green
Positive treatment
Issue: parole violationNY ↗
Issue: number of statutory factorsNY ↗
Issue: required statutory factorsNY ↗
23.8 score
Treatment trajectory · 2005 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2005
2015
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Allen v. Stanford
The Board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory factor ( see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis , 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of Geames v Travis , 284 AD2d 843, 843 [2001], appeal dismissed 97 NY2d 639 [2001]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MatterofMolinarvNewYorkStateDivisionofParole
Notably, petitioner did not raise the affidavit or its content during the interview and the Board was not obligated to discuss it or address it in its decision (see Matter of Wah Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Molinar v. New York State Division
Notably, petitioner did not raise the affidavit or its content during the interview and the Board was not obligated to discuss it or address it in its decision (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Molinar v. New York State Division
Notably, petitioner did not raise the affidavit or its content during the interview and the Board was not obligated to discuss it or address it in its decision (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole
The magnitude of this violent act, the shooting down of an individual on a public street and the taking of a life of a police officer, make release at this time unwarranted.” Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c) sets forth the factors that the Parole Board must consider in evaluating discretionary parole requests (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [3d Dept 2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Huntley v. Evans
The Parole Board is not required to give equal weight to each factor, nor is it required to articulate specifically each factor in its determination (see Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d at 691 ; Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 AD3d 994, 994-995 [2008]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Miller v. New York State Division of Parole
The Parole Board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory factor (see Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 AD3d 994, 994-995 [2008]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brower v. Alexander
The Board was not required to specifically articulate each factor considered in making its decision nor to accord each factor equal weight (see Matter of Vasquez v Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, 909 [2006]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Martin v. New York State Division of Parole
However, in making its determination, the Board need not give equal weight to each statutory factor nor is it required to specifically articulate each factor considered (see Matter of Ward v New York State Div. of Parole, 26 AD3d 712, 713 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 702 [2006]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilcher v. Dennison
Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the violent nature of the instant offense, which it found to have demonstrated a propensity for extreme violence and disrespect for society and the law, it “was not required to equally weigh or discuss each statutory factor or reward petitioner’s achievements while incarcerated” (Matter of Webb v Travis, 26 AD3d 614, 615 [2006]; see Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056, 1057 [2006]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lu Po-Yen v. Dennison
Moreover, the record with respect to the other factors that the parole board must consider pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Wattman v Travis, 18 AD3d 304, 307 [2005]; Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 432 [1993], affd 83 NY2d 788 [1994]; Cappiello v New York State Bd. of Parole, 6 Misc 3d 1010[A] , 2004 NY Slip Op 51762[U] [2004]) was not otherwise “sufficiently detailed to permit intelligent judicial review of the grounds for the [parole board’s] denial of parole release” (Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; see Matter of W…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ward v. New York State Division of Parole
In making its determination, the Board need not articulate every factor it considered or give equal weight to each factor (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Prout v. Dennison
(2×)
Although the Board is not required to give all such factors equal weight or to articulate each factor considered in making its decision (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789, 790 [2004]), it must comply with the statutory requirements (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 17 AD3d 754, 754-755 [2005], appeal dismissed 5 NY3d 782 [2005]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wood v. Dennison
Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the serious nature of petitioner’s crimes, it was not required to give each statutory factor equal weight (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789, 790 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
De Lagarde v. New York State Division of Parole
We reiterate that the Board is not required to specifically set forth each statutory factor it considered in making its decision nor must it accord each factor equal weight (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789, 790 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rivera v. New York State Division of Parole
Thus, the Board properly took into account the statutory factors set forth in Executive Law § 259-i and was not required to articulate each specific factor in its decision or give each factor equal weight (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789, 790 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pucci v. New York State Board of Parole
Respondent is not required to give equal weight to or specifically discuss each factor considered (see Matter of Salahuddin v Travis, 17 AD3d 760, 760 [2005]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hunter v. New York State Division of Parole
Although the Board emphasized the serious nature of the instant offense, which involved terrorizing multiple victims and was committed while petitioner was on probation supervision, it was not required to assign equal weight to or discuss every factor it considered in making its determination (see Matter of Motti v Travis, 19 AD3d 763 [2005]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cartagena v. New York State Board of Parole
Respondent was not required to give equal weight to the statutory factors enumerated in Executive Law § 259-i or to specifically articulate each factor considered in its determination (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789, 790 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mandala v. Dennison
The Board is not required to enumerate every statutory factor considered in its decision nor give each factor equal weight (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789, 790 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Carter v. Dennison
Although the determination placed particular emphasis on the nature of the instant offense, the Board is not required to discuss or give equal weight to every factor it considered in rendering its determination (see Matter of Legette v Travis, 11 AD3d 849, 850 [2004]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stasinski v. Travis
In reviewing an inmate’s request for parole release, the Board must consider various statutory factors (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]), but it is not required to give equal weight to or discuss every factor it considered in reaching its discretionary determination (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Davis v. New York State Board of Parole
Although respondent must comply with the requirements of Executive Law § 259-i in making such determinations (s ee Matter of Rosario v Travis, 1 AD3d 792, 792 [2003]), it need not articulate every factor considered or give each factor equal weight (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of Ek v New York State Bd. of Parole, 307 AD2d 433, 433-434 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gaetan v. Travis
Although the Board placed greater emphasis on the violent nature of the crime, it was not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory factors (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of Ek v New York State Bd. of Parole, 307 AD2d 433, 433-434 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Farid v. Travis
Although the Board must comply with the requirements of Executive Law § 259-i (see Matter of Rosario v Travis, 1 AD3d 792, 792 [2003]), it need not articulate every statutory factor it considered in making its decision nor give each factor equal weight (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of Marcelin v New York State Div. of Parole, 308 AD2d 616, 617 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Flood v. Travis
Moreover, the Board is not required to articulate each factor it considered in making its decision concerning parole release nor must it accord each factor equal weight (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of Marcelin v New York State Div. of Parole, 308 AD2d 616, 617 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Watford v. Travis
However, because the Board is not required to give equal weight to each factor, it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Board to deny petitioner parole release on the basis that, despite his positive postconviction activities, release at this time would not be appropriate in light of, inter aha, the seriousness of his crime (see Matter of Legette v Travis, 11 AD3d 849, 850 [2004]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of Torres v New York State Div. of Parole, 300 AD2d 128, 128-129 [2002]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
De Jesus v. New York State Division of Parole
A Board determination denying parole release will not be disturbed unless there is a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000] [citation omitted]; see Matter of Cox v New York State Div. of Parole, 11 AD3d 766, 767 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 703 [2005]; Matter of Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. New York State Board of Parole
It is well settled that the Board is not required to give equal weight to or specifically discuss every factor considered in making its decision (see Matter of Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of Marcelin v New York State Div. of Parole, 308 AD2d 616, 617 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Larmon v. Travis
Although the Board is required to consider the factors set forth in Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c), it is not required to give equal weight to each factor or specifically articulate every factor considered in making its decision {see Matter of Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789, 790 [2004]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Aulet v. Travis
Inasmuch as there was no “ ‘showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]), we find no reason to disturb the determination.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Wan Zhang
v.
Brion D. Travis, as Chair of the New York State Board of Parole
v.
Brion D. Travis, as Chair of the New York State Board of Parole
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Sep 30, 2004.
Rose.
Cited by 38 opinions | Published
Rose, J.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Sise, J.), entered November 25, 2003 in Washington County, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of respondent Board of Parole denying petitioner’s request for parole release.
[*829] As a result of petitioner’s involvement in the violent robbery of a restaurant owner during which a gun was held to the head of the owner’s infant child, petitioner was convicted of multiple counts of robbery, burglary and grand larceny and sentenced to an aggregate term of 7 to 21 years in prison. Following the denial of two of his parole release applications, he reappeared before respondent Board of Parole in June 2002. His application for release was again denied and he was ordered to reappear before the Board in June 2004. This determination was affirmed on administrative appeal and petitioner commenced the instant CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging it. Following service of respondents’ answer, Supreme Court granted the petition, finding that the determination was not sufficiently detailed to permit intelligent judicial review. Respondents now appeal.
Initially, we note that the factors the Board must consider in making discretionary parole release determinations are set forth in Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c). In making such determinations, however, the Board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory factor (see Matter of Geames v Travis, 284 AD2d 843 [2001], appeal dismissed 97 NY2d 639 [2001]; Matter of Patterson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 202 AD2d 940, 940 [1994]) nor is it required to specifically articulate every factor considered (see Matter of Angel v Travis, 1 AD3d 859, 860 [2003]; Matter of Rentz v Herbert, 206 AD2d 944, 945 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 810 [1994]). In the instant case, the parole review interview, confidential inmate status report and parole hearing transcript reveal that the Board, in making its determination, considered petitioner’s institutional record, including his disciplinary record and program accomplishments, his potential deportation and postrelease living arrangements, as well as the violent circumstances of crimes of which he was convicted. Notwithstanding the Board’s failure to specifically mention each of these factors in its determination, the record is, in our view, sufficiently detailed to permit intelligent judicial review of the grounds for the Board’s denial of parole release. Inasmuch as the Board considered the appropriate factors and there was no “ ‘showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]), the Board’s determination should not have been annulled.
Crew III, J.P., Peters, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs, determination confirmed and petition dismissed.