In re Liston J., 81 A.D.3d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). · Go Syfert
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In re Liston J., 81 A.D.3d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
22 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Matter of Daughtry v. Jacobs (nyappdiv, 2017-11-22)
Treatment trajectory · 2012 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Daughtry v. Jacobs
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
In order to obtain an upward modification of the father’s support obligation as set forth in the order on consent, the mother was required to show a substantial change in circumstances since the issuance of that order (see Matter of Morgan v Spence, 139 AD3d 859, 861 [2016]; Matter of Kay v Desantis, 114 AD3d 947, 947-948 [2014]; Matter of Rabasco v Lamar, 106 AD3d 1095, 1096 [2013]; Matter of Braun v Abenanti, 103 AD3d 717, 719 [2013]; Matter of Anderson v Anderson, 92 AD3d 779, 780 [2012]; Matter of Ceballos v Castillo, 85 AD3d 1161, 1162 [2011]; Matter of Ish-Shalom v Wittmann, 81 AD3d 64…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Kolodny v. Perlman
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
Contrary to the father’s contention, he failed to establish that his financial situation had deteriorated between the issuance of the judgment of divorce and the time he filed his modification petition (see Matter of Ish-Shalom v Wittmann, 81 AD3d 648, 648 [2011]), or a substantial improvement in the mother’s financial condition warranting a reduction in child support (see Matter of Nieves-Ford v Gordon, 47 AD3d at 937 ; Carr v Carr, 187 AD2d 407, 408 [1992]). *821 However, the father’s petition for a downward modification of his child support obligation should not have been, in effect, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Jonathan M.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Other relevant factors include, but are not necessarily limited to, a respondent’s history of drug or alcohol use (see Matter of Teriyana A. Mc., 100 AD3d at 902), a respondent’s association with gang activity (see id.), a respondent’s academic and school attendance record (see Matter of Liston J., 81 AD3d 648, 649 [2011]), the nature of the underlying incident (see Matter of Uriah D., 74 AD3d 1194, 1195 [2010]), a respondent’s decision to accept responsibility for his or her actions (see Matter of Liston J., 81 AD3d at 649 ), any recommendations made in a probation or mental health re…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Jonathan M.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Other relevant factors include, but are not necessarily limited to, a respondent’s history of drug or alcohol use (see Matter of Teriyana A. Mc., 100 AD3d at 902), a respondent’s association with gang activity (see id.), a respondent’s academic and school attendance record (see Matter of Liston J., 81 AD3d 648, 649 [2011]), the nature of the underlying incident (see Matter of Uriah D., 74 AD3d 1194, 1195 [2010]), a respondent’s decision to accept responsibility for his or her actions (see Matter of Liston J., 81 AD3d at 649 ), any recommendations made in a probation or mental health re…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Ashanti D. (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
The appellant was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because she had no previous encounters with the law, or in light of the other mitigating circumstances that she cites (see Matter of Liston J., 81 AD3d 648, 648 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Ashanti D. (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
The appellant was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because she had no previous encounters with the law, or in light of the other mitigating circumstances that she cites (see Matter of Liston J., 81 AD3d 648, 648 [2011]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Natasha G.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
The appellant was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was her first encounter with the law, or in light of the other mitigating circumstances that she cites (see Matter of Liston J., 81 AD3d 648, 648 [2011]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Liston J.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Feb 1, 2011.
81 A.D.3d 648
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

[*649] In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Liston J. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), dated February 3, 2010, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated November 24, 2009, made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree, and after a dispositional hearing, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and, inter alia, placed him on probation for a period of 18 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated November 24, 2009.

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the Family Court has broad discretion in determining the proper disposition (see Matter of Ashley P., 74 AD3d 1075, 1076 [2010]). Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining to adjourn the proceeding in contemplation of dismissal (see Family Ct Act § 315.3). The Family Court properly adjudged the appellant to be a juvenile delinquent (see Family Ct Act § 352.1) and, inter alia, placed him on probation for a period of 18 months (see Family Ct Act § 352.2 [1] [b]). The appellant was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was his first encounter with the law or in light of the other mitigating circumstances that he cites (see Matter of Uriah D., 74 AD3d 1194 [2010]; Matter of Nikita P., 3 AD3d 499, 501 [2004]; Matter of Steven R., 230 AD2d 745 [1996]). Rather, the Family Court’s disposition was appropriate in light of the violent nature of the incident, the appellant’s poor academic and school attendance record, his school disciplinary record, which included five suspensions, his failure to take responsibility for his actions, and the recommendation in the probation report (see Matter of Uriah D., 74 AD3d 1194 [2010]; Matter of Melissa B., 49 AD3d 536, 537 [2008]; Matter of Leah G., 23 AD3d 658 [2005]; Matter of Gerald W., 12 AD3d 522, 523 [2004]; Matter of Nikita P., 3 AD3d at 500-501).

The appellant’s remaining contention is without merit. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Belen and Austin, JJ., concur.