Thompson v. Steuben Realty Corp., 18 A.D.3d 864 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). · Go Syfert
Thompson v. Steuben Realty Corp., 18 A.D.3d 864 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
21 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Roldan (nyappdiv, 2011-01-11)
Treatment trajectory · 2005 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2005 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Roldan
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
To successfully oppose a motion for leave to enter a default judgment based on the failure to timely serve an answer, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see May v Hartsdale Manor Owners Corp., 73 AD3d 713 [2010]; Kouzios v Dery, 57 AD3d 949 [2008]; Giovanelli v Rivera, 23 AD3d 616 [2005]; Mjahdi v Maguire, 21 AD3d 1067, 1068 [2005]; Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 864, 865 [2005]; Dinstber v Fludd, 2 AD3d 670, 671 [2003]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) May v. Hartsdale Manor Owners Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
To successfully oppose a motion for leave to enter a default judgment based on the failure to timely serve an answer, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its delay and the existence of a meritorious defense (see Kouzios v Dery, 57 AD3d 949 [2008]; Giovanelli v Rivera, 23 AD3d 616 [2005]; Mjahdi v Maguire, 21 AD3d 1067, 1068 [2005]; Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 864, 865 [2005]; Dinstber v Fludd, 2 AD3d 670, 671 [2003]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kouzios v. Dery
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
To successfully oppose the plaintiffs’ motion, the defendant was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default and the existence of a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Giovanelli v Rivera, 23 AD3d 616 [2005]; Mjahdi v Maguire, 21 AD3d 1067, 1068 [2005]; Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 864, 865 [2005]; Dinstber v Fludd, 2 AD3d 670, 671 [2003]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baldwin v. Mateogarcia
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
To successfully oppose a motion for leave to enter a default judgment based upon a failure to appear or timely serve an answer, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay and the existence of a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Miller v Ateres Shlomo, LLC, 49 AD3d 612 [2008]; Giovanelli v Rivera, 23 AD3d 616 [2005]; Mjahdi v Maguire, 21 AD3d 1067 [2005]; Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 864, 865 [2005]; Dinstber v Fludd, 2 AD3d 670, 671 [2003]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aquilar v. Nassau Health Care Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Although it is generally within the sound discretion of the court to determine what constitutes a reasonable excuse (see Pristavec v Galligan, supra), reversal is warranted if that discretion is improvidently exercised (see Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 864, 865 [2005]; Orwell Bldg.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rosario v. Beverly Road Realty Co.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Furthermore, in light of the disclaimer letters from the appellants’ insurance carriers, the appellants failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their delay of about six years in seeking to interpose an answer (see Ramirez v Rao, 23 AD3d 447 [2005]; Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 864, 865 [2005]; Robinson v 1068 Flatbush Realty, Inc., 10 AD3d 716, 716-717 [2004] ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Newton v. Nutty Irishman (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
To successfully oppose the plaintiffs motion for leave to enter a default judgment against it based on its failure to answer, the defendant was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious defense (see Platinum RX, LLC v Pose, 31 AD3d 522 [2006]; Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 864, 864-865 [2005]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buywise Holding, LLC v. Harris
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
The defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default and the existence of a meritorious defense (see CPLR 3215; Giovanelli v Rivera, 23 AD3d 616 [2005]; Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 864, 865 [2005]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Platinum RX, LLC v. Pose
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
Holzberg (hereinafter the defendants), were required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default and a meritorious defense (see Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 864, 864-865 [2005]; Freulich-Woodruff v B.A.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ramirez v. Rao
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
In light of, inter alia, the disclaimer letter of Allstate Insurance Company dated June 14, 2002, and the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to enter judgment against the defendants upon their default in appearing or answering, the defendants failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their delay of more than one year in seeking to interpose an answer (see Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 18 AD3d 864, 865 [2005]; Robinson v 1068 Flatbush Realty, Inc., 10 AD3d 716, 716-717 [2004]; compare Seccombe v Serafina Rest.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Torianne Thompson
v.
Steuben Realty Corp.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
May 31, 2005.
18 A.D.3d 864
2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5852
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, Steuben Realty Corp., Joseph Broch Realty, also known as JBR Realty, and JBR Realty Management Corp. appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (M. Carson, J.), dated December 3, 2004, as granted the plaintiffs motion for leave to enter judgment against them upon their failure to appear or answer the complaint, and denied their cross motion to vacate their default.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

To successfully oppose the plaintiffs motion for leave to enter[*865] judgment against them upon their failure to appear or answer the complaint, the appellants were required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default in answering and a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Dinstber v Fludd, 2 AD3d 670, 671 [2003]; Siu Lung Cheng v Leader Jewelry Corp., 246 AD2d 526 [1998]; Albano v Nus Holding Corp., 233 AD2d 280, 281 [1996]). Generally, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the court; however, reversal is warranted where the court improvidently exercises that discretion (see Levy Williams Constr. Corp. v United States Fire Ins. Co., 280 AD2d 650, 651 [2001]). In making its determination, the court should consider relevant factors such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits (see Orwell Bldg. Corp. v Bessaha, 5 AD3d 573, 574 [2004]). Contrary to the appellants’ contention, they failed to present a reasonable excuse for their delay in answering after the insurance carrier disclaimed coverage on or about January 23, 2004. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs motion and in denying the appellants’ cross motion to vacate their default (see Robinson v 1068 Flatbush Realty, Inc., 10 AD3d 716, 716-717 [2004]; compare Seccombe v Serafina Rest. Corp., 2 AD3d 516 [2003]; Perez v Linshar Realty Corp., 259 AD2d 532, 533 [1999]; Fire Is. Pines v Colonial Dormer Corp., 109 AD2d 815, 816 [1985]). H. Miller, J.P., S. Miller, Goldstein, Mastro and Lifson, JJ., concur.