Valentin v. New York City Police Pension Fund, 16 A.D.3d 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). · Go Syfert
Valentin v. New York City Police Pension Fund, 16 A.D.3d 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Diversified Investment Advisors, Inc. v. Baruch (nyed, 2011-06-24)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Diversified Investment Advisors, Inc. v. Baruch (2×)
E.D.N.Y · 2011 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
unavailing ... is the fact that the agreement did not expressly include a waiver of preretirement death benefits"; valid waiver of "any rights ... in ... pension or retirement benefits
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Cor Van Rensselaer St. Co., III, Inc. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · confidence medium
Contrary to respondent's contention, although a determination that remits a matter for purely ministerial action is appealable as of right ( see Valentin v New York City Police Pension Fund , 16 AD3d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2005]), here the court directed respondent to submit petitioner's grant application for a determination by respondent's Board of Directors, not for a " 'purely ministerial' " action ( Matter of Mid-Is.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Christie
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Here, notwithstanding Sandra’s argument, her waivers in the 1987 and 1998 separation agreements were sufficiently explicit to waive her interest in the QJSA benefits (compare Curley v Giltrop, 68 NY2d 651, 653-654 [1986], Hess v Wojcik-Hess, 86 AD3d at 849 , Matter of Sbarra, 17 AD3d 975, 977 [2005], Valentin v New York City Police Pension Fund, 16 AD3d 145, 146 [2005], with Smith v Pathmark Stores, Inc., 57 AD3d 759, 760 [2008], Kammerer v Kammerer, 278 AD2d 282, 283 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Trump Village Apartments One Owner v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Hosp. v Wyman, 15 NY2d 374, 379-380 [1965]; Valentin v New York City Police Pension Fund, 16 AD3d 145, 146 [2005]; cf. Matter of Arbor Hill Partners v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 156 AD2d 896, 898 [1989]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Troeller v. New York City Dept. of Educ.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Corp. v Spitzer, 26 AD3d 180, 180 [1st Dept 2006]; Valentin v New York City Police Pension Fund, 16 AD3d 145, 145 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 703 [2005]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Denise Valentin, as Administratrix of the Estate of Santos Valentin, Jr.
v.
New York City Police Pension Fund, and Selena Valentin
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Mar 3, 2005.
16 A.D.3d 145
2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2184

Judgment (denominated an order), Supreme Court, New York County (Lewis Bart Stone, J.), entered on or about October 30, 2003, which granted the petition to set aside respondent Pension Fund’s determination and remanded the matter for disbursement of death benefits to the decedent’s estate instead of to Selena Valentin, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The standard of review is limited to whether the administrative determination was affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious, or was an abuse of discretion (Matter of City of New York v Plumbers Local Union No. 1 of Brooklyn & Queens, 204 AD2d 183, 184 [1994], lv denied 85 NY2d 803 [1995]; CPLR 7803 [3]). Interpretation of an unambiguous marital agreement was a question of law for the court (Wattenberg v Wattenberg, 289 AD2d 73 [2001]), and did not require deference to any particular expertise of the administrative agency.

In the agreement, involving a childless couple who had separated after less than a year of marriage, and which was ex[*146] ecuted just 18 days before decedent’s death, Selena Valentin waived, inter alia, any rights, title or interest in his pension or retirement benefits, and any other interest in his estate, specifically, a right to take under any “testamentary writing . . . now or hereafter in force and effect.” This evinced a clear intent of the parties to separate their lives and finances, and was to be the sole expression of the division of their property and interests. Taken as a whole, this unambiguous contract was sufficiently specific to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that respondent-appellant waived any right to the death benefits she was awarded by the Pension Fund.

That the decedent did not remove his estranged wife as a named beneficiary on his pension during the last 18 days of his life is of no moment (see generally Silber v Silber, 99 NY2d 395 [2003], cert denied 540 US 817 [2003]). Also unavailing for appellant is the fact that the agreement did not expressly include a waiver of preretirement death benefits. Indeed, no mention was made of dividing such interests, either (see Kazel v Kazel, 3 NY3d 331 [2004]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295 [2002]).

Inasmuch as the remand was for purely ministerial action, the determination is appealable as of right (see Matter of Mid-Is. Hosp. v Wyman, 15 NY2d 374 [1965]; compare Matter of Leung v Department of Motor Vehs. of State of N.Y., 65 AD2d 736 [1978]). Concur—Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Friedman, Marlow and Nardelli, JJ.