At page 284 While the trial court dismissed plaintiff Han Soo Lee’s claim for lost wages on other grounds, it misrepresented the law when it suggested to the jury that…3 citing cases
- Maliqi v. 17 East 89th Street Tenants, Inc., 25 Misc. 3d 182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).publishedTo allow a jury to believe otherwise is error and will cause undue prejudice to plaintiff (see Han Soo Lee v Riverhead Bay Motors at 284).
- Angamarca v. New York City P'ship Hous. Dev. Fund, Inc., 87 A.D.3d 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2011).publishedIn that case, the Court of Appeals was confronted with the narrow question of whether an undocumented alien who was prohibited from working in the United States under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (8 USC § 1324a et seq. [IRCA]) co…
- Moctezuma v. New York City Tr. Auth., 2023 NY Slip Op 06445 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2023).published The award of damages for future medical expenses was supported by the testimony of plaintiff's treating physician, and the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in permitting him to testify as to the need for future sur…
v.
Riverhead Bay Motors, and Riverhead Pooh, L.L.C.
[*284] While the trial court dismissed plaintiff Han Soo Lee’s claim for lost wages on other grounds, it misrepresented the law when it suggested to the jury that plaintiff was precluded from recovering lost wages because of his immigration status (see Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC, 6 NY3d 338, 362 [2006]). The court erred in failing to provide a curative instruction explaining that working in the United States without the proper documentation is neither a crime pursuant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (8 USC § 1324a et seq.) (see Balbuena at 361) nor a bar to the recovery of damages in a civil action for personal injuries, and this error caused undue prejudice to plaintiff.
The court improperly precluded the testimony of plaintiffs treating orthopedic surgeon as to his need for future back surgery. The requirement of future back surgery was set forth in expert disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d), which included two of the surgeon’s reports and the surgeon’s explanation that he was trying less invasive treatments before resorting to surgery (see McGee v Family Care Servs., 246 AD2d 308 [1998]).
Similarly, the court improperly precluded the testimony of another treating orthopedic surgeon as to plaintiff’s need for future hip replacement surgery. The need for future hip surgery was raised in plaintiffs bill of particulars, which stated that plaintiff developed post-traumatic degenerative arthritis of the hip and would require a hip replacement in the future (see Holshek v Stokes, 122 AD2d 777, 778-779 [1986]). The surgeon should have been permitted to testify also as to the permanency of plaintiffs pain, his limp, and his future need of a cane. The court also improperly precluded the testimony of plaintiff’s treating physiatrist, a doctor of osteopathy, as to plaintiffs need for future physical therapy, on the ground that he was not a medical doctor (see Escobar v Allen, 5 AD3d 242 [2004]).
[*285] The court properly precluded plaintiffs expert economist from testifying, as plaintiff failed to provide a proper foundation for the expert’s testimony (see DelValle v White Castle Sys., 277 AD2d 13 [2000]).
Plaintiffs do not appeal from that portion of the judgment that awarded $100,000 for past loss of services and $126,000 for past medical expenses.
We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Sweeny and Moskowitz, JJ.