Bayo v. Burnside Mews Assocs., 45 A.D.3d 495 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). · Go Syfert
Bayo v. Burnside Mews Assocs., 45 A.D.3d 495 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim ⚠ not in text
14 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Wally G. v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (Metropolitan Hospital) (nyappdiv, 2014-09-18)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wally G. v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (Metropolitan Hospital) (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Although a court is not precluded from examining whether infancy caused the delay in serving the notice, the Court in Williams noted that the "Legislature deleted the causation language" in GML § 50-e(5) and added the simple fact of infancy as one of the considerations that should be considered ( Williams , 6 NY3d at 538 ; see also Bayo v Burnside Mews Assoc. , 45 AD3d 495, 495 [1st Dept 2007] [where the record demonstrates that the defendant's possession of the medical records provided actual notice of the facts constituting a claim of medical malpractice, the infant plaintiff should not be …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Plaza v. New York Health & Hospitals Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Auth., 72 AD3d 595, 596 [2010]; see also Bayo v Burnside Mews Assoc., 45 AD3d 495, 495 [2007] [“Although the stated ignorance of the law by infant plaintiff’s mother is not a reasonable excuse . . . , infant plaintiff should not be deprived of a remedy, where, as here, the record evidence demonstrates that [defendants’] possession of the medical records sufficiently constituted actual notice of the pertinent facts, and that they would not be substantially prejudiced by the delay”]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Plaza v. New York Health & Hospitals Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Auth., 72 AD3d 595, 596 [2010]; see also Bayo v Burnside Mews Assoc., 45 AD3d 495, 495 [2007] [“Although the stated ignorance of the law by infant plaintiff’s mother is not a reasonable excuse . . . , infant plaintiff should not be deprived of a remedy, where, as here, the record evidence demonstrates that [defendants’] possession of the medical records sufficiently constituted actual notice of the pertinent facts, and that they would not be substantially prejudiced by the delay”]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ansumana Bayo
v.
Burnside Mews Associates, and Kay Talya Gubbay, M.D.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Nov 29, 2007.
45 A.D.3d 495
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Douglas E. McKeon, J.), entered December 27, 2005, which granted plaintiffs’ motion for an order deeming the notice of claim timely served upon defendants-appellants, and denied appellants’ cross motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to file a timely notice of claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court providently exercised its discretion in deeming the notice of claim timely served upon appellants (General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]). Although the stated ignorance of the law by infant plaintiff s mother is not a reasonable excuse for the failure to have served a timely notice of claim (see Harris v City of New York, 297 AD2d 473 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 503 [2002]), infant plaintiff should not be deprived of a remedy, where, as here, the record "evidence demonstrates that appellants’ possession of the medical records sufficiently constituted actual notice of the pertinent facts, and that they would not be substantially prejudiced by the delay (see De La Cruz v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 13 AD3d 130 [2004]). Plaintiffs submitted affirmations from a physician establishing that the medical records, on their face, evinced that appellants failed to provide infant plaintiff with preventive care against lead poisoning (compare Williams v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 537 [2006]), and appellants’ argument that the delay would prejudice them in defending the action because of the inability to reconstruct events and conversations is unconvincing (Moody v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. [Renaissance Health Care [*496] Network], 29 AD3d 395 [2006]; Matter of McMillan v City of New York, 279 AD2d 280 [2001]). Concur—Lippman, P.J., Nardelli, Buckley, Gonzalez and Sweeny, JJ.