Randall was not disabled, and she sought review from the appeals council. After the appeals council denied Mrs. Randall’s request for review, she filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The district court remanded Mrs. Randall’s claim back to the Secretary because the hearing tape was inaudible. After remand, a second administrative hearing was held on March 26, 1986, at which the AU issued a recommended decision that Mrs. Randall was not disabled. The appeals council adopted the recommended decision of the AU on June 30, 1986, and Mrs. Randall filed suit in district court seeking judicial review of that decision. The magistrate remanded Mrs. Randall’s case back to the Secretary in order for him to obtain vocational expert testimony. A supplemental hearing was held before an AU on December 2, 1988, at which a vocational expert testified. After the hearing, the AU issued a recommended decision, which the appeals council adopted, finding that Mrs. Randall was not disabled because she could perform sedentary work that existed in significant numbers in the region in which she resided. Mrs. Randall filed suit in district court seeking review of that decision. On March 19,1991, the district judge adopted the magistrate’s opinion that again remanded the case back to the Secretary. The remand was issued because the judge concluded that there was not substantial evidence to support the AU’s finding that Mrs. Randall was not disabled. [1] The Secretary appeals this remand order.

B. Medical History

Mrs. Randall has a lengthy medical history dating from 1980 until present. A summary of that history is appropriate because of the fact intensive nature of our review. In February of 1980, Mrs. Randall fell down some stairs at work and injured her back and neck. After several months of treatment, she underwent a discectomy and laminectomy performed by Dr. Gessner.

In November of 1980, Mrs. Randall was examined by Dr. Battalora, who determined that she had limited back motion and was in need of continued orthopedic treatment.

In September of 1981, Mrs. Randall was admitted to Hotel Dieu Hospital under the care of Dr. Gessner. After a year of administering treatment, the doctor opined that she was not fit for duty regarding her lower back.

Mrs. Randall saw Dr. Applebaum, a neurosurgeon, in May of 1982. He found no evidence of disease or damage to the spinal cord or nerve roots, and saw no neurological reason why she could not return to work. He noted, however, that because of her persistent back pain an orthopedic reevaluation was recommended.

In August of 1982, Mrs. Randall was examined by Dr. Kewalramani. He found that she was suffering from lumbar myo-fascial pain syndrome and cervical myofas-cial pain, and that she had hypesthesia in her lower left extremities. He recommended that she avoid lifting, pushing, and pulling activities with weight exceeding 20-25 pounds.

Mrs. Randall visited Dr. Benson in November of 1982. He opined that she had R/O neuropathy in the upper extremity, R/O cervical radiculopathy, and R/O recurrent lumbar radicular involvement. He[*108] recommended that she begin treatment at St. Charles Hospital three times a week, and that an EMG be performed on her.

In December of 1982, Mrs. Randall underwent surgery for a biopsy on her right breast. The biopsy revealed a fibroadeno-ma of the right breast.

In February of 1983, Dr. Benson conducted an EMG on Mrs. Randall that revealed findings of bilateral radiculopathy involving the anterior and posterior primary divisions of C7 on the left and the posterior primary division of C6 on the right. Three days after administering the EMG, Dr. Benson performed a CT scan on Mrs. Randall that revealed degenerative changes, spinal stenosis, and probable disc herniation at the C6-C7 level.

In April of 1983, Mrs. Randall visited Dr. Jackson who reviewed her CT scan and EMG reports, and conducted a neurological examination. He suggested removal of the C6-C7 disc and an anterior cervical fusion for relief of her pain. However, Dr. Jackson did not see any evidence of a disc bulge at the C6 level.

In March of 1983, Dr. Richardson examined Mrs. Randall and found that she had full rotation in her cervical spine, minimal evidence of nerve root irritation, and a negative lumbar spine examination. He did not feel that surgery was appropriate at that time, but recommended admission to a pain clinic.

Mrs. Randall was admitted to the pain clinic at the Hotel Dieu Hospital in April of 1983. She made little or no effort to improve while at the hospital, and it was the attending physician’s impression that she had passive dependant personality, with minimal organic illness and maximum emotional problems.

In October of 1983, Mrs. Randall visited Dr. Diodene who performed a physical examination on her and took x-rays. The examination revealed degenerative disc disease in the cervical spine region, and the doctor determined, in his opinion, that Mrs. Randall was disabled and that she should refrain from doing any type of repetitive bending, heavy lifting, or overhead work.

In November of 1983, Mrs. Randall was examined by Dr. Levy who performed a neurological examination on her and took x-rays. The neurological examination revealed no objective mechanical signs in the neck or lower back, and he found that there was no residual evidence of spinal cord or nerve root injury or disease in the cervical or lumbar regions. The doctor opined that Mrs. Randall had a 5-10% permanent anatomical disability of the body attributable to her surgery in June of 1980, but he saw no reason why she could not return to work from a functional standpoint.

In January of 1984, Mrs. Randall was examined by Dr. Nutik who reviewed her medical records, took x-rays of her cervical spine, and conducted a neurological examination. The doctor found that Mrs. Randall had early degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine at the C4-C5, C5-C6, and C6-C7 levels, but that the neurological examination did not reveal any irritation of the cervical nerve roots. He noted that Mrs. Randal] had residual disability of the lower back region resulting from a lumbar laminectomy, and opined that she would be restricted from doing any heavy lifting, climbing, or excessive stooping.

Mrs. Randall continued to visit Dr. Benson on a regular basis from 1984-1986. The doctor treated her with heat, massage, traction, transcutaneous nerve stimulation, and dry therapy; all of which proved to be only mildly successful. In March of 1986, Dr. Benson found that Mrs. Randall was disabled with regard to heavy or light manual labor, noting that she had been disabled since the time of her injury.

In January of 1987, Dr. Jackson diagnosed Mrs. Randall as having Brown-Se-quard Syndrome, and performed an anteri- or cervical discectomy with decompression of the spinal cord and nerve root at the C4-C5, C5-C6, and C6-C7 levels. After surgery, Mrs. Randall continued to be examined by Dr. Benson with continued complaints of pain until August of 1988. She also followed up her surgery with three visits to Dr. Jackson. At each visit she complained of continuing pain.

[*109] In July of 1988, Dr. Hosma performed surgery on Mrs. Randall’s left wrist because she suffered from DeQuervain’s tendinitis with superficial radial nerve neuritis.

In December of 1988, Mrs. Randall visited Dr. Williams who conducted both a physical and x-ray examination. The doctor discovered evidence of degenerative disc disease, failed fusion between the bodies of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th cervical vertebras, and restricted motion in her neck and lower back. Based on those findings, the doctor determined that Mrs. Randall would be limited in her ability to work.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Our decision on appeal is limited to the question of whether there is “substantial evidence” of record to support the Secretary’s decision to deny Mrs. Randall benefits. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). On review, we can not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute our judgement for that of the Secretary. Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 392 (5th Cir.1985). However, despite our limited function, it is imperative that we scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached by the Secretary and whether substantial evidence exists to support it. Ransom v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir.1983); Anderson v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir.1981).

B. Improper Medical Records

In determining disability, the ALJ follows a five-step “sequential evaluation” process that is laid out in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. sec. 404.1520 (1991). In this case, Mrs. Randall was denied benefits at the fifth step of the process, when the AU determined that she could perform other work in the national economy despite her disability. In making that determination, the AU based his opinion in part on a 1983 medical report of an EMG test that the AU classified as the “only truly objective test.” That report states “[s]uch findings do not show severe damage to the nerves.” The problem with the report is that it is based on an EMG study of another person, which was supposed to have been removed from the record in 1986. The report that actually refers to Mrs. Randall suggest bilateral radiculopathy.

The AU’s significant reliance upon an incorrect test result would render the finding of no disability unsupported by substantial evidence. The Secretary’s assertion that the AU did not actually rely on the wrong test is belied by the emphasis on the results of this particular test in the AU’s opinion. It is clear from the opinion, which is the only insight we have into the AU’s decisionmaking process, that the EMG test result was a major factor in the determination of no disability.

III. DECISION

In light of the Secretary’s mistaken reliance on the improper medical report and in light of our review of Mrs. Randall’s extensive medical record, we hold that there is not substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s decision that Mrs. Randall is not disabled. Because of the medical record, we think it unconscionable to remand this eight year old case to the Secretary for further review. Accordingly, we remand this case with instructions to remand to the Secretary, and order him to award Mrs. Randall the benefits she would have otherwise been entitled to but for the determination by the AU that she could perform other work in the national economy despite her disability. Deters v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 789 F.2d 1181, 1186 (5th Cir.1986); Emory v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1092, 1095-96 (10th Cir.1991).

MODIFIED AND REMANDED.

1

. The magistrate’s recommendations, which the district court adopted, determined that it was improper for the ALJ to render an opinion as to the residual capacity of Mrs. Randall because a plaintiffs residual capacity is to be properly determined by a vocational expert. We disapprove of that determination, because clearly it is the ALJ’s responsibility to assess and determine a plaintiffs residual function capacity. 20 C.F.R. sec. 404.1546 (1991); Perez v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir.1985).