number of statutory factors in New York

2025The equitable distribution of marital assets must be based on the circumstances of the particular case and the consideration of a number of statutory factors ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d]; Holterman v Holterman , 3 NY3d 1, 7 ).

2018The equitable distribution of marital assets must be based on the circumstances of the particular case and the consideration of a number of statutory factors ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d]; Holterman v Holterman , 3 NY3d 1, 7 ).

2014“Absent a convincing demonstration to the contrary, the Board is presumed to have acted properly in accordance with statutory requirements, and judicial intervention is warranted only where there is a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 AD3d 994, 994 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Thomches v Evans, 108 AD3d 724 [2013]).

2010While the Parole Board is required to consider a number of statutory factors in making its determination (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c]), it is not required to give equal weight to each of the factors it considers, nor is it required to address each factor in its decision (see Matter of Porter v Alexander, 63 AD3d 945, 946 [2009]; Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 AD3d 994, 994-995 [2008]; Matter of Hardwick v Dennison, 43 AD3d 406 [2007]).

2013Pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c), the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) “is required to consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released on parole” (Matter of Gelsomino v New York State Bd. of Parole, 82 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2011]; see Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690, 691 [2010]; Matter of Mitchell v New York State Div. of Parole, 58 AD3d 742, 743 [2009]).

2013Pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c), the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) “is required to consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released on parole” (Matter of Gelsomino v New York State Bd. of Parole, 82 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2011]; see Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690, 691 [2010]; Matter of Mitchell v New York State Div. of Parole, 58 AD3d 742, 743 [2009]).

2013“The Parole Board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory factor, nor is it required specifically to articulate every factor considered” (Matter of Gelsomino v New York State Bd. of Parole, 82 AD3d at 1098 ; see Matter of Huntley v Evans, 77 AD3d 945, 946 [2010]; Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d at 691 ).

2011The New York State Division of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) is required to consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released to parole (see Executive Law § 259-i; Matter of Huntley v Evans, 77 AD3d 945, 947 [2010]; Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690, 691 [2010]).

2013Pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c), the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) “is required to consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released on parole” (Matter of Gelsomino v New York State Bd. of Parole, 82 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2011]; see Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690, 691 [2010]; Matter of Mitchell v New York State Div. of Parole, 58 AD3d 742, 743 [2009]).

2013Pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c), the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) “is required to consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released on parole” (Matter of Gelsomino v New York State Bd. of Parole, 82 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2011]; see Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690, 691 [2010]; Matter of Mitchell v New York State Div. of Parole, 58 AD3d 742, 743 [2009]).

2026"Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory factors" ( Fairchild v Fairchild , 149 AD3d 810, 810-811 ; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][c], [d]).

2026"Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory factors" ( Fairchild v Fairchild , 149 AD3d 810, 810-811; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][c], [d]).

2026"Those factors include: the income and property of each party at the time of marriage and at the time of commencement of the divorce action; the duration of the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the loss of inheritance and pension rights; any award of maintenance; any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of marital property by the party not having title; and any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper" ( Taylor v Taylor , 140 AD3d 944, 945-946 ).

2017The equitable distribution of marital assets must be based on the circumstances of the particular case and the consideration of a number of statutory factors (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d]; Holterman v Holterman, 3 NY3d 1, 7 [2004]; Taylor v Taylor, 140 AD3d 944, 945 [2016]). *1060 In determining an equitable disposition of property the court must consider, inter alia, the wasteful dissipation of assets by either party (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d] [12]; Wilner v Wilner, 192 AD2d 524, 525 [1993]).

2018The equitable distribution of marital assets must be based on the circumstances of the particular case and the consideration of a number of statutory factors ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d]; Holterman v Holterman , 3 NY3d 1, 7 ; Halley-Boyce v Boyce , 108 AD3d at 504 ).

2016The equitable distribution of marital assets must be based on the circumstances of the particular case and the consideration of a number of statutory factors (see Holterman v Holterman, 3 NY3d 1, 7 [2004]; Halley-Boyce v Boyce, 108 AD3d 503 [2013]; Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d]).

2022A nonjury trial was held on the issues of equitable distribution, child support, and counsel fees. "'Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory factors'" ( Fairchild v Fairchild , 149 AD3d 810, 810-811 , quoting Fields v Fields , 15 NY3d 158, 170 ; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][c], [d]). "'A trial court considering the factors set forth in the Domestic Relations Law has broad discretion in deciding what is equitable under all of the

2019We agree with the defendant that the Supreme Court should have directed the plaintiff to purchase life insurance in the defendant's favor in an amount sufficient to secure the payment of the plaintiff's maintenance and child support obligations ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][8][a]; Hartog v Hartog , 85 NY2d 36, 50 ; Baron v Baron , 71 AD3d 807, 810 ; Comstock v Comstock , 1 AD3d 307, 308 ). " Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory

2013In determining whether to grant parole to an inmate, the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) is required to consider a number of statutory factors (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c]; Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788, 790 [1994]).

2013In determining whether to grant parole to an inmate, the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) is required to consider a number of statutory factors (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c]; Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788, 790 [1994]).

2024See Santamaria v. Santamaria , 177 AD3d 802 , 804 (2d Dept. 2019); Culen v. Culen , 157 AD3d 926 , 929 (2d Dept. 2018). "'Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory factors.'" Fairchild v. Fairchild , 149 AD3d 710 , 710—711 (2d Dept. 2017), quoting Fields v. Fields , 15 NY3d 158, 170 (2010).

2022A nonjury trial was held on the issues of equitable distribution, child support, and counsel fees. "'Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory factors'" ( Fairchild v Fairchild , 149 AD3d 810, 810-811 , quoting Fields v Fields , 15 NY3d 158, 170 ; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][c], [d]). "'A trial court considering the factors set forth in the Domestic Relations Law has broad discretion in deciding what is equitable under all of the

2026While the court is required to discuss the statutory factors it relied upon in distributing marital property, it is not required to specifically cite to and analyze each statutory factor where it is evident that it considered the relevant factors and the reasons for its decision are articulated ( see Spera v Spera , 71 AD3d 661, 662 ).

2019We agree with the defendant that the Supreme Court should have directed the plaintiff to purchase life insurance in the defendant's favor in an amount sufficient to secure the payment of the plaintiff's maintenance and child support obligations ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][8][a]; Hartog v Hartog , 85 NY2d 36, 50 ; Baron v Baron , 71 AD3d 807, 810 ; Comstock v Comstock , 1 AD3d 307, 308 ). " Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory

2024"The equitable distribution of marital assets must be based on the circumstances of the particular case and the consideration of a number of statutory factors." ( see Jones v Jones , 182 AD3d 586 [2d Dept 2020] quoting Culen v Culen , 157 AD3d 926 [2d Dept 2018] citing Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d] ).

2024"The equitable distribution of marital assets must be based on the circumstances of the particular case and the consideration of a number of statutory factors." ( see Jones v Jones , 182 AD3d 586 [2d Dept 2020] quoting Culen v Culen , 157 AD3d 926 [2d Dept 2018] citing Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d] ).

2025"Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory factors" ( Sufia v Khalique , 189 AD3d 1499, 1500 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][c], [d]).

2025"Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory factors" ( Sufia v Khalique , 189 AD3d 1499, 1500 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][c], [d]).

2020While " the Supreme Court is required to discuss the statutory factors it relied upon in distributing marital property,'" where " it is evident that the Supreme Court considered all relevant factors and the reasons for its decision are articulated, the court is not required to specifically cite to and analyze each statutory factor'" ( Spera v Spera , 71 AD3d 661, 662 , quoting Milnes v Milnes , 50 AD3d 750, 750 ).

2019We agree with the defendant that the Supreme Court should have directed the plaintiff to purchase life insurance in the defendant's favor in an amount sufficient to secure the payment of the plaintiff's maintenance and child support obligations ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][8][a]; Hartog v Hartog , 85 NY2d 36, 50 ; Baron v Baron , 71 AD3d 807, 810 ; Comstock v Comstock , 1 AD3d 307, 308 ). " Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory

2014“Absent a convincing demonstration to the contrary, the Board is presumed to have acted properly in accordance with statutory requirements, and judicial intervention is warranted only where there is a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 AD3d 994, 994 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Thomches v Evans, 108 AD3d 724 [2013]).

2014“Absent a convincing demonstration to the contrary, the Board is presumed to have acted properly in accordance with statutory requirements, and judicial intervention is warranted only where there is a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 AD3d 994, 994 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Thomches v Evans, 108 AD3d 724 [2013]).

2013Pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c), the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) “is required to consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released on parole” (Matter of Gelsomino v New York State Bd. of Parole, 82 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2011]; see Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690, 691 [2010]; Matter of Mitchell v New York State Div. of Parole, 58 AD3d 742, 743 [2009]).

2013Pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c), the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) “is required to consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released on parole” (Matter of Gelsomino v New York State Bd. of Parole, 82 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2011]; see Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690, 691 [2010]; Matter of Mitchell v New York State Div. of Parole, 58 AD3d 742, 743 [2009]).

2012There is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be made on an equal basis (see DeSouza-Brown v Brown, 71 AD3d at 946 ; Peritore v Peritore, 66 AD3d 750, 752-753 [2009]; Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 713 [2007]).

2012There is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be made on an equal basis (see DeSouza-Brown v Brown, 71 AD3d at 946 ; Peritore v Peritore, 66 AD3d 750, 752-753 [2009]; Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 713 [2007]).

2012There is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be made on an equal basis (see DeSouza-Brown v Brown, 71 AD3d at 946 ; Peritore v Peritore, 66 AD3d 750, 752-753 [2009]; Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 713 [2007]).

2012There is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be made on an equal basis (see DeSouza-Brown v Brown, 71 AD3d at 946 ; Peritore v Peritore, 66 AD3d 750, 752-753 [2009]; Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 713 [2007]).

2010The Parole Board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory factor (see Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 AD3d 994, 994-995 [2008]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).

2010The Parole Board is not required to give equal weight to each factor, nor is it required to articulate specifically each factor in its determination (see Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d at 691 ; Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 AD3d 994, 994-995 [2008]; Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]).

2025"While 'the Supreme Court is required to discuss the statutory factors it relied upon in distributing marital property,' where 'it is evident that the Supreme Court considered all relevant factors and the reasons for its decision are articulated, the court is not required to specifically cite to and analyze each statutory factor'" ( Fishman v Fishman , [*2] 186 AD3d 1199, 1201 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Spera v Spera , 71 AD3d 661, 662 ; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][g]; Sufia v Khalique , 189 AD3d 1499, 1500 ).

2025"Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory factors" ( Shvalb v Rubinshtein , 204 AD3d 1059, 1061 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][c], [d]).

2024"Those factors include: the income and property of each party at the time of marriage and at the time of commencement of the divorce action; the duration of the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the loss of inheritance and pension rights; any award of maintenance; any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of marital property by the party not having title; and any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper." Taylor v. Taylor , 140 AD3d 944 , 945—946 (2d Dept. 2016); see DRL § 236B(5)(d). "'While equita