Patel v. Exxon Corp., 43 A.D.3d 1323 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). · Go Syfert
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Patel v. Exxon Corp., 43 A.D.3d 1323 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
5 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: One Flint St., LLC v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (nyappdiv, 2013-12-27)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) One Flint St., LLC v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
We conclude that plaintiffs established their entitlement to a determination that defendants are contributing “dischargers” pursuant to Navigation Law § 172 (8) and thus are strictly liable under section 181 (1) for, inter alia, the cleanup and removal costs (see State of New York v Green, 96 NY2d 403, 406 [2001]; Patel v Exxon Corp., 43 AD3d 1323, 1323-1324 [2007]), despite the fact that the parcels subsequently were the sites for various commercial operations that also may have contributed to the contamination of the properties, including a scrap yard.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) One Flint St., LLC v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
We conclude that plaintiffs established their entitlement to a determination that defendants are contributing “dischargers” pursuant to Navigation Law § 172 (8) and thus are strictly liable under section 181 (1) for, inter alia, the cleanup and removal costs (see State of New York v Green, 96 NY2d 403, 406 [2001]; Patel v Exxon Corp., 43 AD3d 1323, 1323-1324 [2007]), despite the fact that the parcels subsequently were the sites for various commercial operations that also may have contributed to the contamination of the properties, including a scrap yard.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 1093 Group, LLC v. Canale
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
In support of its cross motion, plaintiff had the initial burden of establishing that defendant “ ‘actually caused or contributed to such damage’ and thus is liable as a ‘discharger’ pursuant to Navigation Law § 181 (1)” (Patel v Exxon Corp., 43 AD3d 1323, 1323 [2007]; see Tifft v Bigelow’s Oil Serv., Inc., 70 AD3d 1248, 1249 [2010]; Kramer v Oil Servs., Inc., 56 AD3d 730 , 731 [2008]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tifft v. Bigelow's Oil Service, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Thus, defendants have failed to raise a triable issue of fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment in plaintiffs favor adjudging defendants strictly liable under Navigation Law § 181 (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d at 562 ; Nudi v Schmidt, 63 AD3d 1474, 1477 [2009]; Patel v Exxon Corp., 43 AD3d 1323, 1324 [2007]; State v Passalacqua, 19 AD3d at 789 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ghanshyam K. Patel
v.
Exxon Corporation, as Successor in Interest to Esso Standard Oil Company
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Sep 28, 2007.
43 A.D.3d 1323
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John F. O’Donnell, J.), entered March 21, 2006. The order granted plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied the cross motion of defendant Exxon Corporation, as successor in interest to Esso Standard Oil Company, Humble Oil and Refining Company, and The Humble Companies Charitable Trust, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed with costs.

Memorandum: Supreme Court properly granted the motion of plaintiffs seeking partial summary judgment on liability on their indemnification cause of action against defendant Exxon Corporation (Exxon) and denied the cross motion of Exxon seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it. In their indemnification cause of action, plaintiffs seek recovery of remediation costs related to the cleanup of petroleum contamination on their property (see Patel v Exxon Corp., 11 AD3d 916 [2004]; see generally Starnella v Heat, 14 AD3d 694 [2005]). Contrary to Exxon’s contention, plaintiffs met their initial burden by establishing that Exxon “actually caused or contributed to such damage” and thus is liable as a “discharger” pursuant to Navigation Law § 181 (1) (White v Long, 85 NY2d 564, 569 [1995]; see State of New York v Passalacqua, 19 AD3d 786,

[*1324] 788-789 [2005]). Exxon’s speculation that others may have also contributed to the discharge is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact to defeat plaintiffs’ motion (see Passalacqua, 19 AD3d at 789). Present—Scudder, P.J., Martoche, Lunn, Peradotto and Green, JJ.